CASE OF VINTER  AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading punishment;Inhuman punishment) (Substantive aspect)

David Thór Björgvinsson;George Nicolaou;Lech Garlicki;Ledi Bianku;Nicolas Bratza;Päivi Hirvelä;Vincent A. De Gaetano

Since the abolition of the death penalty in England and Wales, the sentence for murder has been a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. When such a sentence is imposed, it is the current practice, in the majority of cases, for the trial judge to set a minimum term of imprisonment which must be served before the prisoner is eligible for release on licence. Exceptionally, however, “a whole life order” may be imposed by the trial judge instead of a minimum term. This has the effect that the prisoner cannot be released other than at the discretion of the Secretary of State. (The power of the Secretary of State to release a prisoner is provided for in section 30(1) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.) The Secretary of State will only exercise his discretion on compassionate grounds when the prisoner is terminally ill or seriously incapacitated (see Prison Service Order 4700 set out at paragraph 36 below).

Prior to the entry into force of the 2003 Act, it was the practice for the mandatory life sentence to be passed by the trial judge but for the Secretary of State, after receiving recommendations from the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice, to decide the minimum term of imprisonment which the prisoner would have to serve before he would be eligible for early release on licence. This was also referred to as the “tariff” part of the sentence and was taken to represent the minimum period which the prisoner was required to serve to satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence.

It was open to the Secretary of State to impose a whole life tariff on a prisoner. In such a case, it was the practice of the Secretary of State to review a whole life tariff after twenty-five years’ imprisonment to determine whether it was still justified, particularly with reference to cases where the prisoner had made exceptional progress in prison (see Hindley at paragraph 39 below).

With the entry into force of the 2003 Act (and, in particular, section 276 and schedule 22 to the Act), all prisoners whose tariffs were set by the Secretary of State have been able to apply to the High Court for review of that tariff. Upon such an application the High Court may set a minimum term of imprisonment or make a whole life order.

This case concerns three applicants who, having been convicted of murder in separate criminal proceedings in England and Wales, are currently serving mandatory sentences of life imprisonment. All three applicants have been given whole life orders: in the first applicant’s case this order was made by the trial judge under the current practice; in the case of the second and third applicants, who were convicted and sentenced prior to the entry into force of the 2003 Act, the orders were made by the High Court. All three applicants maintain that these whole life orders, as they apply to their cases, are incompatible inter alia with Articles 3 and 5 § 4 of the Convention. The facts of the applications, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 20 May 1996, the first applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a work colleague, with a minimum term of 10 years. He was released on licence on 4 August 2005.

He began living with a woman who was to become the victim of his second murder offence. The couple married on 27 June 2006. On 31 December 2006 the first applicant was involved in a fight in a public house and charged with affray (using or threatening unlawful violence). His licence was revoked and he was recalled to prison. In July 2007, having pleaded guilty to the charge of affray, he was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment. He was released on licence again in December 2007 and returned to live with his wife and her four children. The couple became estranged and the first applicant left the marital home.

On 5 February 2008, the first applicant followed his wife to a public house. He had been drinking and had taken cocaine. The couple argued and the wife’s daughter, who was present, telephoned the police to alert them to the dispute. The first applicant ordered his wife to get into a car. When the daughter tried to get into the car to protect her mother, the first applicant forcibly removed her. He then drove off with his wife. When the police telephoned her to ascertain if she was safe, the first applicant forced his wife to tell them that she was fine. The first applicant also telephoned the police to tell them that his wife was safe and well. Some hours later he gave himself up to the police, telling them that he had killed her. A post-mortem examination revealed that the deceased had a broken nose, deep and extensive bruising to her neck (which was consistent with attempted strangulation), and four stab wounds to the chest. Two knives were found at the scene, one of which had a broken blade.

The first applicant pleaded guilty to murder and instructed his counsel not to make any submissions in mitigation lest it add to the grief of the victim’s family. The trial judge considered that the first applicant fell into that small category of people who should be deprived permanently of their liberty. He passed the mandatory life sentence and made a whole life order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal on 25 June 2009. It considered the general principles for determining the minimum term of a mandatory life sentence (as set out in schedule 21 to the 2003 Act: see relevant domestic law and practice below). It found that, given the circumstances of the offence, there was no reason whatever to depart from the normal principle enshrined in schedule 21 to the 2003 Act that, where murder was committed by someone who was already a convicted murderer, a whole life order was appropriate for punishment and deterrence.

On 7 August 1985, the second applicant’s parents, his adoptive sister and her two young children were shot and killed. The second applicant was subsequently charged and, on 28 October 1986, convicted of the murders. The prosecution’s case was that the murders were premeditated and planned and had been committed for financial gain. It was also alleged that the second applicant had arranged the crime scene so as to mislead the police by making it appear as if his adoptive sister had killed the family and then herself.

The trial judge recommended to the Secretary of State that the second applicant serve twenty-five years’ imprisonment “as a minimum” (his underlining). On the trial judge’s letter to the Secretary of State, the Lord Chief Justice added the comment “for my part I would never release him”. In 1988, the Secretary of State imposed a whole life tariff. The practice at the time was not to inform the prisoner of this decision. By letter dated 15 December 1994, the applicant was informed that the Secretary of State had concluded that the requirements of retribution and deterrence could only be satisfied by the second applicant remaining in prison for the whole of his life.

In 2008, following the entry into force of section 276 and schedule 22 to the 2003 Act, the second applicant applied to the High Court for review of the whole life tariff. Having regard to schedule 21 to the Act, the High Court concluded that, given the number of murders involved and the presence of premeditation by the second applicant, the offence plainly fell within that category of cases where the appropriate starting point was a whole life order. Having further regard to statements submitted by the victims’ next-of-kin and submissions by the second applicant, including reports as to the behaviour and progress he had made in prison, the High Court found that there was no reason to depart from the views of the Lord Chief Justice and the Secretary of State. It therefore imposed a whole life order.

The second applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal on 14 May 2009. The court found that, when the Secretary of State had set a whole life tariff in 1988, he had been provided with two different judicial recommendations: one from the trial judge recommending a minimum term of twenty-five years and one from the Lord Chief Justice recommending that the second applicant should never be released. The Secretary of State had been entitled to choose between those recommendations or to adopt neither of them. The Court of Appeal also found that the whole life order imposed by the High Court was not only correct but, for the purposes of punishment and retribution, fully justified.

Relying on its previous judgment in R v. Bieber (see paragraph 40 below), it found that no issue arose under Article 3 of the Convention as the whole life order was not an irreducible life sentence as that term had been used in Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04, ECHR 2008... Finally, following its ruling in R v. Pitchfork (see paragraph 41 below) it found that the review procedure created by the 2003 Act was compatible with Article 7 of the Convention as, properly construed, the relevant statutory provisions meant a prisoner could not be disadvantaged by the outcome of the review: the term to be served could be reduced, or maintained, but it could not be increased or extended.

The second applicant applied to the Court of Appeal to certify that its judgment concerned a point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House of Lords. That application was refused on 23 June 2009.

On 29 November 1996 the third applicant was convicted after trial in the Crown Court at Chester of four counts of murder. The victims were homosexual men and the applicant, himself a homosexual, was alleged to have committed the murders for his own sexual gratification. Each victim was stabbed many times with a large combat knife which the third applicant had bought for that purpose. The first victim was attacked in his home on 23 September 1995. Soon after, on the weekend of 7 October 1995, the third applicant met his second victim in a bar and arranged to take him home for sex; he instead took him to a forest, stabbed him to death and left the body there. The third victim was stabbed in the caravan where he lived on 30 November 1995. Finally, shortly before Christmas 1995, the third applicant went to a beach which was well-known for homosexual trysts. He met the fourth victim on the beach and stabbed him there.

