3 Ib. vi. 401 ; Clarke Papers, in. 115. 4 ' Whitehall : 10 Aug. Last night came news that some of our ships, more foul than the rest, were returning home, together with General Blake himself, from the coast of Spain, he being sick nigh unto death. * This morning came the unwelcome news of the death of that gallant general ; a man of great honor, that had wholly devoted himself to the service 266 LAST YEARS OF THE PROTECTORATE was mindful of the welfare of the men who served under him, and on the night before he died he called Rear-Admiral Bourne and other captains round him, and charged them to represent to the government the necessities of the ships left behind at Cadiz. ' As he had lived/ wrote one of his captains, ' so he continued to the end, faithful. The Lord grant that a supply of his great loss maybe made up for the good of his people/1 All felt that he could not be replaced. ' I am sorry/ wrote the stolid Monck, ' to hear the ill news of the death of my old friend General Blake, and doubt his Highness will find a want of him/ 2 The government gave Blake the public funeral which befitted his ser- vices, as it had done to Admiral Deane, killed fighting the Dutch in 1653. Blake's body was embalmed and lay in state for some days at Greenwich House. It was then borne by water to Westminster, with a train of barges following it and with minute guns firing from the Tower. Finally it was interred in Westminster Abbey, to the sound of volleys of musketry from all the regiments in London.3 His body rested there till of his country, and who gave many proofs of an extraordinary courage and conduct, in actions both by sea and land. He hath been a long time decaying, and in his return being come to the Lizzard Point, finding himself to fail, he called several of the commanders of the other ships aboard his own, to confer with them ; afterwards, drawing on towards his last, he willed them to bear up with all speed for Plimouth, hoping to have reached land before his death ; but in the very entrance into the Sound of Plijnouth he expired. His body being imbowelled, and closed in a sheet of lead, the bowels were interred there in the cathedral church, and his corps were (sic) sent along with the ships toward the Downs. The fleet remains still upon the Spanish coast.' — Mercurius Politicus, No. 375, August 6-13, 1657, p. 7988. 1 Gal. State Papers Dora., 1657-8, p. 57. 2 Thurloe, vi 467. 3 Clarke Papers, iii. 118. Blake's body was brought to Greenwich on August 19. The funeral took place upon September 4, and was described at length in the newspapers. The cost of it amounted to ^550 (Gal. State Papers Dom., 1657-8, pp. 60, 68, 179). An elegy on Blake's death was printed at the time, written ' by George Harrison, gent, on board the Dunbar in the Downs ' (Naval Songs and Ballads, ed. by C. H. Firth, 1908, p. 48). A long poem on his life and actions is to be found in Poems on Affairs of State, pp. 274-90. FATE OF BLAKE'S BODY 267 the Restoration. On September 9, 1661, Charles II issued a warrant for its disinterment, and Deane's body ^ shared the same fate. Both were taken up and flung into a pit somewhere in the green on the north side of the Abbey, between the north transept and the west end.1 At the same time as Blake — perhaps on the same day — died another of the naval heroes of the Common- wealth, Blake's comrade in arms, Vice- Admiral Richard Badiley.2 As faithful as Deane or Blake in his service to the state, he had earned less conspicuous rewards, and escaped public honour and public shame. 1 The warrant is printed in Chester's Westminster Abbey Registers, p. 521 ; see also Stanley, Westminster Abbey, ed. 1886, p. 209 ; Rennet's Register, p. 534. ' Reinterred in a pit dug at the back door of one of the two prebendal houses in St. Margaret's churchyard which then blocked up the north side of the Abbey.' 2 Mercurius Politicus for August 6-13 announces the death of both. Under August ii it says : * This day we had an account also touching the death of Vice- Admiral Badiley, who hath been some time absent from sea, by reason of indisposition of body ; and of late going to the waters in hope of recovering health, he decayed more and more, and hath exchanged this life for a better.' Mr. T. A. Spalding, in his Life and Times of Richard Badiley, gives August 7 as the date of his death. CHAPTER IX THE CAMPAIGN IN FLANDERS CHAP. IN the same month of May, 1657, in which Cromwell vJ^L/ refused the crown (May 8) the contingent which the 1656-7 protector sent to the assistance of Louis XIV against Spain landed in Flanders. During the troubles of the Fronde France had lost the conquests which she had previously made in Flanders, and was now painfully and slowly