Violation of Art. 5-1;No violation of Art. 5-1;Violation of Art. 5-1;Violation of Art. 5-3;Violation of Art. 5-4;No violation of Art. 6-1;No violation of Art. 6-3-b;No violation of Art. 6-1 and 6-3-d;No violation of Art. 6-3-b;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Anatoly Kovler;George Nicolaou;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Peer Lorenzen

The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Moscow.

In 2000 Mr D., a businessman from Moscow informed the police that since 1996 he and his two business partners had been paying a monthly fee to a local gang for “protection”. Mr D. gave the police audio records of his telephone conversations with the gangsters, which he had secretly made when the “fee” had become too burdensome for him. The police set up an undercover operation. Police agents secretly observed the meetings between the three businessmen and the gangsters and recorded their conversations. At the last meeting, which took place on 25 September 2000, the businessmen handed to the emissaries of the gang the money they had earlier received from the police. After the receipt of the money the two emissaries of the gang were arrested and the money (which had been previously marked by the police) was seized from them. One of the alleged gangsters was Mr M., the applicant’s brother.

On 9 April 2001 the applicant was charged with large-scale extortion as part of an organised criminal group (Article 163 § 3 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). However, because his whereabouts were unknown, on 18 April 2001 the case against the applicant was separated from the case of other members of the group. On 22 May 2001 the applicant was put on a wanted list.

On 1 June 2001 the Moscow City Prosecutor issued a detention warrant in respect of the applicant. It referred to the gravity of the charges and the risk of his absconding, as well as to the fact that the applicant was on the wanted list. The detention warrant did not specify the period of detention.

On 7 April 2002 the applicant was arrested at his house in the Moscow Region. On the same date he was detained.

On 6 June 2002 the Moscow City Prosecutor authorised the extension of the applicant’s detention until 9 August 2002. The detention warrant referred to the gravity of the charges and the risk of the applicant absconding, re-offending or interfering with the investigation. There is no information on whether the applicant appealed against that decision.

On 1 August 2002 the Babushkinskiy District Court of Moscow considered the detention request lodged by the prosecution. The defence argued that there were no grounds for continued detention since the applicant had no criminal record, permanently resided in Moscow, and had not tried to flee from the investigation – at the time when he had been on the wanted list he had been living in his summer house in the Moscow Region with his minor children and had not been aware of the proceedings against him. The defence also contended that the charges against the applicant were unfounded and noted long periods of inactivity on the part of the investigation authorities during previous detention periods.

The court rejected those arguments and extended the applicant’s detention until 7 October 2002. The court held that the applicant had been accused of grave crimes and that he had to take part in several investigative activities. The court also found that the applicant would flee from justice given that he had previously been on the wanted list, and had been arrested in the Moscow Region. There is no information on whether the applicant appealed against that decision.

On 2 October 2002 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 9 December 2002 holding that there were no grounds to amend or revoke the preventive measure, given the gravity of the charges and the risk of his absconding. There is no information on whether the applicant appealed against the decision.

On 28 November 2002 the investigation was completed and the case file was sent to the Nikulinskiy District Court (hereinafter – the District Court).

On 11 December 2002 the District Court scheduled a preparatory hearing. In its decision to hold a preparatory hearing it also ordered that the applicant’s detention should remain unchanged. The court neither specified the time-limit for his detention nor gave the reasons for such decision.

On 24 December 2002 the preparatory hearing was held. The defence filed a request for release stating that the decision ordering the applicant’s detention pending investigation had expired and that he was therefore being unlawfully detained. They also noted that the decision of 11 December 2002 did not contain any reasoning. The District Court rejected the request referring to the gravity of the charges and to the fact that the court had not yet assessed the evidence. As to the subject matter of the accusations against the applicant, the District Court remitted the case to the prosecution because the bill of indictment had been issued improperly and was not ready for examination at the trial. The prosecution was given five days to modify the bill of indictment. The ruling of the District Court referred to Article 236 § 1 (2) of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (CCrP) (“Types of decision which can be taken at the preparatory hearing”), Article 237 § 1 (1) (“Returning the case to the prosecutor”), and Article 255 § 3 (“Deciding on the measure of restraint [during the trial proceedings]”).

The prosecution appealed against the part of this decision concerning the remittal. The defence appealed against the refusal to release the applicant. The appeals were lodged on 26 and 30 December 2002 respectively.

According to the Government, the applicant’s statement of appeal against the detention order of 24 December 2002 was received by the District Court on 15 January 2003. On 28 January 2003 the applicant was handed a copy of the appeal by the prosecution. The case was received by the Moscow City Court on 13 February 2003. The appeal hearing was scheduled for 5 March 2003. However, since the applicant’s lawyers failed to produce powers of attorney, the appeal hearing was adjourned until 13 March 2003.

On 13 March 2003 the Moscow City Court allowed the prosecution’s appeal and referred the applicant’s case back to the District Court for a preparatory hearing. The appeal of the defence was dismissed for the same reasons as given by the District Court in its decision of 24 December 2002. The City Court’s decision also referred to the provision in the CCrP establishing a default six-month detention period after the referral of a case to the trial court.

On 21 April 2003 the second preparatory hearing was held. The defence filed a new application for release. In addition to the arguments mentioned earlier they referred to the unreasonable period of detention and the lack of special diligence during the proceedings. The District Court once again ordered the case to be remitted to the prosecutor and rejected the request for release, relying on the same arguments as in the previous decision, namely the gravity of the charges and the need to carry out additional investigative activities. The ruling contained references to Articles 236 § 2 (1) and 237 § 1 (1) of the CCrP. Both prosecution and defence appealed.

On 5 June 2003 the Moscow City Court returned the case to the District Court for another preparatory hearing. It also upheld the decision of the District Court regarding the applicant’s detention.

On 2 July 2003 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing, and held that the applicant should stay in custody. It does not appear that the court indicated in its ruling any time-limit for the applicant’s further detention.

On an unspecified date the defence appealed against the ruling of 2 July 2003.

On 9 July 2003 the court held a preliminary hearing and scheduled a hearing on the merits. The District Court rejected the applicant’s request for release and confirmed that the applicant should remain detained pending trial, without, however, indicating any time-limit for the detention.

On 18 July 2003 the defence lodged an appeal against the decision of 9 July 2003. They claimed that the six-month time-limit for detention pending trial had expired on 28 May 2002 and that the applicant was therefore being detained unlawfully.

On 21 July 2003 the applicant’s detention pending trial was extended for three months because judgment on the merits had not yet been delivered. The District Court referred to the gravity of the charges and to the fact that the court had not yet assessed the evidence. The defence appealed. The statement of appeal against the decision of 21 July 2003 was dated 30 July 2003, although it is unclear whether it was introduced on that date.

On 3 September 2003 the Moscow City Court dismissed appeals against the decisions of 2, 9 and 21 July 2003 holding that the findings of the District Court had been correct.

According to the applicant, on 7 October 2003 his detention was extended for three more months, with the same reasoning as before. In support of his assertion the applicant submitted a copy of the ruling of the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow of that date, signed by Judge K. The defence appealed against that ruling; the applicant submitted a copy of the statement of appeal with the District Court’s stamp on it confirming the date of introduction (16 October 2003) and the incoming mail number (no. 4547). The applicant claimed that the appeal court had never considered the complaint. The Government claimed that on 7 October 2003 the applicant’s detention had not been extended, and that the applicant’s detention was still covered by the detention order of 21 July 2003.

On 21 October 2003 the District Court adopted the judgment in the applicant’s case.

The applicant’s case was initiated jointly with the cases of other members of the organised criminal group, including the applicant’s brother, Mr M. They were all accused of large-scale extortion. Owing to the failure to find the applicant, his case was separated from the case of the other members of the group.

On 27 December 2002 the Nikulinskiy District Court convicted Mr M. of large-scale extortion as part of an organised criminal group (Article 163 § 3 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). The District Court was sitting as a panel of three judges comprising a professional judge (Ms K., the president), and two lay judges.

The judgment of 27 December 2002 started with the finding that Mr M. had committed extortion in concert with “unidentified persons”. In relating the facts of the case the court once mentioned the applicant’s name. Specifically, on page 5 of the judgment the court held that an unidentified member of the gang had mentioned in a telephone conversation with one of the victims that “[the applicant] was unhappy that the victims had not transferred the money to [Mr M.] at his first request”.

The applicant’s name was also mentioned in the part of the judgment summarising the witness statements. In particular, on page 6 of the judgment in connection with the testimony of Mr M., who denied his or his brother’s involvement in the criminal group. The District Court, however, found that Mr M.’s testimony was refuted by the incriminating evidence, namely witness statements. Some of the witnesses, as well as confirming the role of Mr M. in the gang, mentioned that the applicant had been an important person in the gang and participated in negotiations as a person of authority (page 7). They further mentioned that the applicant had told the victims that “they had to pay him in order not to pay other persons he had talked to” (page 7), that the money was collected from the businessmen for the applicant (page 8), that “[the applicant] had been introduced [to them] as a leader of the criminal group” (page 8), and that the victims “had paid mobile telephone bills for [the applicant]” (page 8). The District Court also examined information on the telephone communications of Mr M. and the applicant and referred to them in its judgments (without, however, indicating their importance for the conviction).

