Preliminary objections dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies;Six month period);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Liberty of person;Security of person;Article 5-1-f - Extradition) (Ukraine);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for home);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention) (Russia);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Procedural guarantees of review;Review by a court;Speediness of review);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Stanislav Shevchuk

The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in the town of Feodosiya, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

On 19 September 2000 the Prosecutor’s office of the NorthWestern Administrative District of the city of Moscow (“the Prosecutor’s office”) opened a criminal investigation into the murder of a businessman.

By a decision of 30 October 2000 the Prosecutor’s office ordered the applicant to appear as a witness in this case. Since at that time the applicant resided in the town of Feodosiya in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the prosecutor also ordered the police to take measures with a view to ensuring the applicant’s attendance. It appears that the relevant summons was sent to the applicant’s only known address in Russia, that of his sister, who resided in Moscow. The applicant denied having received the summons at that time.

On 1 and 2 November 2000 the Prosecutor’s office ordered the applicant’s apartment in Feodosiya to be searched, requested the cooperation of the Ukrainian authorities in conducting the search, and also dispatched a team of police officers from the Department of Criminal Investigations of the Moscow City Department of the Interior to Ukraine. In his letter dated 1 November 2000 a prosecutor from the Prosecutor’s office specifically mentioned that he had decided to send two police officers from that Department to Feodosiya for “operative follow-up”.

Two Russian police officers, Ti. and Go., were entrusted with this operation and at once sent to Ukraine. It appears that they had secured the support of the head of the Department of Criminal Investigation of the Feodosiya Department of the Interior, lieutenantcolonel Mir., who had apparently instructed his subordinate, police officer Kov., to assist the Russian police officers in their task. The exact mandate of police officer Kov. is unclear.

On 3 November 2000 police officer Kov. and the two Russian police officers, Ti. and Go., located and arrested the applicant. He was handcuffed and his apartment was searched. The search took place in the presence of the applicant’s mother, B.N., and her neighbours K.M. and P.N. acting as witnesses; it was documented in a report drawn up by Kov. on 3 November 2000. The report stated that the applicant had been given a copy of the report on the day of the search.

According to the applicant, after the search he remained in the custody of the Ukrainian and Russian police, who the next day escorted him to a local airport. The Russian officers and the applicant took the first flight to Moscow. On arrival, the applicant was formally arrested by the same two officers and detained on suspicion of murder.

The applicant submitted a copy of the passenger manifest for Aeroflot flight Su-200 dated 4 November 2000. The document showed that the applicant and police officers Go. and Ti. had travelled on the same flight and occupied seats nos. 5 (Go.), 6 (the applicant) and 7 (Ti.).

According to the Russian Government, after the search the applicant had been taken to the Ukrainian police and shortly thereafter had been released. The next day he had bought a ticket and took a flight to Moscow. Two police officers, Ti. and Go., had been tipped off about the applicant’s decision to buy a ticket and managed to buy tickets for the same flight. When the applicant arrived at a Moscow airport, he had been arrested by Ti. and Go. and brought before an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office.

The Ukrainian Government did not submit their own version of these events.

After the events of 3 and 4 November 2000 the applicant’s parents made a number of complaints to various Ukrainian officials and bodies about the actions of the Ukrainian policemen and requested assistance from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in repatriating the applicant to Ukraine from Russia.

More specifically, on 25 November 2000 the applicant made a criminal complaint to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s office, alleging abuse of power and the unlawfulness of the search, arrest and detention.

In response to one of the complaints of the applicant’s parents’, on 8 December 2000 a prosecutor from the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s office initiated administrative proceedings regarding the events of 3 November 2000 against the Ukrainian officials involved. The decision stated that:

“... On 3 November 2000 police officers from the Moscow department of criminal investigations arrived at the town of Feodosiya with a warrant to carry out a search at [the applicant’s home address], this decision having been authorised by [a] prosecutor from the Moscow North-Western District.

The head of the criminal investigation department of the Department of the Interior ... police lieutenant-colonel Mir., seriously breached the requirements of Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine and Article 80 of the Minsk Convention ... according to which contact concerning questions of extradition, criminal prosecution, and the execution of investigatory missions ... is to be made by the Prosecutor General’s offices of the respective parties. He directed his [subordinates] to render assistance [to the Russian police] in carrying out their search.

Before the start of the search the Moscow police officers, in the presence of Ukrainian police officers Kov., Ga., and Bol., arrested [the applicant] and handcuffed him: this was confirmed by [the applicant’s parents and witnesses] K.M. and P.N.

After the search, a Ukrainian national [the applicant] was apprehended by the Russian police and taken to an unknown location ...”

On 9 December 2000 the head of the Feodosiya Department of the Interior, lieutenant-colonel Mir., issued order no. 478, in which he reprimanded police officer Kov. who had taken part in the events of 3 November 2000, for “incorrect and unathorised actions while assisting the police of other states”.

On 22 December 2000 the same official from the Feodosiya Department of the Interior issued order no. 501, in which he mentioned that the initial authorisation given to police officer Kov. had only included the instruction “to locate [the applicant] and indicate that location to the police officers from Moscow”.

By a letter dated 30 December 2000 the Ukrainian authorities informed the applicant’s mother that police officer Kov. had been reprimanded and that the question of the disciplinary liability of lieutenantcolonel Mir. would be decided when he returned from holiday.

On 22 January 2001 a prosecutor from the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s office wrote a letter to the applicant’s father and informed him that they “had requested legal assistance [from the Russian authorities] in resolving [the applicant’s complaint] about his unlawful arrest ... and his ... subsequent transfer to [Russia]”. By the same letter the applicant’s father was informed that the applicant’s complaint about unlawful actions on the part of the Ukrainian policemen had been forwarded to a prosecutor’s office for further investigation.

By a letter dated 23 April 2001, in response to one of the complaints from the applicant’s family, a prosecutor from the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the Russian lawenforcement bodies had never formally asked the Ukrainian authorities to conduct a search at the applicant’s address in Ukraine.

By a letter dated 7 February 2002 a prosecutor from the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s office informed the applicant’s mother that the inquiry into the events conducted by the Prosecutor’s office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea revealed that officers from both the Russian and the Ukrainian police had been present during the search. The inquiry resulted in the decision to bring administrative proceedings in respect of the Ukrainian police officers who had breached the rules of criminal procedure and the Minsk Convention.

In July 2004 the applicant’s mother lodged a complaint about the events of 3 November 2000 with the Feodosiya Town Court. This complaint remained unexamined and on 19 August 2004 it was forwarded instead to the Feodosiya Town Prosecutor’s office. A covering letter signed by the President of the Feodosiya Town Court explained to the applicant’s mother that the complaint had been forwarded to the Prosecutor’s office for examination.

