Dissenting Opinion by
ELDRIDGE, J.,
in which RAKER, J., joins.
The majority today holds that Bar Counsel presented sufficient facts to establish that the respondent committed the crime of obstructing or hindering a police officer and that, therefore, his conduct violated MRPC 8.4(b).1 The majority *262states that “Respondent’s inappropriate conduct stems from sending his son to Israel with the knowledge that Samuel [his son] had committed a homicide in Maryland.” Furthermore, the majority also finds respondent’s actions to be “so appalling” and “egregious” that his conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of MRPC 8.4(d).2 In fact, the extreme language and tone of the majority opinion might lead a reader to conclude that the respondent was the one who committed the homicide. Despite the majority’s characterizations of the respondent’s conduct, I do not believe that his conduct, when viewed separately from the underlying crime committed by his son, constitutes misconduct by a criminal act under MRPC 8.4(b) or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice under MRPC 8.4(d).
I.
 As stated by the majority, quoting from Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gavin, 350 Md. 176, 189, 711 A.2d 193, 200 (1998), under the Maryland Rules, “ ‘[t]his Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings.’ ”3 In our independent review of the record, we must *263determine whether the findings of the hearing judge, Judge Pincus, are based upon clear and convincing evidence. Under ordinary circumstances, a “hearing court’s findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997). Such deference is paid because “[t]he hearing judge is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to decide which one to believe and ... to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 390, 794 A.2d 92, 101 (2002). Usually, it is the hearing judge who is uniquely positioned to evaluate all aspects of a witness’s demeanor — including the expression of his countenance, how he sits or stands, whether he is inordinately nervous, his coloration during critical examination, the modulation or pace of his speech and other non-verbal communication. These factors may convince the observing judge whether the witness is testifying truthfully or falsely. These *264same factors, however, are entirely unavailable to a reader of the transcript. Cold paper records supply none of this information.
 Thus, contrary to the majority’s view, the instant case does not require us to give the normal deference to the hearing judge’s findings on the respondent’s credibility. Because the respondent was not present at the hearing below, Judge Pincus based his credibility determinations solely upon the transcript of the respondent’s testimony at the Grand Jury proceedings, the same cold record before us today. As such, the members of this Court are just as capable of assessing the respondent’s credibility as the hearing judge, and no special deference is warranted for Judge Pincus’s findings concerning the respondent’s credibility.
The majority also overlooks the principle that “[t]he ‘clear and convincing’ standard of Rule [BV10 d] applies to the measure of proof imposed upon the Attorney Grievance Commission in factual determinations essential to establishing its case against the attorney. * * * It does not apply to factual matters sought to be established by the attorney in defense of the attorney’s position.... As to this, the preponderance of evidence standard is the applicable measure of proof.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606, 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991), quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bailey, 285 Md. 631, 644, 403 A.2d 1261, 1268 (1979). See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 99 n. 13, 797 A.2d 757, 765 n. 13 (2002). Therefore, while it is incumbent upon Bar Counsel to prove each of the charges by clear and convincing evidence, respondent need only establish facts in his defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
II.
 As discussed above, when alleging that an attorney’s actions violate the MRPC by constituting a crime, the standard of proof imposed upon Bar Counsel is to prove each element of *265the offense by clear and convincing evidence.4 See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Childress, 364 Md. 48, 55, 770 A.2d 685, 689 (2001). In light of this standard, the evidence presented by Bar Counsel was insufficient to establish the requisite specific intent to hinder Detective Hamill in the performance of her investigation. Moreover, I strongly doubt that the respondent’s actions constituted the offense of hindering or obstructing a police officer. Instead, the effect of the respondent’s conduct, at most, was to prevent or delay a homicide prosecution by the State’s Attorney in Montgomery County in favor of a homicide prosecution, a conviction, and a 24-year prison sentence in Israel.
