Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Nebojša Vučinić;Robert Spano

The applicant, a professor of medicine, was born in 1945 and lives in Istanbul.

On 29 November 1981 a well-known journalist/columnist published an article in the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet in which he drew attention to the similarities between the books Mother’s Book, written by Professor Dr I.D., a prominent academic and president of the Higher Education Council between 1981 and 1992, and that of Dr Benjamin Spock entitled Baby and Childcare. It mentioned, humorously, that the latter must have copied from Professor Dr I.D.’s book.

On 14 December 1997 the applicant brought to the attention of the members of the Turkish Academy of Sciences the allegation that Professor Dr I.D. had committed plagiarism in respect of the above-mentioned book.

On 9 January 1998 the applicant, acting as the head of the Ethics Committee of the Turkish Academy of Sciences, together with two other members of the Committee, submitted a two-page report in which they took the view that Professor Dr I.D. had committed plagiarism in his book entitled Mother’s Book. They gave five examples in this connection. They asked the Council of the Academy of Sciences to take various actions in this regard. It appears, however, that no action was taken.

Similar allegations were also made by Professor Dr M.T.H. in his book The History of the University in Turkey, 2nd edition, 2000.

In December 2000 an article written by the applicant entitled ‘Ethics of Science and plagiarism’ was published in the Turkish Journal of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. In this article the applicant renewed his claim that Professor Dr I.D. had committed plagiarism in his book entitled Mother’s Book.

In the meantime, on 15 November 2000, a daily newspaper, Milliyet, had published a shortened version of the article that was to be published in the Turkish Journal of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. The headline read, in small type, “the YÖK is establishing an ethics committee to examine the ethics of science of docent candidates”, and in larger type “D. should first be reprimanded”. A photograph of Professor Dr I.D. accompanied the article.

In this article the applicant stated, inter alia, that there were many ways to deviate from the ethics of science, but that the most primitive and dangerous way was to present the work of others as one’s own, that “plagiarism” was, unlike in Turkey, an action frowned upon in Western culture, and those who committed it were seen as common criminals, that such actions were punished by the laws on copyright, and that in developing countries like Turkey creative ideas and their products had not yet reached the sacred untouchable status they had in developed countries. In this connection, the applicant noted that the YÖK had decided to create an ethics committee to examine the publications of docent candidates. He maintained that plagiarism was so common that the YÖK’s decision was well-founded, and proposed that the latter should approach its founder, I.D., and ask him to apologise for the plagiarisms he had committed. In this part of the article the applicant claimed that Professor Dr I.D.’s book Mother’s Book was plagiarised from Dr Benjamin Spock’s book Baby and Childcare. The applicant congratulated YÖK for the initiative of the ethics committee, but considered that it was not possible to correct “our ethics of science” without first dealing with this issue. Later in the article the applicant criticised the application of the statute of limitations to plagiarism and the lack of flexibility of the applicable sanction.

In a small box next to the article the applicant gave an account of his unsuccessful attempt to deal with plagiarism while head of the ethics committee at the Turkish Academy of Sciences. In this connection, he referred to the ethics committee’s above-mentioned opinion regarding I.D. and the resistance it had encountered in that respect, prompting the resignation of committee members.

On 18 November 2000 the General Assembly of the Turkish Paediatrics Association condemned the above article published in Milliyet, considering it an attack on Professor Dr I.D.

On 29 November 2000 Professor Dr I.D. (“the plaintiff”) brought a civil action for compensation against the applicant before the Ankara Civil Court of First Instance on the ground, inter alia, that the applicant’s assertion that the book written by the plaintiff entitled Mother’s Book was plagiarised from Benjamin Spock’s Baby and Childcare constituted an attack on his personality rights.

On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil action for compensation against Professor Dr I.D. on the ground that some of the remarks made by the plaintiff constituted an attack on his own personality rights.

In the course of the proceedings before the Ankara Civil Court of First Instance that court decided to obtain an expert report with a view to establishing the veracity of the applicant’s assertion that the plaintiff had committed plagiarism. It appointed two professors of paediatrics and one lawyer.

On an unspecified date the applicant objected to the appointment of the two professors of paediatrics on the ground that they both had close links with the plaintiff. In this connection, he stated that one of them currently worked and the other one had worked prior to his retirement at Hacettepe University, which had been established by the plaintiff, and that they were members of the Turkish Paediatrics Association, which was also headed by the plaintiff.

On 18 September 2001 the expert report, which concluded that there had been no plagiarism, was submitted to the firstinstance court. It held, in brief, that the content of Professor Dr I.D.’s book was “anonymous” information regarding child health and care which organisations such as WHO or UNICEF sought to have disseminated, that the plaintiff in the introduction to the book stated that the book had been compiled on the basis of questions asked by parents and conclusions reached from scientific research and experience of experts in the field, that it was natural for the two books to resemble each other – they were handbooks, and neither of them contained any bibliography or sources. In this connection, it pointed out similarities which existed in other similar handbooks, such as Mayo Clinic Family Health Book and John Hopkins Family Health Book. The experts also noted that the book in question was not a scientific publication. The report also assessed the merits of the complaint, holding that in the present case the plaintiff’s personality rights had been violated.

On 25 October 2001 the Ankara Civil Court of First Instance (11th Division), relying on the conclusions reached by the expert report of 18 September 2001, held, inter alia, that the applicant’s assertion was neither true nor topical. It ordered the applicant to pay compensation to Professor Dr I.D. in the amount of 10,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL), plus interest at the statutory rate applicable from the date of the impugned publication. Counterclaims by the applicant were dismissed, and those decisions subsequently became final, as the applicant did not lodge an appeal in this respect.

In his appeal to the Court of Cassation the applicant argued, inter alia, that two of the experts had close ties with the plaintiff and that therefore the expert report was biased. In this connection, the applicant submitted that the first expert was the plaintiff’s student and that the second expert was a student of the first expert and that they were both members of the Turkish Paediatrics Association, which had already voiced its opinion on this subject. He maintained that experts should not be chosen from Bilkent University and Hacettepe University, because those universities had been set up by the plaintiff.

The applicant further argued, inter alia, that the domestic court had based its decision on the conclusions of an inadequate and biased report which contained praise for the plaintiff and that the applicant’s comments were true, as had been attested to by witness and documentary evidence included in the case file, including a report dated 24 January 2001 and written by Professor Dr J.P., Professor of English Literature and Comparative Literature at Bogazici University. (This report compares the 1968 edition of Mother’s Book with that of Dr Spock and concludes, inter alia, that a number of paragraphs and sentences in the plaintiff’s book were copied from Dr Spock’s book by way of word-by-word translation and by using other methods considered as plagiarism. The report contains an annex with some examples.) The applicant further argued, by referring to various examples such as legal changes in domestic law provisions, that the issue of plagiarism was a topical subject.

On 14 May 2002 the Court of Cassation (4th Division) held a hearing and quashed the judgment of the first-instance court. In its decision it held that the first-instance court should first determine whether the allegations of plagiarism were well-founded. In this connection the court, inter alia, found the experts’ report inadequate and not in compliance with the rules prescribed in Article 276 of the Civil Code of Procedure.

On 11 November 2002 the Court of Cassation dismissed the plaintiff’s request for rectification of its decision.

When the case was remitted back to the first-instance court, the latter appointed as experts Professor Y.A., professor of paediatrics, Professor S.D., professor of paediatrics, and Professor Dr A.E., professor of English. These appointments were made on 4 February 2003. All these experts worked at Gazi University.

On 21 April 2003 the experts’ report, which concluded that there had been no plagiarism, was submitted to the firstinstance court. The experts compared the plaintiff’s book with that of Dr Spock as translated into Turkish by Zuhal Avci, and noted, inter alia, that there was no similarity between the manner in which the two books were conceptualised and shaped, namely the number of pages, picture on the cover, and section headings. Underlining the differences in each section of the book, the experts also concluded that there were no similarities as regards the contents of the book. The experts noted that it was natural for certain information such as Apgar scales or symptoms of various childhood illnesses to be similar. In this connection, they held that these were not the “original views” of Dr Spock.

In the course of the proceedings the applicant objected to the report, particularly on the ground that the first two experts worked with a person close to the plaintiff and that they were themselves members of the Turkish Paediatrics Association.

Following objections to the report by the applicant, on 1 October 2003 the first-instance court appointed three new experts for a second report.

On various dates two of the court-appointed experts, namely Professor Dr D.B. and Professor Dr B.E., both professors of English language and literature at Hacettepe University, resigned because of a potential conflict of interest.

On 22 December 2003 the experts’ report prepared by Professor Dr N.A., professor of paediatrics at the Ankara University School of Medicine, Professor Dr S.A., professor of paediatrics at the Ankara University School of Medicine, and Professor Dr G.C., professor of English language and literature at Atılım University, was submitted to the court.