winning them back. In 1656 negotiations for a peace between France and Spain had been commenced ; but they definitely failed, as France refused to restore the Prince of Conde to the estates and offices he had forfeited by his rebellion. During this negotiation warlike operations had not been intermitted in the Low Countries, but the fortune of war seemed to have turned against France. In July, 1656, the Spaniards defeated the French army which was besieging Valenciennes ; in August the fortress of Conde fell into the hands of the Spaniards. Mazarin, unable to conclude a satisfactory peace with Spain, and worsted in the campaign, needed an ally, and the only ally who offered himself was the Pro- tector. Much against his will he was obliged to promise the cession of Dunkirk in return for English aid ; and Lockhart, Cromwell's ambassador, came to an understanding with Mazarin on the subject in November, 1656. l The terms of the treaty were not 1 Gardiner, iii. 484 ; Cheruel, iii. 9-36. TREATY WITH FRANCE 269 definitely settled until March, 1657. There were various CHAP difficulties in the way on both sides. The Protector, ^J^ whilst willing to assist the French with ships as the I657 price of Dunkirk, demurred for some time to the demand that he should supply a contingent for service on land.1 When Cromwell had agreed in principle to the supply of a land force, the French government on military grounds refused to begin by attacking Dun- kirk. Turenne urged that Gravelines must be taken first, and adduced sound strategic reasons for defeating the Spanish field army before beginning the siege of any seaport.3 Besides this there were differences as to the scope of the intended alliance. The Protector con- tinually returned to the plan of a general confederation. Thurloe proposed a league between France, England, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Provinces, appar- ently to attack the House of Austria. Mazarin wisely pointed out in reply that Holland was little inclined to any such league, and visibly favoured Spain against Cromwell. He succeeded in the end in keeping the Protector to the point and restricting the treaty to a simple alliance between England and France against Spain.3 The treaty was signed on March ^, 1657.* Its preamble recited that the late negotiations, conducted by Lionne, had conclusively proved that Spain, by rejecting the honourable and advantageous conditions 1 Thurloe, v. 574, 585 ; Guizot, Cromwell and the English Commonwealth, ed. 1854, ii. 556. 2 Thurloe, vi. 21, 32. 3 Cheruel, iii. 35-40 ; Lettres de Mazarin, vii. 434. See also Bourelly, Cromwell et Mazarin : Deux Campagnes de Turenne en Flandres, 1886, p. 1-2. 4 The Latin text of the treaty is printed by Guizot, ii. 562. For com- ments, see Cheruel, iii. 52-8 ; and for Lockhart's explanations, Thurloe, vi. 270 LAST YEARS OF THE PROTECTORATE CHAP, offered, intended to keep Christendom in a perpetual ^v— ' state of discord, and must be brought to more moderate 657 counsels by force of arms. In April, therefore, Eng- land and France were to make a joint attack on the fortresses of Gravelines, Mardyke, and Dunkirk, by sea and land. England was to provide a fleet of ships, great and small, for blockading those ports and assisting in their siege. France was to supply 20,000 men, horse and foot, for the land operations. In addition to this, England was to furnish 6000 infantry for the said sieges, being six regiments of 1000 men each. Half of them were to be pikemen, half musketeers, and all were to be Englishmen without any admixture of Scots or Irish.1 Three thousand of these auxiliaries were to be raised and transported at the expense of France ; the other 3000 at the expense of the Protector. During their service all the 6000 were to be paid and fed by France. Next came some stipulations about the division of the spoils. Dunkirk and Mardyke were to fall to the share of England, Gravelines to go to France. But in case Gravelines should be captured first it was to be handed over to the Protector until he obtained posses- sion of Dunkirk. The Protector was to garrison the conquered towns with his own forces, but half the 6000 auxiliaries were to serve the King of France as long as he wished to make use of them. The English contingent, however, was to be always regarded as a separate corps under the command of its own general. Article eleven of the treaty was of some political 1 Scots and Irish were excluded as likely to desert to Charles II, and not to be trusted to fight against the ally of the House of Stuart. As a rule an English regiment was composed two-thirds of musketeers apd one-third of pikemen, but the French army was weak in pikes, and the Spanish