 We noted in Cover v. State, 297 Md. 398, 400, 466 A.2d 1276, 1277 (1983), that, although the crime of hindering a police officer in the performance of the officer’s duties was a statutory one in many States, it remained a common law offense in Maryland. See also DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 32, 729 A.2d 354, 361 (1999); Busch v. State, 289 Md. 669, 675, 426 A.2d 954, 957 (1981); Roddy v. Finnegan, 43 Md. 490, 505 (1876); Howard v. State, 32 Md.App. 75, 82, 359 A.2d 568, 573 (1976). Determining the scope of the crime of “hindering,” “obstruction,” or “interfering” is difficult, however, as the cases addressing this offense do not make any attempt to define or circumscribe the precise types of activities included in these vague terms.5
*266Thus, the Cover Court, in analyzing whether the State had proven the elements of the crime of obstruction or hindering a police officer, found it helpful to separate conduct capable of hindering a police officer into three categories, moving progressively from the more direct obstructions to the more attenuated ones. The Court in Cover, 297 Md. at 405-406, 466 A.2d at 1280, quoting Lidstone, The Offence of Obstruction: (2) Obstructing Freedom,?, [1983] Crim. L.Rev. 29, stated (footnotes omitted):
“Positive direct obstruction: ‘[T]hose cases in which the constable acts directly against the citizen or his property and is physically resisted.’ Id. at 30.
“Passive direct obstruction: Those cases ‘in which the constable seeks to make the citizen act directly, and the citizen refuses or fails to act as required.’ Id.
 “Positive indirect obstruction: Those cases in which ‘the police are not acting directly against the citizen but are acting indirectly against other citizens who are, or may be, about to commit offences against the criminal law, and the citizen does an act which obstructs them in their general duty to prevent or detect crime, intending to frustrate the police operation.’ Id.”
In the case at bar, the charged conduct at issue falls into this last attenuated category — an alleged indirect hindering.
 The only actions of the respondent, forming the basis for the majority’s conclusions, are respondent’s “assisting] his son to circumvent the law by absconding.” Bar Counsel had also alleged that respondent’s failure to notify Detective Hamill of his contacts with Samuel was an omission hindering Detective Hamill in the performance of her duties. This notion can be disposed of by noting that when these actions transpired, it is undisputed that the respondent had not been notified that an arrest warrant had issued for Samuel Sheinbein. Detective Hamill testified that respondent’s attorney, Paul T. Stein, was informed of the arrest warrant the day after Samuel went to Israel. Until an arrest warrant issued, there was no legal duty imposed upon the respondent to *267inform Detective Hamill of his son’s contacts and whereabouts. As such, this omission cannot be the basis of the second element of the charge of obstruction or hindering. The cases finding an obstruction or hindering resulting from an omission or failure to follow police instructions are clearly distinguishable. These cases typically involve refusal to follow an officer’s order to move or disperse. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill.2d 1, 253 N.E.2d 400 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1024, 90 S.Ct. 1262, 25 L.Ed.2d 534 (1970); City of Chicago v. Lynd, 47 Ill.2d 205, 265 N.E.2d 116 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923, 91 S.Ct. 1383, 28 L.Ed.2d 662 (1971).
 After a comprehensive review of the obstruction or hindering cases, this Court in Cover v. State, supra, 297 Md. at 413, 466 A.2d at 1284, articulated the elements of the offense:
“(1) A police officer engaged in the performance of a duty;
“(2) An act, or perhaps an omission, by the accused which obstructs or hinders the officer in the performance of that duty;
“(3) Knowledge by the accused of facts comprising element (1); and
“(4) Intent to obstruct or hinder the officer by the act or omission constituting element (2).”
Furthermore, we acknowledged that it is often difficult to determine what acts or omissions constitute obstructing or hindering the performance of an officer’s duty. Ibid.
The respondent does not challenge the establishment of the first and third elements of the offense, namely that Detective Hamill was a police officer engaged in the performance of her duties and that respondent had knowledge of her involvement in the matter. Nevertheless, Bar Counsel failed to establish the second element, i.e., an act or omission that obstructs or hinders, and the fourth element, i.e., a specific intent to hinder or obstruct.
*268A.
 The underlying case against respondent’s son presented a situation where two different sovereigns had jurisdiction to prosecute Samuel Sheinbein for his involvement in the homicide.6 Without question, the State of Maryland had jurisdiction to prosecute Samuel based on territoriality. Under this concept, Maryland had plenary power to make its substantive laws applicable to any person or occurrence within its territorial boundaries and plenary power to enforce its laws within its territorial boundaries. Additionally, however, the State of Israel had jurisdiction to prosecute Samuel based on his Israeli nationality.7 As a basis for the jurisdiction to prescribe, the nationality principle historically referred to a nation’s authority to control the conduct of its citizens, no matter where that conduct took place. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 402(2) (1987). *269See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 n. 2, 52 S.Ct. 252, 254 n. 2, 76 L.Ed. 375, 382 n. 2 (1932).