The applicant’s case was heard by Judge K. of the Nikulinskiy District Court (the same judge who had earlier presided over the trial in the case of Mr M.). The first hearing on the merits took place on 29 September 2003.

The applicant pleaded not guilty. He did not deny that he knew the victims and that he had had some dealings with them. Namely, he confirmed that he had met with them several times between 1996 and 1999. However, he denied that his involvement in their business had been of a criminal character. He also denied having received from the victims or from Mr M. any criminal payments. He further denied the participation of Mr M., his brother, in any criminal activity.

At the following hearings the court heard testimony of two witnesses for the defence, R. and K., who both denied any involvement of the applicant or Mr M. in the crimes. They testified that the money had been paid by the victims to Mr M. as a rental fee for storage space on premises owned by the applicant.

The victims (Mr D. and his two partners), on the contrary, testified that in 1996 they had met with the applicant who had offered them criminal “protection” from other gangs and fixed a monthly fee for it. At one of the meetings with the applicant another gangster had threatened the victims with beatings. In the following years the victims had been paying the money to the gang, generally not to the applicant directly but to other gangsters, in particular to Mr M. However, the victims had understood that the money had been destined for the applicant. The victims had had several other meetings with the applicant in different places where the amount of the monthly fee had been discussed. Other members of the gang had always referred to the applicant as a person of authority. Throughout that period the applicant had been personally involved in the negotiations with other gangs.

The court also examined audio records secretly made by one of the victims and later by the police during the surveillance operation. Although the applicant was not identified as one of the speakers on those audio records, other gangsters had often referred to somebody named Tengiz (which is the applicant’s first name) who had supposedly been a person of authority within the gang. The applicant claimed that they had probably meant another person also named Tengiz.

The District Court also examined other evidence. Witness V. confirmed that several meetings between the applicant and the victims had taken place. Witness Ya., an accountant for the victims, confirmed that one of the alleged members of the applicant’s gang had been formally employed by the victims and had been receiving a salary, without, however, doing any actual work. She did not know about any official business transactions or rental agreements between the applicant and the victims. The prosecution also produced the applicant’s and other members of the gang’s telephone bills which had been paid by the victims, and some other circumstantial evidence.

During the court proceedings in the applicant’s case the defence requested that Mr M. be summoned. He explained to the courts that Mr M.’s testimony was important. The applicant claimed that according to the victims the money obtained from them had been passed to him by Mr M. and that the examination of the latter “could shed light on these events”. The defence also alleged that without proving the fact that the money had been passed to the applicant he could not be found guilty and that Mr M. had to be summoned as all the witnesses referred to him in their testimony. The trial court rejected the request holding that the court had not yet assessed all the evidence.

Some time later the defence requested the admission in evidence of Mr M.’s written statement obtained by one of the defence lawyers who had visited Mr M. in prison and had interviewed him. In those statements Mr M. had denied his and his brother’s (the applicant) involvement in the gang. The court refused on the ground that the written statement of Mr M. had not been “duly certified” and it was unclear whether that statement had indeed been taken from Mr M.

The defence also requested leave to examine the victims of the impugned extortion for a second time, owing to inconsistencies in their earlier submissions. The request was not granted.

At some point in the proceedings the defence challenged the judge claiming that she was not impartial. They contended that the same judge had earlier found the applicant’s brother guilty in a case closely connected with the applicant’s case. Moreover, the defence noted that the trial judge was the same judge who had earlier remitted the case to the prosecutor and might therefore have been prejudiced in this case. However, the judge refused to withdraw. On several later occasions the defence objected to questions put by the judge to the applicant, claiming that those questions were favourable to the prosecution.

It took the trial court eight hearings to examine the evidence produced by the parties. The hearings took place on 29 and 30 September, and on 1, 2, 7, 14 and 15 October 2003. The last hearing on the merits was held on 16 October 2003. On that day the court heard the last witness, examined certain written materials in the case file and examined the requests of the defence. The judge, having decided that the examination of evidence was over, invited the parties to proceed with their final submissions. The defence objected to ending the examination of the evidence without summoning Mr M. The objection was rejected. The defence then requested an adjournment for at least one day to prepare their final submissions. The judge ordered a twenty-minute break and then proceeded to the final submissions. These were made after a thirty-minute break. All three lawyers for the applicant were able to make oral submissions, in addition to their written submissions which they had handed to the court.

On 21 October 2003 the District Court found the applicant guilty of extortion and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment and confiscation of criminally obtained assets. In the opening paragraphs of the judgment the District Court found that the applicant and his brother, Mr M., who had earlier been convicted by the same court on 27 December 2002, as well as several other unidentified people, were members of an organised criminal group created to extort large sums of money from local businessmen. Between 1996 and 1998 the applicant had met with those businessmen on several occasions. He had offered them protection from other gangs in exchange for a monthly fee. The money had usually been passed from the victims to the applicant through other members of the group, including the applicant’s brother, Mr M. In addition, the victims had been required to pay an unidentified member of the gang’s telephone bills and later those of the applicant himself. The judgment contained a detailed account of all payments which had passed through Mr M. to the applicant and of the amounts of the telephone bills paid by the victims. It also described several episodes when unidentified members of the gang had claimed additional payments on the applicant’s behalf.

The court further analysed the testimony of witnesses R. and K. examined at the request of the defence. The judge noted that although both R. and K. had referred to the existence of a rental agreement between the victims and the applicant, it had allegedly been concluded in the name of a firm which had ceased to exist by that time and had never been signed by the applicant. Furthermore, the court did not have a copy of that agreement and other evidence in the case file contradicted the submissions of R. and K. Lastly, in a telephone conversation between one of the victims and a member of the gang, the latter had instructed the former to tell the police that the payments had been made within a rental agreement. As a result, the judge dismissed the testimony of R. and K. as unreliable.

The applicant’s lawyers appealed. In particular, they drew the court’s attention to the fact that at the trial the victims had acknowledged that they had been giving the money not to the applicant but to other persons. The applicant’s lawyers insisted that the trial court’s failure to summon and question Mr M. made the trial unfair.

On 17 March 2004 the Moscow City Court examined the appeal by the defence. It amended the judgment of the District Court because of changes in the Russian Criminal Law. The confiscation order in respect of criminally obtained assets was thus quashed. However, the remainder of the judgment of 21 October 2003 was upheld.

After arrest the suspect can be placed in custody “pending investigation”. Article 108 §§ 1, 3-6 of the new CCrP (of 2001, in force since 1 July 2002) requires a judicial decision by a district court on a reasoned request for detention by a prosecutor, supported by appropriate evidence, before a defendant can be detained or his or her detention extended. Detention “pending investigation” should not exceed eighteen months (Article 109 §§ 1-3). The period of detention “pending investigation” is calculated up to the day when the prosecutor sends the case to the trial court (Article 109 § 9).

From the time the prosecutor sends the case to the trial court, the defendant’s detention is “pending trial”. Upon receipt of the case file the judge must determine, in particular, whether the defendant should remain in custody or be released pending trial (Articles 228 § 3 and 231 § 2 (6) of the CCrP).

The period of detention “pending trial” is calculated up to the date on which the judgment is given. It may not normally exceed six months, but if the case concerns serious or particularly serious criminal offences, the trial court may approve one or more extensions of no longer than three months each (Article 255 §§ 2 and 3 of the CCrP).

The trial judge can return the case to the prosecutor to remedy the defects impeding the trial (Article 236 § 1 (2) of the CCrP), for instance if the judge has identified serious deficiencies in the bill of indictment (Article 237 § 1 (1) of the CCrP) or a copy of it was not served on the accused. The judge must require that the prosecutor comply within five days (Article 237 § 2) and must also decide on a preventive measure in respect of the accused (Article 237 § 3).

By Federal Law no. 226-FZ of 2 December 2008, Article 237 was amended to the effect that, if appropriate, the judge could extend the term of detention with due regard to the time-limits set forth in Article 109 of the CCrP.

Pursuant to Article 376 of the CCrP, the court of appeal has to set the date, time and place of an appeal hearing and inform the parties accordingly. The parties should be informed no less than fourteen days in advance of the date of the appeal hearing. The court has to decide whether or not the detainee should be brought to the court of appeal in person. That Article also regulates the arrangements governing a detainee’s appearance in appeal proceedings in person and his or her appearance via video-link.

For further details concerning Russian legislation on pre-trial detention, detention pending trial and remittal of the case to the prosecution for correcting defects of the bill of indictment, see the cases of Lebedev v. Russia (no. 4493/04, §§ 33 et seq., 25 October 2007) and Shteyn (Stein) v. Russia (no. 23691/06, §§ 56 et seq., 18 June 2009).

Article 90 of the CCrP provides that “factual circumstances established in a court judgment ... which have acquired legal force, should be accepted by a court ... without additional verification. However, such a court judgment cannot predetermine the question of guilt of those persons who had not participated in [those] proceedings”.

Articles 61 – 63 of the CCrP describe situations in which a judge cannot sit on the bench in a particular case. The judge must withdraw if he is an injured party in that criminal case, if he has already participated in that criminal case in a different capacity (for example, as a representative of a party, as a witness, etc.), if he is a relative of any participant in the criminal proceedings, or “if there are other circumstances which give reason to believe that [the judge] is personally, directly or indirectly, interested in the outcome of the criminal case”. The judge whose impartiality is in doubt must withdraw of his own motion (Article 62 § 1); alternatively, a party to the proceedings may challenge a judge on those grounds (Article 62 § 2). Article 63 of the CCrP provides that the same judge cannot sit on the bench in the trial court and later in the court of appeal or in the supervisory review court in the same case. The same judge who sat on the bench during the first trial cannot remain in the composition if the case is remitted for re-trial. However, there are no rules governing the participation of the same judge in different, yet related, criminal cases.


Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Art. 3 (substantive aspect);Violation of Art. 5-1;Violation of Art. 5-5;Violation of Art. 8;Non-pecuniary damage - award

Anatoly Kovler;Christos Rozakis;Dean Spielmann;Elisabeth Steiner;George Nicolaou;Giorgio Malinverni;Sverre Erik Jebens

The applicant was born in 1975 and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in the Tomsk Region.

During the night of 4 to 5 November 2001 there was a theft from an administrative building in the village of Pospelikha, Altay Region. A fax machine, an electric kettle, a wristwatch and a desk clock were stolen. On 6 November 2001 the authorities opened a criminal inquiry and arrested a Mr A. During his interview, from 6 to 6.30 p.m., he admitted the theft and named the applicant as his accomplice. A search was carried out in the applicant's house; several compact discs, a radio receiver and a telephone set were seized.

It appears that at about 6 p.m. on the same evening the applicant was arrested at his home by two officers from the Pospelikha district police station in the Altay Region. The applicant was taken to the police station and placed in the temporary detention centre. At an unspecified time on the same day Mr S., an investigator with the Pospelikha district police, notified the Pospelikha district prosecutor of the applicant's arrest. The notification had no reference number and no indication of the hour.

According to the applicant, at 11 a.m. on 7 November 2001 he swallowed an open safety pin in order to protest against his allegedly unlawful arrest. He was taken to a public hospital for an X-ray examination, which confirmed the presence of a safety pin in his stomach. At about noon the applicant was brought back to the police station. Policemen stripped him down to his underwear and handcuffed both his hands to the bars in the lobby of the detention centre. At 7 p.m. he was given a chair. During the night he was allowed to sleep on the floor. He remained handcuffed, was given some water and tea but no food. The applicant was interviewed by an investigator on the morning of 8 November 2001. At 2 p.m. he felt sick and was examined by paramedics. At 5 p.m. the applicant was released.

According to the Government, at 8 p.m. on 7 November 2001 the applicant swallowed an open safety pin. After he had been examined at the hospital, he was brought back to the police station. He threatened to slit his veins. He was taken out of the cell, inspected and handcuffed with one hand to metal bars. He remained under the supervision of the on-duty officer. At night the applicant was given a mattress and bedding. The handcuffs were regularly moved from one hand to the other. The applicant was taken to a toilet, at his request, and was given water and tea. On the morning of 8 November 2001 investigator S. interviewed the applicant. At or around 1 p.m. the applicant alleged that he felt sick because he had swallowed a razor blade. He was examined by paramedics, who found that the complaint was false.

On 9 November 2001 Mr A. was interviewed again and stated that he had committed the theft alone. It does not appear that the applicant was subsequently prosecuted for the theft committed during the night of 4 to 5 November 2001. It appears, however, that he was sentenced to a prison term in relation to other criminal offences.

As can be seen from an undated certificate issued by the Prosecutor's Office of the Pospelikha District, the arrested persons' register and the arrest notification register for 2001 did not contain any information that the applicant had been arrested between 6 and 8 November 2001 under Article 122 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure.

In February 2003 the applicant sued the Pospelikha district police station for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by his allegedly unlawful detention and handcuffing on 7 and 8 November 2001. By a judgment of 3 April 2003 the Pospelikha District Court dismissed his claim. The applicant was neither present nor represented at the hearing. On 23 July 2003 the Altay Regional Court quashed the judgment on the ground that the applicant's attendance had not been secured, and remitted the matter for a fresh examination. The Ministry of Finance joined the resumed proceedings as a co-defendant.

By a judgment of 22 September 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant's claim. On the basis of testimony by investigator S., it found that the applicant had been lawfully detained from 6 to 8 November 2001 with a view to dispelling or confirming the suspicion of his involvement in the theft. The District Court further found that the use of handcuffs had also been lawful and justified. In so finding, it took statements from witnesses: another detainee, Mr Z., and two on-duty officers, Po. and Mr Pu. They stated that the applicant had been verbally abusive and had shouted, banged at the door, incited to mass disorder and threatened to slit his veins with a razor blade. He had been handcuffed to prevent mass disorder and self-harm. While handcuffed, he had been given food and drink and a mattress to sleep on during the night, and had also been allowed to use the toilet. The District Court found that the use of handcuffs from 8 p.m. on 7 November to 1 p.m. on 8 November 2001 had been compatible with the requirements of section 45 of the Custody Act for the prevention of mass disorder or attempts to inflict self-harm (see paragraph 41 below). In the District Court's view, the application of handcuffs had not impaired the applicant's rights, inflicted physical suffering or diminished his honour or dignity.

On 10 December 2003 the Altay Regional Court upheld the judgment. It noted that the applicant's deprivation of liberty had been in compliance with Russian law and the Convention because he had been lawfully arrested for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offense.

In the meantime, in September 2003 the applicant had asked the Altay regional prosecutor to open a criminal case against the police officers who had been allegedly responsible for his unlawful detention and handcuffing.

On 29 September 2003 Mr M., an investigator with the Pospelikha district prosecutor's office, refused to institute criminal proceedings. He noted that the Pospelikha district police station possessed no documents or records concerning the applicant's arrest in November 2001. He took a statement from investigator S., who denied that he had ever detained the applicant as a suspect. On the strength of that evidence the investigator concluded that the applicant had not been arrested or detained at the police station from 6 to 8 November 2001.

On 23 October 2003 the Pospelikha district prosecutor annulled Mr M.'s decision and asked his deputy, Mr Ch., to resume the inquiry.

By a decision of 4 November 2003 Ch. refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant's allegations. He had not interviewed the applicant in person but instead quoted his statements to the District Court. He had interviewed investigator S., who had retracted his earlier statement and stated that he had apprehended the applicant as a suspect. A record of the arrest had been properly compiled, but after the applicant's release, he had taken it away from the police station with a view to putting it in the file but had subsequently mislaid it. Mr Ch. also interviewed the director and deputy director of the temporary detention centre, who claimed that the record of the arrest had been properly drafted and that the handcuffs had been applied to prevent self-harm. Two on-duty officers testified in the same vein. Relying on those statements and the findings of the District Court in the civil proceedings (see paragraph 14 above), Mr Ch. determined that the use of handcuffs had been lawful and justified.

By a judgment of 11 February 2004 the District Court upheld Ch.'s decision by way of judicial review. It found that the inquiry had been thorough and complete and that sufficient evidence of the lawfulness and reasonableness of the applicant's arrest and handcuffing had been collected. The District Court took note of the certificate from the head of the district police station showing that the record of the arrest and the detention registers for November 2001 had been destroyed after one year's storage. The District Court held in that connection that the “documents had been wrongly destroyed before the expiry of the correct retention period” but that there was no proof of malice on the part of the public officials. In the District Court's view, Ch. had not been required to hear the applicant in person because he had set out his allegations in sufficient detail. Nor had he been required to examine further witnesses, including other detainees, because the statements by police officers had been sufficient. Lastly, the District Court dismissed as insignificant the applicant's argument that the use of handcuffs had not been recorded in any reports, as required by domestic law.

On 30 September 2004 the Regional Court upheld the judgment.

By a letter of 7 September 2007 the Court informed the applicant that the present application had been communicated to the respondent Government. This letter was received at Rubtsovsk remand centre no. 22/4 on 29 October 2007 and was handed over to the applicant on an unspecified date. By a letter of 28 November 2007 the applicant was invited to submit before 30 January 2008 his comments on the Government's observations. This letter was received at the detention facility on 18 December 2007 and was handed over to him on or around 28 January 2008. By a letter of 8 January 2008 the applicant was provided with a copy of the English translation of the Government's observations. This letter was received at the detention facility on 17 January 2008 and was handed over to the applicant on 11 February 2008. The delays were due to the applicant's transfers between several detention facilities. All three letters were monitored and stamped by the prison staff.

It appears that on 20 May 2008 the detention facility dispatched a letter from the applicant to the Court. However, the letter was returned to the detention facility by the Russian Postal Service with a requirement to add stamp value and remove sellotape from the envelope. In October 2008 the Tayga Town Court of the Kemerovo Region held that the refusal to dispatch the letter for lack of funds was unlawful.

On 29 July, 28 August and 11 September 2009 the applicant's representative brought a number of complaints before the Court in relation to various restrictions concerning the correspondence between the applicant and the Court, as well as between the applicant and his representative before the Court (see below).

As can be seen from a certificate issued by the administration of colony no. 2 in the Tomsk Region, submitted by the Government, between August 2007 and September 2009 the applicant submitted a number of letters for dispatch to the Court. The register of outgoing correspondence contained various entries such as “complaint”, “petition”, “additional complaint”, “request concerning the course of proceedings”, “request concerning receipt of the previous letter”, “request concerning the list of previously submitted documents”, “complaint concerning a violation of his rights”. It appears that the entries for the letters submitted for dispatch in 2009 were marked as “sealed envelope” without any further indication of the contents.