The applicant’s parents appealed against the Town Court’s failure to examine his mother’s arguments on the merits before the Appeal Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on 29 November 2004.

On 8 December 2004 the President of the Appeal Court explained that on 6 April 2001 an investigator had already refused to bring criminal proceedings in respect of the events of 3 November 2000.

It is unclear whether the applicant or his family received a copy of the decision of 6 April 2001. According to a certificate submitted by the Ukrainian Government, the inquiry case file was destroyed owing to expiry of the retention period on 4 May 2006.

On 6 December 2000 the applicant lodged a similar complaint with the Russian Prosecutor General, stating that his arrest in Ukraine, subsequent transfer to Moscow and detention in custody by the Russian authorities had been unlawful.

On 22 December 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office questioned officer Ti. in connection with the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest in Ukraine. Ti. stated:

“... on 1 November 2000 the prosecutor’s office of the Northern Western Administrative District issued an international request for the search of [the applicant’s apartment] and the applicant’s arrest. Whether it reached the police of Feodosiya I am not sure, but as far as I understood it [did].

In order to execute the request, [officer] Go. and I set off for Feodosiya in possession of a copy of the international request.

Having arrived in Feodosiya, we contacted the Department of the Interior of Feodosiya and asked them to be present during the search and other activities within the framework of the request. On 3 November 2000 we attended the search at [the applicant’s] place of residence. The search of [the applicant’s] apartment was conducted by the [Feodosiya] police officers and they drew up a record in this respect. Go. and I were present at the search, but did not actively participate in it. After the search [the applicant] was invited by the [Feodosiya] police officers to the premises of the Department of the Interior for questioning.

I was informed by one of the [Feodosiya] police officers that [the applicant] refused to answer any questions concerning the matter. No documents were given either to me or to Go. We were only given a copy of the search record.

I knew that we had no right to carry out any operative search activities on the territory of Ukraine, and therefore we did not personally participate in the verbal exchanges with [the applicant]. Having refused to make any statements, [the applicant] was released.

The next day, 4 November 2000, the [Feodosiya] policemen – I don’t remember who exactly – informed Go. and myself that [the applicant] had bought a ticket for a plane to Moscow and told us the flight and seat number. At once we set off for the sales office and, since very few tickets were sold, managed to buy tickets for seats close to [the applicant] so as to be able to observe him. The plane was not full, since few people were flying to Moscow. We did not show any interest or attention towards [the applicant]. I don’t know whether [the applicant] recognised us. In any event, had he had any concerns, he could have expressed them to the officers [of the law enforcement agencies in the airport]. [The applicant] did not do this, from which I deduce that he was not aware of either me or Go., nor had he recognised [us], and he expected to go into hiding in Moscow.

We knew about the investigator’s decision to arrest [the applicant] because he had no place of residence in Moscow. Upon his arrival in Moscow, we decided to arrest [the applicant] and bring him [to the police station of the Northern Western Administrative District] for investigative actions ...”

On 22 December 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office questioned officer Go. in connection with the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest in Ukraine. Go. repeated word for word the statements given earlier by Ti.

By a decision of 26 December 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office rejected the applicant’s complaint on the grounds that the applicant had travelled to Moscow of his own free will and had been detained on arrival in accordance with domestic law. The prosecutor relied principally on the evidence given by the two Russian police officers, who explained that they had happened by mere chance to be on the same plane to Moscow as the applicant. They denied that they had taken an active part in the events in Ukraine and stated that the applicant had been released after the search and had then bought a plane ticket to Moscow on his own. The officers had been tipped off by an undisclosed source within the Ukrainian police and had managed to buy tickets for the same flight, “sitting not very far from the applicant’s seat”. On arrival in Moscow the officers arrested the applicant in the airport terminal and took him to the investigating authorities.

On 28 December 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s office questioned the applicant in connection with the circumstances of his arrest in Ukraine. The applicant stated:

“... I was arrested on 3 November 2000 in the town of Feodosiya, in the Krym Region. The arrest was carried out by five police officers from the Feodosiya Town Police and two other police officers, who I later learned were from Moscow. Once the policemen had identified me I was handcuffed. Thereafter they conducted a search of my home. I was shown a search warrant signed by the Prosecutor from the Northern-Western Administrative District of Moscow but no other documents were provided. After the search I was brought to the police station in Feodosiya. I was not shown any documents justifying my arrest. I was refused a phone call. After that I was transported to hotel “Sailor” in Feodosiya where the policemen from Moscow were staying and where I was handcuffed to a radiator. We spent about an hour in the hotel but after that I was taken to the police station because the hotel manager objected to the presence of three men in a room designed only for two. The rest of the night I spent in an office belonging to the police, attached by handcuffs to the radiator. The next morning the policemen from Moscow took me to the passport office of Feodosiya Police Station to collect my ID card and thereafter we went by car to the airport. At the airport I was in the car with the policemen from Feodosiya. The policemen bought a ticket in my name. Then we took flight 200 from Simferopol to Moscow. Before boarding we went through the customs and border control. As we were passing it, my handcuffs were removed and the policemen showed their licences to use special devices. Upon landing in Moscow, the policemen and I did not go through the border and customs control, but went out through [a special] exit. Thereafter I was put in a car and brought to the [police station] of the Northern-Western Administrative District of Moscow ...”

In decisions of 16 February and 16 April 2001, in response to further complaints by the applicant, the prosecutor reiterated his earlier findings.

By a judgment of 2 September 2002 the Khoroshevskiy District Court of the city of Moscow confirmed the prosecutor’s decision to dispense with criminal proceedings in respect of the allegedly unlawful arrest, search and detention. Among other things, the court referred to the Minsk Convention.

The Moscow City Court quashed this judgment on 31 October 2002 on the grounds that the questions of the lawfulness of the applicant’s arrest and the search of his apartment were inextricably linked to the merits of the applicant’s criminal case and could not be decided before the trial court judgment.

The case was remitted for fresh examination at first instance and on 27 November 2002 the Khoroshevskiy District Court of Moscow rejected the applicant’s appeal. This judgment was upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 9 January 2003.

It appears that the applicant subsequently tried to institute court proceedings in respect of the same questions before the domestic courts. By a judgment of 18 July 2003, given in the applicant’s absence, the Khoroshevskiy District Court of Moscow rejected these arguments. The court held, in particular, that:

“... as is apparent from the case file, [the applicant] was arrested by the [police officers] Go. and Ti. on 4 November 2000 at Sheremetyevo airport as ordered by the investigator in his decision of 30 October 2000 ...