pikemen were renowned for their steadiness and skill. Hence, no doubt, this stipulation, TERMS OF THE TREATY 271 interest. It bound the Protector to preserve the free CHAr- exercise of the Catholic religion in any Flemish towns ^-' which came into his power. In Dunkirk, Mardyke, and Gravelines, * he shall leave all things so far as concerns the Catholic religion in the same state in which he finds them, and he shall maintain the ecclesiastics, either regular or secular, in the enjoyment of their revenues and the possession of their churches/ l Besides this a secret article of considerable im- portance was appended to the treaty. For a whole year from March 23, 1657, France and England engaged to conclude no truce or treaty with Spain save by mutual consent. All propositions which one of the allies might receive from Spain were to be communicated to the other, and in case the King of Spain at the per- suasion of the Pope or the Venetian republic should consent to the meeting of a conference to treat of a general peace, English plenipotentiaries should be invited and empowered to take part in it. Both the King of France and the Protector promptly ratified the treaty, but its execution was retarded by numerous difficulties. The campaign should have begun in April with the siege of Gravelines and Dunkirk, but neither the French nor English were ready. Lockhart had warned his government to raise troops and name officers, and make other preparations without waiting for the formal conclusion of the treaty, but his advice was not followed.3 Consequently the Spaniards were in the field first. They besieged the small fortress of St. Ghislain, which, thanks to the revolt of the Irish troops amongst its garrison, fell into their hands on March 23, i657.3 1 Guizot, ii. 566. The Latin original is quoted on p. 211, vol. ii. post. 2 Chemel, iii. 58 ; Bourelly, pp. 7, n, 12 ; Thurloe, vi. 87, 108. 3 Carte, Life of Ormond, iii. 657 ; Clarendon, Rebellion, xv. 80. 272 LAST YEAKS OF THE PKOTECTORATE CHAP. Turenne by the beginning of May had 24,000 men under ^ — ' his command on the borders of Picardy, but it was already too late. The Spaniards, informed of the terms of the treaty, had thrown 2000 picked infantry into Dunkirk, and as many more into Gravelines, while a mobile force of 4000 under the Prince de Ligne was ready to succour whichever of those places the French might attack. Under these conditions an attack on the seaports offered little chance of success ; so Mazarin and Turenne resolved to attack some inland place of importance.1 Cambray, which had a weak garrison of but 400 men, was chosen for this diversion. On May 29 Turenne suddenly appeared before Cambray with his whole army and invested the place. But the Prince of Conde with equal decision made a forced march to its relief, and, breaking through Turenne's lines, threw himself into Cambray with 4000 cavalry.2 Turenne's stroke was thus frustrated ; and, since the capture of the city was now impossible, he raised the siege and retired to St. Quentin. There, on the plateau between Oise, Scheldt, and Somme, he could bar the march of the Spaniards upon Paris, whether they sought to advance by the valley of the Oise or by that of the Somme. In this camp, early in June, the English contingent joined him.3 The 6000 Englishmen sent by the Protector to serve in Flanders were levied and organised in very great haste. About a quarter of their number consisted of soldiers drafted from the standing army in England ; the remainder were volunteers, raised by beat of drum 1 Cheruel, iii. 62, 64. 2 Ib. iii. 58 ; Bourelly, pp. 15-18 ; Thurloe, vi. 304. Mazarin apolo- gised to Lockhart for the attempt on Cambray, saying it would draw the Spanish forces away from the coast (Thurloe, vi. 298 ; cf. Lettres de Mazarin, vii. 493)- 3 Bourelly, p. 18. THE ENGLISH CONTINGENT 273 for this special service, and in many cases must CHAP- have been raw recruits who had never seen service ^—^ , - 1657 before.1 Yet many of these volunteers were doubtless old soldiers. England was full of men who had learnt during the civil war how to handle pike and musket, and were willing to take up their old trade again when opportunity offered. The 6000 men could hardly be described as veterans, but probably at least half of them had seen service before. They were given the red coats worn by the New Model, ' for the terrible name thereof 9 as a contemporary historian tells us, and they were not likely to disgrace their uniform.3 Like the men, the officers were rather a heterogeneous body. Of the six colonels three, Reynolds, Morgan, and Alsop, had served or were serving in the regular army ; two, Clark and Lillingston, had held commands