On 29 January 2008 the International Protection Centre, a non-governmental organisation in Moscow, received a letter from the applicant enclosing an authority form for Ms Misakyan to represent him in the proceedings before the Court.

On 2 and 11 September, 16 October and 11 December 2008 and 12 March 2009 the applicant sent letters to Ms Misakyan at the address of the International Protection Centre. The letters were accompanied by covering notes by the facility administration, summarising their contents. On 6 June 2009 Ms Misakyan sent a letter to the applicant, who was then being held in prison hospital no. 1 in the Tomsk Region. The letter was monitored and stamped by the facility administration on 15 June 2009; the stamp was placed directly above the text of the letter. In the meantime, on 8 June 2009 the International Protection Centre had received a letter from the applicant, the envelope of which carries a stamp indicating that the letter had been inspected by a correspondence officer.

As can be seen from a certificate issued by the administration of colony no. 2 in the Tomsk Region, produced by the Government, in 2008 and 2009 the applicant submitted a number of letters for dispatch to Ms Misakyan at the address of the International Protection Centre. The register of outgoing correspondence contained various entries such as “request for legal assistance”, “complaint concerning the proceedings before the European Court”, “complaint”, “ letter – replies to questions from the European Court”, “request concerning legal assistance”, “request concerning samples of documents”, “request concerning translation”, and “personal letter”.

On 14 September 2009 the applicant's representative wrote to the administration of Tomsk prison no. 2 indicating that she was representing the applicant before the Court and that her correspondence with him should be treated as privileged and confidential.

On 5 October 2009 the applicant's representative sent a letter to the applicant by registered mail, indicating on the envelope “from advocate Misakyan”. This letter was returned to her with a note “not required because of the time-limit since 8 December 2009”.

In November and December 2009 the applicant submitted for dispatch three letters addressed to Ms Misakyan. The administration of the detention facilities dispatched these letters with notes indicating the number of pages in the correspondence. One of the notes was addressed to the International Protection Centre; the other two notes also indicated that the letters were addressed to “advocate Misakyan”.

Article 122 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure (RSFSR CCrP) allowed the arrest of a suspect (i) at the time of the offence or immediately thereafter; (ii) if eyewitnesses pointed to him as the perpetrator of the crime; or (iii) if the suspect bore or was in possession of evident traces of the crime or if such traces were found on his clothes or at his home. A record of the arrest was to be drawn up with an indication of the legal basis and the reasons for the arrest, its time and place, and a statement by the arrested person. A prosecutor was to be informed within twenty-four hours. After the receipt of the notification the prosecutor had forty-eight hours to authorise the arrested person's placement in custody or to order his release.

The arrested or detained suspect should be interviewed immediately or, if this was impossible, within twenty-four hours (Article 124).

Article 1069 of the Civil Code provides that damage caused by unlawful actions or inaction on the part of a public authority or a public official should be compensated. Article 1070 § 1 of the Code provided, at the time, that damage caused by unlawful prosecution or unlawful placement in custody should be compensated for in full by the State, irrespective of any fault by public officials. Article 1070 § 2 provides that other damage caused by unlawful activity on the part of the investigative authorities or the prosecutor's office should be compensated for under the rules laid down in Article 1069.

Article 23 § 2 of the Russian Constitution protects the confidentiality of correspondence and communications and allows restrictions on them only on the basis of a court order. Article 55 § 3 provides that rights and freedoms may be limited by a federal law in so far as is necessary for protecting the constitutional regime, morals, health, the rights and legitimate interests of others, and for ensuring national defence and security. The Constitutional Court has held that the above limitations could be imposed in relation to the deprivation of liberty of convicted persons and concomitant restrictions (decisions of 16 October 2003 and 17 October 2006).

Article 91 of the Code of Execution of Sentences provides that the incoming and outgoing correspondence of a convicted prisoner may be inspected. However, a convicted prisoner's correspondence with a court, a prosecutor's office, a public authority supervising detention facilities, a federal or regional ombudsman and the European Court of Human Rights should not be monitored. Convicted prisoners' correspondence with their defence counsel or other persons providing legal advice on legal grounds should not be monitored, except if the prison administration has confirmed information that the correspondence contains information aimed at criminal activity. In such situations the prison administration should issue a reasoned decision on monitoring the correspondence. In addition, under Rule 50 of the Internal Prison Regulations adopted by the Federal Ministry of Justice on 3 November 2005 (decree no. 205), outgoing correspondence should be put in a mailbox or handed over to the prison staff in an unsealed envelope, except if such correspondence is privileged.

The Supreme Court of Russia has examined the legality of the above legislation and held that it was aimed at “protecting the rights and legitimate interests of other persons” and did not violate the requirements of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, which, in turn, referred to “public safety” and “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. The court also held that the censorship rule was “nothing but” a way of exercising the right and thus could not be a violation of the right to correspondence; in any event, the censorship regime was subject to “constant control and supervision” (see decisions of 13 June and 5 September 2006).

On 26 December 2006 the Federal Ministry of Justice adopted Administrative Rules on the examination of detainees' complaints to public authorities (decree no. 383). The Rules provide that stationery and postal costs are to be paid in compliance with federal legislation (Rule 11). Correspondence addressed to a prosecutor, a court or a public authority supervising detention facilities, the federal or regional ombudsman or the European Court of Human Rights should not be inspected. Such correspondence should be dispatched to the addressee within one day in a sealed envelope (Rule 17). Correspondence addressed to other public authorities, non-governmental organisations or defence counsel should be dispatched within three days (Rule 18). Replies to “suggestions, applications and complaints” should be handed over to the detainee within three days of their receipt; the detainee should sign the record; and the correspondence may be included in the detainee's prison file (Rule 19). Since May 2009 such incoming correspondence is read out instead of being handed over to the detainee, and is compulsorily included in the prisoner's file; the detainee may purchase a copy of the correspondence for his personal use. Rule 54 of the Rules provides that in order to ensure the right of petition to the Court the prison administration should inform the detainee of the “procedure for making such applications” and provide him with an application form, the instructions for applications and the European Court's postal address.

Under section 20 of the Custody Act, persons detained on remand (suspects and accused) can only correspond through the intermediary of the detention facilities; detainees should pay for their own correspondence. The correspondence is inspected. If the correspondence contains information which may obstruct the criminal proceedings or support a criminal activity, such correspondence should not be dispatched or handed over to the detainee to whom it is addressed. The dispatch of outgoing correspondence or the handing over of incoming correspondence should be carried out within three days or as soon as it has been translated into Russian. If the detainee has left the detention facilities, the correspondence should be forwarded to the new address within three days. Under section 21 of the Custody Act, a detainee (suspect or accused) should dispatch his correspondence to State or municipal authorities and non-governmental organisations through the intermediary of detention facilities. Correspondence addressed to a prosecutor, a court, the federal or regional ombudsman or the European Court of Human Rights should not be monitored. Correspondence to other public authorities, non-governmental organisations or defence counsel should be examined by the administration of the detention facility and dispatched within three days.

Article 49 of the 2001 Code of Criminal Procedure defines “defence counsel” as a person who represents a suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings and provides him with legal advice. It also specifies that in order to act as defence counsel, an advocate should produce his certificate to practise law and an order from his law firm authorising representation of the person concerned.

Section 45 of the 1995 Custody Act provides that handcuffs may be used on a suspect or accused to put an end to his unlawful resistance, and to prevent him from escaping or from causing damage to others or himself.

The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers adopted Recommendation Rec(2006)2 to member States on the European Prison Rules, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

“23.1 All prisoners are entitled to legal advice, and the prison authorities shall provide them with reasonable facilities for gaining access to such advice.

23.2 Prisoners may consult on any legal matter with a legal adviser of their own choice and at their own expense.

23.3 Where there is a recognised scheme of free legal aid the authorities shall bring it to the attention of all prisoners.

23.4 Consultations and other communications including correspondence about legal matters between prisoners and their legal advisers shall be confidential.

23.5 A judicial authority may in exceptional circumstances authorise restrictions on such confidentiality to prevent serious crime or major breaches of prison safety and security.

23.6 Prisoners shall have access to, or be allowed to keep in their possession, documents relating to their legal proceedings...

24.1 Prisoners shall be allowed to communicate as often as possible by letter, telephone or other forms of communication with their families, other persons and representatives of outside organisations and to receive visits from these persons.

24.2 Communication and visits may be subject to restrictions and monitoring necessary for the requirements of continuing criminal investigations, maintenance of good order, safety and security, prevention of criminal offences and protection of victims of crime, but such restrictions, including specific restrictions ordered by a judicial authority, shall nevertheless allow an acceptable minimum level of contact.

24.3 National law shall specify national and international bodies and officials with whom communication by prisoners shall not be restricted.”

The 1996 European Agreement relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights reads as follows:

“The Contracting Parties shall respect the right of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Agreement to correspond freely with the Court.

As regards persons under detention, the exercise of this right shall in particular imply that:

... such persons shall have the right to correspond, and consult out of hearing of other persons, with a lawyer qualified to appear before the courts of the country where they are detained in regard to an application to the Court, or any proceedings resulting therefrom.

In application of the preceding paragraphs, there shall be no interference by a public authority except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, for the detection or prosecution of a criminal offence or for the protection of health.”

The Russian Federation is not a party to this Agreement.