In this report, the experts submitted that they had compared the first edition of the plaintiff’s book, published in 1952, with a copy of Dr Spock’s book as originally published. In sum, the experts held that the plaintiff’s book was a popular health book, that it was not a word-for-word translation or citation from Dr Spock’s book, that in the first edition of his book the plaintiff referred at the end of his book to Dr Spock and J.H. Kenyon as regards the methodology he had followed, that there were sections in the book which did not exist in Dr Spock’s book, and that the plaintiff’s book contained national-specific matters and various laws and customs, but that in certain parts of the book there were paragraphs where the translation method had been used and which were similar to Dr Spock. As regards this last point the experts considered that these parts did not concern scientific information but anonymous information known to all paediatricians, and that following these paragraphs the plaintiff had referred to national- specific matters. They further considered that certain conditions required for scientific books, such as citation of sources, were not required for books published at that time, and that an acknowledgement only in the form of thanks sufficed.

The experts concluded that the book written by the plaintiff was a popular health book, that in its first edition he had thanked those whose books had inspired him, and that the book was in conformity with the rules of the time of its publication. In this connection, they noted that even today reference by full citation was mostly applicable only to scientific and academic books, and that even if such ethical rules should be held to be applicable to popular health books a book written in 1952 should not be judged by current standards.

On 29 December 2003 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Ankara public prosecutor’s office, claiming that the transcript of the court decision of 1 October 2003 regarding the appointment of experts, namely Professor Dr G.C., had been tampered with.

On 25 February 2004 the Ankara Civil Court of First Instance (11th Division) ordered the applicant to pay compensation to Professor Dr I.D. in the amount of 10,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL), plus interest at the statutory rate applicable from the date of the impugned publication.

In its decision, the court began by stating that, after the parties had asked the court to appoint experts, it had requested a list of qualified experts from all universities in Ankara and that it had appointed experts who had not taken part in the academic debate between the parties. It further added that following the applicant’s objection to the first report the court had commissioned a second expert’s report.

The court, referring to the evidence in the case file, held that the book written by the plaintiff was not a copy of the book written by Dr Spock, that it was a genuine publication, and that therefore the applicant’s assertion was not correct. It found therefore that there had been an unlawful attack on the plaintiff’s personality rights and scientific career.

The applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that one of the experts, Professor Dr G.C., was working at Hacettepe University, which gave rise to concerns as to her impartiality.

On 19 October 2004 the Court of Cassation (4th Division) held a hearing and quashed the judgment of the first-instance court. The court, after referring to the importance of citation of sources in publications, especially scientific publications, held, relying on the information provided in the experts’ report, that a mere reference to Dr Spock, as regards the methodology followed in the book, in the original edition, was not sufficient to consider that the plaintiff had made a proper reference and that, in addition, in subsequent editions there was no such reference in the book in question. It therefore found no unlawfulness in the applicant’s remarks and held that the case should be dismissed.

On 8 November 2005 the Ankara Civil Court of First Instance (11th Division) decided not to abide by the decision of the Court of Cassation, and ordered the applicant to pay compensation to Professor Dr I.D. in the amount of 10,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL), plus interest at the statutory rate applicable from the date of the impugned publication. In its decision, it held, inter alia, that experts had been appointed in accordance with the previous decision of the Court of Cassation, that these experts had concluded that there had been no plagiarism, and that the court could not draw conclusions which were contrary to the assessment of the experts. The court held that the applicant had suggested that the plaintiff had committed plagiarism, which under the disciplinary regulation of the YÖK required the heavy sanction of expulsion from the university. It underlined in this connection that everyone had the right to criticise a person exercising a public function. However, criticism which overstepped objective boundaries and became unjust vilification or belittling in bad faith was unlawful. In the circumstances of the present case, the court considered that the plaintiff’s personality rights had been infringed.

In his appeal to the Plenary Session of the Court of Cassation, the applicant underlined, inter alia, that the first-instance court had failed to properly assess the decision of the Court of Cassation. In particular, the court had failed to address the fact that there were parts of the book which were translations, and that a reference to Dr Spock in the first edition, which in any event does not figure in later editions, could not be considered a proper citation. In this connection, the applicant underlined that using a methodology adopted in another book and repeating the same words and paragraphs cannot be considered provision of anonymous information, and that there was no scientific basis for the first-instance court’s view that plagiarism only applied to original ideas.

The applicant repeated, inter alia, that there was no unlawfulness in his assertion that the plaintiff had in his book plagiarised from Dr Spock’s book by way of translation and quotations without providing proper references, that this fact was already known by the public as such allegations had been previously made by others and the plaintiff had failed to sue them, and that the voicing of this fact was in the public interest.

The applicant further criticised the wording of the decision, in particular the use of capital letters to emphasise certain words, and others.

On 10 May 2006 the Court of Cassation (plenary session), by a majority, upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. In its decision, the court held, inter alia, that all the experts’ reports included in the case file since the beginning had insistently underlined that both books were handbooks, that they contained anonymous information and not original ideas developed by the authors, and that therefore it was not necessary to provide references therein. It further considered that, contrary to the experts’ reports, the applicant had since 1998 brought similar criticisms against the plaintiff, leading sometimes, as in the present case, to unlawful attacks on the plaintiff’s personality rights. In the present case the applicant in the article in question had insulted the plaintiff and attacked his personality rights instead of assessing the establishment of the ethics committee by the YÖK. The court considered that there was not even the smallest connection between the subject of the article and the plaintiff. It therefore found that the subject was not topical. The court maintained that there was no reason why the applicant would include the plaintiff in this subject. It therefore held that the incident, as established by experts’ reports, was not only false but also not topical.

The court further noted that when it had first quashed the decision of the first-instance court, the Court of Cassation (4th Division) had held that the veracity of the allegation was to be established by a report written by experts on the subject and that the first-instance court should make its decision on the basis of that report. It therefore held that if the report concluded that there had been no plagiarism, the applicant’s article - as it was not topical - would constitute an attack on personality rights and an award of compensation would be required.

It considered that since the first-instance court had decided to abide by the above decision of the Court of Cassation there was an acquired procedural right in favour of the plaintiff. It considered, however, that the 4th Division, in its second decision to quash the first-instance court judgment, had revised its view and, contrary to the experts’ report, had taken the view that the book was a scientific publication. In this connection, the court referred to its case-law in which it had previously held that where an issue required expertise judges could not rule on it on the basis of their own personal views and opinions. It underlined that this case-law was also applicable to the Court of Cassation. Otherwise, the acquired procedural right would be violated.

The court underlined the conditions that must be met for compensation to be awarded for an attack on personality rights in the press: unlawfulness, fault, damage and interconnectedness between reason and conclusion. It further held that for a published criticism or news item to be held unlawful there must be a violation under one of the following criteria: truthfulness, topicality, public interest, public good and interconnectedness between the subject, form and idea.

The court noted that in the present case, according to experts’ reports, the article published in Milliyet was not true, that the article was not topical, and the opinions expressed in the article exceeded the limits of criticism and insulted the plaintiff.

It further found that the 4th Division’s assessment referred to above was contrary to its case-law regarding the assessment of experts’ reports.

The court therefore found that the first-instance court’s decision to resist the 4th Division’s judgment was justified. It transferred the case back to the 4th Division of the Court of Cassation for determination of the amount of compensation.

Two dissenting members (judges sitting on the bench of the 4th Division) considered, inter alia, that in the instant case the conditions of public interest, topicality and veracity had been met, and that the form and the words used by the applicant in his criticism of an important public figure and academic was not contrary to law.

On 27 September 2006 the Court of Cassation (plenary session) dismissed a request by the applicant for rectification of its decision.

On 16 November 2006 the Court of Cassation (4th Division), finding the amount awarded to the plaintiff excessive, reduced the amount of compensation to 2,500 new Turkish liras (TRY).

On 14 March 2007 the Court of Cassation (4th Division) dismissed the parties’ request for rectification of its decision.

A description of the relevant domestic law at the material time can be found in Sapan v. Turkey, no. 44102/04, §§ 24-25, 8 June 2010.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention. Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention.


Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant, Ms Sanet Soyupova, is a Russian national, who was born in 1944 and lives in Zakan-Yurt, a village in the Chechen Republic.

summarised as follows.

The applicant is a Chechen. In 1944, during the Second World War, the USSR State Defence Committee issued a decree (Постановление ГОКО № -5073сс от 31 января 1944 г.) by which it ordered the deportation of her family and other Chechens to a special settlement in the Kazakh Soviet Republic and placed them under police surveillance. In 1956 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR allowed the deportees out of exile, but banned them from returning to their homeland and ruled out the return of confiscated property. In 1958 the applicant left the special settlement.

In 1991, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia passed the Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Persecution (Закон “О реабилитации жертв политических репрессий”), whose preamble provided for the rehabilitation of victims and compensation for material damage and personal suffering.

In 2005 the mention of personal suffering was removed from the preamble.

In 2008 the applicant was recognised as a victim of Soviet political and ethnic persecution and in 2014 she sued the State for 5,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (about 98,000 euros) in damages for the suffering she had undergone in her childhood.