Blood from the first and third victims was found on the third applicant’s jacket and on the knife. Property from the first, second and fourth victims was found in his possession. He made extensive admissions about all four murders to the police. The police had been unaware of the second victim until the third applicant mentioned him to them. The body was recovered from the forest with his assistance. At trial, the applicant’s defence was that the murders had been committed by someone else, though he admitted to having been present at all the murders save for that of the second victim.

After the third applicant was convicted, the trial judge passed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment and recommended to the Secretary of State for the Home Department that, in his view, the applicant should never be released. Upon review, the Lord Chief Justice reported that he thought the minimum period before eligibility for release should be set at thirty years. On 27 September 2002, the Secretary of State decided to set a whole life tariff.

In 2008, pursuant to section 276 and schedule 22 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the third applicant applied to the High Court for review of the whole life tariff set by the Secretary of State. In its judgment of 12 June 2008 the High Court rejected the third applicant’s submission that it should accept the Lord Chief Justice’s recommendation of a minimum term of thirty years. It found that, while weight should be accorded to that recommendation, the Lord Chief Justice did not have regard to the principles set out in schedule 21 as the High Court was required to do. It also rejected the submission that an issue arose under Article 6 given that a whole life tariff had been set by the Secretary of State. The High Court found that the procedure for applying to the High Court under section 276 and schedule 22 of the Act provided the necessary independent review as to whether a prisoner should be released. The court also found that a whole life order would be compatible with Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. Having regard to the general principles for determining the minimum term of a mandatory life sentence (as set out in schedule 21 to the Act), no issue of arbitrariness arose and whether such a sentence was disproportionate depended on the facts of each case.

The High Court found that, since the case involved the murder of two or more persons, sexual or sadistic conduct and a substantial degree of premeditation, under schedule 21 the starting point was a whole life order. There were no mitigating features and even the Lord Chief Justice, in recommending a minimum term of thirty years, had shared the trial judge’s view that it might never be safe to release the third applicant. There were no reasons, therefore, to mitigate the starting point of a whole life order. The High Court added that, even if the starting point were a minimum term of thirty years, the aggravating features of the murders were such as to make a whole life order appropriate.

On 26 February 2009, the Court of Appeal dismissed the third applicant’s appeal, finding that the High Court was not only entitled, but clearly right, to conclude that a whole life order was appropriate.

It appears that the third applicant, in order to allow him to appeal to the House of Lords, then applied to the Court of Appeal to certify that its judgment concerned a point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House of Lords. On 14 August 2009, he was informed by the Court of Appeal’s Criminal Appeal Office that, because the Court of Appeal had refused his application for permission to appeal against sentence (as opposed to granting permission to appeal against sentence and then dismissing the appeal), an application to certify a point of law for the House of Lords could not be made.

In England and Wales, the mandatory life sentence for murder is contained in section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965.

The power of the Secretary of State to set tariff periods for mandatory life sentence prisoners, as contained in section 29 of the Crime Sentences Act 1997, was found by the House of Lords to be incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention in R (Anderson) v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 837. This led to the enactment of Chapter 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and schedules 21 and 22 to that Act.

Section 269 of the 2003 Act directs a trial judge, in passing a mandatory life sentence, to determine the minimum term which the prisoner must serve before he or she is eligible for early release on licence. By section 269(3), this minimum term must take into account the seriousness of the offence. Section 269(4) allows the trial judge to decide that, because of the seriousness of the offence, the prisoner should not be eligible for early release (in effect, to make a “whole life order”). Section 269(4) only applies to an offender who is 21 years of age or over when he committed the offence. Section 269(5) directs the trial judge, in considering the seriousness of the offence, to have regard inter alia to the principles set out in schedule 21 to the Act.

Schedule 21 provides for three different “starting points” which may be increased or decreased depending on the presence of aggravating or mitigating features in the offence: a whole life order, a minimum term of thirty years’ imprisonment and a minimum term of fifteen years’ imprisonment.

By paragraph 4(1) of the schedule, if the seriousness of the offence is “exceptionally high” the appropriate starting point is a whole life order. Paragraph 4(2) provides that the following cases would normally fall within this category:

(a) the murder of two or more persons, where each murder involves any of the following—

(i) a substantial degree of premeditation or planning,

(ii) the abduction of the victim, or

(iii) sexual or sadistic conduct,

(b) the murder of a child if involving the abduction of the child or sexual or sadistic motivation,

(c) a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, or

(d) a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder.

By paragraph 5(1), if the seriousness of the offence does not fall within paragraph 4(1) but is “particularly high”, the appropriate starting point in determining the minimum term is thirty years’ imprisonment. Paragraph 5(2) provides that the following cases would normally fall within this category:

(a) the murder of a police officer or prison officer in the course of his duty,

(b) a murder involving the use of a firearm or explosive,

(c) a murder done for gain (such as a murder done in the course or furtherance of robbery or burglary, done for payment or done in the expectation of gain as a result of the death),

(d) a murder intended to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice,

(e) a murder involving sexual or sadistic conduct,

(f) the murder of two or more persons,

(g) a murder that is racially or religiously aggravated or aggravated by sexual orientation, or

(h) a murder falling within paragraph 4(2) committed by an offender who was aged under 21 when he committed the offence.”

Paragraphs 6 and 7 provide that, in all other cases, the appropriate starting point in determining the minimum term is fifteen years’ imprisonment (twelve years for those less than eighteen years of age).

Paragraphs 8 and 9 provide that, having chosen a starting point, the trial judge should take into account any aggravating or mitigating factors which may result in a minimum term of any length (whatever the starting point), or in the making of a whole life order.

Paragraph 10 provides that aggravating factors include:

“(a) a significant degree of planning or premeditation,

(b) the fact that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of age or disability,

(c) mental or physical suffering inflicted on the victim before death,

(d) the abuse of a position of trust,

(e) the use of duress or threats against another person to facilitate the commission of the offence,

(f) the fact that the victim was providing a public service or performing a public duty, and

(g) concealment, destruction or dismemberment of the body.”

Paragraph 11 provides that mitigating factors include:

(a) an intention to cause serious bodily harm rather than to kill,

(b) lack of premeditation,

(c) the fact that the offender suffered from any mental disorder or mental disability which (although not falling within section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 (c. 11)), lowered his degree of culpability,

(d) the fact that the offender was provoked (for example, by prolonged stress) in a way not amounting to a defence of provocation,

(e) the fact that the offender acted to any extent in self-defence,

(f) a belief by the offender that the murder was an act of mercy, and

(g) the age of the offender.”

Schedule 22 enacts a series of transitional measures for those prisoners who were given mandatory life sentences prior to the entry into force of section 269 of the Act and whose minimum terms of imprisonment were set by the Secretary of State. It also applies to those prisoners whom the Secretary of State directed should never be eligible for early release on licence (that is, those prisoners for whom a whole life tariff had been set). Paragraph 3 of the schedule allows both categories of prisoners to apply to the High Court. Upon such an application the High Court must, in the case of a prisoner who is subject to a minimum term of imprisonment set by the Secretary of State, make an order specifying the minimum term that prisoner must serve before he or she is eligible for early release. Under paragraph 3(1)(b), where the Secretary of State notified the prisoner that a whole life tariff had been set, the High Court may make an order that the prisoner should not be eligible for release (“a whole life order”).

The minimum term set by the High Court must not be greater than that previously set by the Secretary of State (paragraph 3(1)(a)).

Similar provisions apply to sentences passed after the commencement of the Act in respect of murders committed before commencement. Paragraph 10 provides that the court may not make an order which, in its opinion, is greater than that which the Secretary of State would have been likely to have made under the previous practice.