in the Eng- lish regiments in the Dutch service ; and the sixth, Bryce Cochrane, was a soldier of fortune who had served in the Scottish forces in Ireland and under David Leslie in Scotland. Some of their subordinates had been captains or lieutenants in the regular army who were now promoted to higher posts in the new regiments ; but a good many seem to have possessed little experi- ence and to have been chosen with very little care.3 However, the two generals were both carefully selected. For general, the Protector pitched upon Sir John Reynolds, who had fought throughout the civil war as a cavalry officer, and had risen to be Commissary- General of the Horse in Ireland. No doubt the choice fell upon him because he was a man of some political and administrative ability as well as a soldier, and 1 See ' Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders.' Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 1902-3, p. 76. 2 Heath, Chronicle, p. 720. 3 See 'Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders,' pp. 77, 78, in. VOL. i. T 274 LAST YEARS OF THE PROTECTORATE CHAP, qualified both by birth and education for a post which ^J^ involved something more than purely military duties. 1657 The fact that he was Henry Cromwell's brother-in-law seemed a guarantee of his fidelity to the government, whatever temptations the chance of war might bring. Henry Cromwell trusted him completely, had employed him in delicate missions to the Protector and his Council, and regarded him as his right hand in the government of Ireland. Reynolds was reluctant to leave Ireland ; but the Protector's commands were so ' express and positive ' that he finally accepted a commission as April, ( captain - general and commander - in - chief ' of the 2 5 English contingent.1 The second in command was a man of very different character to Reynolds. Major-General Thomas Mor- gan had served in the wars of the Low Countries and in the Thirty Years' War, at one time under the French flag, at another under that of Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar. He had fought for the Parliament throughout the civil war. Sometimes he had commanded a regiment of foot, sometimes a regiment of dragoons, and he was also held to be a skilful artilleryman and very expert in sieges. Morgan had been Monck's chief assistant in the subjugation of Scotland, and there was no one of whose military judgment and trustworthiness Monck had a higher opinion. The little, active, shrill-voiced, choleric man knew his business thoroughly, and played 1 Thurloe, vi. 223, 230, 347. There is a life of Reynolds in the Dictionary of National Biography, xlviii. 47. His commission is as ' captain general and commander in chief,' but at first he was only offered the post of second in command. He wrote to Henry Cromwell on April 14, saying that he regretted to exchange his present post in Ireland ' for the second command of 6000 foot on foreign service, which is the employment now to be conferred upon me, but I have not accepted my commission and do hope it will not be proffered. I have offered to go with the title of Major-General of the said 6000 under your Excellency or the lord Richard, but I am not willing to serve under another nation and a foreigner, or at best a general but half an Englishman.' — Lansdowne MSS. THE CONTINGENT EMBARKS 275 a far more important part in the campaign than his nominal commander.1 The new levied forces were hastily organised, for time pressed and the campaign in Flanders had begun. On May I, 1657, whilst Morgan was still on his way from Scotland, the six regiments were reviewed on Blackheath, ' stout men and fit for action, as was manifest from their appearance/ says a spectator. Hugh Peters preached a sermon to the soldiers, ' exhorting them that when they come abroad they be sure to avoid the vices of other places, and to remember the virtuous and victorious military discipline of England, by which, through God's blessing, so many great actions have been performed at home. This wrought upon the soldiers so that they declared themselves with alacrity resolved to uphold the honour and re- nown of England abroad/ - No time was lost ; 3000 May or 3500 men embarked on the 8th or gth of May and — were landed near Boulogne ; the remainder followed a week later.3 The soldiers of the English contingent were very well satisfied with their reception by their allies. ' We are nobly treated in all places/ says a letter from the camp.4 For the first few days at all events they were well lodged and regaled with wine and beer at each town they came to ; and their only complaint was that the French rate of pay was much lower than that which 1 For a life of Morgan, see Dictionary of National Biography, xxxix. 