On 13 March 2015 the Achkhoy-Martan District Court dismissed her claim. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, she argued that the Law had given her a “legitimate expectation” of redress.

On 16 June 2015 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the lower court, considering that the applicant had had no legitimate expectation: the Law had not provided for compensation for people who had been deported as they had not been “deprived of their liberty” within the meaning of section 15; the Law had made no promise of damages for personal suffering, nor could such damages be awarded under the Civil Code because the Code had introduced the notion of personal suffering into Russian law long after the persecution had taken place.

At the heart of the present case lie differences between two versions of the Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Persecution: the original version (18 October 1991) and the one in force at the time of the applicant’s claim (30 November 2011).

“This Law aims to rehabilitate all victims of political persecution ... and to compensate them ... for their material damage and personal suffering.”

“This Law aims to rehabilitate all victims of political persecution ... and to compensate them ... for their material damage.”

“Those who have been persecuted by way of deprivation of liberty and rehabilitated ... shall be paid RUB 180 per month of captivity, but no more than RUB 25,000 ...”

“Those who have been persecuted by way of deprivation of liberty or forced psychiatric custody and rehabilitated ... shall be paid RUB 75 per month of captivity ... but no more than RUB 10,000.”

Article 4 § 1 of the Civil Code of 1994 reads:

“Provisions of civil legislation shall have no retroactive effect and shall be applied to legal relationships which have arisen after [the provisions] have entered into force ...”

On 24 September 2012 the Constitutional Court found the 2011 version of section 15 of the Law compatible with the Constitution and confirmed that the compensation mentioned in the Law aimed to provide redress for the most severe acts of political persecution, that is, imprisonment and forced psychiatric custody (judgment 1765-O).


Branko Lubarda;Johannes Silvis;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra;Mārtiņš Mits

The applicant, Mr Aurel Ali Asan, is a Romanian national, who was born in 1973 and has been detained in Galați Prison since June 2010.

The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumar, from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant has been detained since June 2010 and, following his conviction in 2011, has been serving a twenty-three years prison sentence.

On 28 November 2011 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Brăila County Court seeking the suspension of his prison sentence on medical grounds.

On an unspecified date the Brăila County Court asked the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute to produce an expert medical report in respect of the applicant’s illnesses and to clarify if he could be treated in a prison hospital.

On 17 June 2012 the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute produced the expert medical report ordered by the court. One of the conclusions of the report was that the applicant had bone tissue missing on the right side of his head since an operation to treat a head injury suffered in 2006. It noted that after the surgery he had been recommended to undergo an osteoplasty (surgical repair or alteration of the bone). It concluded by agreeing that an osteoplasty was recommended for the applicant’s condition. The surgery was not urgent but could be carried out only in a civilian hospital. The applicant could be transferred to a civilian hospital under permanent guard after an appointment had been made and he had consented in writing. Also, from a medical standpoint, it was not impossible for the applicant to serve out his sentence.

On 24 September 2012 the Brăila County Court dismissed the applicant’s action. It held that according to the conclusion of the expert medical report produced by the Mina Minovic Forensic Institute, it was not impossible for the applicant to serve out his sentence from a medical standpoint. The applicant appealed on points of law (recurs) against the judgment.

By a final judgment of 24 January 2013 the Galați Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as ill-founded.

On 30 January 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Galați County Court seeking the suspension of his prison sentence on medical grounds.

On 19 March 2013 the Galați County Court dismissed the applicant’s action. It held that according to the expert medical report produced by the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute on 17 June 2012 the applicant’s illness did not make it impossible for him to serve out his sentence. The applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment.

By a final judgment of 26 April 2013 the Galați Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as ill-founded.

On 3 June 2013, relying on the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute’s expert report, the applicant lodged a request with the post-sentencing judge attached to Galați Prison seeking his assistance in gaining permission to undergo the surgery he needed.

On 4 June 2013 the post-sentencing judge attached to Galați Prison informed the applicant that his request had been forwarded to the prison’s medical office in order to be resolved.

On 7 June 2013, referring to the Galați Prison’s post-sentencing judge’s referral, the governor of Galați Prison informed the applicant that according to the neurosurgical evaluation report, produced in Rahova Prison Hospital for the expert medical report by the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute, the cranium cerebral trauma that had been operated on in 2006 did not need neurosurgical treatment.

On 29 July 2014 the post-sentencing judge attached to Galați Prison informed the Government that except for his request of 3 June 2013 the applicant had never complained before him between 2012 and 2014 under Laws nos. 275/2006 and 254/2013 that his right to medical assistance had been breached.

On 5 June 2012 the applicant was taken to the Bucharest University Emergency Hospital for a neurological evaluation. The evaluation report concluded that the applicant was not suffering from any serious neurological problems. However, it did recommend a neurosurgical evaluation.

On 22 and 29 June 2012 the applicant was taken to the Bucharest University Emergency Hospital for two neurosurgical evaluations. The evaluation reports concluded that the surgery was not urgent and that the applicant could have been operated on at any time.

On 12 December 2012 the applicant was taken for a CT scan which did not disclose any internal brain haemorrhage.

On 17 December 2012 the applicant was taken to the Carol Davila Central Military University Emergency Hospital for a neurosurgical evaluation. The evaluation report noted that the applicant’s condition was favourable and it recommended subsequent neurological evaluations with a view to an osteoplasty.

From 18 to 25 October 2013 the applicant was hospitalised in Rahova Prison Hospital for a neurosurgical evaluation and in order to determine the need for an osteoplasty. The evaluation report concluded that the applicant’s head injury was old and therefore was not an emergency warranting neurosurgery.

On 30 July 2014 the Medical Agency attached to the National Prison Service informed the Government and submitted supporting evidence attesting that from 20 September 2010 to 17 July 2014 the applicant had been repeatedly examined and treated for his medical conditions, including his head injury, in prison hospitals. Moreover, he was regularly given medical evaluations in respect of his condition.

On 25 June 2015 the National Prison Service informed the Government that on 19 June 2015 the applicant had been examined by a neurosurgeon at the Constanța County Hospital. The aforementioned neurosurgeon concluded that the applicant’s health was good and reiterated the chronic nature of the applicant’s condition and that it was not an emergency warranting neurosurgery.

The relevant provision of the former Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure concerning suspension of prison sentences (Articles 453 and 455), are described in Aharon Schwarz v. Romania, no. 28304/02, §§ 66-67, 12 January 2010.

Excerpts from the relevant legal provisions concerning the rights of detainees, namely Law no. 275/2006 on the execution of prison sentences, are given in the cases of Petrea v. Romania (no. 4792/03, §§ 21-23, 29 April 2008); Gagiu v. Romania (no. 63258/00, § 42, 24 February 2009); and Măciucă v. Romania (no. 25763/03, § 14, 26 May 2009).

The Execution of Prison Sentences Act (Article 56 of Law no. 254/2013), which entered into force on 1 February 2014, provides that a detainee can complain before the post-sentencing judge against the measures taken by the prison administration in respect of his lawful rights. The post-sentencing judge’s decision can also be challenged before the domestic courts.


No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sibinj.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant was a civil servant of the City of Slavonski Brod, working in its Office for Public Relations and Protocol (Grad Slavonski Brod, Ured za odnose s javnošću i protokol – hereinafter “the City of Slavonski Brod”). In 2007 he was suspended from the civil service on account of having been accused of severe breaches of his official duties.

For the duration of his suspension, that is to say between September 2007 and September 2008, the applicant was entitled to monthly salary compensation in the amount of 60% of the salary remitted in the month prior to his suspension from the civil service.

On 5 September 2008 the Osijek Civil Service Tribunal (Službenički sud u Osijeku) found the applicant guilty of severe breaches of his official duties and fined him 10% of the salary paid to him in the month in which the said sanction was imposed.

On 14 October 2008, after the applicant lodged an appeal, the Superior Civil Service Tribunal (Viši službenički sud) amended the impugned decision and fined the applicant 5% of his salary paid in the month in which the said sanction was imposed.

On 3 November 2008 the applicant lodged an application for the reimbursement of the portion of his gross salary – in the total amount of 78,428.47 Croatian kunas ((HRK), approximately 10,900 euros (EUR) at the time) – withheld during the suspension period between September 2007 and September 2008, together with accrued default interest running from the date of his suspension until payment of the said portion. He was of the opinion that by withholding 40% of his salary for a period of 12 months and imposing a fine on him the administrative bodies had punished him twice.

By a decision of 17 November 2008 the City of Slavonski Brod dismissed that application.

The applicant then lodged an appeal, which was dismissed as ill-founded by the same administrative body that delivered the above-mentioned decision (that is to say the City of Slavonski Brod). However, in its decision of 22 December 2008 it gave the instruction that the applicant had a right to bring an administrative action against it before the Administrative Court.

On 22 January 2009 the applicant brought an administrative action, in accordance with the City of Slavonski Brod’s ruling.