In determining an application under paragraph 3, the High Court must have regard inter alia to the seriousness of the offence and, in so doing, must also have regard to the general principles set out in schedule 21 and any recommendations to the Secretary of State by the trial judge or the Lord Chief Justice as to the minimum term to be served by the offender before release on licence (paragraphs 4 and 5 of schedule 22). The offender may also make representations to the High Court, including representations as to his or her behaviour and progress in prison since the offence, before the High Court determines the application. Representations can also be made by the victim or victims’ families. The High Court may also hold an oral hearing in rare cases.

Section 30(1) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 provides that the Secretary of State may at any time release a life prisoner on licence if he is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist which justify the prisoner’s release on compassionate grounds.

The criteria for the exercise of that discretion are set out in Prison Service Order 4700 chapter 12, which, where relevant, provides:

“• the prisoner is suffering from a terminal illness and death is likely to occur very shortly (although there are no set time limits, 3 months may be considered to be an appropriate period for an application to be made to Public Protection Casework Section [PPCS]), or the ISP (Indeterminate Sentenced Prisoner) is bedridden or similarly incapacitated, for example, those paralysed or suffering from a severe stoke;

and

• the risk of re-offending (particularly of a sexual or violent nature) is minimal;

and

• further imprisonment would reduce the prisoner’s life expectancy;

and

• there are adequate arrangements for the prisoner’s care and treatment outside prison;

and

• early release will bring some significant benefit to the prisoner or his/her family.”

According to the Government, as of 28 April 2011, 4,900 prisoners were serving mandatory life sentences for murder in England and Wales. Forty-one prisoners were subject to whole life orders (including those held in secure hospitals). Since 1 January 2000, thirty-seven whole life orders had been imposed, eight of which were subsequently reduced by the Court of Appeal. Since 2000, no prisoner serving a whole life term had been released on compassionate grounds. In response to a freedom of information request by the first applicant, the Ministry of Justice indicated that, as of 30 November 2009, thirteen life-sentence prisoners who had not been given whole life terms had been released on compassionate grounds.

In R. v. Lichniak and R. v. Pyrah [2003] 1 AC 903, the House of Lords considered that, in its operation at that time, a mandatory life sentence was not incompatible with either Articles 3 or 5 of the Convention.

Such a sentence was partly punitive, partly preventative. The punitive element was represented by the tariff term, imposed as punishment for the serious crime which the convicted murderer had committed. The preventative element was represented by the power to continue to detain the convicted murderer in prison unless and until the Parole Board, an independent body, considered it safe to release him, and also by the power to recall to prison a convicted murderer who had been released if it was judged necessary to recall him for the protection of the public (Lord Bingham of Cornhill at paragraph 8 of the judgment).

The House of Lords therefore held firstly, that the appellant’s complaints were not of sufficient gravity to engage Article 3 of the Convention and secondly, that the life sentence was not arbitrary or otherwise contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Lord Bingham added:

“If the House had concluded that on imposition of a mandatory life sentence for murder the convicted murderer forfeited his liberty to the state for the rest of his days, to remain in custody until (if ever) the Home Secretary concluded that the public interest would be better served by his release than by his continued detention, I would have little doubt that such a sentence would be found to violate articles 3 and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights ... as being arbitrary and disproportionate.”

In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hindley [2001] 1 AC 410, HL and R. v. Anderson [2003] 1 AC 837, HL, the House of Lords found that, under the tariff system then in operation, there was “no reason, in principle, why a crime or crimes, if sufficiently heinous should not be regarded as deserving lifelong incarceration for purposes of pure punishment” (per Lord Steyn at pp. 416H). Lord Steyn also observed: “there is nothing logically inconsistent with the concept of a tariff by saying that there are cases were the crimes are so wicked that even if the prisoner is detained until he or she dies it will not exhaust the requirements of retribution and deterrence” (p. 417H). The House of Lords also found that the Secretary of State had not unlawfully fettered his discretion in reviewing the cases of prisoners where a whole life tariff was in place after the prisoner had served twenty-five years’ imprisonment and reducing the tariff in appropriate cases.). The judgment records the Secretary of State’s policy statement of 10 November 1997, in which the Secretary of State indicated that he was: “open to the possibility that, in exceptional circumstances, including for example, exceptional progress by the prisoner whilst in custody, a review and reduction of the tariff may be appropriate.” The Secretary of State indicated that he would have this possibility in mind when reviewing at the 25 year point the cases of prisoners given a whole life tariff and in that respect would consider issues beyond the sole criteria of retribution and deterrence (p. 417A-C).

In R v. Bieber [2009] 1 WLR 223 the Court of Appeal considered the compatibility of the 2003 Act with Article 3 of the Convention in the light of Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04, ECHR 2008...

It found that a whole life order did not contravene Article 3 of the Convention because of the possibility of compassionate release by the Secretary of State. It also found that the imposition of an irreducible life sentence would not itself constitute a violation of Article 3 but rather that a potential violation would only occur once the offender had been detained beyond the period that could be justified on the ground of punishment and deterrence. The court observed:

“45. While under English law the offence of murder attracts a mandatory life sentence, this is not normally an irreducible sentence. The judge specifies the minimum term to be served by way of punishment and deterrence before the offender’s release on licence can be considered. Where a whole life term is specified this is because the judge considers that the offence is so serious that, for purposes of punishment and deterrence, the offender must remain in prison for the rest of his days. For the reasons that we have given, we do not consider that the Strasbourg court has ruled that an irreducible life sentence, deliberately imposed by a judge in such circumstances, will result in detention that violates article 3. Nor do we consider that it will do so.

It may be that the approach of the Strasbourg court will change. There seems to be a tide in Europe that is setting against the imposition of very lengthy terms of imprisonment that are irreducible. Thus it may become necessary to consider whether whole life terms imposed in this jurisdiction are, in fact irreducible.

Under the regime that predated the 2003 Act it was the practice of the Secretary of State to review the position of prisoners serving a whole life tariff after they had served 25 years with a view to reducing the tariff in exceptional circumstances, such as where the prisoner had made exceptional progress whilst in custody. No suggestion was then made that the imposition of a whole life tariff infringed article 3.

Under the current regime the Secretary of State has a limited power to release a life prisoner under section 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.

At present it is the practice of the Secretary of State to use this power sparingly, in circumstances where, for instance, a prisoner is suffering from a terminal illness or is bedridden or similarly incapacitated. If, however, the position is reached where the continued imprisonment of a prisoner is held to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, we can see no reason why, having particular regard to the requirement to comply with the Convention, the Secretary of State should not use his statutory power to release the prisoner.

For these reasons, applying the approach of the Strasbourg court in Kafkaris v Cyprus 12 February 2008, we do not consider that a whole life term should be considered as a sentence that is irreducible. Any article 3 challenge where a whole life term has been imposed should therefore be made, not at the time of the imposition of the sentence, but at the stage when the prisoner contends that, having regard to all the material circumstances, including the time that he has served and the progress made in prison, any further detention will constitute degrading or inhuman treatment.

For these reasons we reject the challenge made to the defendant’s sentence that is founded on article 3.

51 We would add, for the avoidance of doubt, that we have not been asked to consider, nor have we, whether the decision under section 30 of the 1997 Act is one that should properly be taken by a judge rather than by a minister.”

The transitional measures set out in schedule 22 were found by the Court of Appeal to be compatible with Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention in R v. Pitchfork [2009] EWCA Crim 963. The schedule expressly provided that the outcome of the High Court review could not be an increase in the minimum period set by the Secretary of State. It was not in breach of Article 7 to direct the High Court to consider the general principles set out in schedule 21: neither those principles nor the original recommendations by the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice were to enjoy primacy over the other. Instead, the High Court was conducting a fresh review, taking account of both the judicial recommendations and schedule 21.