33. He was summoned from Scotland by Cromwell on April 23, 1657. 2 Mercurius Politicus, April 3o-May 7, p. 7769. See Royalist and Crom- wellian Armies in Flanders, p. 78. 3 According to Mercurius Politicus, 3500 were embarked on May 8 and May 9, the rest on May 16 (ib. pp. 79, 80). See also Clarendon State Papers, iii. 340, and Thurloe, vi. 287, 291. Bourelly, referring to the Letters of Mazarin, gives May 1 8 to 24 (N.S.) as the dates during which the English troops were trans- ported (Lettres de Mazarin, vii. 453, 470-2, 497). 4 See Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, p. 81 ; Thurloe, vi. 297; Clarke Papers, iii. no; and Mercurius Politicus, May 21-28. T 2 16 276 LAST YEARS OF THE PROTECTORATE CHAP, they had been accustomed to get in England.1 — , — ' About the eleventh of June, Reynolds and the Eng- ine lish contingent joined Turenne at St. Quentin.2 At A Bibemont-sur-Oise, on June 16, Louis XIV and Car- dinal Mazarin reviewed the six regiments, and were highly pleased with their appearance.3 ' They are all well-made soldiers and look as if they would do good service/ wrote Mazarin, while Turenne described them as the finest troops that could be seen.4 Immediately after their arrival the French govern- ment, in the hope of inducing the Spaniards to withdraw their forces from the Flemish coast, resolved to attack Montmedy in the duchy of Luxemburg. While Marshal de la Ferte with part of the army laid siege to it, Turenne with another part covered the siege and protected the French frontier from attack. The siege began on June n, lasted a couple of months, and ended on August 7.5 During these two months the English contingent formed part of the covering army under Turenne, was part of the time stationed at Guise, and was generally under the immediate command of the Marquis de Gastelnau. When Montmedy fell, Turenne turned his course westwards, and made a sudden attack 1 On the question of pay, see Clarke, Papers, iii. no, and Thurloe, vi. 287, 290, 297. Half of the 6000 were to have been armed by the French govern- ment, but this stipulation was very imperfectly carried out. However, the Cardinal provided eighty tents for the officers, and a couple of wagons for the baggage of every regiment (ib. 290, 297, 301). 2 Their march is traced by Bourelly, p. 18, note i. Cf. Lettres de Mazarin, vii. 482, 488, 500. 3 Ribblemont, Lockhart terms it (Thurloe, vi. 337). See Bourelly, p. 21. Mercurius Politicus, June 18-25, ?• 7874, gives a description of the review, and says it took place on June 6. At Tupigny, on June 8, says Bussy-Rabutin, Memoires, ii. 30. 4 Bourelly, p. 22 ; Lettres de Mazarin, vii. 475, 507. Mazarin also praised their good behaviour, and hoped the King's troops would take example by it (ib. vii. 488, 5i4» 73i). 5 Bourelly, pp. 19-26 ; cf. Thurloe, vi. 351, 383, 385, 397, 423-6 ; Mer- curiu* Politicus, pp. 7907, 7916, 7926, 7969, 7978, 7985. ..,. , BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN 277 on St. Venant, which surrendered after a ten days' CHAP- investment.1 All these operations received little hind- ^ ranee from the Spaniards. Don Juan and Conde marched to raise the siege of Montmedy, but avoided giving battle ; and an attempt to surprise Calais, in the hope of inducing the French to abandon the attempt on Montmedy, failed. In the same way, when Turenne besieged St. Venant, the Spaniards responded by a sudden attack upon Ardres, and would have succeeded in taking the place, which was but weakly garrisoned, had not the fall of St. Venant enabled Turenne to march to its relief. August In these operations the English troops and their ^ leader justified the good opinion which Turenne and Mazarin had expressed of them. The English officers were somewhat surprised by the strategy of the Spanish and French leaders. The elaborate manoeuvring for strategic positions, the time spent in the sieges of un- important fortresses, the deliberate avoidance of battle on the part of the Spaniards, and the fact that the French made no attempt to bring about a general en- gagement, seemed strange to soldiers bred in the school of Fairfax and Cromwell. ' Fighting/ said Reynolds contemptuously in one of his letters, ' is not the fashion of the country/ 2 When Don Juan and the Spanish army came to the relief of St. Venant, and established themselves at Calonne on the Lys, about a mile from the besieged town, Reynolds urged Turenne to attack. If he would let him have but 2000 French horse, said Reynolds, he would with them and his 6000 English foot fall upon the Spanish camp ; ' thinking that number of horse sufficient in that enclosed country, and 1 See Mercurius Politicals, August 27-September 3, and Thurloe, vi. 462, 467, 479. 