The instrument of ratification of the Convention deposited by the Russian Federation on 5 May 1998 contained the following reservation:

“In accordance with Article 64 of the Convention, the Russian Federation declares that the provisions of Article 5 paragraphs 3 and 4 shall not prevent ... the temporary application, sanctioned by the second paragraph of point 6 of Section Two of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation, of the procedure for the arrest, holding in custody and detention of persons suspected of having committed a criminal offence, established by Article 11 paragraph 1, Article 89 paragraph 1, Articles 90, 92, 96, 961, 96-2, 97, 101 and 122 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure of 27 October 1960, with subsequent amendments and additions...”


Preliminary objection rejected (non-exhaustion);Violation of Art. 6-1;Violation of Art. 6-3-a;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

C. Russo;J.A. Carrillo Salcedo;N. Valticos

Mr Georg Brozicek was born in Czechoslovakia and now resides at Steinalben in the Federal Republic of Germany, of which country he is a national.

On 13 August 1975 the municipal police of Pietra Ligure (Savona) detained him on the public highway shortly after he had torn down some small ornamental flags erected in connection with a fête organised by a political party. The police, who had intervened at the request of one of the organisers, took him to the police station because he did not have any identity papers with him and, according to their version of events, because he had to be protected against the hostility of the participants. On this occasion he wounded one of the police officers.

On 14 August the carabinieri, who had also intervened on the previous day, submitted a report on the incident to the Savona Public Prosecutor's Office. On the same day Mr Brozicek sent a letter, in French, to the Police Chief (questore) of Savona, which was subsequently transmitted to the Public Prosecutor, who ordered its translation into Italian on 31 January 1976.

The Public Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation and on 23 February 1976 sent to the applicant - by registered letter requiring acknowledgment of receipt and bearing the address of the applicant's then residence in Nuremberg - a "judicial notification" (comunicazione giudiziaria; see paragraphs 24-25 below). It informed him that proceedings had been instituted against him for the offences of resisting the police and assault and wounding (Articles 337 and 582 of the Criminal Code). In addition, it invited him to appoint a defence lawyer of his choice and informed him that if he failed to do so Mr T. S., avvocato, would be appointed by the authorities.

On 1 March 1976 Mr Brozicek returned the document to the Public Prosecutor's Office with the following note (translation from the German):

"I return the enclosed document to the sender as I find it difficult to understand. In lodging my detailed complaint of 14 August - on which no action has yet been taken even though the facts complained of could have far-reaching consequences - and in all correspondence to date with the Italian authorities, I have always expressly requested that either the mother tongue of the persons concerned or one of the international official languages of the United Nations be used, in order to avoid from the outset any risk of misunderstanding."

The Public Prosecutor's Office received this letter on 3 March 1976. It did not send any reply and did not have the letter translated.

On 17 November 1978 the Public Prosecutor's Office sent to the applicant by registered letter requiring acknowledgment of receipt a second "judicial notification". In addition to the information contained in the first notification, it asked the applicant to provide an address for service in Italy (Article 177 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

On 5 December 1978 the German postal authorities returned the letter to the sender marked "unclaimed".

The acknowledgment of receipt bore the name "Brozicek", in a different space to that provided for the addressee's signature. The Government maintained that it was the applicant's signature but he has always denied this; he claimed that he had not received the communication because he had just moved house. The expert opinion ordered by the Court (see paragraphs 5 and 8 above) did not resolve this question.

By an order (decreto) of 13 December 1978 the Public Prosecutor stated that it had not been possible to notify the applicant and that "further enquiries at the place of birth and place of last residence" had not produced any result. He appointed a defence lawyer and directed that all the documents for notification to the accused during the investigation should thereafter be lodged at the secretariat of the Public Prosecutor's Office.

At the hearing before the European Court on 22 May 1989, the Government affirmed that the reference to further enquiries was probably an oversight. They maintained that the provision applied to the applicant was the second part of the second paragraph of Article 177 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure (concerning an accused who has given no address for service, see paragraph 26 below), which does not require such enquiries.

The Public Prosecutor summonsed Mr Brozicek to appear for examination on 30 December 1978, but to no avail, and, on that day, he asked the President of the Savona Regional Court to commit the applicant for trial.

The trial was set down for 3 November 1980 but when the time came the proceedings had to be adjourned because the date of the hearing had not been notified to the accused.

On 11 March 1981 the President of the Savona Court decided that any notification would be lodged with the court registry because the accused had not provided an address for service in Italy (Articles 170 and 177 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, see paragraph 26 below). He also appointed a lawyer to represent the accused.

After an adjournment for reasons extraneous to the proceedings, the trial took place on 1 July 1981.

On that date the applicant was convicted in absentia, sentenced to five months' imprisonment and ordered to pay the costs. The sentence was, however, suspended and no reference to the conviction was to be included in criminal-record certificates issued at the request of private individuals.

This decision too was notified to the applicant by being lodged at the court registry because, still pursuant to Article 177 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the president of the court had again noted, on 2 July, that Mr Brozicek had not provided an address for service in Italy.

As there was no appeal, the judgment became final on 7 July 1981.

On 5 May 1984 the applicant received a letter from the Principal Public Prosecutor at the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). The letter informed him of his conviction by judgment of the Savona court of 1 July 1981, which had become final on 7 July 1981, and that the conviction had been entered in the German criminal records (Article 52 of the Criminal Records Act, Bundeszentralregistergesetz).

On 7 May Mr Brozicek lodged an application with the Commission, stating, inter alia, that "the possibilities for appealing [were] manifestly time-barred under Italian law ...". On the same day he also wrote to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ministry of Justice.

In his letter to the German Ministry he requested its assistance in securing, as soon as possible, the rectification or the annulment of the Savona judgment.

In his letter to the Italian Ministry he claimed that he had not received any information in his own language on the trial and had been unable to defend himself because neither the indictment nor the judgment had been notified to him. He asked what possibilities of appealing against the decision were open to him.

On 5 October the Italian Ministry replied that he could lodge an appeal against the judgment outside the normal time-limits (hereinafter referred to as a "late appeal"; see paragraph 26 below), if the notification to him had not been lawfully made, and seek a retrial.

The applicant did not avail himself of either of these possibilities.

The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany at Genoa to determine whether there was any possibility of appealing against the judgment of 1 July 1981. As the first result of its communications with the Savona court, the Consulate forwarded to the applicant, on 10 July 1989, a photocopy of the Italian text of the judgment, which was for the most part handwritten. Mr Brozicek acknowledged receipt of this text by a letter dated 18 July 1984.

A judicial notification is the document by which the judicial authorities inform the person suspected of having committed an offence that an investigation has been opened and invite him to appoint a defence lawyer of his choice and to provide an address for service. It must specify the legal provisions infringed and the date of the alleged offence.

The investigating judge, in the event of a "formal" investigation, or the public prosecutor, where the investigation is "summary", must send the notification at the very beginning of their investigation (Articles 304 and 390 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

The notification must be sent by registered letter requiring acknowledgment of receipt. If the letter is not delivered because the addressee is untraceable (irreperibile), a bailiff must serve the notification in accordance with the normal procedure (Articles 168-175 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

In its Foti and Others judgment of 10 December 1982 and its Colozza judgment of 12 February 1985 (Series A no. 56, p. 12, §§ 33-36, and Series A no. 89, p. 11, §§ 18-19, and pp. 12-13, §§ 21-23) the Court gave a brief description of the Italian legislation then in force as regards the notification to a person or an accused who is "untraceable", trial in absentia (contumacia) and "late appeal" (appello apparentemente tardivo).

In this regard Article 177 bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows (translation from the Italian):

"Where there is precise information in the documents in the proceedings as to the place where the accused resides abroad, the Public Prosecutor or trial judge (pretore) shall send him by registered letter notification of the proceedings against him with an invitation to declare or otherwise give notice of an address for service in the place where the proceedings are conducted. This formality shall neither suspend nor delay the proceedings.

Where the accused's address abroad is unknown or where he has not declared or otherwise given notice of an address for service or if the information provided by him is insufficient or inadequate, the judge or the public prosecutor shall make the order (decreto) provided for in Article 170.

The above provisions shall not apply where the issue of an arrest warrant is mandatory."

The second sub-paragraph of Article 170 states that (translation from the Italian):

"The judge or the public prosecutor ... shall take a decision appointing a defence lawyer to act for the accused where he does not yet have one in the place where the proceedings are conducted and ordering that notification which has proved or proves impossible to carry out be effected by means of lodging the relevant documents at the registry of the judicial organ before which the proceedings are pending. The defence lawyer shall be informed without delay of any such notification."

The possibility of lodging a "late appeal" was at the time derived from judicial interpretation of Articles 500 and 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which (translation from the Italian):

"In the case of in absentia proceedings, an extract of the decision or judgment shall be notified to the accused who may lodge against it any appeal that would have been open to him in respect of a judgment delivered in adversarial proceedings, subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 199."

For the decisions or judgments referred to in Article 500, the period within which the accused may appeal shall begin to run from the notification of the decision or judgment.

On the basis of these provisions the courts had consistently held that if the notification of an extract of a decision or judgment delivered in absentia was not lawful because it had been wrongly assumed that the accused did not intend to participate in the proceedings, the person concerned could, within three days, contest such notification and challenge the finality of the decision in question. If he was successful in so doing, he was accorded a new time-limit within which to appeal against the said decision.