In R v. Neil Jones and Others [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 19 the Court of Appeal held that protection of the public was not a relevant factor in fixing the minimum term, since it was the task of the Parole Board to ensure that the offender was not released after serving the minimum term unless this presented no danger to the public. The court also held:

“A whole life order should be imposed where the seriousness of the offending is so exceptionally high that just punishment requires the offender to be kept in prison for the rest of his or her life. Often, perhaps usually, where such an order is called for the case will not be on the borderline. The facts of the case, considered as a whole, will leave the judge in no doubt that the offender must be kept in prison for the rest of his or her life. Indeed if the judge is in doubt this may well be an indication that a finite minimum term which leaves open the possibility that the offender may be released for the final years of his or her life is the appropriate disposal. To be imprisoned for a finite period of 30 years or more is a very severe penalty. If the case includes one or more of the factors set out in para.4(2) it is likely to be a case that calls for a whole life order, but the judge must consider all the material facts before concluding that a very lengthy finite term will not be a sufficiently severe penalty.”

In Attorney-General’s Reference No 38 of 2008 (also known as R v. Wilson) [2008] EWCA Crim 2122, the offender had been convicted of murder in 1991, and was notified of the decision of the Secretary of State to set a whole life tariff in 1994. Upon an application to the High Court, the whole life tariff was substituted by a minimum term of eighteen years’ imprisonment. That decision was reviewed by the Court of Appeal, which increased the minimum term to thirty years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal also observed that it remained open to the High Court to consider the recommendation of the trial judge and Lord Chief Justice in their contemporaneous context but, as in any case, the findings and views of the trial judge represented a critical element in any sentencing decision. The recommendations were not subsidiary to the provisions in schedule 21 and paragraph 4(2) of schedule 22 made it clear that proper weight should be given to these recommendations in the review process. The Court of Appeal accepted that the recommendations in the case before it, and in many cases like it, would be “likely to have been made in a sentencing environment in which the term to be served would be likely to be shorter than it is now”.

In R v. Leigers [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 104 the Court of Appeal stated that schedule 21 provided an even more rigorous approach to the determination of the minimum term than had applied previously and, when followed, would in some cases lead to longer minimum terms. However, in that case, which concerned a sentence passed after the commencement of the 2003 Act in respect of a murder committed before its commencement, the court went on to state that the scheme was compatible with Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention, given the transitional measures contained in paragraph 10 of schedule 22.

The United States requested the extradition of Ralston Wellington from the United Kingdom to stand trial in Missouri on two counts of murder in the first degree. In his appeal against extradition, Mr Wellington argued that his surrender would violate Article 3 of the Convention, on the basis that there was a real risk that he would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in the form of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

In giving judgment in the High Court ([2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin)), Lord Justice Laws found that there were “powerful arguments of penal philosophy” which suggested that risk of a whole-life sentence without parole intrinsically violated Article 3 of the Convention. He observed:

“The abolition of the death penalty has been lauded, and justified, in many ways; but it must have been founded at least on the premise that the life of every person, however depraved, has an inalienable value. The destruction of a life may be accepted in some special circumstances, such as self-defence or just war; but retributive punishment is never enough to justify it. Yet a prisoner’s incarceration without hope of release is in many respects in like case to a sentence of death. He can never atone for his offence. However he may use his incarceration as time for amendment of life, his punishment is only exhausted by his last breath. Like the death sentence the whole-life tariff is lex talionis. But its notional or actual symmetry with the crime for which it is visited on the prisoner (the only virtue of the lex talionis) is a poor guarantee of proportionate punishment, for the whole-life tariff is arbitrary: it may be measured in days or decades according to how long the prisoner has to live. It is therefore liable to be disproportionate – the very vice which is condemned on Article 3 grounds – unless, of course, the death penalty’s logic applies: the crime is so heinous it can never be atoned for. But in that case the supposed inalienable value of the prisoner’s life is reduced, merely, to his survival: to nothing more than his drawing breath and being kept, no doubt, confined in decent circumstances. That is to pay lip-service to the value of life; not to vouchsafe it.”

However, and “not without misgivings”, he considered that the relevant authorities, including those of this Court, suggested an irreducible life sentence would not always raise an Article 3 issue.

On Wellington’s appeal to the House of Lords, a majority of their Lordships found that Article 3, insofar as it applied to inhuman and degrading treatment and not to torture, was applicable only in attenuated form to extradition cases. In any event, all five Law Lords found that the sentence likely to be imposed on the appellant would not be irreducible; having regard to the powers of clemency and commutation of the Governor of Missouri, it would be just as reducible as the sentence at issue in Kafkaris.

All five Law Lords also noted that, in Kafkaris, the Court had only said that the imposition of an irreducible life sentence may raise an issue under Article 3. They found that the imposition of a whole life sentence would not constitute inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 per se, unless it were grossly or clearly disproportionate. Lord Brown in particular noted:

“Having puzzled long over this question, I have finally concluded that the majority of the Grand Chamber [in Kafkaris] would not regard even an irreducible life sentence—by which, as explained, I understand the majority to mean a mandatory life sentence to be served in full without there ever being proper consideration of the individual circumstances of the defendant’s case—as violating article 3 unless and until the time comes when further imprisonment would no longer be justified on any ground—whether for reasons of punishment, deterrence or public protection. It is for that reason that the majority say only that article 3 may be engaged.”

Moreover, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown all doubted Lord Justice Laws’ view (endorsed by the Privy Council in de Boucherville – see section 3 below) that life imprisonment without parole was lex talionis. Lord Hoffmann, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown did not accept his premise that the abolition of the death penalty had been founded on the idea that the life of every person had an inalienable value; there were other, more pragmatic reasons for abolition such as its irreversibility and lack of deterrent effect. Lord Scott rejected the view that an irreducible life sentence was inhuman and degrading because it denied a prisoner the possibility of atonement; once it was accepted that a whole life sentence could be a just punishment, atonement was achieved by the prisoner serving his sentence.

Wellington’s application to this Court was struck out on 5 October 2010, the applicant having indicated his wish to withdraw it; Wellington v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 60682/08.

The relevant texts of the Council of Europe, the European Union and other international legal texts on the imposition and review of sentences of life imprisonment, including the obligations of Council of Europe member States when extraditing individuals to States where they may face such sentences, are set out in Kafkaris, cited above, at §§ 68-76. Additional materials before the Court in the present cases (and those materials in Kafkaris that are expressly relied on by the parties) may be summarised as follows.

The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CPT”) prepared a report on “Actual/Real Life Sentences” dated 27 June 2007 (CPT (2007) 55). The report reviewed various Council of Europe texts on life sentences, including recommendations (2003) 22 and 23, and stated in terms that: (a) the principle of making conditional release available is relevant to all prisoners, “even to life prisoners”; and (b) that all Council of Europe member States had provision for compassionate release but that this “special form of release” was distinct from conditional release.

It noted the view that discretionary release from imprisonment, as with its imposition, was a matter for the courts and not the executive, a view which had led to proposed changes in the procedures for reviewing life imprisonment in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The report also quoted with approval the CPT’s report on its 2007 visit to Hungary in which it stated:

“[A]s regards “actual lifers”, the CPT has serious reservations about the very concept according to which such prisoners, once they are sentenced, are considered once and for all as a permanent threat to the community and are deprived of any hope to be granted conditional release”.

The report’s conclusion included recommendations that: no category of prisoners should be “stamped” as likely to spend their natural life in prison; no denial of release should ever be final; and not even recalled prisoners should be deprived of hope of release.

Article 77 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court allows for the imposition of a term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. Such a sentence must be reviewed after twenty-five years to determine whether it should be reduced (Article 110).

Article 5(2) of Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant provides:

“if the offence on the basis of which the European arrest warrant has been issued is punishable by custodial life sentence or life-time detention order, the execution of the said arrest warrant may be subject to the condition that the issuing Member State has provisions in its legal system for a review of the penalty or measure imposed, on request or at the latest after 20 years, or for the application of measures of clemency to which the person is entitled to apply for under the law or practice of the issuing Member State, aiming at a non-execution of such penalty or measure...”