2 September i, 1657 J Reynolds to H. Cromwell. Lansdowne MS8. 278 LAST YEARS OF THE PROTECTORATE CHAP, relying on the bravery of his English foot who had been ^ > — ' accustomed to hedge fighting to supply their want 7 of numbers/ But Turenne thought the undertaking too desperate and refused his consent.1 Nevertheless, during the course of the siege, the English infantry found opportunity to show their quality ; and the desperate courage with which 600 of them stormed the outworks of St. Venant not only gained them great praise, but, by hastening the surrender of the town, enabled Turenne to march to the relief of Ardres. ' I rejoice to tell your lordship/ wrote Lockhart to Thurloe, ' that the taking of St. Venant and the raising of the siege of Ardres, is wholly imputed to the good service of our English forces, of whom there is so high an esteem as is scarcely credible/ 3 In other respects the French generals found the English soldiers less satisfactory. They behaved much better in the towns and villages in which they were quartered than the French soldiers did.3 On the other hand, they were somewhat exacting, and inclined to mutiny when they were not paid with due regularity. At this same siege of St. Venant, Turenne, in order to appease them, was forced to cut up his own plate and distribute it amongst them by weight in place of coin.4 The brown bread, composed largely of rye and bran, upon which the French soldier was fed, was distasteful to men accustomed to a liberal 1 Life of James II, i. 305, 309. 2 Thurloe, vi. 487. There are three accounts of the exploit of the English at St. Venant : Clarke Papers, iii. 116 ; Harleian Miscellany, iii. 342 (' A Relation of Major-General Sir Thomas Morgan's Progress in Flanders'); Mercurius Politicus, August 27-September 3, 1657, pp. 1590, 1597. French narratives do not seem to mention it. 3 Thurloe, vi. 337. 4 Bourelly, p. 27 ; Cheruel, iii. 70. Lockhart says, speaking of the delay to pay the money : ' The forces endured much hardship before it came, though M. Turenne had the kindness to cut his plate, and give it out by weight to them.' Thurloe, vi 487 ; Lettres de Mazarin, viii. 46, HI, 132. DECREASE OF THE CONTINGENT 279 allowance of cheese and biscuit. They relied upon the CHAP. five sous a day, which the French government was -J^ pledged to pay them, to supplement their rations with more palatable and familiar food ; and when they did not get their money, not only grumbled, but fell ill. ' Since our coming into France/ wrote Major-General Morgan August to General Monck, after the relief of Ardres, ' we have ^ had many hard marches, and being run in arrear of pay for six weeks together, our men being forced to subsist only with their ammunition-bread, water, and fruit, it hath brought them into a great weakness and much dis- couraged them, insomuch that they make all the shifts they can to get into England, notwithstanding we take all the care possible/ ! Sickness and desertion rapidly reduced the number of the English contingent. At the beginning of September, Sir John Reynolds wrote to Henry Cromwell, pressing to be recalled from Flanders, and saying that his 6000 men were now less than 4000. ' Howsoever/ he added figura- tively, ' if I must fight on until my dagger, which was a sword, become an oyster knife, I am content and submit/ 3 The Protector was not content to see his troops spent in marches and sieges far away from the ports against which he meant them to be employed. He refused to accept the reasons by which Mazarin and Turenne proved the necessity of the operations in 1 Clarke Papers, iii. 116. ' We find a great want of cheese, which I hope will be supplied, bread and water being strange to our soldiers,' says another officer. Ib. iii. in ; cf. Guizot, ii. 575. See Cromwell's Army, pp. 212, 225, for additional information on the question of provisions. The desertions were numerous, and sufficient care was not taken in England to arrest those who returned home. A certain number of men deserted to the Spaniards and swelled the regiments under the command of the Duke of York. Thurloe, vi- 480 ; Clarendon State Papers, iii. 344, 407 ; Clarke MSS., xxxix. no. 2 Reynolds to Henry Cromwell, September i, 1657. Lansdottme MSS- Guizot, ii. 577. See also Lettres de Mazarin, viii. 149, 151, 161, IX —^v 1657 280 LAST YEARS OF THE PROTECTORATE CHAP, the interior of Flanders and the impossibility of attack- ing Dunkirk or Gravelines.1 Lockhart represented his master's views to the Cardinal with great persistency. As soon as he heard of the siege of Cambray he protested against it. While thanking the Cardinal for the unusual favours granted the English