 Thus, the question inevitably arises, in a situation where two sovereigns have jurisdiction over a particular offense, whether an attorney or parent, who has counseled his or her client or child to proceed to the jurisdiction with the lesser penalty, has committed any misconduct? The answer to this question is clearly “No.” Submission to custody in one jurisdiction, whether the result of an attorney’s advice, or a parent’s advice, or the client’s uncounseled choice, or a decision by the Attorney General, necessarily hinders prosecution in the other jurisdiction. Hence, even assuming arguendo that the respondent had sent his son to Israel with the specific intent of opting for Israel’s prosecution over prosecution in Maryland, the action is not criminal. In sum, respondent’s “devising and facilitating his son’s departure to Israel,” in the language of the majority opinion, does not bring him within the ambit of the offense of obstruction or hindering.
Indeed, when more than one sovereign has jurisdiction to prosecute a person for homicide, it appears to be entirely appropriate for those on the prosecution side to send the alleged perpetrator to the sovereign likely to impose the most severe punishment.8 According to the majority opinion, however, it is not appropriate for those on the defense side to send the alleged perpetrator to the sovereign likely to impose a less severe punishment. If prosecutors are free to forum-shop for a jurisdiction with more severe penalties, or a broader capital punishment statute, when choosing where to prosecute the accused, the defense should not be punished for sending the accused to a jurisdiction with less severe maximum penalties.
 *270It would be a different case if there were any evidence in the record that the respondent had either tried to evade prosecution in Israel or had sent his son to a country with no jurisdiction to prosecute the homicide.9 But that is not the case before us. Not only did the respondent dispatch his older son, Robert, to bring Samuel back to Maryland to face charges, but once Samuel arrived in Israel, there was no attempt to hide him from the Israeli authorities, or to send him out of Israel to any number of neighboring countries. It was only a matter of days before the Israeli police took custody of Samuel, unobstructed and unhindered.10
Additionally, the majority claims that the respondent’s conduct “denied Detective Hamill any opportunity to pursue investigatory leads.” Yet, the respondent allowed Detective Hamill to execute the search warrant at his home and cooperated with her by providing her with Samuel’s credit card number, as well as his son’s cellular phone number. In light of these facts, the only other “investigatory leads” for Detective Hamill to cull would result from questioning Samuel.
 Two points should be made with regard to this. First, even if the respondent had contacted Detective Hamill upon hear*271ing from his son, the likelihood that any attempt at questioning Samuel would have elicited investigatory leads is remote. Unlike a witness, who can be compelled to testify under the sanction of contempt, Samuel was free to invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and likely would have, as his entire family had done prior to the respondent’s testifying before the Grand Jury. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6. This is especially likely since the record reflects that the respondent retained an attorney, Paul T. Stein, for his son the morning after the search warrant was executed. Under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), even if the opportunity for questioning Samuel had presented itself, once the arrest warrant issued Detective Hamill could not have questioned Samuel without his attorney present. Thus, with his attorney present during questioning, it is extremely doubtful that Samuel would have given Detective Hamill any investigatory leads.
 Secondly, it bears repetition that, at most, the effect of the respondent’s conduct was to prevent or delay a homicide prosecution by the State’s Attorney in Montgomery County in favor of a prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in Israel. Samuel’s departure to Israel on the evening of September 21st could not have “denied Detective Hamill any opportunity to pursue investigatory leads,” because the record reveals that the arrest warrant was issued on September 20th. By the time Samuel departed, Detective Hamill’s investigation was complete; the evidence necessary for an arrest had already culminated into a warrant, and the State’s case against Samuel Sheinbein had entered the prosecution phase. Although a Maryland State’s Attorney may have been hindered in prosecuting a high profile case, there simply was no hindering of a police officer.11
*272B.