When questioned in this connection, Go. and Ti. stated that they did not arrest [the applicant] in Ukraine and did not take any part in the search of his apartment, but were simply in attendance.

According to the search record of 5 November 2000, the search was carried out in [the applicant’s] apartment in Feodosiya by the local police and the request to carry it out had been made to the Feodosiya prosecutor by the prosecutor of the North Western Administrative District of Moscow.

The order to execute the request is defined by the party to which the request is addressed. In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code of RSFSR and the Law on Operative and Search Activities, the said norms applied only on the territory of RSFSR but they did not contain any rules preventing [investigation and operative] activities on the territory of another state. The [Minsk] Convention sets out the possibility of legal assistance and does not contain a ban on procedural actions on the territory of Contracting States, recognising the lawfulness of such actions if they are authorised by the law of the party to which the request was addressed (Article 6 of the Convention). According to part 3 of Article 8 of the Convention, the presence of officers acting for the requesting party during such actions is possible.

In the view of the above, the court considers that the search was carried out fully and properly. In the present case the prosecutor’s office was only competent to assess the events which took place on the territory of Russia, as the norms of the code of criminal procedure of RSFSR only applied there, and any decision concerning events which took place on the territory on Ukraine could only be taken by the competent body in Ukraine and the corresponding investigation could only be initiated upon a request from the party to which the request was addressed, that is to say Ukraine. However, no such request was ever made, and, as is apparent from the letter from the Feodosiya prosecutor, the request to bring a criminal case in this connection had been refused ...”

According to the applicant, he received only a copy of the judgment on 28 July 2003 and tried to appeal against it on 30 July 2003. His request for restoration of the time-limits for appeal, submitted on 31 October 2003, was refused by the Khoroshevskiy District Court of Moscow on 19 November 2003 for the applicant’s failure to justify the filing of the appeal outside of the ten days’ statutory time-limit. The Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 19 November 2003 on 13 January 2004.

After the Court had communicated the case to the Russian Government on 30 November 2005, police officers Ti. and Go. wrote explanatory reports to their superiors dated 13 March 2006 concerning the events of 3 and 4 November 2000, with the following content:

“... After the search had been carried out, [the applicant] went to the Police Department along with [the Ukrainian police officials] to give

The next day officer Go. and I departed for Moscow by air. We were told by one of the Ukrainian police officers that [the applicant] had bought a ticket to Moscow; we managed to buy tickets for the same flight.

Upon arrival in Moscow, after going through customs and border control in the airport terminal, we ... approached [the applicant and arrested him].

No physical or psychological pressure was exercised on [the applicant] ...”

At around 9 p.m. on 4 November 2000 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s Office in Moscow drew up a report on the applicant’s arrest, having ascertained that the applicant was wanted on suspicion of murder. The report noted that the applicant had the status of an accused in the case and confirmed that he had been notified of his rights.

It appears that the applicant’s detention was first authorised by a decision of 7 November 2000 taken by the District Prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s office in Moscow. The decision stated that the applicant had been detained on 4 November 2000. It further referred to the gravity of the charge against him, the risk of his fleeing or interfering with the course of the investigation, and the fact that he had no permanent residence in the Moscow region. The decision neither specified the term of the applicant’s detention nor commented on the lawfulness of his arrest in Ukraine, his transfer to Moscow and his subsequent detention in custody by the Russian authorities.

The detention was subsequently extended by order of the prosecutor on 7 December 2000. The order described the course of the investigation into the case and mentioned the progress achieved so far. More specifically, the investigation identified and located Sm. and Ko., two other persons allegedly directly implicated in the murder of the businessman in question. It also included a number of expert examinations, a forensic examination of the body of the businessman, two ballistic examinations and a dactylographic examination. The investigator had mentioned that he still needed to study the network of the applicant’s and Ko.’s connections and to bring new versions of charges against the applicant, as well as against Sm. and Ko. The order extended the applicant’s detention until 2 February 2001.

By order of 23 January 2001 the applicant’s detention was extended until 19 March 2001. It was based on the same reasoning as the detention order of 7 December 2000.

On 22 March 2001 the prosecution concluded the investigation and remitted the case for examination on the merits. It does not appear that there was any procedural decision authorising the applicant’s detention between 19 March and 4 April 2001.

On 4 April 2001 the Moscow City Court conducted a preliminary examination of the applicant’s case and, without examining the question of the lawfulness of his detention between 19 March and 4 April 2001, further remanded the applicant in custody. No time-limit was indicated.

Thereafter the court again extended the applicant’s detention on 24 July, 2 August, 4 September and 17 December 2001 as well as on 1 July 2002, without specifying any time-limit for his detention. All these decisions were taken with reference to the gravity of the charge against the applicant and the fact that the proceedings in the case had not been completed.

The applicant and his counsel were not invited to attend the hearing of 1 July 2002.

It does not appear that the applicant lodged any complaint about the repeated extension of his detention by the prosecutor or by the court prior to the decision of 1 July 2002. The applicant’s complaints of 1 and 22 July 2002 against that decision were rejected by the Supreme Court on 24 October 2002.

According to the applicant, he and his counsel were not invited to attend the hearing of 24 October 2002. However, the Government submitted that the applicant and his counsel had been informed about the hearing of 24 October on 15 October 2002. The applicant’s counsel had not given the appeal court any reasons for her failure to appear, and did not ask for the hearing to be postponed. At the same time, the applicant’s request to attend in person remained unexamined.

It appears that on 16 September and 16 December 2002 the trial court extended the applicant’s detention once again. The applicant submits that he challenged these decisions on 17 September and 17 December 2002 respectively but received no reply.

According to the Government, the applicant’s appeals against the decision of 16 September 2002 were dated 30 December 2002 and 22 January 2003, whilst the decision of 16 December 2002 was appealed against on 13 January 2003. The Government were unable to specify the reasons for the domestic courts’ failure to examine these appeals.

On 22 March 2001 the preliminary investigation was concluded and the prosecutor remitted the applicant’s criminal case to the Moscow City Court for trial.

On 4 April 2001 Judge N. listed the case for a hearing on 16 April 2001.

On 16 April 2001 the court adjourned the hearing until 21 June 2001. On the latter date the hearing was adjourned until 25 July 2001 since a lawyer for one of the co-accused failed to appear.

Judge M. took over the case on 24 July 2001 and scheduled the hearing for 1 August 2001.

On 1 August 2001 the court adjourned the case until 2 August 2001, when the case was again suspended until 3 September 2001 because of the failure of some witnesses to appear.

On 4 September 2001 the hearing was postponed until 8 October 2001 for the same reasons.