On 1 January 2012 certain amendments to the Court Act entered into force and the Administrative Court became the High Administrative Court.

By a decision of 4 January 2012 the High Administrative Court, relying on sections 9 and 30(1), point 5, of the Administrative Disputes Act, declined jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter, stating that an ordinary municipal court (redovni, općinski sud) was the appropriate court to hear the applicant’s case, and declared the applicant’s action inadmissible. This decision was final. On 16 February 2012 it served its decision on the applicant’s representative.

On 12 March 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. He complained, inter alia, that his right to a fair hearing, in particular his right of access to court, as guaranteed by Article 29 of the Croatian Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, had been violated when the High Administrative Court had declared his action inadmissible. In particular, he argued that according to the Supreme Court’s case-law, ordinary municipal courts did not have jurisdiction over disputes arising from legally binding decisions of administrative bodies. He also argued that even if he had brought a civil action, it would have been time-barred because it had taken the High Administrative Court more than three years to declare his administrative action inadmissible.

By a decision of 5 July 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the case raised no constitutional issue. On 17 July 2012 it served its decision on the applicant’s representative.

On 6 September 2012 the applicant brought a civil action in the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) for reimbursement of salary arrears withheld between September 2007 and September 2008.

By a judgment of 20 March 2013 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant’s claim as time-barred. It held, inter alia, that given that the High Administrative Court had declared the applicant’s administrative action inadmissible, it could not be deemed that the statutory limitation period had been interrupted. It relied on section 242(2) of the Civil Obligations Act.

By a judgment of 12 August 2013 the Slavonski Brod County Court (Županijski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment of 20 March 2013.


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom of movement-{general} (Article 2 para. 1 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom of movement);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Civil rights and obligations;Fair hearing);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Civil rights and obligations;Fair hearing);No violation of Article 13+P4-2-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 2 para. 1 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom of movement;Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom of movement-{general});Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Dmitry Dedov;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Ján Šikuta;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Ledi Bianku;Mark Villiger;Nebojša Vučinić;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Robert Spano;Ksenija Turković

The applicant, Mr Angelo de Tommaso, is an Italian national who was born in 1963 and lives in Casamassima.

On 22 May 2007 the Bari public prosecutor recommended that the Bari District Court place the applicant under special police supervision (sorveglianza speciale di pubblica sicurezza) for two years, on the basis of Act no. 1423/1956, and impose a compulsory residence order on him during that time. The public prosecutor submitted that the applicant’s previous convictions for drug trafficking, absconding and unlawful possession of weapons showed that he associated with criminals and was a dangerous individual. He also noted that the applicant had been given a “warning” by the police but had persisted in his criminal conduct.

In submissions of 6 March 2008 the applicant challenged the prosecutor’s recommendation. He argued that there had been a case of mistaken identity and that the alleged breaches of the terms of his special supervision concerned a person who shared his first name and surname but had been born in 1973. He further submitted that no criminal charges had been brought against him since a conviction dating back to 2002. Although he had been convicted of absconding in 2004, that was not a decisive factor for the imposition of the measure in question. He argued that there was no need to place him under special supervision.

In a decision of 11 April 2008, served on 4 July 2008, the Bari District Court placed the applicant under special supervision for two years. It rejected his arguments, finding that the statutory requirements for the imposition of the measure were indeed satisfied, there being no doubt that he was dangerous.

The District Court found that the applicant had “active” criminal tendencies and that the evidence before it showed that he had derived most of his means of subsistence from criminal activity.

The court observed, in particular:

“The subject was issued with a ‘verbal warning for public safety’ on 18 September 2006, but this did nothing to improve his conduct; he continued to associate regularly with key figures in the local underworld (malavita locale) and carried on committing offences (see statement of charges pending: breach of supervision order on 25 April 2007; breach of supervision order on 29 April 2007).”

The District Court further held:

“The findings of the investigation (see documents and certificates in the case file) show that Mr Angelo de Tommaso remains personally involved in various criminal activities, among which the greatest threat to public order and safety is posed by offences against property and weapon- and drug-related offences.

This negative picture is compounded by the contents of the recent report issued by the Gioia del Colle carabinieri on 26 January 2008, from which it appears that far from having receded, the subject’s criminal tendencies are still thought to be active and operational. The evidence in the file indicates that he has no fixed and lawful occupation (having declared himself available for employment from February 2008) and that the serious offences under consideration are such as to warrant the conclusion that he has, up until now, derived a significant part of his means of subsistence from criminal activity, by repeatedly resorting to crime either alone or in association with habitual offenders (whether in his municipality of residence or elsewhere). To ensure more thorough monitoring, it is therefore necessary to order not only special police supervision for a period of two years (a measure deemed reasonable on account of the subject’s character as clearly emerges from the acts attributed to him), but also compulsory residence for the same duration.”

The preventive measure imposed the following obligations on the applicant:

– to report once a week to the police authority responsible for his supervision;

– to start looking for work within a month;

– to live in Casamassima and not to change his place of residence;

– to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion;

– not to associate with persons who had a criminal record and who were subject to preventive or security measures;

– not to return home later than 10 p.m. or to leave home before 6 a.m., except in case of necessity and only after giving notice to the authorities in good time;

– not to keep or carry weapons;

– not to go to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels and not to attend public meetings;

– not to use mobile phones or radio communication devices; and

– to have with him at all times the document setting out his obligations (carta precettiva), and to present it to the police authority on request.

On 14 July 2008 the applicant appealed to the Bari Court of Appeal.

On 31 July 2008 the Bari prefecture ordered the withdrawal of the applicant’s driving licence.

In a decision of 28 January 2009, served on the applicant on 4 February 2009, the Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and quashed the preventive measure ex tunc.

The Court of Appeal observed, firstly, that for a preventive measure to be imposed it was necessary to establish that the individual posed a “current danger”, which was not necessarily linked to the commission of a specific offence, but rather to the existence of a complex situation of a certain duration indicating that the individual had a particular lifestyle that prompted alarm for public safety.

In the Court of Appeal’s view, the requirement of a “current” danger to society implied that the relevant decision should relate to the time of the assessment and should remain valid throughout its implementation; any previous circumstances could be taken into account only in relation to their impact on the “current” element.

The court found that at the time the measure had been imposed, the applicant’s dangerousness could not have been inferred from any criminal activity.

It then observed that in several final judgments delivered between September 1995 and August 1999 the applicant had been convicted of tobacco smuggling. He had subsequently changed his sphere of activity and until 18 July 2002 had been involved in drug trafficking and handling illegal weapons, offences for which he had been sentenced to four years’ imprisonment in a judgment of 15 March 2003, which had become final on 10 March 2004; he had served his sentence from 18 July 2002 to 4 December 2005.

The Court of Appeal accordingly noted that the applicant’s most recent illegal activities relating to drugs dated back to more than five years before the preventive measure had been imposed. All that the court could hold against him was an offence of absconding, committed on 14 December 2004 (while he had been subject to a compulsory residence order).

The court also pointed out that the breaches of the terms of special supervision committed on 25 and 29 April 2007 concerned a different person, who had the same first name and surname as the applicant but had been born in 1973.

The Court of Appeal held that the District Court had omitted to assess the impact of the rehabilitation purpose of the sentence on the applicant’s personality.

It observed in particular:

“While it is true that the application of special supervision is compatible with the status of detention, which relates solely to the time of the execution of the sentence, the assessment of dangerousness is inevitably even more significant in the case of an individual who has fully served his sentence and has committed no further offences after his release, as is the case for Mr de Tommaso.

The note of 26 January 2008 in which the carabinieri mentioned that Mr de Tommaso associated with convicted offenders (to whom he had been caught speaking) does not appear sufficient to establish his dangerousness, bearing in mind that Mr de Tommaso has not been the subject of any further judicial proceedings since the decision to impose the preventive measure.

Lastly, the Court of Appeal notes that the material produced by the defence before the District Court and at the hearing before this division indicates that, notwithstanding the typically casual nature of work as a farm labourer, the subject has, at least since his release from prison in 2005 up to the present day, consistently been in lawful employment providing him with a respectable source of income.

In conclusion, in March 2008 there were no specific facts from which to infer persistent dangerousness on the part of the subject, who, after serving his lengthy sentence of imprisonment, has not displayed any conduct justifying the assessment made in the judgment appealed against, which is therefore to be quashed.”


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)

Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Sochi.

On 27 November 2010 the applicant, a police captain, was arrested for soliciting a bribe. He was taken into custody and his detention was extended on several occasions. On 4 July 2011 the case was submitted for trial in the Tsentralnyy District Court of Sochi.

On 8 July 2011 the District Court determined that the case was not ready for trial and returned the file to the prosecutor. By the same decision, it extended the applicant’s detention until 10 August 2011.