According to a comparative study provided by the applicants (D. Van Zyl Smit, “Outlawing Irreducible Life Sentences: Europe on the Brink?”, 23: 1 Federal Sentencing Reporter Vol 23, No 1 (October 2010)) the majority of European countries do not have irreducible life sentences, and some, including Portugal, Norway and Spain, do not have life sentences at all. In Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey, prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment have fixed periods after which release is considered. In France three such prisoners have no minimum period but it appears they can be considered for release after 30 years. In Switzerland there are provisions for indeterminate sentences for dangerous offenders where release can only follow new scientific evidence that the prisoner was not dangerous, although the provisions have not been used. The study concludes that only the Netherlands and England and Wales have irreducible life sentences.

Article 1 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany provides that human dignity shall be inviolable. Article 2(2) provides:

“Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.”

The compatibility of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for murder with these provisions was considered by the Federal Constitutional Court in the Life Imprisonment case of 21 June 1977, 45 BVerfGE 187 (an English translation of extracts of the judgment, with commentary, can be found in D.P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2nd ed.), Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1997 at pp. 306-313).

The court found that the State could not turn the offender into an object of crime prevention to the detriment of his constitutionally protected right to social worth. Respect for human dignity and the rule of law meant the humane enforcement of life imprisonment was possible only when the prisoner was given “a concrete and realistically attainable chance” to regain his freedom at some later point in time.

The court underlined that prisons also had a duty to strive towards the re-socialisation of prisoners, to preserve their ability to cope with life and to counteract the negative effects of incarceration and the destructive changes in personality that accompanied imprisonment. It recognised, however, that, for a criminal who remained a threat to society, the goal of rehabilitation might never be fulfilled; in that case, it was the particular personal circumstances of the criminal which might rule out successful rehabilitation rather than the sentence of life imprisonment itself. The court also found that, subject to these conclusions, life imprisonment for murder was not a senseless or disproportionate punishment.

In the later War Criminal case 72 BVerfGE 105 (1986), where the petitioner was eighty-six years of age and had served twenty years of a life sentence imposed for sending fifty people to the gas chambers, the court considered that the gravity of a person’s crime could weigh upon whether he or she could be required to serve his or her life sentence. However, a judicial balancing of these factors should not place too heavy an emphasis on the gravity of the crime as opposed to the personality, state of mind, and age of the person. In that case, any subsequent review of the petitioner’s request for release would be required to weigh more heavily than before the petitioner’s personality, age and prison record.

In its decision of 16 January 2010, BVerfG, 2 BvR 2299/09, the Federal Constitutional Court considered an extradition case where the offender faced “aggravated life imprisonment until death” (erschwerte lebenslängliche Freiheitsstrafe bis zum Tod) in Turkey. The German government had sought assurances that he would be considered for release and had received the reply that the President of Turkey had the power to remit sentences on grounds of chronic illness, disability, or old age. The court refused to allow extradition, finding that this power of release offered only a vague hope of release and was thus insufficient. Notwithstanding the need to respect foreign legal orders, if someone had no practical prospect of release such a sentence would be cruel and degrading (grausam und erniedrigend) and would infringe the requirements of human dignity provided for in Article 1.

Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights provides that the Charter guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Section 7 provides:

“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

Section 12 provides:

“Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”

In United States v. Burns [2001] S.C.R. 283, Burns and another (the respondents) were to be extradited from Canada to the State of Washington to stand trial for murders allegedly committed when they were both eighteen. Before making the extradition order the Canadian Minister of Justice had not sought assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed. The Supreme Court of Canada found that the remoteness between the extradition and the potential imposition of capital punishment meant the case was not appropriately considered under section 12 but under section 7. However, the values underlying section 12 could form part of the balancing process engaged under section 7. The extradition of the respondents would, if implemented, deprive them of their rights of liberty and security of person as guaranteed by section 7. The issue was whether such a deprivation was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. While extradition could only be refused if it “shocked the conscience” an extradition that violated the principles of fundamental justice would always do so. The court balanced the factors that favoured extradition against those that favoured seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be sought. The latter included the fact that a degree of leniency for youth was an accepted value in the administration of justice, even for young offenders over the age of eighteen. The court concluded that the objectives sought to be advanced by extradition without assurances would be as well served by extradition with assurances. The court held therefore that assurances were constitutionally required by section 7 in all but exceptional cases.

In United States of America v. Ferras; United States of America v. Latty, [2006] 2 SCR 77, the appellants were to be extradited to the United States to face charges of fraud (the Ferras case) or trafficking of cocaine (the Latty case). The appellants in the Latty case had argued that, if extradited and convicted they could receive sentences of ten years to life without parole and this would “shock the conscience”. In dismissing the appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed the balancing approach laid down in Burns to determining whether potential sentences in a requesting state would “shock the conscience”. The harsher sentences the appellants might receive if convicted in the United States were among the factors militating against their surrender but they had offered no evidence or case-law to back up their assertions that the possible sentences would shock the conscience of Canadians. The factors favouring extradition far outweighed those that did not.

The Supreme Court has also found that a grossly disproportionate sentence will amount to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment within the meaning of section 12 of the Charter (see, inter alia, R v. Smith (Edward Dewey) [1987] 1 SCR 1045). In R v. Luxton [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711, the court considered that, for first degree murder, a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years was not grossly disproportionate. Similarly, in R v. Latimer 2001 1 SCR 3, for second degree murder, a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for ten years was not grossly disproportionate. The court observed that gross disproportionality would only be found on “rare and unique occasions” and that test for determining this issue was “very properly stringent and demanding”.

In Dodo v. the State (CCT 1/01) [2001] ZACC 16, the South African Constitutional Court considered whether a statutory provision which required a life sentence for certain offences including murder, was compatible with the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, the accused’s constitutional right to a public trial and the constitutional prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The court found none of these constitutionals provisions was infringed, since the statute allowed a court to pass a lesser sentence if there were substantial and compelling circumstances. The court did, however, observe that the concept of proportionality went to the heart of the inquiry as to whether punishment was cruel, inhuman or degrading.

In Niemand v. The State (CCT 28/00) [2001] ZACC 11, the court found an indeterminate sentence imposed pursuant to a declaration that the defendant was a “habitual criminal” to be grossly disproportionate because it could amount to life imprisonment for a non-violent offender. The court “read in” a maximum sentence of fifteen years to the relevant statute.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, inter alia, that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. It has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States as prohibiting extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime (Graham v. Florida 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010)). There are two categories of cases addressing proportionality of sentences.

The first category is a case-by-case approach,, the court compares the sentence in question with sentences for the same crime in the same jurisdiction and other jurisdictions. If that analysis confirms the initial inference of gross disproportionality, a violation of the Eighth Amendment is established.

In the second category of cases, the Supreme Court has invoked proportionality to adopt “categorical rules” prohibiting a particular punishment from being applied to certain crimes or certain classes of offenders.

Under the first category, the Supreme Court has struck down as grossly disproportionate a sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed on a defendant with previous convictions for passing a worthless cheque (Solem v. Helm 463 US 277 (1983)). It has upheld the following sentences: life with the possibility of parole for obtaining money by false pretences (Rummel v. Estelle 445 US 263 (1980)); life imprisonment without parole for possessing a large quantity of cocaine (Harmelin v. Michigan 501 US 957 (1991)); twenty-five years to life for theft under a “three strikes” recidivist sentencing law (Ewing v. California 538 US 11 (2003)); forty years’ imprisonment for distributing marijuana (Hutto v. Davis 454 US 370 (1982)).