By a decision of 8 October 2001 the court fixed the next date of the hearing for 30 November 2001.

Between 30 November and 17 December 2001 hearings were held regularly.

On 17 December 2001 the case was adjourned on grounds of witnesses’ absence and the need for a psychiatric examination of the applicant. The examination was carried out on 4 April 2002.

In July 2002 the case was transferred to Judge Z. The next hearing took place in August 2002, when the case was yet again postponed until 17 October 2002 due to witnesses’ failure to appear.

On 30 January 2003 the Moscow City Court convicted the applicant of conspiracy to murder and sentenced him to eight years and six months’ imprisonment. The court did not address the question of the lawfulness of the applicant’s arrest and detention until his arrival in Moscow on 4 November 2000.

On 27 November 2003 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal.


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The cases concern the 1982 State internal premium loan bonds (облигации государственного внутреннего выигрышного займа 1982 года - “1982 premium bonds”) which are in the applicants’ possession. The applicants submitted lists of serials numbers or photocopies of their bonds.

On 30 December 1980 the USSR Cabinet of Ministers decided to issue bonds of an internal premium loan to finance certain State programmes. The bonds had nominal values of 25, 50 and 100 Soviet roubles (SUR). Their period of circulation was set at twenty years, from 1 January 1982 to 1 January 2002, and they were redeemable at any time during the term of the loan with interest at 3% per annum. Soviet citizens could either buy the 1982 premium bonds with their own money or obtain them in exchange for bonds from an earlier 1966 State internal premium loan. The average monthly wage in 1982 was SUR 177.30 across all branches of the economy plus SUR 68.70 in various social benefits (People’s Economy of the USSR 1982, a statistical yearbook by the USSR Central Statistics Directorate, Moscow, 1983).

By the late 1980s the Soviet economy was suffering from a structural imbalance due a rapidly increasing money supply and decreasing availability of consumer goods sold at State-controlled prices. In January 1991 the USSR Government freed 40% of prices and carried out a monetary reform eliminating the largest banknotes in circulation and restricting the withdrawal of money from bank deposit accounts to SUR 500 a month. This led to a two to threefold increase in prices. On 22 March 1991 the USSR President issued Decree no. UP-1708, ordering a one-time increase to savings instruments, including the 1982 premium bonds, of 40% to offset the price rise.

On 26 December 1991 the USSR was dissolved by Declaration no. 142-N of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The declaration invited the heads of newly independent States to reflect on the issues of succession.

On 19 February 1992 the Russian Government issued Resolution no. 97, recognising its succession in respect of the obligations of the former USSR under the 1982 loan:

“1. To confirm succession of the [Russian] Government in respect of the obligations of the former USSR vis-à-vis Russian Federation citizens arising out of the bonds of the 1982 State internal premium loan.

To give Russian Federation citizens who are holders of bonds of the 1982 State internal premium loan the right to voluntarily exchange their bonds against State securities, including 1992 Russian internal premium loan bonds, shares in the Savings Bank ... and also to credit the proceeds of sale of the bonds into deposit accounts open in the Savings Bank ... from 1 October 1992 ...”

Between 1995 and 2000 a series of Russian laws and regulations were passed which provided for the conversion of Soviet securities, including the 1982 premium bonds, into special Russian promissory notes nominated in “promissory roubles” (DOR) (for details, see Yuriy Lobanov v. Russia, no. 15578/03, §§ 16-21, 2 December 2010).

From 2003 to the present day, the application and implementation of those laws and regulations have been continuously suspended, most recently for the period 1 January 2017 to 1 January 2020, by Law no. 429FZ of 19 December 2016 and Resolution no. 1437 dated 22 December 2016.

The applicants applied to the Russian financial authorities and the courts, seeking the redemption of their bonds. Their claims were rejected on procedural and substantive grounds. Mr Ruzanov’s claim was allowed at first instance but the judgment was later overturned on appeal. On 5 May 2014 Mr Israfilov obtained a decision from the Leninskiy District Court in Makhachkala, requiring the Russian Government to convert his bonds into special promissory notes.

Mr Losyakov and Ms Losyakova’s claim was referred by the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court. By decision no. 632-O of 3 April 2012, the Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible, finding that it was not competent to rule on the issue of an alleged failure of federal lawmakers to enact laws guaranteeing the protection of savings which had been recognised as Russia’s internal debt. In its view, the federal lawmakers had adequate discretion to legislate on those issues in the interests of everyone, taking into account the specific social and economic conditions prevailing in Russia and the balance between the rights and lawful interests of various categories of citizens, including those who acted as creditors of the State and others in respect of whom the State had public policy obligations. The legislature was entitled to restrict the rights, including property rights, of some people for the protection of rights and lawful interests of others.


Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant, Ms Maria Adelina Ferreira Basto, is a Portuguese national, who was born in 1954 and lives in Porto. She was represented before the Court by Mr J. Dinis, a lawyer practising in Porto.

The applicant is the owner of a restaurant in Porto. At the relevant time the restaurant was operating with a health and safety licence (alvará sanitário).

On 22 November 1993 three inspectors from the General-Directorate for Primary Healthcare (Direção-Geral de Cuidados de Saúde Primários) conducted an inspection of the applicant’s restaurant during the lunch hour, when the restaurant was crowded.

During the inspection, one of the inspectors publicly addressed the applicant’s husband and claimed that the restaurant did not meet statutory health and safety standards and should therefore be closed down.

According to the applicant, on account of that criticism the restaurant lost clients.

On an unspecified date in 1995 the applicant brought a tort action against the State before the Porto Administrative Court (Tribunal Administrativo do Porto) seeking damages for the conduct of the health inspectors. The State was represented by the Attorney General’s Office (Ministério Público) during the course of the proceedings.

In order to bring the proceedings before the Porto Administrative Court, the applicant applied for legal aid. Pursuant to section 28 of LawDecree no. 387-B/87 of 29 December, the Attorney General’s Office was called upon to issue an opinion on the applicant’s request. On 27 September 1996 the latter considered that the request should be refused on grounds of the applicant’s average daily income, stating as follows:

“The plaintiff admits that she has an average daily income of 30,000.00 Portuguese escudos (PTE), which had previously been PTE 60,000.00. Her monthly salary exceeds, therefore, the amounts considered to constitute a presumption of economic need, according to the legislator. I am therefore of the opinion that the plaintiff’s legal aid request should be refused.”

In its judgment of 23 August 1998 the Porto Administrative Court held that the conduct of the three inspectors from the Directorate-General for Primary Healthcare during the impugned inspection had been illegal and had caused damage to the applicant. Furthermore, it awarded the applicant PTE 350,000.00 (1,745.79 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and an amount in respect of pecuniary damage that remained to be determined during the proceedings for the enforcement of the judgment.