On 9 August 2011 the director of the IZ-23/2 remand prison where the applicant was held reported to the Sochi prosecutor and to the president of the Tsentralnyy District Court that, in the absence of an order extending the applicant’s detention beyond 10 August, he would need to be released on that date. On the same date the Sochi prosecutor replied to him that there were no grounds for releasing the applicant because the date for hearing the prosecutor’s appeal against the District Court’s order of 8 July had been fixed for 17 August. The applicant was not released on 10 August. He complained about his unlawful detention to the head of the Investigations Committee and the regional head of the Ministry of the Interior but did not receive any reply.

On 17 August 2011 the Krasnodar Regional Court quashed the District Court’s order on appeal. As regards the custodial measure, it held that no extension had been necessary because by virtue of Article 255 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the applicant could be held in custody for an initial six-month period starting from the date on which the case had been submitted for trial.


Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicant, Ms Asiye Genç, was born in 1976 and lives in Burdur.

On 30 March 2005 the applicant, who was pregnant and in pain, was taken by her husband, Mr Bülent Genç, to the Gümüşhane public hospital.

At about 11 p.m. on 31 March 2005 the applicant gave birth by Caesarean section to a boy (Tolga Genç), who – at 36 weeks’ gestation –was premature and weighed 2.5 kg.

Shortly after his birth, Tolga began showing signs of respiratory distress.

As there was no suitable neonatal unit in the Gümüşhane public hospital, the doctors decided to transfer the baby to the Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Farabi public hospital (“KTÜ Farabi”), located in Trabzon, 110 km away.

On 1 April 2005 at around 1.15 a.m. the KTÜ Farabi public hospital refused to admit Tolga on the grounds that there were no places available in the neonatal intensive care unit.

Around 2 a.m. Tolga was transferred to the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre (“TMOC”). There, the duty doctor explained to Mr Genç that there were no incubators available and advised him to return to the KTÜ Farabi public hospital, which the father had no choice but to do.

On their arrival, the doctors at the KTÜ Farabi public hospital again argued that they were unable to admit the premature baby, owing to a lack of available places in the neonatal unit.

A fresh attempt was then made to drive Tolga to the TMOC.

Towards 3.30 a.m., he died in the ambulance, which he had apparently never left throughout this sequence of events.

On 6 April 2005 Mr and Ms Genç filed a complaint.

In particular, they called for the conviction of doctors K.M. and T.Ö. from the KTÜ Farabi public hospital.

Two investigations, one criminal and the other administrative, were opened.

In the context of these investigations, several witness statements were taken. The relevant passages read as follows:

The deceased’s relatives:

The applicant: “My pregnancy was progressing normally. The doctors preferred a birth by Caesarean section on account of the baby’s position. The birth had initially been scheduled for 25 April 2005, but during the night of 30 March 2005 I had pains, and the baby was born by Caesarean section the next day. I don’t know what happened after that. I was told that the baby had been transferred to another hospital on account of a respiratory problem, but that he had not been admitted because there were no available places, and that he died in an ambulance, in the garden of a hospital, without a doctor taking the trouble to care for him. I want those responsible for my son’s death to be punished.”

Mr Genç: “My son was born prematurely at the Gümüşhane public hospital. The doctors decided to transfer him to another hospital with better equipment. The KTÜ Farabi hospital did not admit him owing to a lack of places. He was also refused admission to the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre, for the same reasons. Instead of caring for my son, the doctors wasted time with administrative formalities. They did not even take the trouble to examine him, although it was an emergency situation. They ought to have diagnosed and treated him. We fought for four hours for my son to be seen by a doctor, but no hospital would agree to admit him. After several trips back and forth between hospitals, he died in an ambulance, in a hospital garden. Had my son been admitted to hospital in time, he would not have died. The persons responsible must be punished.”

Ö.B.: “Mr Genç is a friend. I accompanied him on the evening of the incident. We followed behind the ambulance in a car. At the KTÜ Farabi hospital, the duty paediatrician, Ms T.Ö., was annoyed that the transfer had been carried out without any prior checks that there was indeed a place available at the hospital. She paid no attention to the baby. She was busy with the administrative side of things and asked for documents proving that there were in fact no places in the other hospitals. She first called the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre, then the Giresun public hospital, to check. She told us that there were indeed places at the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre, but that the duty doctor had simply not wished to be disturbed. She advised us to request an official signed document stating that there were no places available in the hospital. She added that if the doctors at the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre were confronted with such a request, they would certainly change their attitude, find a place and agree to admit the child. When we went to the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre, doctor K.B. told us that there were no places available and that they could not take the child into their care. Instead of looking after the child, who needed urgent medical assistance, he preferred to spend time drawing up a document stating that there were no places in the hospital. 45 minutes were lost in this way. After numerous back-and-forth trips between hospitals, the child ended up having a heart attack. Treatment by the emergency doctor was not enough to save him. Nobody wanted to take charge of the child. No emergency doctor examined him. They all refused to admit him and tried at any cost to transfer him to another hospital. This indifference towards a child who required emergency medical killed him.”

The medical staff:

O.Ü.: “I work as a gynaecologist and obstetrician at the Gümüşhane public hospital. Ms Genç’s Caesarean section proceeded normally. We handed over the child to the paediatrician after the birth. He was crying. I don’t know what happened after that, since I continued with the operation.”

E.K.: “I work as a midwife in the Gümüşhane public hospital. Ms Genç gave birth to a boy. The child was showing no anomalies when I took him in my arms. Suddenly, for a reason I don’t understand, he had difficulty breathing. Doctor N.A. stepped in right away. The child was intubated. He was transferred to another hospital by ambulance.”

N.A.: “I work as a paediatrician at the Gümüşhane public hospital. I saw the child about five minutes after his birth. I intervened as a matter of urgency, since he was not breathing correctly and his pulse was weak. Once his condition had stabilised, we organised his transfer to a better equipped hospital. I had been told that there was a place available at the KTÜ Farabi hospital. The child was transferred by ambulance and he was intubated during the transfer.”

N.S.: “I work as an anaesthetist at the Gümüşhane public hospital. Ms Genç gave birth by Caesarean section to a 36-week-old premature baby. Shortly afterwards, the midwife told us that the child had breathing difficulties. The paediatrician intervened immediately to provide the necessary treatment. It was decided to transfer him to another hospital, since there was no appropriate medical unit on site. I was in the ambulance with E.İ. The child was intubated. The transfer was carried out in an incubator. At the KTÜ Farabi hospital, the duty paediatrician, Ms T.Ö., did not examine the child. She simply said that we should go to the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre. Once there, doctor K.B. also refused to admit the child on the grounds that there were no available places. He took this decision without even examining the child. We went back and forth between hospitals, but no one would accept him. He died in the ambulance outside the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre.”

E.İ.: “I work as a nurse at the Gümüşhane public hospital. I was on duty on the day of the incident. The child had been brought to us in an incubator so that we would take him to the KTÜ Farabi hospital. Once there, doctor K.M. told us that it was impossible to take charge of the child and that he ought to be looked after by a specialised paediatrician. He told us to go and see doctor T.Ö. That is what we did. Ms T.Ö., without even examining the child, told us that there were no places in the hospital and that he should be transferred to the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre. We went there immediately. Doctor K.B. did not examine the child. He simply told us that there were no places in the hospital. We insisted for about half an hour that he take the child in for treatment. He refused. We then set off again for the KTÜ Farabi hospital. Doctor T.Ö. again refused to admit the child and insisted that he be transferred to the Giresun public hospital. The child’s father and I protested strongly against this decision. Doctor T.Ö. then asked us to provide her with an official document stating that there were no places at the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre. As no one had thought to give us such a document, we were unable to give it to her. She then asked us to return once more to the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre. Faced with her categorical refusal, we set off once again for the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre. Once there, the doctors again refused to admit the child. The child died in the ambulance at about 3.30 a.m.”

K.M.: “On the evening of the incident, I was on duty at the adult emergency department at the KTÜ Farabi hospital. I spoke to the father on the telephone. I told him that paediatrics was not my field, but that I could help him with the transfer to the emergency paediatrics department.”

T.Ö.: “I was on duty at the paediatrics department in the KTÜ Farabi hospital on the evening of the incident. The Gümüşhane public hospital did not contact us to find out whether or not there were free beds. The child was transferred directly to our hospital. I immediately addressed myself to his care. Other than the presence of meconium on his body, the child was fine. His vital functions were normal. I tested his oxygen saturation level, and it was between 95 and 100%. As there was a risk that the child would inhale meconium, I preferred to keep him [at the hospital] in order to ensure closer monitoring. However, I discovered that there were no beds in the department. The child’s father told me that doctor K.M. had stated that there were places available in the hospital. I then called doctor K.M., who was in the adult emergency department. He told me that he had thought that there were still places in the neonatal unit, but that he had not thought it necessary to call and check. I then expressed my displeasure to him. The child’s father, who was accompanied by a friend, protested strongly against my decision to refuse to admit [the child] for lack of a bed. But I had only followed the procedure. The head of department had expressly asked us not to accept patients if there were no places available and to organise for their immediate transfer. That is what I attempted to do. Someone from the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre told me on the telephone that there was one place available. After completing the administrative formalities, I ordered an ambulance journey. However, the ambulance came back to our hospital about two hours later, since the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre had refused to admit him. As there was no official document to that effect, I again transferred the patient to the same hospital. As it was impossible to take the child into our care, I did not go ahead with his administrative registration or open a treatment file.”