The new Code of Criminal Procedure, which came into force on 24 October 1989, now makes express provision for this possibility of "re-establishing the time-limit".


No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Paul Lemmens

The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Prem. She is the mother of Simon Volk, who was born in 1983.

On 14 January 2008 the applicant’s son was convicted of rape, grievous bodily harm and deprivation of liberty. He was sentenced to three years and four months in prison. On 11 November 2008 he started serving his prison sentence in Dob Prison.

The applicant’s son had been dependent on drugs since 2001. As a part of his medical treatment in prison he received substitutes for opiates, such as Suboxon, Sanval, which is a hypnotic, Serguel, which is an antipsychotic drug, and Zoloft, which is an anti-depressant. Before beginning his sentence, the applicant’s son made an appointment at a drug dependency treatment centre at a psychiatric hospital. Its report, dated 7 October 2008, shows that he had stated that he wished to be hospitalised, but had failed to meet the conditions, namely abstinence. On 6 November 2008 the applicant’s son was examined privately by a psychiatrist, who noted that he had no sign of abstinence and was referred to his general practitioner for treatment for drug dependency.

As regards the facilities available to the applicant’s son in the cells and common areas in Dob Prison, as well as the health care regime in the prison and the conditions imposed on him regarding activities outside the cells and contact with the outside world, see the Court’s decision in the case of Lalić and Others v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 5711/10 etc., 27 September 2011.

As regards drug users, the prison offers medical (including methadone substitution) treatment and therapeutic help in accordance with a specialised drug treatment programme. Prisoners who successfully undergo methadone substitution treatment are able to undergo detoxification, which normally takes three to four weeks. Further rehabilitation of previous drug users is provided in the drug-free sections of the prison, to which only those prisoners who are no longer dependent on drugs and who are no longer undergoing opiate replacement therapy may be assigned.

When he arrived in Dob Prison, the applicant’s son underwent an admission interview, conducted by a social worker, which, apart from his dependency problem, did not show anything giving rise to particular concern. On 12 November 2008 he was examined by a doctor, who prescribed him substitution therapy for drug dependency. On the same day he was seen by a drug abuse therapist.

The applicant’s son was initially placed in a seven-square-metre cell, which he shared with another prisoner. Between 17 November 2008 and 12 February 2009 he was accommodated in cell 1, Block 2. The cell, in which fifteen prisoners were held, measured about 60 square metres.

On 20 November 2008 the applicant’s son developed an infection in his right arm and underwent surgery on 24 November 2008. Between 25 November and 2 December 2008 his wound was cleaned and dressed daily.

On 12 and 26 November 2008 the applicant asked the Dob Prison authorities to move her son to Koper Prison. She stated that the latter prison was closer to their home and had better living conditions. She also stated that her son was often ill and was in hospital at the time of the request. Her request was rejected on the grounds that proper medical assistance could also be provided in Dob Prison.

In the meantime, the prison psychologist saw the applicant’s son on 25 November 2008. He noted, inter alia, that no serious mental difficulties or suicidal tendencies could be observed. On 5 December 2008 a prison social worker N.B., held a meeting with the applicant, her son and his sister. The applicant inquired about the prison regime and repeated her requests for a transfer for her son.

On 1 December 2008 the applicant told the drug abuse therapist that he was in crisis with his drug dependency and that he had stopped taking his substitution medication. The therapist informed him of the possible treatments for his drug dependency in the prison. On 8 December 2008 the applicant had a consultation with the psychologist. On 9 December 2008 the general practitioner noted in the report that the applicant had stopped taking the substitution medication.

On 10 December 2008 a “personal plan” (osebni načrt) was set up for the applicant’s son. Referring to the judgment by which he had been convicted and the report from the drug abuse therapist, the plan noted that the applicant’s son’s substitution therapy should be monitored and that he should be encouraged to deal with his drug dependency. It was envisaged that a urine test be regularly taken; that he have special psychological therapy with regard to the criminal offence he had committed; and that he be given the opportunity to continue his primary education. It was also noted that social worker N.B. was the officer responsible for his case.

On 11 December 2008 the applicant’s son had a consultation with the drug abuse therapist. On the same day he was also introduced to leisure activities provided by the prison. It was agreed that he would attend such activities for three hours every Wednesday. However, he attended only three times and after 7 January 2009 he gave up the enrolment.

On 22 December 2008 a meeting was held with the applicant’s son. The report prepared by the head of Block 2 following the meeting does not reveal anything untoward.

On 15 January 2009 the applicant’s son told the psychiatrist that he had started taking heroin again. He told the drug abuse therapist, whom he saw the same month, the same thing. During January 2009 the applicant’s son also had two consultations with the psychologist.

On 5 February 2009 the applicant’s son was seen by a social worker, following an “urgent request” in which he complained about extortion by his co-inmate, S.B., from other inmates, including himself. The applicant’s son gave a statement on the record in which he alleged that S.B. had taken money from him, as well as clothes and slippers. On 6 February 2009 S.B. was moved to Block 1 (high-security regime).

In the evening of 9 February 2009, two guards entered the cell and found the applicant’s son using a wet towel to cool his face. He told them that he had been attacked by D.M. because of a dispute over a USB network key. The operative head of the prison then talked to both prisoners, who reached agreement. After the incident, the applicant’s son’s personal belongings were searched. It was discovered that his computer was connected to the internet and drugs were found in his cupboard. The computer and the drugs were seized. Following the search, the applicant’s son repeatedly said that he would cut or hang himself and that he would not survive the night. The applicant’s son was then transferred to a special cell with video surveillance, where he remained from 10.55 p.m. On 10 February 2009 a report noting these events was prepared by the prison guard who was on duty that evening.

At 10.55 a.m. on 10 February 2009 the applicant’s son was returned to an ordinary regime. Before this transfer he was seen by the head of Block 2. According to the report prepared by the head, the applicant’s son had said that he had had no intention of committing suicide and that he had calmed down. It was also noted that he had refused to be examined by a doctor, as he had not sustained any injuries. Lastly, the report noted that the psychologist had talked to the applicant’s son and that the prison guards had been informed that they needed to pay special attention to him.

On 11 February 2009 the head of Block 2 and the prison psychologist held a meeting with the applicant, her son and his sister. The report of the meeting notes that the applicant alleged that her son was in danger and that it was no surprise that he was on drugs. They also discussed the incident of 9 February 2009 and the applicant’s transfer request. As regards the latter, the prison officers explained to the applicant that her son could not simply be moved to Block 3 or 4, and informed her that the prisoner who had extorted money from the applicant (presumably S.B.) was now being held in a high-security block (i.e. Block 1). The next day, 12 February 2009, the applicant was transferred to Block 1. The decision referred to his drug problem, refusal to give urine samples and possession of illegal items. His transfer to Block 1 implied that he could only have two hours of outdoor exercise and was not allowed to spend time in the recreation room. He was allowed to receive visits of an hour’s duration, and to use the telephone in accordance with the daily schedule. When leaving the cell he was accompanied by a guard and he could spend time outdoors only in the Block 1 yard. Two prisoners were allowed to be in the same area of the yard, under supervision. the applicant’s son was held in cells 32, 21 and 41.

On 18 February and 4 March 2009 social worker N.B. invited the applicant’s son for a consultation, but he refused. He also refused to have a consultation with the drug abuse therapist on 25 March and 15 April 2009. However, in February 2009 the applicant’s son had one consultation with the drug abuse therapist and three with the psychologist. In March 2009 he saw the drug abuse therapist once and the psychologist twice. Moreover, between 19 January and 23 March 2009 the applicant’ son had six consultations with the psychiatrist, in which they discussed his drug dependency and substitution therapy.

The applicant made further requests for a transfer for her son, which were refused on 18 March 2009.

On 23 March the team of officers dealing with the applicant’s son’s case decided that he should be moved to Block 3.

On 25, 27 and 31 March 2009 social worker N.B. held meetings with the applicant’s son. They discussed transferring him to an ordinary regime, where he would be able to participate in a drug treatment group and attend school as well as take part in leisure activities. They also discussed his problem with debt. The applicant’s son said that he had a debt of 200 euros (EUR) but he did not fear the person to whom he owed the money. He had more concern about a certain I.N., to whom he owed EUR 130 and whom he might meet on the yard if transferred. He added that he would not provoke I.N. When reminded, on 31 March 2009, that it was planned to transfer him to Block 3, the applicant’s son requested that this be delayed for at least a month. He said he did not feel strong enough to reject drugs if they were offered to him. He was reminded that he was continuing to refuse to give urine samples, which was an indication that he was taking drugs while in Block 1.

Following the meeting with social worker N.B. on 31 March 2009 (see paragraph 27 above), at which he had opposed the idea of being transferred to an ordinary regime, a decision was taken that he should stay in Block 1.

Following unsuccessful attempts to reach the Head of the Administration for the Execution of Prison Sentences (“the Administration”) by email or telephone, the applicant sent him a letter on 26 March 2009. She complained about the refusal of her request for transfer, stating that it was clear from the documentation available to the prison authorities that her son had lodged a complaint against S.B. and that she had asked for him to be transferred out of the cell following the attack by D.M. She also complained that the applicant’s son had previously been in a cell with sixteen prisoners, although the statutory limit was eight prisoners, and that, unlike in Koper Prison, in Dob Prison he was not provided with the opportunity to study or work. She also stated that of 510 prisoners 470 were taking drugs and that one psychiatrist was employed for less than six hours a day and was not sufficiently accessible. This letter was treated as an appeal and rejected by the Administration on 16 April 2009. The latter reiterated that Koper Prison did not provide any special psychological treatment targeted at her son’s drug abuse and the offence he had committed, and that Dob Prison had sufficient means at its disposal to ensure his safety.