Examples of cases considered under the second category include Coker v. Georgia 433 US 584 (1977) (prohibiting capital punishment for rape) and Roper v. Simmons 543 US 551 (2005) (prohibiting capital punishment for juveniles under eighteen). In Graham, cited above, the court held that the Eighth Amendment also prohibited the imposition of life imprisonment without parole on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. The court found that life imprisonment without parole was an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile and that the remote possibility of pardon or other executive clemency did not mitigate the harshness of the sentence. Although a State was not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a non-homicide crime, it had to provide some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. The court also held that a sentence lacking in legitimate penological justification (such as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation) was, by its nature, disproportionate. Such purposes could justify life without parole in other contexts, but not life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders.

In Reyes v. the Queen [2002] UKPC 11 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered that a mandatory death penalty for murder by shooting was incompatible with section 7 of the Constitution of Belize, which prohibits torture and ill-treatment in identical terms to Article 3 of the Convention. Lord Bingham observed that to deny the offender the opportunity, before sentence is passed, to seek to persuade the court that in all the circumstances to condemn him to death would be disproportionate and inappropriate was to treat him as no human being should be treated. The relevant law was not saved by the powers of pardon and commutation vested by the Constitution in the Governor-General, assisted by an Advisory Council; in Lord Bingham’s words “a non-judicial body cannot decide what is the appropriate measure of punishment to be visited on a defendant for the crime he has committed”.

In de Boucherville v. the State of Mauritius [2008] UKPC 70 the appellant had been sentenced to death. With the abolition of the death penalty in Mauritius, his sentence was commuted to a mandatory life sentence. The Privy Council considered the Court’s judgment in Kafkaris, cited above, and found that the safeguards available in Cyprus to prevent Kafkaris from being without hope of release were not available in Mauritius. The Mauritian Supreme Court had interpreted such a sentence as condemning de Boucherville to penal servitude for the rest of his life and the provisions of the relevant legislation on parole and remission did not apply. This meant the sentence was manifestly disproportionate and arbitrary and so contrary to section 10 of the Mauritian Constitution (provisions to secure protection of law, including the right to a fair trial). It had also been argued by the appellant that the mandatory nature of the sentence violated section 7 of the Constitution (the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment). In light of its conclusion on section 10, the Committee considered it unnecessary to decide that question or to consider the relevance of the possibility of release under section 75 (the presidential prerogative of mercy). It did, however, find that the safeguards available in Cyprus (in the form of the Attorney-General’s powers to recommend release and the President’s powers to commute sentences or decree release) were not available in Mauritius. It also acknowledged the appellant’s argument that, as with the mandatory sentence of death it had considered in Reyes, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment did not allow for consideration of the facts of the case. The Privy Council also considered any differences between mandatory sentences of death and life imprisonment could be exaggerated and, to this end, quoted with approval the dicta of Lord Bingham in Lichniak and Lord Justice Laws in Wellington (at paragraphs 46 and 38 above).

In State v. Philibert [2007] SCJ 274, the Supreme Court of Mauritius held that a mandatory sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment for murder amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of section 7 on the grounds that it was disproportionate.

In State v. Tcoeib [1997] 1 LRC 90 the Namibian Supreme Court considered the imposition of a discretionary life sentence to be compatible with section 8 of the country’s constitution (subsection (c) of which is identical to Article 3 of the Convention). Chief Justice Mahomed, for the unanimous court, found the relevant statutory release scheme to be sufficient but observed that if release depended on the “capricious exercise” of the discretion of the prison or executive authorities, the hope of release would be “too faint and much too unpredictable” for the prisoner to retain the dignity required by section 8. It was also observed that life imprisonment could amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if it was grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offence. The High Court of Namibia found mandatory minimum sentences for robbery and possession of firearms to be grossly disproportionate in State v. Vries 1997 4 LRC 1 and State v Likuwa [2000] 1 LRC 600.

In Lau Cheong v. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region [2002] HKCFA 18, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal rejected a challenge to the mandatory life sentence for murder. It found that the possibility of regular review of the sentence by an independent board meant it was neither arbitrary nor grossly disproportionate and thus it did not amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.

Section 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 also protects against disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.


The applicant, İbrahim Cağlayan, is a Turkish national, who was born in 1952 and lives in Istanbul. He was represented before the Court by Mr Kocak, a lawyer practising in Istanbul.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In 1992, the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways (Devlet Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü), a state body responsible, inter alia, for motorway construction, expropriated a plot of land belonging to the applicant in İstanbul. A committee of experts assessed the value of the plot of land and this amount was paid to the applicant when the expropriation took place.

On 25 November 1997, following the applicant’s request for increased compensation, the Pendik Civil Court of General Jurisdiction awarded him an additional compensation of 1,479,600,000 Turkish liras (TRL) plus an interest at the statutory rate of 30 % per annum.

On 9 March 1998 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the firstinstance court. The due amount, which was 2,501,918,000 Turkish liras (TRL) including the interest, was paid to the applicant on 26 May 1998.

Under Law no. 3095 of 4 December 1984 the rate of interest on overdue State debts was set at 30% per annum. As of 1 January 1998 the statutory rate of interest was increased to 50%. The statutory rate of interest was set at the compound interest rate, namely 60% as of 1 January 2000.

A description of further relevant domestic law may be found in the Aka v. Turkey, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI, §§ 17-25; Akkuş v. Turkey, judgment of 9 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV, §§ 13-16.


Violation of Art. 6-1;Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses (domestic proceedings) - claim dismissed;Costs and expenses award - Convention proceedings

The applicants are German citizens. They live respectively in Oberhausen and Mülheim/Ruhr. The application concerns proceedings initiated by Mrs Gretel Janssen, who died on 27 July 1986. After her death, her son Heinz–Jürgen Janssen and her daughter Margit Jakobs, born Janssen, continued the proceedings. Heinz–Jürgen Janssen died on 19 November 1992. His widow Roswitha Janssen and his daughter Melanie Janssen act in his stead in pursuing the case.

The husband of the original plaintiff Mrs Gretel Janssen worked between October 1950 and December 1959 as an asbestos fabric cutter in an area where asbestos mattresses were manufactured. During this period, the workers who were exposed to asbestos dust while working had to clean their clothes themselves. This was done by the original plaintiff Mrs Gretel Janssen for her husband. The husband contracted an asbestos dust–related lung disease (asbestosis), which was recognised as an occupational disease by the Düsseldorf Health Insurance Association (Maschinenbau- und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft). The Health Insurance Association paid the husband a pension until his death on 21 February 1973 and subsequently a widow’s and orphan’s pension to the surviving family members.

Having contracted a mesothelioma, an asbestosis related disease, Mrs Gretel Janssen applied on 23 December 1985 to the Düsseldorf Health Insurance Association for compensation payments, claiming that her illness was the consequence of the daily cleaning of her husband’s work clothes. On 28 February 1986 the Health Insurance Association dismissed her request holding that her activity was not covered by the industrial health insurance, since she had acted on a strictly private basis and not as an employee.

On 20 March 1986 Mrs Gretel Janssen filed an objection (Widerspruch) against this decision which was rejected on 23 April 1986 by the Appeals Board of the Health Insurance Association.

On 26 May 1986 Mrs Gretel Janssen commenced proceedings before the Duisburg Social Court (Sozialgericht).

On 27 May 1986 the Social Court invited the defendant Health Insurance Association to comment on the claim and to submit the file. On 9 July 1986 Mrs Janssen’s lawyer telephoned the court and requested that a date be fixed for a hearing as soon as possible. He expressed the fear that the plaintiff would not live to attend a hearing in July or August 1986. On 18 July 1986 the Health Insurance Association sent written observations and the administrative file to the Social Court. Mrs Gretel Janssen died on 27 July 1986. Written observations on her behalf were submitted on 18 August 1986. On 13 October 1987 the court received a power of attorney on behalf of the applicants as heirs of Mrs Gretel Janssen without any further explanation. On 9 November 1987 the parties were summoned to appear at a hearing on 26 November 1987. This hearing was cancelled on 23 November 1987.