Doctor A.A.: “I saw doctor T.Ö. looking after the child. He was doing well and was not intubated. The oxygen saturation level was about 95%.”

Nurse A.A.: “I do not recall having seen any intubated child in the paediatric unit of the KTÜ Farabi hospital on the evening of the incident.”

İ.E.: “I am a doctor at the KTÜ Farabi hospital. The child was taken care of by doctor T.Ö. From what I saw, his general state was entirely satisfactory. The oxygen saturation level was 95%.”

Y.A.: “I am the head of the paediatric department at KTÜ Farabi hospital. My assistant, doctor T.Ö., was right to refuse to admit the child, because we cannot admit patients when the department is full. On the other hand, she ought to have opened an administrative file.”

K.B.: “I was on duty at the Trabzon Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre. At about 2 a.m. on 1 April 2005, an ambulance carrying an intubated newborn baby arrived at our hospital. I did not want to take the child out of the incubator, since there is a risk of hypothermia with premature babies. I called doctor M.K. to ask for his advice, since the child needed to be put on a respirator, but there were no available places in the department. I called the other hospitals to try to find a place, but without success. I then told them to return to the KTÜ Farabi hospital. Around one hour later, they came back asking for an official document stating that there were no available places in our hospital. I did not give them a document of this sort, but I told them they could visit the department if they didn’t believe me. While I was in the middle of explaining all this, I was suddenly informed that the child had had a heart attack. I immediately went into the ambulance to carry out resuscitation, but in spite of all my efforts I was unable to save the child. I do not think that I was negligent. If we had admitted the child, we would have had to care for him in an ordinary bed. We would have been unable to control his temperature and guarantee artificial ventilation in those conditions, which in fact would probably have caused an even quicker death.”

M.K.: “K.B. called me to ask for advice. As we had no places, I told him to organise a transfer to the nearest university hospital. The patient was in an incubator in the ambulance. Yet we didn’t even have an incubator available in the hospital. We would have lost the patient much more quickly had we admitted him. We couldn’t really do anything else. Furthermore, according to what I’ve been told, Gümüşhane public hospital would not have wanted to lend us the ambulance incubator.”

With regard to the available places in the neonatal units on the evening of the incident, the criminal investigation revealed that there had been only one incubator at the Gümüşhane public hospital and that it was out of order.

At the KTÜ Farabi public hospital, there were five children in the maternity unit and nineteen in the neonatal unit, where capacity was limited to fourteen children.

There were four incubators at the CMOT: three were occupied and the fourth was out of order. Furthermore, they were not equipped with assisted ventilation systems.

With regard to the two other establishments located in the region, it was noted that, out of nine incubators at the Fatih public hospital, two were available at 3 p.m. on 31 March 2005, but that they did not have assisted ventilation systems.

The Giresun Medico-Surgical and Obstetrics Centre had no neonatal unit at all.

A full autopsy was carried out on Tolga’s body. It revealed, in particular, that the child’s lungs showed signs of “asphyxial haemorrhage”.

On 12 May 2005 the Gümüşhane public prosecutor held that he did not have jurisdiction and relinquished the investigation to the Trabzon prosecutor’s office.

On 1 June 2005 the Trabzon public prosecutor sent the file to the Karadeniz University Rector’s Office, to which the KTÜ Farabi public hospital was attached.

On 20 October 2005 a committee of investigation, composed of doctors, issued a report concluding that the doctors in question had not committed any fault and that, accordingly, there were no grounds to grant authorisation for bringing proceedings against them.

On 19 January 2006 the Supreme Administrative Council upheld that decision.

On 2 May 2005 the Gümüşhane Governor refused to open a criminal investigation against doctor N.A., considering that he had committed no breach of his professional duties.

On 9 May 2005 the Gümüşhane public prosecutor filed an objection to that decision, on the grounds that doctor N.A. ought not to have ordered the child’s transfer to a hospital that had no places available.

On 18 May 2005 the Trabzon Regional Administrative Court rejected the prosecutor’s objection.

On 31 May 2005, taking note of that judgment, which was ipso jure final, the prosecutor issued a decision that there was no case to answer.

In the absence of an appeal before the Assize Court, this decision became final on 23 June 2005.

On 3 May 2005 the Trabzon Governor refused to open proceedings against doctors K.B. and M.K., taking the view that they could not be criticised for any negligence in performing their duties.

The Trabzon public prosecutor lodged an objection to that decision, considering that the accused had indeed committed an offence and that they ought to be referred to the courts for negligence in the performance of their duties.

On 8 June 2005 the Trabzon Regional Administrative Court rejected the prosecutor’s objection.

On 21 June 2005 the prosecutor, who was obliged to comply with that final judgment, issued a decision that there was no case to answer.

In the absence of an appeal before the Assize Court, this decision became final on 22 July 2005.

An investigation committee within the Ministry of Health’s Trabzon branch decided of its own motion to carry out administrative investigations.

On completion of these investigations, on 26 April 2005 Trabzon Governor refused to authorise the opening of an additional investigation in respect of doctors K.B. and M.K.

By contrast, in respect of doctor T.Ö., the Governor accepted the conclusions of the investigation committee and decided to open a criminal investigation for professional negligence.

To that end, on 17 May 2005 the Trabzon public prosecutor, to whom the case had been referred back, transferred the file to the Rector’s Office of Karadeniz University, to which T.Ö. was subordinate.

The Rector’s Office immediately opened an administrative inquiry.

This confirmed the preliminary conclusions reached by the ministerial investigation committee.

On 25 August 2006 the Rector’s Office authorised the opening of a criminal investigation in respect of T.Ö. The relevant passages of that decision read as follows:

“Health Inspector S.M. considered in his report of 26 April 2005 that doctor T.Ö. had been negligent and that she should be held liable.

In his report of 26 June 2006, Health Inspector G.Ç. found that doctor T.Ö. ought to have carried out administrative registration of the patient and opened a treatment file.

The information in the file reveals that there were no places available in the KTÜ Farabi hospital.

The patient’s transfer to this hospital was due to a failure in communication and coordination.

At the KTÜ Farabi hospital, no adequate treatment was given, although the patient’s state was very serious and his condition was life-threatening.

Furthermore, apart from the witness statements by medical staff from the KTÜ Farabi hospital, there is no evidence showing that the patient was examined by a doctor.

In addition, there is no administrative file or treatment file in the patient’s name.

Doctor T.Ö.’s explanation that “if [she] did not open an administrative file, it was because we could not admit the patient to the hospital” is unacceptable conduct.

In this incident, it must be concluded that there was negligence and fault on the part of doctor T.Ö.”

On 14 September 2006 T.Ö. applied to have that decision set aside.

On 25 July 2007 the Supreme Administrative Council set aside the decision of 25 August 2006 (see paragraph 44 above) on the grounds that, in the absence of new evidence capable of justifying revision, its previous judgment of 19 January 2006 (see paragraph 27 above) remained final.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)

Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Vladikavkaz.

The applicant was a police officer at the Office of the Interior of the Iristonskiy District of Vladikavkaz (“the police station”) until 2005.

Between 25 and 27 February 2008 a submachine gun disappeared from the police station. The police officers noticed it was missing on 27 February 2008.

According to the applicant, on 28 February 2008, in the evening, police officers delivered him to the police station. There they handcuffed him to a chair and ill-treated him overnight, beating him on the back and head and pressing bare electric wires against his ears to make him confess to the theft of the sub-machine gun. He was released from the police station before noon on 29 February 2008.

On 3 March 2008 the applicant underwent a medical forensic examination. Forensic report no. 521 attested that he had concussion, abrasions on his head which could have been inflicted by hard blunt objects, areas of pigmentation on his earlobes resulting from healing abrasions which could have been inflicted as a result of the application of low-frequency electrical current, and areas of pigmentation on his lower arms which could have been caused by hard blunt objects, possibly handcuffs. The report stated that the aforementioned injuries could have been inflicted within the period, and in the circumstances, described by the applicant.

On 3 March 2008 the applicant complained about the events of 2829 February 2008 to the prosecutor’s office of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania. The latter referred his complaints to the prosecutor’s office of the Pravoberezhniy District of Vladikavkaz and to the prosecutor’s office of the Iristonskiy District of Vladikavkaz for inquiry, in letters of 6 and 12 March 2008 respectively. The latter prosecutor’s office further transmitted the applicant’s complaint to the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department on 18 March 2008.