troops, he told him that the good usage of his soldiers was not all that his Highness expected ; and that un- less the more material part of the treaty were kept, the Protector's service would require their presence elsewhere.3 During the siege of Montmedy, Lockhart renewed his remonstrances. He pointed out to the Cardinal ' the ill consequences that were like to follow upon their delays/ and told him ' that the remissness of their procedure, in what concerned the keeping of their promises, did very much lose the affections of many persons of interest in England, who had hitherto always expressed great zeal for the alliance with France/ 3 The Protector urged Lockhart to still greater vigour. ' I desire you/ he said, ' to take boldness and freedom to yourself in your dealing with the French on these ac- counts/ In another letter, dated August 31, he ordered him to present what was practically an ultimatum to the Cardinal. Unless an immediate movement was made against Dunkirk and Gravelines the English forces were to be withdrawn. ( I am deeply sensible/ said Cromwell, ' that the French are very much short with us in ingenuity and performance. And that which increaseth our sense of this is, the resolution we for our part had, rather to overdo than to be behindhand in anything of our treaty. i 1 Cheruel, iii. 64, 67. 2 Thurloe, vi. 298, 301, 346. 3 Jb. vi. 345, 421, 437.' CROMWELL'S ULTIMATUM 281 1 To talk of giving us garrisons which are inland, as CHAP. caution for future action ; to talk of what will be done ' — ^ next campaign — are but parcels of words for children. If they will give us garrisons, let them give us Calais, Dieppe, and Boulogne ; which I think they will do as soon as be honest to their words in giving us any one Spanish garrison upon the coast into our hands. I positively think, which I say to you, they are afraid we should have any footing on that side, though Spanish. ' I pray you to tell the Cardinal from me, that I think, if France desires to maintain its ground, much more to get ground upon the Spaniard, the performance of his treaty with us will better do it than anything appears yet to me of any design he hath. Though we cannot so well pretend to soldiery as those that are with him ; yet we think that, we being able by sea to strengthen and secure his siege, and to reinforce it as we please by sea, and the enemy being in a capacity to do nothing to relieve it, the best time to besiege that place will be now. Especially if we consider that the French horse will be able so to ruin Flanders as that no succour can be brought to relieve the place ; and that the French army and our own will have constant relief, as far as England and France can give it, without any manner of impediment, especially considering the Dutch are now engaged so much to the southward as they are. ' I desire you to let him know, that Englishmen have had so good experience of winter expeditions, they are confident, that if the Spaniard shall keep the field, as he cannot impede this work, so neither will he be able to attack anything towards France with a possibility of retreat. And what do all delays signify but the giving the Spaniard opportunity the more to reinforce 282 LAST YEARS OF THE PROTECTORATE CHAP, himself ; an(j £ne keeping our men another summer to serve the French, without any colour of a reciprocal, or any advantage to ourselves ! 'And therefore, if this will not be listened unto, I desire that things may be considered of to give us satis- faction for the great expense we have been at with our naval forces and otherwise ; which out of an honourable and honest aim on our part hath been done, that we might answer our engagements. And that considera- tion may be had how our men may be put into a posture to be returned to us ; whom we hope we shall employ to a better purpose than to have them continue where they are/ l Lockhart lost no time in carrying out these instruc- tions, though doubtless he softened the expressions used by Cromwell when he delivered his message to the Car- dinal.2 But his previous remonstrances had produced their effect. Turenne, after the capture of St. Venant, had turned his course westwards and drew down to- wards the coast, intending to force the Spaniards to give battle, if it were possible, and to commence operations against the Flemish seaports.3 On September 13 Sir "13 John Reynolds announced the movement to the Pro- tector, writing at the same time to Admiral Montagu, who commanded the English fleet in the Downs, to assist in the enterprise by approaching the Flemish coast with his fleet, and by lying before Dunkirk and Mardyke. The English government was asked to supply heavy artillery and mortarpieces for a siege, biscuit in case the communications of the besiegers with France should be interrupted, and hay for the cavalry. At the desire 1 Thurloe, vi. 490 ; Carlyle's Cromwell, Letter ccxxii. 