On an unknown date the Attorney General’s Office lodged an appeal against the judgment with the Supreme Administrative Court (Supremo Tribunal Administrativo). On 9 April 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

On an unknown date the applicant instituted proceedings before the Porto Administrative Court for the enforcement of the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment and the calculation of the amount to be awarded in respect of pecuniary damage. She claimed damages of EUR 603,004.40, corresponding to the pecuniary losses allegedly suffered as a result of the inspectors’ conduct from the day of the inspection until such time as the action had been brought.

On 26 February 2004 the Attorney General’s Office contested the amount claimed by the applicant as excessive. It argued that any pecuniary damages should be limited to the loss sustained as a consequence of the reduction in the applicant’s daily income, in accordance with the facts that had been established by the first-instance court and pursuant to the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment of 9 April 2002.

On 19 October 2009 the Porto Administrative Court adopted a decision in which it awarded the applicant EUR 9,010.50 in respect of pecuniary damage. The domestic court’s decision was based on the evidence provided by the parties, namely the applicant, and on an expert assessment that had been requested by the court to estimate the damage suffered.

The applicant appealed against the decision before the Supreme Administrative Court, contesting the amount awarded. She argued that the witnesses’ statements and the evidence provided had been wrongly assessed. She also disputed the legality of the first-instance court’s refusal to grant a request she had lodged for the clarification of the expert assessment during the course of the proceedings before the first-instance court. The applicant further complained that the Attorney General’s Office had been allowed to have two contradictory legal positions in the proceedings without suffering any sanction, by making reference to its opinion on her legal aid request during the tort proceedings and the fact that it had disputed the amount she had claimed for pecuniary damage.

The Supreme Court judgment was adopted on 23 September and notified to the applicant on 30 September 2010.

In its judgment the Supreme Court held that the expert’s opinion had been inconclusive and considered that the amount awarded on that account had not been sufficiently justified. It further noted that the expert’s opinion had been requested under a legal provision which was not applicable to the case at hand. The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the expert’s assessment and made a new assessment of the evidence in order to evaluate the extent of the damage suffered by the applicant. With reference to the witnesses’ statements heard and the evidence provided, namely by the applicant, the higher court considered that it could not establish a loss in the amount claimed by the applicant. Thus, the Supreme Court decided that the pecuniary damages should be calculated on the basis of equity (juízo de equidade), taking into account the facts that had been established in the course of the proceedings. Accordingly, it awarded the applicant EUR 9,000 in respect of pecuniary damage, to be paid by the State.

At the material time, legal aid was regulated by Law-Decree no. 387-B/87 of 29 December 1987. Requests for legal aid were decided by the judicial authority in charge of the proceedings for which they had been submitted. Pursuant to section 28 the Attorney General’s Office was called upon to submit an opinion on that regard.

In judgment no. 287/99.0TABJA-B.E1-A.S1 of 16 December 2010, the Supreme Court considered the possibility of reconciling a discrepancy between two discordant positions of the Attorney General’s Office, when acting in the capacity of a public prosecutor in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court’s judgment seeking to harmonise the judicial approach to that question (acórdão de fixação de jurisprudência) contains the following passages:

“The Attorney General’s Office, which assumes, at any stage of the proceedings, a legal position as to the innocence or guilt of the accused, cannot subsequently modify its position, claiming a better judgment, to the possible detriment of the defendant’s position.

Consequently it follows, inexorably, that conflicting and contradictory procedural interventions which are not a demand for truth and justice, but derive solely from the need to express subjective opinions, are inadmissible.

In view of the combined provisions of Articles 48 to 53 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Attorney General’s Office has no interest in appealing against decisions that are consistent with its previously held position in the proceedings.”


Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Syria);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Syria);Violation of Article 13+2 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 2 - Right to life;Extradition);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review by a court;Review of lawfulness of detention);Respondent State to take individual measures (Article 46-2 - Individual measures);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in 1986. Since February 2015 he has been kept in a detention centre for foreign nationals in the town of Makhachkala, Dagestan Republic, Russia.

The applicant arrived in Russia in October 2011. He was in possession of a visa declaring the purpose of his visit as business. The applicant’s visa was due to expire in October 2012. However, the visa allowed the applicant to stay in Russia for no longer than ninety days in the course of a single visit. As submitted by the Government, he was therefore expected to leave Russia in early 2012.

The applicant did not leave and started to live together with Ms B., a Russian national. In November 2013 they had a child together. In April 2014 they married.

In the meantime, on 15 and 19 February 2013 the applicant was found guilty of an offence under Article 18.10 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO), which provided that a foreigner could be punished for unlawful employment activities in Russia.

By judgment of 26 February 2015 the Sovetskiy District Court of Makhachkala found the applicant guilty of an offence under Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the CAO (see paragraph 24 below), of remaining in Russia after the expiry of the visa. It sentenced him to a fine and a penalty of forcible administrative removal (принудительное административное выдворение) from Russia. The District Court held as follows:

“Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the CAO provides for the following penalties: a fine of between 2,000 and 5,000 roubles with or without administrative removal from Russia ...

The subsidiary penalty of administrative removal from Russian may be imposed with due regard to the information that confirms the actual need to impose such a penalty on the defendant, as well as the information that confirms the proportionality of this penalty as the only acceptable measure for achieving a balance between the public and private interests at stake ...

The defendant has no legal grounds for remaining in Russia. If a fine is imposed, the defendant will add himself to the group of illegal labour immigrants who do everything to avoid compliance with the Russian migration legislation. The penalty of administrative removal is also necessary for the sake of national security, to avoid the spread of various infectious diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis and leprosy, and to ensure the optimal balance of labour resources and in order to support, as a matter of priority, the employment of Russian nationals ...”

In the same judgment the District Court ordered that, while awaiting enforcement of the administrative removal, the applicant be placed in a special detention facility for foreigners in the town of Makhachkala.

Lawyer D. lodged a statement of appeal on behalf of the applicant against the judgment of 26 February 2015. It appears that the applicant raised arguments relating to his family life in Russia; it is unclear whether he raised any argument relating to a risk to his life and physical integrity in the event of enforcement of the penalty of forcible removal.

On 4 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Dagestan Republic upheld the judgment. The appeal court held as follows:

“Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the CAO provides for the following penalties: a fine of between 2,000 and 5,000 roubles with administrative removal from Russia ...

[The applicant] has committed a violation of the regime applicable for the presence of foreigners in Russia, by way of omitting after 7 October 2012 to leave Russia ...