On 4 April 2008 the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant’s allegations. The decision stated that according to the applicant, at 9.15 p.m. on 28 February 2008 he received a phone call from a former colleague at the police station, Ms P., who told him that another former colleague from the same police station, Officer K., had some problems. Ms P. asked the applicant to call Officer K. The applicant called Officer K. The latter said that he had problems and asked the applicant to join him in Officer K.’s car, parked outside the applicant’s house, to go to South Ossetia. Officer K. also asked the applicant to take his passport with him. The applicant went outside and joined Officer K. and another man in camouflage uniform in a silver grey Niva-Chevrolet car. The applicant sat in the back seat and they drove off. As they were driving, Officer K. told the applicant that when he started his duty shift he had signed an entry in the register confirming that he had been issued with a sub-machine gun, but this had not actually been the case, as the gun had not been found. Officer K. asked the applicant to go with him to South Ossetia until everything had “cleared up”. Then Officer K. and the other man began contending that it was the applicant who had taken the sub-machine gun, because on the day the sub-machine gun had gone missing he had been at the police station; this was recorded on CCTV. The applicant protested against these allegations, and the man in the camouflage uniform started beating him, while Officer K. pretended to try to separate them. Then they drove to the town centre, stopped at the police station, and the man in the camouflage uniform left. Soon Officer G., the deputy head of criminal investigations and the applicant’s former colleague, came out of the police station. The applicant expressed indignation about the police officers’ allegations and assault. Officer G. replied that he did not suspect the applicant, but asked him to help them if he could. The applicant said that he could not help them. Then Officer G. left and Officer S. came out of the police station and told the applicant that Mr A.L., the applicant’s cousin, would soon arrive. Mr A.L. arrived shortly afterwards, accompanied by officers of the police special unit (SOBR) and asked the applicant to help Officer K. because he was a close friend. The applicant responded that there were no grounds to suspect him and that he did not wish to continue this conversation. Officer S. then said that they had a video recording, and the applicant asked to see it. They went together to the office of the head of criminal investigations on the second floor of the police station, where Officer Z. showed the applicant a recording of him entering and leaving the police station. The applicant explained that during his entire visit to the police station he had been accompanied by police officers. After they left that office Officer S., Mr A.L., and another man, X., whom the applicant did not know, took him to Officer S.’s office, where Mr A.L. again urged him to confess to stealing the sub-machine gun. Then they took him to a different office, where Officers K., D., Kas. and X. handcuffed him to a chair, taped his mouth, put wires against his ears and passed electric current through them. The applicant fell off the chair several times but they put him back and sent the current through the wires to his ears again. He managed to get rid of the tape and spit out the blood that had collected in his mouth. Officer K. started yelling at him, saying that he would receive no pity as the “minister” had personally ordered that he should be “locked up”. The applicant then realised that he would not be able to endure the torture and offered to confess in writing that he had thrown the sub-machine gun into the river. However, they were unhappy with this suggestion. Then they took him to Officer K.’s office, where he and Officers D. and X. remained until 11 or 11.30 a.m. on 29 February 2008, when they let him go.

The decision further quoted forensic report no. 521 (see paragraph 9 above) and statements by police officers. In particular, Officer Kas. stated that he knew the applicant, as he had worked at the police station until 2005. On 27 February 2008 they had realised that a sub-machine gun was missing. Officer M. had seen it last when he was on duty; he was subsequently dismissed from the police for its loss. When they tried to establish what had happened, they watched the CCTV records since 25 February 2008, this being the likely date of the sub-machine gun’s disappearance. The recording showed the applicant entering the police station; in the film of him leaving he seemed to be holding an unidentified object under his jacket. As the applicant often visited the police station and went into its offices, including the office from which the sub-machine gun might have gone missing, it was decided to invite the applicant, show the recording to him, and ask him to return the weapon. Officer K., a relative of the applicant, was instructed to invite him. On the date in question Officer Kas. saw Officer K. and the applicant in the police station. The applicant did not have any visible injuries, seemed to be in a good mood and asked him how he was doing. An hour later he saw the applicant leaving the police station. Neither he nor any other police officers applied physical force to the applicant. However, Officer Kas. still suspected the applicant of stealing the sub-machine gun and believed that his allegations were an attempt to undermine any possible prosecution for the theft of the weapon. Officer Kas. believed that the applicant had caused the injuries stated in forensic report no. 521 himself, in order to corroborate his submissions.

Officer K. stated that he was a distant relative of the applicant. He then corroborated Officer Kas.’s statement concerning the loss of the sub-machine gun, and added that with the help of Ms P. he had contacted the applicant and arranged a meeting with him near his home. Officer K. went there by car alone and, when the applicant joined him, explained the situation to him and asked him to return the sub-machine gun, as otherwise Officer K. and his colleagues would have a lot of problems. The applicant denied being involved in the theft of the weapon, and agreed to go to the police station. On arrival they met Officer G., who also suggested that the applicant return the sub-machine gun. The applicant reiterated that he had nothing to do with its loss. Then Officer K. took him to the office of the head of criminal investigations and left him there with Officer Z. In an hour or an hour and a half he saw the applicant leaving the police station; he was sitting on a bench nearby with Officer Kas. He had not seen the applicant since. From Officer Z. he knew that the latter had shown the applicant the video recording and had asked him to return the sub-machine gun, but nobody had used physical force against him. Officer K. had no idea how the applicant had sustained the injuries or why he had accused the police officers of causing them; he maintained that those allegations were false.

Officer S. corroborated Officers Kas.’s and K.’s statements concerning the loss of the sub-machine gun, and added that on the day in question he had seen the applicant and Officer K. on the second floor of the police station. He had asked the applicant to return the sub-machine gun, explaining that otherwise the police officers would be in serious trouble. However, the applicant denied being involved in its disappearance. Then Officer S. left and went to the first floor. He did not know where the applicant had gone afterwards but he saw no injuries on him. Officer S. did not know how the applicant had sustained the injuries described in forensic report no. 521, as no one in the police station had either ill-treated or insulted him. Officer S. believed that the applicant’s allegations were intended to discredit his former colleagues.

Officer D. corroborated the statements of Officers Kas., K. and S. concerning the disappearance of the sub-machine gun, and added that on the date in question, when he left the police station on finishing work and was walking towards his car parked nearby, he had seen Officer K. and the applicant entering the police station. He had not spoken to the applicant and had only seen him from a distance. Officer D. had then gone home. He did not know how the applicant could have sustained the injuries stated in forensic report no. 521, as neither Officer D. nor other police officers had ill-treated him.

Officer G. corroborated the statements of Officers Kas., K., S. and D. concerning the disappearance of the sub-machine gun, and added that on the day in question, when he left the police station, he had seen the applicant and Officer K. nearby. They were talking peaceably and he did not see any injuries on the applicant’s head or body. Officer G. approached them and told the applicant that there were grounds to believe that he had stolen the sub-machine gun and that he must return it. The applicant responded that he had nothing to do with its disappearance. The applicant did not make any complaints concerning the police officers. Officer G. had not seen the applicant since, and believed that his allegations were an attempt to avoid prosecution for the theft of the weapon.

The decision concluded that, as a result of the inquiry conducted, the applicant’s allegations were not corroborated, and it was doubtful whether he had received the injuries described in forensic report no. 521 in the circumstances described by him. Accordingly, the actions of the police officers disclosed no evidence of a criminal offence.

A copy of the decision was sent to the applicant on the same date.

On 5 June 2008, following a complaint lodged by the applicant, a senior investigator of the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department set aside the decision of 4 April 2008 as premature, because a number of investigative steps had not been taken. In particular, the investigators were instructed to question the applicant and the police officers who had been on duty on the relevant date, to inspect, in the presence of the applicant, the office where he had allegedly been ill-treated, and to take other investigative measures if they appeared necessary.

On 15 June 2008 the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department again refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant’s allegations. The decision reproduced verbatim the decision of 4 April 2008, with the addition of one paragraph. The paragraph concerned the questioning of Officer M., who had served at the police station since 2005. He submitted that he knew the applicant and that the latter frequently came to the police station to see his former colleagues. However, because of the time which had elapsed since then he could not remember whether he had seen the applicant at the end of February 2008, and had no information about whether the applicant had been forcibly held at the police station between 28 and 29 February 2008.

On 16 June 2008 a copy of the decision was sent to the applicant, who complained about the decision to the Office of the Prosecutor General. That complaint was subsequently forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Iristonskiy District of Vladikavkaz.

On 6 August 2008 the Iristonskiy District Prosecutor’s Office allowed the applicant’s complaint, found the decision of 15 June 2008 ungrounded, and forwarded the materials concerning the complaint to the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department for it to set aside that decision.

On 9 October 2008 a senior investigator of the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department set aside the decision of 15 June 2008 as premature and superficial as, in particular, the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained the injuries had not been established. The investigators were instructed to (i) establish the circumstances in which the injuries had been caused; (ii) inspect in the presence of the applicant the office where he had allegedly been ill-treated; (iii) question Officer Mir.; (iv) question Officer Z.; (v) question Mr A.L.; (vi) add to the case file materials relating to criminal proceedings instituted in connection with the disappearance of the weapon from the police station; and (vii) take other investigative measures if they appeared necessary.