 Another necessary element of obstruction or hindering a police officer is the “[i]ntent to obstruct or hinder the officer by the act or omission constituting [the second] element.” Cover v. State, supra, 297 Md. at 413, 466 A.2d at 1284. Here, a holding of obstruction or hindering must turn on whether Bar Counsel established, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent had the requisite specific intent to hinder Detective Hamill’s investigation by sending Samuel to Israel. We have recently explained the meaning of specific intent in Chen v. State, 370 Md. 99, 111 n. 5, 803 A.2d 518, 524 n. 5 (2002), quoting Harris v. State, 353 Md. 596, 603, 728 A.2d 180, 183 (1999):
“ ‘[S]pecific intent is not simply the intent to do the immediate act but embraces the requirement that the mind be conscious of a more remote purpose or design which shall eventuate from the doing of the immediate act. Though assault implies only the general intent to strike the blow, assault with intent to murder, rob, rape or maim requires a fully formed and conscious purpose that those further consequences shall flow from the doing of the immediate act.’ ” (Additional quotation marks omitted).
Thus, in this case, the mere act of sending Samuel to Israel alone is not enough. It must be shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent sent Samuel to Israel with the conscious purpose of frustrating Detective Hamill’s investigation.
 The respondent’s Grand Jury testimony discloses that his actual intent in sending Samuel to Israel was (a) to prevent him from committing suicide; (b) to distance his son from the influence of Aaron Needle; and (c) to avert the possibility of a violent confrontation with the police. His testimony also reveals that he implored his son to surrender to the Maryland police but that Samuel was adamant in his refusal to do so. Moreover, the respondent further testified before the Grand Jury that, upon being apprised of the issuance of an arrest warrant, he sent his eldest son, Robert, to Israel to collect *273Samuel and bring him back to Maryland to face the authorities. Given the confluence of factors that presented themselves in a relatively short period of time, respondent claims that he had little time tor reflection. He then stated, “I took his passport with me in the event nothing else worked.” Respondent’s Grand Jury Testimony at 66-67.
 Rased on his reading of the respondent’s Grand Jury testimony, the hearing judge found that the testimony of the respondent’s actual intent was not credible. The judge relied on the oft-quoted presumption that “a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Thus, the requisite criminal intent may be inferred from the defendants’ voluntary and knowing commission of an act which is forbidden by law or from the defendant’s omission to do an act required by law.” As explained earlier, however, the respondent did not commit an act forbidden by law nor did he omit to do an act required by law. Additionally, Israel’s ultimate refusal to extradite was neither a natural nor probable consequence of the respondent’s sending his son there. Finally, since the hearing judge could only look to the transcript from the Grand Jury, his finding with respect to the respondent’s credibility is not entitled to any special deference.
The majority nevertheless states that “[t]he record is replete with facts” supporting the hearing judge’s finding that the respondent was not credible in testifying before the Grand Jury about his actual intent. Among other things, the majority claims that two separate comments made by the respondent during his Grand Jury testimony undermine his credibility. First, the majority cites the following exchange (respondent’s Grand Jury Testimony at 69.):
“Q[uestion of prosecutor] Okay. Now Sunday night, obviously, the trip is set up for Samuel to go to Israel. When did Robert go to Israel?
A[nswer of respondent] Okay. On Monday, we decided that there was no — on Sunday, there was no arrest warrant whatsoever for Samuel, none whatsoever; that he was not a *274wanted person, he was not a fugitive. He was not on the run officially by the police—
Q Right.
 A — but he would be; that’s obvious.”
From this exchange, the-majority asserts that the respondent “plainly admitted” that he knew his son would “obviously” be on the run from an arrest warrant. Yet, the phrase “but he would be; that’s obvious” is susceptible to various interpretations. It may just mean that it was obvious, in hindsight, that his son would be wanted by the police. This equivocal phrase is hardly enough to meet Bar Counsel’s burden to clearly and convincingly prove that the respondent intended to hinder Detective Hamill’s investigation.
The second bit of testimony relied on by the majority, as support for the hearing judge’s finding on the respondent’s credibility, relates to the purchase of Samuel’s airline ticket. In response to a question about how Samuel’s voyage was financed, the respondent stated, “I went to Tower Air in New York City, and I purchased the ticket, a one-way ticket — well, a round-trip ticket is cheaper than a one-way — on Tower Air.” Respondent’s Grand Jury Testimony at 67. The majority declares that this statement alone discredits the respondent’s argument that he purchased a round-trip ticket in contemplation of Samuel’s return. But this misses the point. Even if the respondent’s purchase of a round-trip ticket was based solely on the price differential, this does not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent did not contemplate his son’s return once the immediate crisis had diffused. Indeed, the facts that developed in the days immediately following Samuel’s departure refute the majority’s theory. It is undisputed that the respondent sent his son, Robert, to Israel to bring Samuel back to this country. The obstacle to Samuel’s return was not the want of a return ticket.