The court dismisses [the applicant’s] argument relating to his family life in Russia ... The marriage with Ms B. was concluded on 28 April 2014, which was a long time after the commission of the offence by [the applicant] ... The administrative offence record did not contain any information relating to his family life in Russia. No such information was adduced during the proceedings before the first-instance court ...

[The applicant’s] prolonged violation of the migration legislation since October 2012 amounts to abuse of Russia’s hospitality and thus should be treated as a breach of the receiving country’s interests ...”

On an unspecified date the applicant received a copy of the appeal decision.

The penalty of administrative removal was not enforced. According to the Government, the bailiff service instituted enforcement proceedings on 12 March 2015, but they were not pursued on account of an application lodged by the applicant for temporary asylum (see below).

On 5 May 2015 the applicant applied for temporary asylum. He referred to the ongoing intensive military actions in Syria, in particular in his home town of Aleppo. He further argued that given his age, he would be drafted by the governmental forces for active military service, thereby putting his life and physical integrity in danger.

It appears that the applicant engaged lawyer K. to assist him in those proceedings and had a meeting with him in the detention centre. On 2 June 2015 the applicant called the lawyer from the detention centre, complaining of beatings. On the same day, the lawyer was refused access to the applicant in the detention centre, apparently because he should have obtained authorisation for the visit from the regional migration authority. The lawyer wrote to the regional prosecutor’s office complaining of a violation of the applicant’s rights and physical integrity.

On 4 June 2015 the lawyer made a further unsuccessful attempt to gain access to the applicant.

On 6 August 2015 the local migration authority dismissed the applicant’s application for temporary asylum. The applicant sought review of this refusal before the Federal Migration Service (“the FMS”). On 24 September 2015 the FMS upheld its decision, stating as follows:

“In February 2012 there were no large-scale military operations in Syria; there were only localised hostilities between governmental forces and opposition groups. Despite the above, the applicant failed to leave Russia ... At the time he did not apply for asylum and continued to stay in Russia unlawfully until the imposition of the penalty of administrative removal.

The following violations of the migration rules for foreigners should be pointed out:

The applicant arrived in Russia under a business visa, whereas his actual goal was employment. Thus, his declared aim did not correspond to the actual aim for arriving in Russia.

The applicant was unlawfully engaged in employment activities ...

In February 2013 he was twice prosecuted for administrative offences. However, even after this, he did not seek asylum, while neglecting the real possibility of his future deportation from Russia ...

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that Syrian nationals who return to their homeland or who are deported or expelled there may arrive in Damascus and then proceed to other regions that are controlled by governmental forces.”

On 14 October 2015 the applicant, assisted by lawyer M., sought judicial review of the refusal of temporary asylum under the Code of Administrative Procedure (“the CAP”) and asked the Leninskiy District Court of Makhachkala to put in place an interim measure by way of suspending enforcement of the judgment of 26 February 2015. On 16 October 2015 the court refused to deal with the case, concluding that it had to be lodged before a court with jurisdiction in the area of the applicant’s current “place of residence”; his stay in the detention centre did not qualify as a place of residence.

Assisted by Ms Biryukova (who is his representative before this Court) the applicant resubmitted his application for judicial review to the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow. On 27 October 2015 the District Court left the matter without examination because the applicant had not indicated the date and place of his birth; had not specified whether he had a law degree, which was relevant because the case could only be lodged by a person in possession of a law degree; and had not provided evidence that his representative had a law degree. The applicant was required to remedy the above defects by 18 November 2015.

By a judgment of 9 December 2015 the District Court upheld the refusals of temporary asylum. The court held that the applicant was at risk of violence which was no more intensive than for other people living in Syria:

“The grounds for granting temporary asylum on account of humanitarian considerations include the following situations: a grave medical condition for which the foreigner will not receive the requisite medical care in the country of nationality, thus putting his or her life at risk; a real threat to his or her life or liberty on account of hunger, epidemics, emergency situations of environmental or industrial origin or on account of an internal or international conflict that encompasses the entire territory of the state of nationality; a real threat of being subjected to torture or another cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country of nationality.

Under Article 62 of the Code of Administrative Procedure the parties to the case must prove the circumstances to which they refer as the basis for their claims or objections, unless otherwise provided for by the Code.

Assessing the evidence submitted to it, the court concludes that [the applicant] has not adduced convincing arguments that he is at risk of being persecuted by the authorities or by groups of the population on account of his religion, race or membership of a social group ... Despite the difficult social and political situation in Syria, there are no grounds to consider that his life will be at a higher risk than that of other people living in this country ... According to information from the Federal Migration Authority, people returning to Syria may reach directly the city of Damascus, which is under the control of the government. ...”

The applicant received a copy of the judgment in February 2016 and lodged an appeal. He argued that the first-instance court had not paid proper attention to his argument relating to the risk to his life and physical integrity in the event of his removal to Syria; the migration authority had not refuted his argument while the court had shifted the burden of proof onto the applicant and had placed undue emphasis on the illegality of the applicant’s presence in Russia. His appeal was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 8 June 2016. The appeal court held as follows:

“The first-instance court considered that the applicant did not fall within the scope of the notion of “refugee” under the Refugees Act ... In view of the applicant’s failure to submit specific facts disclosing that in the event of his removal to Syria he would be exposed to a real threat to his security ... or that he was persecuted in this country, the appeal court agrees with the first-instance court ... The appeal court also notes that the applicant arrived in Russia in 2011 but only sought temporary asylum in 2015.”


Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström

The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana.

On 11 July 2000 the Adana Magistrate’s Court ordered the detention of the applicant in absentia.

On 20 July 2000 the applicant was questioned by the gendarmerie in the absence of his lawyer. In his statement, the applicant gave a detailed description about his involvement in an illegal organisation and the activities in which he had taken part. Subsequently, he was brought before the public prosecutor at the Adana State Security Court. During the interview, the applicant stated, again in the absence of a lawyer, that his statements made to the gendarmerie had been correct.

On 15 September 2000 the investigating judge at the Mardin Magistrate’s Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention, again in the absence of a lawyer.

On 24 October 2000 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment before the Adana State Security Court, charging the applicant under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory.

On 25 October 2005 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged.

On 26 April 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction.

On 6 November 2007 the Adana Assize Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant’s statements to the gendarmerie and the public prosecutor, the applicant had committed the offence under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

On 12 November 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

Aleš Pejchal;Armen Harutyunyan;Kristina Pardalos;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos

The applicants were or are still detained in Korydallos Prison Hospital (“the Prison Hospital”). They all suffer from HIV infection, apart from the third applicant who suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.

The first applicant, Dimitrios Zabelos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 6 March 2014 until 17 June 2015, when he made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code.