It would appear that on 8 April 2009 the governor of Dob Prison requested, of his own motion, that the applicant’s son be transferred to Koper Prison, stating that this would have a positive effect on his motivation for realisation of his “personal plan”.

On 6, 14 and 16 April 2009 the applicant’s son saw the psychologist.

On 15 April 2009 it was ordered that the applicant’s visits to her son should be held behind a glass partition. The decision referred to the fact that following visits from his sister and the applicant on 4 and 15 April 2009 he was found to be in possession of a presumably illegal substance.

On 16 April 2009, during a conversation with a psychiatrist, the applicant’s son became very upset and threatened to harm himself. The prison governor ordered that he be placed in a single cell under supervision and afterwards remain in Block 1.

On 20 April 2009 the psychiatrist had a discussion with the applicant about her son’s situation. The applicant’s son was also examined by the psychiatrist. At that examination he said that he wished to reduce substitution therapy. He also confirmed that he had had suicidal thoughts twice before. The physiatrist prescribed him substitute therapy and anti-stress medication. The applicant’s son saw the psychologist the same day.

On 24 April and 6 May 2009 social worker N.B. invited the applicant’s son for a consultation, but he refused to attend.

On 12 May 2009 social worker N.B. and the prison governor held a meeting with the applicant and her son. The applicant stressed that her son was in danger and referred to her requests that he be transferred.

In the meantime, on 4 May 2009 the applicant’s son reported to the prison authorities that he had been attacked by an inmate from the same cell and asked to be transferred to another cell.

On 11 May 2009 the Head of the Administration issued a decision refusing the request by the governor of Dob Prison on the grounds already given in the previous decisions (see paragraphs 13 and 29 above), but ordered of his own motion a temporary placement of the applicant’s son in Koper Prison for the period between 20 May and 20 November 2009.

On 14 May 2009 a report was sent to Koper Prison, which noted the applicant’s son’s addiction problem and his fear of fellow inmates to whom he owed money. It was also mentioned in the report that officers from Dob Prison had noticed that a certain prisoner was putting pressure on the applicant and was demanding that he return money.

On 22 and 27 May 2009 the applicant’s son was examined by a general practitioner in Koper Prison, who noted that he had not been taking substitution medication.

On 5 July 2009, after a visit from his mother and sister, the applicant’s son was found to be in possession of a bag containing forty-nine tablets, which had been hidden in a shampoo bottle. Because of this incident, as well as because of his lack of interest in education and drug rehabilitation, the applicant’s son was returned to Dob Prison on 20 July 2009.

Following his return to Dob Prison, the applicant’s son was interviewed by a prison officer, who noted in a special questionnaire that he had a history of drug abuse and attempted suicide. The doctor who examined him noted that his medical condition remained unchanged. The applicant’s son was placed in a single cell 20 (7.4 square metres) in Block 1. The electric light in this cell was not functioning.

On 23 July 2009 the drug abuse therapist held a consultation with the applicant’s son. The latter said that he wished to discontinue the substitution therapy, but did not want to participate in drug therapy or give urine samples. He also alleged that he had intended to use the tablets he had been found to possess in Koper Prison to “clean himself”.

On 7 August 2009 the psychologist discussed a “personal plan” with the applicant’s son.

On 9 August 2009 the applicant’s son lodged a request to be given leave to bring into his cell certain objects, such as an electric extension cable, a USB key and so on, which was granted on 10 August 2009.

On 13 August 2009 the applicant was transferred to single cell 21 in Block 1, which was identical to cell 20 but had functioning electricity.

During his stay in Dob Prison the applicant’s son sent thirty-seven letters and received nineteen packages. He had telephone contact with his father, his sister and the applicant. He was visited regularly by the applicant and by his sister. He was allowed to bring in his computer, radio, headphones, boxing equipment and so on. In the period between 15 December and 23 March 2009 the applicant’s son participated in the “Bridge to education” programme. He attended forty-eight hours of this course.

On 14 August 2009, the technical facilities in the cell were inspected and the applicant’s son was given a DVD player, a night light and some other items for personal use brought in by his mother. Between 11.40 a.m. and midday the applicant telephoned his mother. Beforehand, while waiting for the telephone in the corridor, he was attacked by prisoner S.B. The security camera footage from the staircase area at the time of the attack, which was submitted to the Court, show that S.B. and the applicant’s son met at the stairs and that the former swung his hand towards the latter and grabbed or attempted to grab him, possibly around the neck. S.B. is then seen leaving, being followed by the guard who was rushing after him. These events took fourteen seconds.

At 6.50 p.m., in the context of regular supervision when the guard changed, two guards on day duty entered cell no. 20 and saw the applicant’s son sitting smoking. They later said that the applicant’s son looked at them and greeted them and that he seemed normal, as he had earlier in the day. At 7.25 p.m. two guards from the night shift opened cell 20 for a nurse to deliver the prescribed medication. They found the applicant’s son hanging from a water pipe by his bed sheet. The nurse examined him and concluded that he was dead. At 7.40 p.m. a doctor arrived. Officers from a local police station arrived at the scene at around 8 p.m. The investigating judge on duty was informed of the incident but declined to attend. According to a report dated 15 August 2009 the doctor found that the applicant’s son had died as a result of suicide, that there were no signs of violence and that the cause of suicide was a depressive syndrome and drug addiction. The remains were taken to a hospital, where an autopsy was carried out.

Immediately after the death of her son, the applicant requested the police to seize the applicant’s son’s personal file kept in the prison, which they did.

Following the death of the applicant’s son, one report was prepared by M., head of security at Dob Prison, and another by a three-member commission formed within the Administration.

The first report, which is dated 15 August 2009, concluded:

“We regret the incident. The prisoner was a known drug addict when he started serving his sentence. Due to his drug addiction, the enforcement of the prison sentence was very difficult ... Due to his drug addiction, [the applicant’s son] soon got into trouble with other inmates and suffered mental difficulties.

It is our assessment that the treatment of the prisoner was lawful, respectful and professional ...

We believe that the prisoner’s suicide could not have been prevented, due to the complexity of his problems.”

On 17 August 2008 the Head of the Administration appointed a three-member commission to investigate the circumstances of the applicant’s son’s death. The commission held interviews with the two prison guards who were on duty on the day of the suicide, the prison psychologist, certain prisoners, the nurse who was present at the scene of the suicide, the governor, and the Head of Unit 1, S.Ž,, and examined documents which remained available after the seizure. It issued a report on 28 August 2009. According to the report, the prison doctor and S.Ž. stated that the applicant’s son had not shown any suicidal tendencies. It noted that the applicant’s son had not reported the conflict he had with S.B. on the day of his death, which was only observed when the video recordings were inspected after the suicide. The commission concluded:

“According to the assessment made by the commission, the treatment [of the applicant’s son] was lawful, respectful and professional. However, by his conduct and actions the prisoner contributed to several conflict situations, which the authorities could not entirely prevent. The fact that the prisoner was often transferred within the establishment as well as to Koper Prison demonstrates that efforts were made to ensure his safety....The commission also notes that the deceased never reported maltreatment by or conflicts with the prison staff. It was also denied by the prisoners heard by the commission that the deceased was maltreated, threatened or intimidated by prison staff.

On the basis of the established facts, the commission concludes that the [authorities of] Dob Prison could not have prevented the suicide of the deceased.”

On 22 September 2009 the governor of Dob Prison sent the Administration an additional report, focusing on the conflict between the applicant’s son and S.B. It noted that the contact between the applicant’s son and S.B. took six seconds. Having regard to the statements of prison staff and a prisoner who were near the staircase at the time in question and did not observe or hear anything, as well as to the fact that the applicant’s son sustained no injuries, it was unlikely that S.B. had hit the applicant. The report also noted that the prison staff was of the opinion that there had been much more conflict going on than had actually been observed by them, and that some inmates claimed that the applicant’s son had debts amounting to a total of around EUR 5,000. According to the report, the telephone booths were situated near the staircase and inmates often encountered each other there. This was a known problem, and efforts to change the system were under way. The report suggested that it would have been easier for the applicant’s son to serve a sentence in a smaller prison and that a systemic solution to cases such as his would have been isolation from other inmates, which was legally and practically impossible at the material time.

Previously, on 23 March 2009, the applicant had lodged a criminal complaint against the prisoners who had allegedly intimidated and beaten her son on several occasions. Her statement given to the police read, as far as relevant, as follows:

“Simon started serving his sentence in 2008. He was placed in Building 2. There, he was intimidated by a prisoner called ... [S.B.], who would take his things (money and other things) and beat him (for example, every day he would wait for him outside the bathroom, slap him and demand that Simon give him everything he had). This was confirmed by another prisoner ... who shared a cell with Simon. [Further to complaints from Simon and another prisoner]... [S.B.] was transferred to Building 1 ... Simon was then beaten by a prisoner ... [D.M] on 9 February 2009 ... Immediately after that attack, Simon reported the incident to the prison guards and told them that he would cut his throat (this is what the administration told me). For that reason, Simon was put under video surveillance for twelve hours in a special room ... On 12 February 2009 Simon was moved to Building 1 and since then he has been afraid to leave the room ... He is afraid of ... [S.B and D.M.], who were also moved to this building ... so that now all three of them are there ...