 Next, the majority argues that, because Samuel was alone when he met with his family in New York City, he was no longer in imminent danger of being under Aaron Needle’s unwanted influence. Yet, the respondent’s Grand Jury testi*275mony reveals a long history of distrust toward Mr. Needle, which was no doubt resurrected and exacerbated by the present circumstances. Moreover, the respondent was aware that his son had driven to New York with Mr. Needle; consequently, although Mr. Needle was not present at the family meeting, he probably was not very far away. Thus, I fail to discern any evidence casting doubt upon the respondent’s credibility when he claimed that he wanted to distance his son from Mr. Needle.
 Finally, the majority contends that there was no “apparent imminent danger of [Samuel] committing suicide” in the presence of his family in New York. This is especially true, the majority argues, because Samuel had surrendered the shotgun to the respondent upon the family’s arrival. Under the circumstances, however, it is reasonable that the respondent was truly concerned that his son would take his own life. The respondent was well aware that his son had been involved in a grisly homicide, whether or not in self-defense, and that Samuel was not thinking clearly at this time. The fact that Samuel was no longer in possession of the shotgun only eliminated one means of killing himself. So long as Samuel was still expressing suicidal thoughts, it is credible that the respondent, as his father, was distressed over the possibility of his son’s suicide. Albeit in hindsight, I am also mindful of the fact that Mr. Needle, who likewise had expressed suicidal inclinations in New York, ultimately hanged himself on April 18, 1998, two days before jury selection was to begin in his trial.
 There must be affirmative, clear and convincing evidence of the respondent’s specific intent to hinder a police officer. That is, even if the respondent’s testimony as to his intent is not deemed credible, this legal conclusion cannot supplant the affirmative showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Bar Counsel must establish with regard to his specific intent. It is a well-settled principle in the law that lack of credibility, without more, is not ipso facto affirmative evidence sufficient to meet a proponent’s burden of proof on an intent element in a charge. See, e.g., VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation Corp., 350 *276Md. 693, 711, 715 A.2d 188, 196 (1998) (The finder of fact’s “prerogative not to believe certain testimony, however, does not constitute affirmative evidence of the contrary”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Clements, 319 Md. 289, 298, 572 A.2d 174, 179 (1990) (“A refusal to believe evidence of a respondent, however, does not, of itself, supply affirmative evidence of the ... [misconduct] charged”).
Furthermore, on the basis of the Grand Jury testimony, the hearing judge had little basis for determining whether the respondent was telling the truth. The record is not so much “replete” with facts supporting a finding of non-credibility, as it is replete with cold-record testimony susceptible of various interpretations. Therefore, I conclude that Bar Counsel did not present clear and convincing evidence of a specific intent to hinder or obstruct Detective Hamilfs investigation.
 In sum, Bar Counsel did not provide proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent committed the common law offense of obstruction or hindering a police officer. I do not agree that an attorney or father has criminally obstructed or hindered police activity in the case where two jurisdictions have the authority to prosecute an offense, and the attorney advises his client, or the father advises his son, to go to the jurisdiction with the less severe sanction. Moreover, when the only “hindering” is to frustrate the questioning of one who has been accused of a crime, and who is certain to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, I do not believe that the offense of hindering has occurred. Nor do I believe that Bar Counsel proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that-the respondent had the requisite intent to hinder Detective Hamill in the course of her duties. Consequently, no misconduct by a criminal act, in contravention of MRPC 8.4(b), is present in this case.
III.
 The majority also concludes that the respondent violated MRPC 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Generally, this Court has found *277conduct to be in violation of Rule 8.4(d) under two circumstances: First, when there has been conduct that is criminal in nature, or second, when the lawyer’s conduct concerned his own legal practice or his relationship with his clients.12 This is *279consonant with the guidance set forth in the Comments to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (2002) (emphasis added)):
“Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law.... Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category.”
As noted in the majority opinion, the hearing judge’s conclusions on this point were based on his assessment that respondent’s conduct was criminal in nature, fitting within the first prong of cases mentioned above. In finding a violation of Rule 8.4(d), the hearing judge determined that “[t]he Respondent indisputably hindered the administration of justice by providing a means for his son to flee the country.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 14. Thus, his conclusion as to Rule 8.4(d) relied on his earlier pronouncements that all the elements of the offense of hindering a police officer were present in this case.