The second applicant, Adriatik Berberaj, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 6 April 2010 until 21 January 2011 and from 7 February 2012 until 1 July 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served one third of his sentence.

The third applicant, Dimitrios Berberidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital on 6 December 2012 and was released on 11 June 2015 following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served one third of his sentence.

The fourth applicant, Pola Honein, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 18 December 2012 until 1 July 2015. He was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code.

The fifth applicant, Theodoros Iliopoulos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 January 2013 until 2 June 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served two fifths of his sentence.

The sixth applicant, Marouf Kamoli, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 30 December 2013 until 19 May 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided by section 11 of Law no. 4274/14, having served two fifths of his sentence.

The seventh applicant, Davit Khutsishvili, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 1 July 2014 until 27 October 2016. He was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015.

The eighth applicant, Roustam Konstantinidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 23 August 2013 until 14 December 2015. He was released following an application on the basis of section 3 of Law no. 4322/2015.

The ninth applicant, Ioannis Machos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 1 November 2012. He was still in detention when the parties submitted their observations.

The tenth applicant, Andreas Martzaklis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 28 May 2013 until 3 August 2015, when he was released after he lodged an application on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015. He was again detained in the Prison Hospital from 22 January 2016, and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations.

The eleventh applicant, Saeed Hamo Moradyan, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 February 2013 until 27 January 2016, the date on which he was released on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served one third of his sentence.

The twelfth applicant, Antonios Oikonomakos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 27 November 2013 until 30 September 2015, when he was released, having served one tenth of his sentence, on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015. He was again detained from 6 November 2015 until 23 December 2015 when he was released, having served two fifths of his sentence, on the basis of the same provision.

According to the documents before the Court, the thirteenth applicant, Nikolaos Papadopoulos, was detained in the Prison Hospital for significant periods of time from 4 April 2014 until 16 July 2015.

The fourteenth applicant, Spiridon-Xenofon Pirpiniadis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 20 December 2013 until 13 August 2015, when he was released on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served two fifths of his sentence.

The fifteenth applicant, Sabri Sabrioglou, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 22 January 2013 until 24 December 2014 and from 11 February until 20 October 2015.

The sixteenth applicant, Dimitrios Samlidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 July 2014 until 26 February 2015, when he was released, after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code.

The seventeenth applicant, Emmanouil Toufektsis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 30 October 2013 and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations.

The eighteenth applicant, Chrisovalantis Tsiriklos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 4 July 2013 until 8 July 2015, when he was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. He was again detained on 21 August 2015 and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations.

The applicants submitted that the Prison Hospital had been overcrowded which, in addition to causing poor sanitary conditions, had resulted in the deterioration of their already fragile health. They maintained that all of them had been detained in hospital wards which had measured 44 sq. m and which had been occupied by twelve detainees on average for the period between 2013 and 2015. In addition, the second and third applicants had been detained in cells measuring 17 sq. m and which had held four inmates. They further argued that they had not been able to move freely within the wards owing to the space occupied by furniture. In particular, bunk beds were not used in the Prison Hospital and extra furniture, such as medical equipment, was required; therefore half the area of each ward had been occupied by furniture, which had resulted in them having a personal space in which they could move freely of below 2 sq. m.

The above-mentioned conditions had led them to receiving inadequate health care. There had been a high risk of infection with contagious diseases as there had not been effective separation of detainees according to the disease from which they had suffered. In addition, only four toilets had been available for the detainees in a total of five wards on the first floor.

Meals had been insufficient and of poor quality and the absence of recreational activities had affected their psychological health. Central heating had been inadequate and collection of rubbish, especially in the kitchens, had not been sufficient, creating hygiene problems and resulting in bad smells and the presence of pests. The applicants also complained of the lack of medical staff and properly equipped laboratories for their medical examinations. In particular, during the period 2013-14 only one general practitioner had been available to the hospital.

The applicants acknowledged that the conditions of their detention had improved in mid-2016 and that the medical-staff numbers had increased, resulting in conditions which met the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention but only for the period after June 2016.

On 18 December 2014 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Prison Board under Article 6 of the Penal Code (Law No. 2776/1999), to which they have not received any reply to date.

According to the Government, the Prison Hospital’s official capacity was sixty patients and at the time of the applicants’ detention the hospital had held between 180 and 220 patients. Specifically as regards the applicants, some of them had been detained in wards 7 and 8 on the first floor of the hospital and some others in wards 1, 2 and 3 on the second floor. The wards measured 44.40 sq. m each, and each of them hosted eight to thirteen detainees. Therefore, the personal space available to them ranged from 3.4 sq. m to 5.5 sq. m. It was also noted that toilets had been in the corridors, not inside the wards, which had remained unlocked so as to ensure unobstructed access to the bathrooms.

The Prison Hospital was an establishment providing primary medical care by operating as a clinic. Detainees who required more intense or specialised care were referred to public hospitals, a procedure which was used for the third, fourth, ninth, fifteenth and seventeenth applicants. The patients were separated by disease. They were examined regularly by doctors and they were submitted often to general and specialised laboratory examinations.

Wards were sufficiently ventilated and heated and had adequate natural light via six large windows. Hot water was ensured by solar water heaters and by boilers which operated for four hours per day. Wards were regularly cleaned by cleaning crews consisting of detainees and disinfected by specialist companies. The hospital’s social service provided personal hygiene products to detainees who could not afford them. All wards and corridors had rubbish bins which were emptied regularly.

As regards detainees’ meals, they were designed under medical supervision to ensure that patients received all necessary nutrients. The Government submitted the menu of two random weeks to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food.

According to the Government, detainees were not obliged to spend all day in the wards; on the contrary, they could move along the corridors and spend time in the yard. Various recreational activities were organised and detainees had had the opportunity to enrol in educational programmes since October 2015. Detainees were also granted days of leave that they could spend outside the prison hospital; the third, fifth and eleventh applicants had benefitted from such leave.

Lastly, according to the Government, during 2015 and 2016 conditions of detention in the Prison Hospital were drastically improved. That was mainly due to measures taken to reduce overcrowding in prisons under Law no. 4322/2015, which provided for early release schemes. In November 2014 a women’s ward had been opened at the hospital and work had been carried out to improve the facilities. In addition, new and updated medical equipment was procured and medical-staff numbers had been reinforced by the recruitment of three new doctors of various specialties. The Government specified that all the above-mentioned improvements had made the Prison Hospital a detention facility significantly different to the image given in the Greek Ombudsman’s (Συνήγορος του Πολίτη) report, which had been prepared on the basis of a visit in February 2012, that is to say on a date that had no relevance to the present case.


Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Ksenija Turković

The applicant, Mr Stefan Lichtenstrasser, is an Austrian national, who was born in 1977 and lives in Pfaffstätten. He was represented before the Court by Mr R. Kilches, a lawyer practising in Vienna.

The applicant was employed by the C. company from 1999 to 2004. On 9 November 2004 he attended a trade show for young entrepreneurs and gave an interview to a journalist. In this interview, he stated that in his opinion it was only possible to develop ideas in one’s own company, whereas this was difficult when working for an enterprise. He further declared that he intended to set up his own company together with a partner. He explained that they were not discouraged by the fact that a loan and a lot of work input was required. This statement was quoted on 10 November 2004 in the daily newspaper “Wirtschaftsblatt” in a report on the topic why young people dared to become self-employed, under the headline “We simply want more freedom”. One of the applicant’s superiors read the newspaper article and confronted the applicant with it on 16 November 2004.

The next day the applicant was told that the company wished to end the working contract. In order not to harm his future career, his superior advised him to either give notice out of his own motion, or end the contract in mutual consent (einvernehmliche Auflösung). If he did not choose one of the two options, the company would dismiss him.

After having reflected on the options, the applicant ended the contract in mutual consent with the company by a signed agreement dated 17 November 2004. The parties agreed that the contract ended on 30 November 2004 and that the applicant received the statutory dismissal pay (gesetzliche Abfertigung) of three months’ salary. They agreed that the applicant was off duty from that day on. The parties however did not agree on the payment of a compensation for the dismissal of the applicant.

On 24 November 2004 the applicant, represented by counsel, filed an action against his former employer challenging the mutual agreement at the Vienna Labour and Social Court (Arbeits- und Sozialgericht). He claimed that he had been under duress when signing the agreement. By terminating the employment agreement mutually he had waived several entitlements which he had not been informed about.

The applicant set the value of the dispute at 4,500 euros (EUR). The opponent company objected to this value and argued that the action rather concerned a declaratory judgment that the contract was still in force. According to the law the value should thus be set at EUR 462,000 (i.e. ten years’ salary), but at least EUR 138,600 (i.e. three years’ salary). The court set the value at EUR 138,600.

In its judgment of 18 July 2006 the Vienna Labour and Social Court (Arbeits- und Sozialgericht) dismissed the applicant’s claim. In its reasoning the court noted that the applicant had had time to reflect on the possibilities offered to him by his employer and read the agreement before signing it. The court found that the applicant was under no pressure when signing the agreement and his superior had not misused the special emotional situation of the applicant. The court also noted that the applicant obviously regretted having agreed on the termination without receiving a compensation for the dismissal.

The applicant appealed and argued, inter alia, that the value was set too high and that the legal reasoning was wrong. He also argued that not only the State but also the employer were held to observe his rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”).

On 25 July 2007 the Vienna Court of Appeal upheld the decision on the merits and the value at issue, holding that the value as set by the first instance court was not against the law. It noted that the value determined by the court of first instance was only challengeable if it was contrary to the law, but apart from that there was a margin of discretion afforded to the first instance. The Court of Appeal pointed out that the first instance had set the value at a fairly low rate.

The applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court and again argued that the employer had disregarded the applicant’s rights under Article 10 of the Convention.

On 28 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to deal with the merits of the case for lack of an important question of law; it held that it had no jurisdiction to alter the set value at issue. The applicant was obliged to pay the costs of the court proceedings and of the opponent’s lawyer. This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 23 January 2008.

According to Austrian labour law, an employee can in principle be dismissed without the employer being obliged to give any reason. The employer only has to respect the period for giving notice (Kündigungsfrist) and the dismissal date (Kündigungstermin). Only in case of a dismissal without notice (Entlassung) the employer would be obliged to rely on an important reason prescribed by law.

Section 29 of the Private Employees Act (Angestelltengesetz) stipulates that in case the employee is sent off-duty after a dismissal or in case of a dismissal without notice without an important reason, he or she is entitled to compensation for the dismissal (Kündigungsentschädigung). The employee is hence entitled to the full salary until the end of the period of notice and the aliquot part of the Christmas bonus (Weihnachtsgeld) and holiday pay (Urlaubsgeld). Furthermore the employee is entitled to a compensation for any vacation he did not consume (Urlaubsentschädigung).

In addition to the compensation for dismissal an employee is entitled to dismissal pay (Abfertigung) according to Section 23 of the Private Employees Act. This dismissal pay is paid out if the contract was concluded before 1 January 2003 and the employee had worked for the company for more than three years. The amount of the dismissal pay depends on the years of service.

In case an employment contract is terminated by mutual agreement, the parties are free to agree on the payment or the amount of the compensation for the dismissal. However, the payment of the dismissal pay is compulsory.

According to Article 879 and 1385 of the Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) an agreement (Vergleich) can only be challenged in case the parties were mistaken about an essential fact of the agreement, in case of an error of expression or in case of extortion (Wucher).

According to Section 58 of the Act on Exercise of Jurisdiction (Jurisdiktionsnorm), in a court case regarding an action for a declaratory judgment that an employment contract is still in force, the value should be set at ten years’ salary of the employee.

In general, when a party challenges the fixing of the value of the claim, the court of first instance has to do so in accordance with Article 7 of the Lawyer’s Fees Act (Rechtsanwaltstarifgesetz). This decision is contestable only if it is contrary to mandatory rules. The value of the claim is the basis for the court costs and the lawyer’s fees.


Violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to free elections-{general} (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 - Vote);No violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Pavlina Panova;Síofra O’Leary;Yonko Grozev

The first applicant, Mr Kulinski, was convicted of hooliganism on 16 May 2008 in a final judgment of the Sofia City Court. He served his sentence in Sofia Prison between 6 November 2008 and 30 December 2009. Having served the entirety of his sentence, he was released on the latter date.

The second applicant, Mr Sabev, was convicted of robbery and murder and sentenced to whole-life imprisonment on 17 December 2003 in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation. The applicant is serving his sentence in Sofia Prison. On 3 September 2014 the VicePresident of Bulgaria, exercising the constitutional prerogative to grant clemency, commuted the applicant’s whole-life sentence to a “simple-life” sentence (see paragraph 16 below).

In 2009, while both applicants were serving their sentences, the following elections took place: elections to the European Parliament on 7 June 2009 and to the Bulgarian Parliament on 5 July 2009. No polling station was set up in the prison where the applicants were detained, as the relevant legislation excluded sentenced individuals from voting.

Subsequently, the second applicant was not allowed to vote in the elections to the Bulgarian Parliament on 12 May 2013 and 5 October 2014, nor in the European Parliament election on 25 May 2014.