On 24 November 1987 the plaintiff’s counsel informed the court about Mrs Gretel Janssen’s death. On 17 March 1988 the Social Court requested the plaintiff’s counsel to indicate the successors in title. It sent a reminder on 8 July 1988. The court received the requested information on 25 July 1988.

The proceedings were resumed on 28 July 1988. On 22 November 1988 the parties were summoned to appear at a hearing on 8 December 1988. On 28 November 1988 the plaintiff’s counsel requested to anticipate the hour of the hearing. On 5 December 1988 the Social Court cancelled the hearing. On 14 February 1989 the court set the case down for hearing on 2 March 1989.

On 2 March 1989 the Duisburg Social Court dismissed the action on the ground that, pursuant to Section 539 §§ 1 and 2 of the Social Security Act (Reichsversicherungsordnung), the plaintiff was not insured against accidents at work. The court found that Mrs Gretel Janssen had not been an employee herself, nor had she acted like an employee. She had cleaned her deceased husband’s clothes on ground of their living together, but not with a view to acting for her husband’s employer.

On 10 May 1989 the legal successors of the deceased appealed against the judgment to the Social Court of Appeal (Landessozialgericht) of North Rhine-Westphalia. The appeal was received by the court on 12 May 1989.

At a hearing held on 30 October 1989 the Social Court of Appeal summoned the employer to take part in the proceedings and requested him to submit information as to the kind of work carried out by his former employee between 1950 and 1959 and as to the protection requirements to be complied with. The employer supplied information on 7 December 1989. The defendant filed written pleadings on 22 December 1989. On 24 August 1990 the Social Court of Appeal instructed doctors who had treated Mrs Gretel Janssen to submit reports. The court obtained medical reports from a general practitioner, Dr P., on 2 September 1990 and from a hospital doctor, Dr H., on 10 September 1990. On 21 September 1990 the court requested additional information which was submitted on 4 October 1990.

On 30 October 1990 the Social Court of Appeal had also instructed a medical expert, Prof. W., to submit a report on the awareness at that time of health risks related to the exposure to asbestos and the existence of any protective measures. On 24 August 1990 the Social Court of Appeal had invited Prof. W. to reply to further detailed questions. Prof. W.’s report dated 29 November 1990 was received by the court on 6 December 1990.

On 12 February 1991 the court summoned the Rhineland Communal Accident Insurance Association (Rheinischer Gemeindeunfallversicherungs- verband) as a third party. It further requested Prof. W. to submit an expert opinion on the causes of Mrs Gretel Janssen’s mesothelioma disease. On 17 July 1991 Prof. W. asked the court for certain information.

On 4 November 1991 the court applied to the German Meteorological Service and a witness for further information.

On 23 December 1991 the court sought supplementary advice from Prof. W. and supplied the information he had requested on 17 July 1991. On 30 January 1992 the court reminded the expert to submit his report. The expert opinion dated 26 June 1992 was received by the court on 13 July 1992.

By a judgment of 14 October 1992 the Social Court of Appeal modified the judgment pronounced on 2 March 1989 by the Duisburg Social Court. The Social Court of Appeal considered that Mrs Gretel Janssen’s death was the consequence of an occupational disease. The court granted leave of appeal on points of law holding that the case raised issues of general interest (grundsätzliche Bedeutung).

The Düsseldorf Health Insurance Association lodged an appeal on points of law (Revision).

On 19 November 1992, Mrs Gretel Janssen’s son died. His widow and his daughter continued the proceedings as his legal successors.

By a judgment of 13 October 1993 the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) set the appellate court’s judgment aside and dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal. The Federal Social Court considered in particular that Mrs Gretel Janssen’s death was not the consequence of an occupational disease as the cleaning of her husband’s work clothes mainly served the interests of the couple’s household and not the employer’s interests.

On 2 December 1993 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint alleging that the interpretation of Section 539 of the Social Security Act by the social security courts of first and last instance violated the principle of equality before the law and the right to a fair hearing. Invoking Article 6 of the Convention, the applicants further submitted that proceedings relating to professional diseases allegedly caused by asbestos lasted in general too long.

On 12 January 1994 a panel of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declined to accept the case for adjudication on the ground that the constitutional appeal was inadmissible for lack of substantiation. The court further pointed out that a constitutional complaint could not be based on an alleged violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. This decision was notified to the applicants’ lawyer on 25 January 1994.


Violation of Art. 3 (ill treatment while in detention and failure to conduct an effective investigation);Not necessary to examine Art. 13;Reminder inadmissible;Violation of Art. 34;Non-pecuniary damage - financial award;Costs and expenses - partial award (Convention proceedings)

The applicant, Mr Vitalie Colibaba, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1978 and lives in Chişinău.

On 21 April 2006 the applicant was arrested on charges of assaulting a police officer.

On 25 and 27 April 2006 the applicant was allegedly tortured by police officer I.M. and two other police officers in order to extract a confession from him. According to the applicant, his hands and feet were tied together behind his back and a metal bar from a coat hanger was passed under his arms. The metal bar was placed on two chairs and his body was suspended for more than forty minutes. His hands had been covered with cloth so that no traces of rope would remain on them. Loud music was played so that his cries would not be heard. While being suspended in this manner, his head was covered with a coat and he was beaten with a chair on the back of his head. These acts of brutality were accompanied by verbal and psychological aggression. The Government contested the allegations of ill-treatment.

The same day, after being taken to his cell, the applicant attempted to commit suicide by cutting his veins. However, his attempt was not successful and he was taken to hospital.

On 27 April 2006 the applicant was allowed for the first time to have contact with his lawyer, but only in the presence of police officers. The applicant complained to the lawyer that he had been tortured.

According to the applicant, as a retaliatory measure for his complaint to the lawyer, the same evening he was again tortured. He was hit on the head with a two-litre plastic bottle full of water and also punched and kicked. The Government disputed these allegations.

On 28 April 2006 the applicant's lawyer lodged with the Buiucani prosecutor's office a criminal complaint concerning the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant.

On 29 April 2006 the applicant was taken by the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated him to the Centre of Forensic Medicine, where he underwent a medical check-up in their presence. His lawyer was not present and, according to the applicant, the medical examination only lasted several minutes and was superficial.

The medical report issued by the Centre of Forensic Medicine was dated 28 April 2006 and concluded that besides the injury caused by his attempted suicide, the applicant did not have any other signs of violence on his body.

On 30 April 2006 the Buiucani prosecutor's office ordered that police officer I.M. be removed from the applicant's case on account of the latter's complaint alleging ill-treatment. The police officer was prohibited even from accompanying the applicant to and from the detention centre. The removal was justified by the need to ensure the objectivity of the investigation into the applicant's complaints.

On 2 May 2006 the applicant's lawyer requested the prosecutor of the Buiucani District to authorise the applicant to undergo, inter alia, neurological, ophthalmological, psychiatric and other medical examinations. He requested that the medical examinations be carried out by independent doctors in the presence of the applicant's relatives. This request was refused.

On 3 May 2006, following complaints by the applicant's lawyer, Amnesty International organised action in support of the applicant by publishing on their Russian internet site a description of the applicant's case and an appeal to people from all over the world to write to the Prosecutor General of Moldova, the Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Moldovan Embassy in their country asking them to take action, such as conducting a medical examination of the applicant and carrying out an effective investigation into his complaints of torture, and allowing the applicant to meet his lawyer in conditions of confidentiality.

Following Amnesty International's action, the Moldovan authorities received twenty-seven letters from different countries and the applicant's case was widely reported in the mass media.