 In addition, Bar Counsel’s Petition for Disciplinary Action bases both of the misconduct charges on the allegation that respondent’s “actions in assisting his son to leave the State of Maryland, and subsequently the country, was in direct impedance and obstruction of the investigation of the murder of Alfred Enrique Tello, Jr. in violation of Maryland law and the Rules of Professional Conduct governing the actions of attor*280neys.” Petition for Disciplinary Action at 11. Thus, the 8.4(d) charge in the Petition was dependent upon a finding that the conduct being alleged was criminal. No language appears in the Petition alleging that the respondent’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice for any reason other than its alleged criminal nature. Consequently, in the instant case, as in the vast majority of 8.4(d) cases, the 8.4(d) charge is dependent upon the presence of another form of misconduct, rather than having an independent basis.
The majority, however, claims that the respondent’s acts violate Rule 8.4(d) on two separate grounds: first, under the theory that his acts were criminal and, second, under an alternative theory that his acts were “directly harmful to the legal profession.” I disagree. I doubt, under In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), that it is proper for the majority to conjure up, sua sponte, alternative grounds to support a violation of Rule 8.4(d). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, I do not believe the respondent’s actions constituted the offense of obstruction or hindering. Finally, because the actions taken by the respondent did not impact on his clients or on his law practice, I do not believe that his conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice.
A.
 At the threshold, the majority’s opinion as to the 8.4(d) charge is questionable under In re Ruffalo, supra. In Ruffalo, the petitioner was a trial lawyer who was charged with twelve counts of misconduct. As a result of incriminating testimonial evidence adduced during his hearing before a hearing board, the state’s grievance commission added a thirteenth charge against the petitioner. The hearing board found the petitioner guilty of seven charges, including the appended thirteenth charge. On review, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain only two charges, including the thirteenth charge, and ultimately concluded that disbarment was required. Proceedings thereafter ensued to disbar petitioner in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit, relying *281solely on the record and findings of the Ohio courts, held that the thirteenth charge alone justified disbarment in its court. The United States Supreme Court, concluding that the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process, reversed, stating: “Disbarment ... is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer. * * * He is accordingly entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the charge.” Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550, 88 S.Ct. at 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d at 122.
 As Ruffalo holds, principles of due process require that fair notice of the charges be given to a defendant at the outset of disciplinary proceedings. Here, the majority states that, even if the conduct in question is not criminal, it is still prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). According to the majority, “respondent’s actions are so appalling that either shoe will fit; respondent’s acts are both criminal in nature and directly harmful to the legal profession.” To the extent that the majority opinion relies upon a basis for finding an 8.4(d) violation which was neither alleged in the Petition for Disciplinary Action nor relied upon by the hearing judge, it presents a procedural due process infirmity in contravention to the holding in Ruffalo. In this case, the respondent was never given notice of such a basis for the 8.4(d) charge nor an opportunity to defend against an 8.4(d) violation based on his acts being “directly harmful to the legal profession.” As the Court in Ruffalo stated, disbarment proceedings are “adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. * * * The charge must be known before the proceedings commence.” 390 U.S. at 551, 88 S.Ct. at 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d at 122. It seems clear that, when a court devises a new basis for a charge at the eleventh hour of a quasi-criminal proceeding, as the majority has done here, the respondent has been deprived of procedural due process.
 As noted by the majority, the respondent has been charged in a Statement of Charges in State of Maryland v. Sol Sheinbein, District Court of Maryland, Montgomery County, Case No. 6D00071133, with the criminal offense of hindering a police officer. An arrest warrant on that charging document has been issued in that case for Sol Sheinbein, District Court *282of Maryland, Warrant No. D98442735. Respondent, as a member of the Bar of this State, is an officer of this Court. It may be that the respondent’s conduct, in failing to present himself for trial and perhaps willful avoidance of prosecution on this Maryland criminal charge, would constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(d) as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Mulford, 625 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 2001) (sanctioning an attorney as a member of the Iowa bar for willful avoidance of prosecution by failing to return to the United States to resolve charges alleged in a federal indictment). Because this theory was never alleged as a basis for the professional misconduct charge before this Court, due process, as held in Ruffalo, precludes this Court from considering it now.