On 20 October 2008 the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department again refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant’s allegations. The decision reproduced verbatim the decision of 15 June 2008, with the addition of two paragraphs setting out the submissions of Officers Mir. and Z. Officer Mir. stated, in particular, that at 8.30 a.m. on 28 February 2008 he had started his 24-hour duty shift at the police station. Because of the time that had passed since then, he could not remember whether the applicant had been delivered to the station during his duty hours, but he was positive that nobody had used physical force on him. Officer Z. stated that after the official weapon had gone missing from the police station it had appeared possible that the applicant had been involved in its theft, as he had been recorded leaving the police station with his arm pressed against his body. When the applicant was asked why he had held his arm in such a way he responded that that was how he walked. However, it was clear to Officer Z. that he was lying. He was then asked to tell everything he knew about the weapon’s disappearance, but he said he knew nothing and left the office. No one either threatened the applicant or applied physical force to him.

The applicant was informed of the decision by a letter sent on the same date.

On 19 March 2009, following a complaint lodged by the applicant, a senior investigator of the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department set aside the decision of 20 October 2008 as superficial since (i) the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained the injuries had not been established; (ii) neither the applicant nor Mr A.L. had been questioned; and (iii) materials concerning criminal proceedings instituted in connection with the disappearance of the weapon from the police station had not been added to the case file. The investigators were instructed to rectify the above shortcomings.

On 30 March 2009 the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department again refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant’s allegations. A copy of that decision has not been provided to the Court.

The applicant was informed of this decision by a letter sent on the same date.

On 31 May 2010, following a complaint lodged by the applicant, a senior investigator of the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department set aside the decision of 30 March 2009, on the ground that the investigators had failed to rectify the shortcomings indicated in the decision of 19 March 2009. They were instructed to (i) enclose in the case file materials concerning criminal proceedings instituted in connection with the disappearance of the weapon from the police station; (ii) establish the applicant’s whereabouts and question him in relation to the injuries sustained; (iii) establish the whereabouts of Mr A.L. and question him with respect to his meeting with the applicant at the police station; (iv) carry out a forensic medical examination of the applicant with a view to establishing how the injuries had been caused; and (v) take other investigative measures if they appeared necessary.

On 25 June 2010 another forensic examination was conducted, apparently on the basis of the materials in the case file. Forensic report no. 98 stated that the applicant had concussion and abrasions on his head which could have been inflicted by hard blunt objects, possibly on 29 February 2008. He also had a scar on his tongue formed as a result of a healed wound, and pink pigmentation of skin on his earlobes and on his right lower arm. On the basis of the materials available it was not possible to determine either when and how those injuries had been caused, or their gravity.

On 30 June 2010 the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department once again refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s allegations. The decision reproduced verbatim the decision of 20 October 2008, with an additional paragraph describing forensic report no. 98 of 25 June 2010.

It appears that the decision of 30 June 2010 was again set aside by a senior investigator of the Vladikavkaz Investigation Department.

On 16 May 2011, after the Court had communicated the application to the respondent Government, the Iristonskiy Inter-District Investigation Department of Vladikavkaz instituted criminal proceedings against Officers K., Kas. and D. on account of the applicant’s ill-treatment.

On 7 June 2011 the applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings.

In a letter of 3 October 2011 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania informed the applicant that a number of investigative steps had been taken in his case. They included confrontations between the applicant and Officers K., Kas. and D.; identification of the fourth suspect on the basis of photographs; and inspection of the crime scene in the presence of the applicant.

On 31 October 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz. He alleged, in particular, that, whereas he had indeed taken part in the confrontations with Officers Kas., D. and K. in September 2011, he had not taken part in the inspection of the crime scene, which had apparently been conducted later, or in the identification of the fourth suspect on the basis of photographs; and that his signature on the records of these investigative actions had been forged. The applicant made a number of other complaints concerning the progress of the investigation.

On 2 November 2011 the Leninskiy District Court returned the complaint unexamined, on the ground that the applicant had failed to specify the actions or omissions of the investigators that he was seeking to have declared unlawful. The applicant was advised that he could resubmit his complaint after it had been rectified.

Between 10 and 11.35 a.m. on 13 November 2011 the investigating authorities conducted a confrontation between the applicant and Mr E.L., a relative of both the applicant and Officer K. They were questioned about the events of 28-29 February 2008. The applicant reiterated his account of the events. Mr E.L. stated that during the evening of 28 February 2008 Officer K. had called him and asked to meet him. They met at a supermarket, where Officer K. told him that the applicant was suspected of stealing a submachine gun from the police station, and asked him to talk to the applicant. Mr E.L. agreed. On the same date he arrived at the police station and entered an office: he could not remember exactly which one because of the time that had passed since the events. In the office he was left alone with the applicant. When Mr E.L. asked the applicant about the sub-machine gun, the latter replied in a rude manner. Mr E.L. then pushed him and said that that was no way to talk to a relative. The applicant hit Mr E.L. back and this started a fight. Then Officers K. and Dz. appeared and separated them. The applicant said that he would complain about what had happened, and Mr E.L. left. He had not spoken to the applicant since. On 12 October 2011 he met Officer K., who reminded him of those events and said that criminal proceedings had been instituted against him and other police officers in this respect. As Mr E.L. thus became aware that police officers “were suffering” because of injuries he had caused the applicant, he decided to go to the police station and confess. Mr E.L. added that he had not told his relatives about the events of 28 February 2008, so as not to upset them. The applicant contested Mr E.L.’s submissions and insisted on his account of the events. He said that he had no idea why Mr E.L. had contended that he had caused him injuries.

The investigator noted that, apart from the concussion and abrasions on the head, according to forensic report no. 98 of 25 June 2010 the applicant also had a scar on his tongue and pink pigmentation of skin on his earlobes and on the right lower arm, and asked Mr E.L. for clarification in this respect. Mr E.L. replied that in the course of the fight he had hit the applicant on the head and face and other places, and that therefore the concussion and the abrasions on the head had most likely been caused by his blows. However, Mr E.L. could provide no information with respect to the scar on the applicant’s tongue and the pigmentation of his skin.

Between 1 p.m. and 2.45 p.m. on 13 November 2011 the investigating authorities conducted a confrontation between the applicant and Officer Dz. who served at the police station. They were also questioned about the events of 28-29 February 2008. The applicant reiterated his account of the events. Officer Dz. submitted that on 27 February 2008, after it had been established that a sub-machine gun had gone missing and the recording of the applicant leaving the police station had been found on the CCTV, Officer K. was instructed to invite the applicant to the police station and to ask him to return the weapon. On the date in question Officer Dz. saw Officer K. and the applicant at the police station. The applicant seemed to be in a good mood and did not have any injuries. Officer Dz. was aware that Officer K. had also told Mr E.L., the applicant’s relative, that the applicant was suspected of stealing the sub-machine gun, and asked him to come to the police station to talk to the applicant. Mr E.L. arrived at the police station on the same date, and was alone with the applicant in an office for some time, while Officers Dz. and K. stood outside in the corridor. Officer Dz. could not remember exactly which office that was. When they heard noise and the sound of a quarrel in the office, they entered it and saw the applicant and Mr E.L. fighting. When Officers Dz. and K. separated them, the applicant said that he would complain about this. Officer Dz. then left and had not seen the applicant since. In his view, the applicant alleged that he had been beaten by the police officers because Mr E.L. was his relative. He contended that the police officers had not caused any injuries to the applicant. The applicant contested Officer Dz.’s submissions and insisted on his own account of the events. He emphasised that Mr E.L. had not caused the injuries.

On 19 February 2012 the criminal proceedings were discontinued on the ground that the actions of Officers K., Kas. and D. disclosed no evidence of a criminal offence.

The applicant complained to the Investigating Committee of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania of a number of breaches in the conduct of the investigation.

On 6 April 2012 the Investigating Committee of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania dismissed his complaint, stating that all the investigative steps had been taken in accordance with the laws on criminal procedure.

On an unspecified date after 27 February 2008 a criminal investigation was instituted in connection with the alleged theft of the submachine gun from the police station by an unidentified person.

On 24 August 2008 the investigation was suspended on the ground that the person to be charged with the offence could not be identified.

According to the applicant, since the events of 28-29 February 2008 the police officers have continued to put pressure on him. In particular, they followed his movements, called him by telephone and tapped his conversations, and visited him at home, interrogating his friends, acquaintances and neighbours about him. Because of this pressure, in September 2010 he had had to close the grocery/delicatessen that he had been running for several years. Furthermore, in the applicant’s submission, he was unable to vote in the election of the Russian President held on 2 March 2008 as a result of that persecution, as he was afraid to leave his home.

The applicant submitted a number of complaints to the prosecuting authorities in this respect. They appear to have been dismissed.