2 Lockhart's account of this interview is not to be found, but he refers to it in a later letter (Thurloe, vi. 618). For French accounts of it, see Cheruel, iii. 69, and Bourelly, p. 33 ; Lettres de Mazarin, viii. 79. 3 Thurloe, vi. 437. TURENNE ATTACKS MARDYKE 283 of Turenne, Eeynolds also asked for two or three thou- CHAP. sand fresh foot to fill the gaps in the English con- vJ^L, tingent.1 Later in the month Talon, the intendant of Turenne's army, came over to London in company with Reynolds to discuss the plan of operations, and to arrange for the necessary supplies and reinforcements. According to Turenne, all that was possible at this late season of the year was to attack Mardyke. The Pro- tector was reluctant to accept this view; and in a stormy interview with Bordeaux he reiterated his complaints about the time which had been wasted in inland sieges. Mardyke, he said, could not be held without great expense, and was not a sufficient compensation for the money spent in keeping the fleet constantly ready to co-operate with the French army. Bordeaux recapitulated all the reasons which had pre- vented the French from attacking the coast fortresses at the beginning of the campaign. The siege of Mont- medy had been undertaken, he said, in order to draw the Spanish forces away from the coast and leave Turenne more free to approach it. The taking of St. Venant had secured the passage of the Lys. Since then he had turned the line of the Colme and taken Bourbourg, which rendered an attack on one of the ports possible ; but both Dunkirk and Gravelines were too strong to be safely attacked while a Spanish army was stationed behind the canal which ran from Bergues to Dunkirk. As Mardyke was a fort which must be captured before the siege of Dunkirk could be thought of, Turenne had thought that he would be doing the Protector agreeable service if he put the place in his hands.3 Cromwell was probably not convinced by these arguments, but he calmed down and agreed to furnish 1 Thurloe, vi. 497, 508, 516, 517, 523. 2 This interview is related by Bordeaux to Brienne in a letter dated Sep- tember 17, 1657. Guizot, ii. 575. IX — ^y^i 1657 284 LAST YEAKS OF THE PROTECTORATE CHAP, the artillery and some of the supplies demanded. He promised to send 2000 men to recruit the English contingent.1 Moreover, in accordance with Turenne's wishes, an English fleet of twenty-five sail prepared to take part in the attack on Mardyke.2 Mardyke, now only a village, was important then because it commanded one of the best harbours on that coast. Its defences were the fort proper, a small work of earth and stone, and a wooden fort built upon piles, communicating with the more important work and serving to defend the road. Both were taken without any difficulty. Turenne appeared before Mar- dyke on September 29, drew a line of entrench- ^ ments between the fort and Dunkirk to prevent the Spaniards from assisting the garrison, battered and took the wooden fort on the third day, and obliged the main fort to surrender on the fourth. Ten guns, about 400 soldiers, and a surprising number of officers fell into the hands of the victors.3 As the terms of the treaty required, Mardyke was immediately handed over to the English ; and the Pro- tector seemed to the French ambassador to be highly delighted at its capture.4 What Cromwell hoped was that the French army would immediately proceed to take Dunkirk ; and he now offered to send over 5000 men of the regular army if Turenne would proceed to attack it. Turenne preferred to attempt Gravelines, which was less strongly garrisoned than Dunkirk, and was said to be insufficiently provisioned. But when he 1 Clarke Papers, iii. 119; Mercurius Politicus, pp. 1639, 1648; Thurloe vi. 526, 553 ; Bourelly, p. 35. 2 Thurloe, vi. 503, 526. 3 Bourelly, pp. 35-9 ; Mercurius Politicus, September 24-October I, pp 1652, 1664. Mardyke was taken — ^ e™ 4 Bordeaux to Brienne, October n, 1657 ; Guizot, ii. 579. MAEDYKE IN ENGLISH HANDS 285 approached to invest it, the garrison of Gravelines cut CHAP. the dykes and flooded the country round, so that he v-SL was obliged to draw off his army. Accordingly he took up his position at Ruminghen, on the left bank of the Aa between St. Omer and Ardres, leaving some 800 English in Mardyke and a mixed garrison of a couple of thousand men in Bourbourg.1 The English contingent was divided ; three battalions were put in Mardyke, three in Bourbourg, and six marched with Turenne. Mardyke was a place easier to take than to keep. 