B.
 In support for its argument that Rule 8.4(d) has been violated, the majority cites an Alaskan case in which an attorney was disbarred after having been convicted of certain criminal offenses. The majority then remarks that in our case, the respondent cannot be tried for obstruction or hindering because he remains in Israel. The majority’s reliance on the Alaskan case assumes that the respondent would be convicted. Since the evidence was insufficient to find that the respondent committed the offense of obstruction or hindering by clear and convincing evidence, the case relied on by the majority furnishes no support for a finding of an 8.4(d) violation.
Next, the majority claims that it “has not always been the case” that conduct violating Rule 8.4(d) must relate to the lawyer’s particular practice or clients, quoting the following statement in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 368, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (1998):
“The respondent argues that to be conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, the act must be one that hinders or otherwise interferes with a judicial proceeding of which he is a party or represents a party. This Court *283has never so narrowly defined Rule 8.4(d). We have instead recognized that conduct that impacts on the image or the perception of the courts or the legal profession, see Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 536, 565 A.2d 660, 666 (1989) and that engenders disrespect for the courts and for the legal profession may be prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
The majority capitalizes on this comment to broaden the scope of Rule 8.4(d) beyond any perceptible bounds.
 In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 565 A.2d 660 (1989), relied on in Richardson and by the majority here, we dealt with a lawyer who hurled epithets during judicial proceedings and whose “irrational dangerous conduct persisted over a period of two years.” 317 Md. at 532, 565 A.2d at 664. There was no question that Mr. Alison’s resistance to a court ordered search, foul language in court, and verbal abuse of court clerks, among other things, “impact[edj on the image or perception of the courts or the legal profession.” Richardson, supra, 350 Md. at 368, 712 A.2d at 532. Mr. Alison’s conduct toward the court and court personnel obviously impacted on his legal practice and on his clients. Furthermore, it was oftentimes criminal.13 Thus, this Court had no difficulty in holding that the conduct he publicly displayed bred disrespect for the courts and for the legal profession.
 Here, in the majority’s view, the respondent “usurped the role of twelve Maryland citizens” and supplanted it with his paternal instincts. Additionally, the majority claims that the respondent made it “impossible for the justice system to work,” and “did everything in his power to ensure that his son circumvent that system.” As a result, the majority concludes, “ti]t is difficult to see, as respondent suggests, how respondent’s blatant interference with an ongoing police investigation *284‘would not seriously impair public confidence in the entire legal profession’ and not, as a result, impair public confidence in the integrity of the courts.” The majority completely ignores the fact that, in September 1999, the Tel Aviv District Court convicted the respondent’s son of murder. As stated earlier, under the Act of State Doctrine, this Court must respect this conviction and may not question its validity. Ultimately, we should acknowledge the fact that justice, under the applicable law, has been served in the underlying case against the respondent’s son.
This case simply does not present facts, as the majority argues, “so appalling” as to constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of MRPC 8.4(d). In the interest of giving members of the legal profession notice of what behavior in their personal lives will subject them to disciplinary action, I am unwilling to expand Rule 8.4(d) to include conduct as ambiguous as the respondent’s in this case. Therefore, Bar Counsel has not presented facts, by clear and convincing evidence, demonstrating a violation of MRPC 8.4(d).
In conclusion, I believe that Bar Counsel’s evidence was insufficient to support a finding of misconduct under either MRPC 8.4(b) or (d).
Judge RAKER agrees with the views expressed herein and joins this dissenting opinion.
 . Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 8.4(b) provides that:
*262“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;”


. MRPC Rule 8.4(d) provides:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
* * *
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”


. The rules promulgated by this Court purport to give us original jurisdiction over contested adjudicatory attorney disciplinary cases, and we have regularly exercised such trial court jurisdiction, entering money judgments and equitable decrees when there were no prior judgments or decrees by a court.
The Constitution of Maryland, however, gives this Court original jurisdiction in only two situations, set forth in Article II, § 6, and Article III, § 5. Neither provision encompasses attorney disciplinary cases. Except for those two situations, the cases have uniformly held *263that the Court of Appeals may exercise appellate jurisdiction only. This Court has consistently held that enactments purporting to confer original jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals are unconstitutional. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 40-44, 343 A.2d 521, 523-525 (1975), and cases there collected.