On 16 May 2006 the applicant was released from detention. On the same day he sought medical assistance at the “Memoria” Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims, a non-governmental organisation financed by the European Union and a member of the General Assembly of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT). He appears to have been subjected there to detailed medical tests and examinations by various medical specialists. In a document entitled “Extract from the medical file” (“Extras din Fişa Medicală”), dated 16 June 2006, issued by the Centre, it was stated, inter alia, that the applicant had suffered the consequences of cranial trauma, post-traumatic otitis and mixed deafness on the right side and hypoacusis (slightly diminished auditory sensitivity, with hearing threshold levels above normal) on the left side.

On 18 May 2006 the applicant underwent a medical check-up at the Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery of the Ministry of Health. It appears that he was directed there by doctors from the “Memoria” Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims who had diagnosed cranial trauma. He was seen by a neurosurgeon, who confirmed that the applicant had suffered cranial trauma and concussion with permanent vegetative disorder and intracranial hypertension. Moreover, the doctor found that the applicant was experiencing loss of consciousness, post-traumatic otitis and sleep disorder. The medical report of the Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery was not issued to the applicant until 12 June 2006.

On 24 May 2006 the prosecutor G.B. from the Buiucani prosecutor's office dismissed the applicant's torture complaint. In his decision he stated, inter alia, that the three policemen allegedly involved in acts of torture had been questioned and had denied all the accusations; that according to the medical report dated 28 April 2006, the applicant did not have any signs of torture on his body; and that in the office where he had allegedly been tortured no coat hanger had been found. As to his attempted suicide, the prosecutor considered that it had been simulated so as to avoid criminal responsibility.

On 30 May 2006 the applicant appealed to the Buiucani District Court against the decision of 24 May 2006. He argued, inter alia, that the prosecutor had refused to allow him to undergo a complete medical examination, as requested by him on 2 May 2006, and that this was contrary to the authorities' positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention. He also informed the court that immediately after his release from detention he had undergone a medical examination which established that he had been tortured during his detention.

On 15 June 2006 the Buiucani District Court held a hearing in the case concerning the applicant's complaint of torture. The applicant's lawyer requested that the medical report of the Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery dated 18 May 2006 be included in the case file. Judge M.D. admitted the report in evidence. However, in a decision of the same date he dismissed the appeal as unfounded without giving an assessment of any of the above evidence. He simply repeated the reasons given by the prosecutor G.B. in his decision of 24 May 2006 dismissing the complaint of torture.

On 24 June 2006, after the medical report from the “Memoria” Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims had become available to him, the applicant wrote to the Buiucani prosecutor's office asking it to re-examine his ill-treatment complaint in the light of the medical report. However, on 5 July 2006 he was informed that there were no grounds for reopening the investigation.

In the meantime, on 22 June 2006, the applicant had lodged an application with the Court in which he complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been tortured and that there had been no effective investigation into his allegations of torture.

On 26 June 2006 the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Moldova, Valeriu Balaban, wrote a letter to the Moldovan Bar Association, in which he stated, inter alia, the following:

“Lately, the Prosecutor General's Office has been confronted with the phenomenon whereby some Moldovan lawyers involve international organisations specialising in the protection of human rights in the examination by the national authorities of criminal cases. These organisations are used as an instrument for serving personal interests and for avoiding the criminal responsibility of suspected persons.

Examples of such incidents are the case of G., triggered by the lawyer A.U., and the case of Vitalie Colibaba, triggered by the lawyer R. Zadoinov. The international mediatisation of these cases prompted active action by the representatives of Amnesty International with a view to safeguarding the rights of the above lawyers' clients.

After having examined sufficiently thoroughly the complaints alleging torture and abuse on the part of the police ... the Prosecutor's Office dismissed the complaints on the ground of lack of proof that offences had been committed. ...

... In such circumstances the irresponsible attitude and behaviour of the lawyers A.U. and R. Zadoinov give rise to concern. They knew that no acts of torture had been committed against their clients. However, they complained to international organisations without first attempting to use the national mechanism for solving such problems. They presented the facts erroneously in order to win their cases...

Such practices by lawyers will be investigated by the Prosecutor General's Office in order to determine whether they have committed the offence provided for in Article 335 § 2 of the Criminal Code, by making public on an international scale false information about alleged breaches of human rights which gravely prejudice the image of our country.

Accordingly, the Bar Association is called upon to take account of the facts described above, to bring to the attention of lawyers the situation so created and to prevent as far as possible any prejudice to the authority of the Republic of Moldova.”

The above letter generated a heated debate in the media. On 30 June 2006 the Moldovan Bar Association issued an official statement in which it qualified the Prosecutor General's letter as an attempt to intimidate lawyers. In an interview to the newspaper Ziarul de Garda the President of the Bar Association declared, inter alia, that this was an attempt to intimidate lawyers so that they would not complain to the Court any more. At the same time Amnesty International organised action in support of the lawyers mentioned in the Prosecutor General's letter and issued a statement in which it declared, inter alia, the following:

“[Amnesty International] is concerned that the letter to the Bar Association of Moldova is a deliberate attempt to intimidate A.U. and Roman Zadoinov, and to prevent lawyers in Moldova from making public information about human rights violations. It is a violation of the right to freedom of expression, and if the lawyers were to be imprisoned for this offence Amnesty International would consider them prisoners of conscience.”

The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code read as follows:

“Article 335. Abuse of official duties

Intentional use by a person... of his or her official duties for personal gain or for other personal interests... shall be punishable by a fine of ... or by imprisonment for up to three years.

The same offence committed by a notary, auditor or lawyer shall be punishable by a fine of MDL 10,000 to 16,000, or by imprisonment for 2 to 5 years...”


Giovanni Bonello;Kristaq Traja;Lech Garlicki;Nicolas Bratza

The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Gdańsk, Poland.

On 16 July 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery. On 17 July 2004 the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody until 16 October 2004. It found that there were reasonable grounds – in particular, evidence from witnesses – for suspecting him of the offence charged. The court further noted that the applicant was liable to a statutory maximum sentence of at least 12 years’ imprisonment. It also found that there was a risk that the applicant might tamper with evidence.

On 11 October 2004 the Gdańsk District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 16 January 2005. It considered that the reasons for keeping him in detention were still valid and the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation justified holding him in custody. It referred to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant. It also found that there was a risk that the applicant might tamper with evidence, given the nature of the charges against him and the fact that he had acted with other co-accused.

The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged by the District Court on unspecified dates. The courts’ decisions were based on Article 258 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which lists grounds for pre-trial detention, such as, the risk that an accused will abscond or go into hiding or a justified fear that an accused will attempt to induce witnesses or co-defendants to give false testimony or to obstruct the proper course of proceedings by any other unlawful means.

On 27 October 2005 the Gdańsk District Court convicted the applicant of two counts of robbery and sentenced him to 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed.

On 26 September 2006 the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) upheld the impugned judgment.

The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal.

The applicant’s letter to the Court dated 24 November 2004 bears a stamp marked “censored” (cenzurowano), “the prosecutor” (prokurator) followed by an illegible signature. It appears that the envelope in which that letter was sent had been cut open and subsequently resealed with adhesive tape. According to the postmark the letter was posted on 8 December 2004.

The application form submitted by the applicant and dated 13 January 2005 bears a stamp marked “censored” (cenzurowano), “the judge” (sędzia) followed by an illegible signature. The envelope bears a stamp confirming that the applicant’s letter was received for dispatch by the prison administration on 18 January 2005. However, according to the postmark the letter was not posted until 31 January 2005. It also appears that the envelope was cut open and subsequently resealed with adhesive tape.

The relevant domestic law concerning the censorship of prisoners’ correspondence is set out in the Court’s judgment in the case of Michta v. Poland, no. 13425/02, §§ 33-39, 4 May 2006.