I asked for a transfer for my son ... but was unsuccessful on the grounds that I failed to bring evidence showing that Simon was in danger.

I am very afraid for the safety of my son ... Simon is also very very afraid. I wish they would transfer him anywhere, just away from here, as he still has eighteen months to serve ...”

The police forwarded the above criminal complaint to the Novo Mesto District Prosecutor (“the Prosecutor”). On 6 April 2009 the Prosecutor requested the police to collect evidence and requested that the case be examined as a priority. Subsequently, the police forwarded to him a report which included a statement by the applicant’s son. The latter told the officers that he had no interest in pursing the proceedings and that it was his father who had started them. On 14 August 2009 the Prosecutor again requested the police to collect evidence, in particular as regards the allegations concerning D.M. and a certain I.N., who was also mentioned by the applicant at some point. He instructed them to question the suspects as well as prison staff, and also to investigate what measures were being taken by the prison staff to monitor the applicant’s son and what the prison authorities’ findings were as regards the applicant’s son’s endangerment and debts.

Following the applicant’s son’s death, on 14 August 2009 the police secured the evidence at the scene and ordered an autopsy. They took statement from, inter alia, the inmates who had had contact with the applicant’s son and seized the video recordings of his contact with S.B. on the day of the suicide. On 15 August 2009 the police interviewed the applicant. On the same day a hospital autopsy report was issued. It stated that there were no signs of violence on the applicant’s son’s body and found that the death had been caused by hanging.

On 15 August 2009 the applicant complained to Trebnje Police Station about the conditions of her son’s detention, and alleged that she had not been taken seriously by prison officers, in particular the governor, J.P.

On 17 August 2009 the applicant told Novo Mesto Police that a prisoner from Dob Prison had called her the previous day to tell her that her son had been attacked by another prisoner shortly before his suicide and that the prison officers had done nothing to stop the attack. She also alleged that her son had died in suspicious circumstances and that the head of Block 1, S.Ž., had intimidated her son. She further alleged that the authorities had not adequately responded to her warnings about the fragile mental state of her son and his risk of suicide. On the same day the applicant also went to Trebnje Police Station, where she alleged that her son had been beaten up prior to his death, that the head of Block 1, S.Ž., had threatened her son and had moved him to a cell with no amenities on 13 August 2009. She also alleged that governor J.P. performed his duties in a negligent manner. On the same day the investigating judge on duty ordered a new autopsy to be carried out by the Institute for Forensic Medicine to establish the exact cause of death, whether there were injuries on the body, and whether prompt help could have prevented the death.

An autopsy report was prepared by the Institute for Forensic Medicine on 28 August 2009. It showed no injuries on the body which could have been caused by the use of violence; it noted suicide as the certain cause of death. It also noted that the applicant’s son was not under the influence of drugs and that the death could have been prevented only if he had been found no more than five minutes after the hanging.

On 14 September 2009 the applicant alleged at the Novo Mesto District Prosecutor’s office that her son’s suicide had been caused by the extortion by S.B. and his attack on the day of her son’s death. She also alleged that the prison guards should be held responsible for the attack, which they could have prevented.

On 15 September 2009 the Prosecutor ordered the police to collect evidence concerning the suspects referred to by the applicant, to conduct interviews with the prison guards and relevant inmates and to prepare a report concerning the video recordings.

On 23 September 2009 the applicant reported to Ilirska Bistrica Police her suspicion that her son had been murdered in the prison. She said that her son took a large number of tablets, then lost consciousness and was hanged by the prison guards.

On 8 October 2009 the Prosecutor sent a letter to police urging them to collect evidence, as previously requested by him. He emphasised the need for an extensive and thorough investigation of the allegations made by the applicant. He also stated that the investigation should be based on direct taking of evidence by police, and gave them certain instructions in this regard.

On 23 October 2009 a forensic report was issued. It found that the fingerprints at the scene of the suicide were those of the applicant’s son.

On 2 November 2009 the police submitted their report concerning the applicant’s allegations. It transpires from the report that the police had questioned, among others, the head of Block 1 S.Ž., the social worker N.B. and nine inmates. The report referred also to the findings of autopsy reports, the toxicological report, the applicant’s son’s prison file and his diary. It noted that the time of death was sometime between 6.50 p.m. and 7.25 p.m.

On 19 November 2009 the Prosecutor requested that a criminal investigation be opened against S.B. concerning the criminal offence of extortion. His request was upheld by the investigating judge. A number of witnesses, including prisoners who knew the applicant’s son and the applicant, were heard. S.B. stated in those proceedings that the applicant’s son had sold everything he had for drugs and had borrowed money from co-inmates, but not from him. According to S.B., the applicant’s son, in order to get more money from his family, falsely reported to authorities that he and D.M. had been extorting money from him. This had had consequences for S.B. as he had been moved to Block 1 for eleven months. S.B. also admitted that he had met the applicant’s son at the staircase on the day of his death. He said that the applicant’s son had greeted him and that he in response had pushed him, saying that he did not have the right to greet him as he had been the reason for his transfer to Block 1. As there was insufficient evidence that S.B. had extorted money from the applicant’s son, and in particular there was insufficient proof that the applicant’s son had owed anything to S.B., the prosecutor eventually discontinued the proceedings (on 24 March 2010). The applicant subsequently took them over in her capacity as a subsidiary prosecutor. The proceedings are currently pending trial.

On 19 November 2009 the Prosecutor requested the police to take further measures to investigate the allegations concerning the alleged lack of protection of the applicant’s son by prison staff and ill-treatment by fellow inmates, in particular I.N. and D.M. He also requested that the role of the prison governor J.P. be explored.

On 16 December 2010 the police obtained a forensic report which indicated that the handwriting on the letter found next to the body was that of the applicant’s son.

On 30 December 2009 and 1 and 25 February 2010 the applicant lodged further criminal complaints against named prisoners and prison officials, including the governor J.P. and the head of Block 1, S.Ž. She alleged, inter alia, that they had committed the criminal offence of negligence by denying her son access to psychiatric care. The Prosecutor subsequently requested the police to question the relevant prison staff with regard to these allegations.

On 20 May 2010 the Prosecutor rejected the applicant’s criminal complaints concerning the criminal offences of extortion, endangering the security of a person, murder, abuse of office, violation of human dignity by abuse of power, and theft allegedly committed against the applicant’s son by fellow inmates or prison staff. The written reasons given for the Prosecutor’s decision, which is eighteen pages long, refer to, inter alia, statements by prisoners. While most of them did not indicate anything which would attract particular attention, two of them testified that the applicant’s son prior to his death had mentioned to them that he was unhappy about not having a television, and that he had said he did not feel well, but did not mention suicide. One also said that the applicant’s son had told him that he wanted to sue the Head of Block 1, S.Ž. Prisoner I.N. said that the applicant’s son had been addicted to heroin and spent EUR 40 to 50 on drugs per day. I.N. said that he had lent him EUR 470, and had taken his jacket as EUR 200 of it. The decision further refers to the analysis of the video recordings and to the limited contact between the applicant’s son and S.B. It also notes that S.B. was sanctioned in disciplinary proceedings for an attack on the applicant’s son. The decision moreover refers to statements by S.Ž., who said during questioning by the police that he had been in daily contact with the applicant’s son in the days preceding his death. After his return from Koper Prison, S.Ž. had not noticed any changes in his behaviour which would indicate that he was a suicide risk. According to S.Ž., the applicant’s son wished to stay in a single cell and the fact that there was no light in cell 20 did not appear to bother him. Moreover, he seemed content on 13 August 2009, after being moved to a new cell. S.Ž. also said that the applicant called the prison authorities on an almost daily basis, in particular before the applicant’s son’s transfer to Koper Prison, requesting her son’s transfer and claiming that he felt unsafe. On the basis of the evidence in the file, the Prosecutor concluded that S.B.’s behaviour had not caused the applicant’s son’s suicide. The Prosecutor also found that there was not the slightest indication that the applicant’s son had been murdered. Furthermore, he noted that his accommodation had been determined in the standard procedure and not at the discretion of S.Ž., that the prison staff had acted within their competences, and that S.Ž. and J.P. had tried to make the applicant’s son’s accommodation as comfortable as possible in the circumstances. He established that the applicant’s son had never been denied medical or psychiatric assistance. There was also no evidence of other acts alleged by the applicant, including the alleged extortion by I.N.

The applicant, in the capacity of a subsidiary prosecutor, subsequently took over the prosecution in the above cases and lodged an indictment. The proceedings appear still to be pending.

On 17 December 2010, the Prosecutor also rejected the applicant’s remaining criminal complaints (see paragraph 70 above), in particular those concerning alleged negligence at work aimed at certain prison personnel.

For the relevant domestic law and practice see paragraphs 33-35 and 38-47 of the Court’s judgment in the case of Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia (nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, 27 September 2011), paragraphs 34-36 of Mandić and Jović v. Slovenia (nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, 27 September 2011), and Lalić and Others, cited above, as well as paragraphs 42-46 of Butolen v. Slovenia (no. 41356/08, 3 April 2012).