Carlo Ranzoni;Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Georges Ravarani

The applicant, Ms Raisa Šarkienė, is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1956 and lives in Vilnius. She had been granted legal aid and was represented before the Court by Mr R. Burda, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė.

On 6 May 2008 the applicant, together with her friend A. and A.’s minor son L., attended a recording of the weekly television show “Celebrity Duets” (Žvaigždžių duetai). The show was a singing competition in which celebrity duets were assessed by a three-member judging panel. The head judge was a well-known opera singer, V.J. The panel also included another musician, D.K.

That evening after the show, V.J. received a message on his personal mobile telephone with the following text:

“I want to tell you this right now! You didn’t have problems – you will now! We have warned you!!! Don’t you think that you live and have protection, moron! I repeat, this is your last warning! I’ll give you time to enjoy your life, if you want to have a family and not coffins, this is not a joke, Mr Soloist! Godmother!!! We have warned you! We are watching you! Good luck. Until the next time, if you’re still alive.”

(“Staigiai noriu pasakyti! neturėjot problemu ju bus! mes gi jus ispejom!!! ar jums neatrodo, kad gyvenat, apsauga turi glusai! kartoju paskutinis buvo ispejimas! duodu laiko dziaugtis gyvenimu jei nori tureti seima o ne karstus cia nejuokai ponas soliste! kriksto mama!!! perspejom! mes jus stebim! sekmes. iki kito karto jei gyvas dar busit.”)

V.J. informed the police that he had been threatened and the police opened a pre-trial investigation. It was discovered that the mobile telephone from which the message had been sent belonged to L. (see paragraph 2 above). On an unspecified date his mother A. was questioned as a witness and stated that L. had lost his mobile telephone sometime around 6 May 2008.

On 22 May 2008 the applicant was questioned as a witness. She stated that she had attended several recordings of “Celebrity Duets” but could not remember the exact dates. She confirmed that she had gone there once with A. and L. and that L. had had a mobile telephone with him, but the applicant had not paid attention to where L. had left it. She stated that she had not taken the telephone or sent any text messages from it. The applicant also said that she had heard from A. that a text message had been sent to V.J. from L.’s telephone; however, the applicant stated that she did not have V.J.’s telephone number and had never called or texted him.

On an unspecified later date L.’s telephone was found in the possession of another individual, V. He told the police that the telephone had been given to him by the applicant, who was his friend.

On 10 July 2008 the applicant was taken to a police station and served with an official notice (pranešimas apie įtarimą) stating that she was suspected of threatening to kill or seriously injure V.J., under Article 145 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 21 below). The notice listed the suspect’s rights under the Code of Criminal Procedure, including the right to a lawyer. The applicant signed the notice to confirm that she had received it and that her rights had been explained to her. She also signed another notice which reiterated her right to a lawyer (teisės turėti gynėją išaiškinimo protokolas), on which she wrote that she did not need a lawyer during questioning. She also signed a notice confirming her decision to refuse a lawyer (protokolas dėl gynėjo atsisakymo), on which she also wrote that she did not need a lawyer during questioning. The latter notice indicated that the refusal did not prevent the applicant from requesting a lawyer at any later stage in the proceedings (see Relevant domestic law in paragraph 20 below).

On the same day the applicant was questioned by the police and confessed to having sent the aforementioned text message to V.J. She stated that she was a fan of the singer R., a participant in “Celebrity Duets”. On 6 May 2008 V.J., as the head judge, had given negative feedback about R.’s performance. The applicant claimed that she had felt insulted and upset by V.J.’s comments, so she had taken an unknown mobile telephone from her table and sent him the text message. She had known V.J.’s telephone number from before, although she could not remember how she had obtained it. The applicant stated that she had not known whose mobile telephone it had been, but she had put it in her purse and forgotten about it until much later, when she had found it again and given it to her friend V. She also said that she had thrown away the SIM card at some point. The applicant stated that during her previous questioning she had given a different statement because she had understood that she had done wrong and had been scared to admit it. She was sorry for the incident and wanted to apologise to V.J.

The applicant also provided a handwritten confession in which she reiterated the essential details of her statement.

On 20 August 2008 the applicant was served with a revised notice stating that she was suspected of threatening to kill or seriously injure V.J., under Article 145 § 1 of the Criminal Code. She requested a lawyer and the police called for a State-appointed lawyer to represent her. She was then questioned in the presence of that lawyer. The applicant withdrew the statement and confession she had given on 10 July 2008 (see paragraph 8 above), stating that she had confessed because of “the instructions and persuasion of [police] officers” (pareigūnų nurodymu ir įkalbinėjimais). She stated that the statement she had given on 22 May 2008 was the correct one (see paragraph 5 above) and that she would give further evidence at trial.

On 9 September 2008 the applicant was charged with threatening to kill or seriously injure V.J., under Article 145 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The case was transferred to the Vilnius City First District Court for examination on the merits.

The applicant was represented by a State-appointed lawyer at all levels of court.

On 15 January 2009 the Vilnius City First District Court held an oral hearing. When questioned by the court, the applicant denied having sent the text message to V.J. She stated that she was a fan of the singer R. and that on 6 May 2008 she and her friend A. had been invited to attend the recording of “Celebrity Duets” by D.K., another member of the judging panel on the show (see paragraph 2 above). The applicant stated that A.’s son L. had had a mobile telephone, which at one point he had left on the table where she and A. had been sitting. The applicant stated that she had not touched the telephone, but an unknown man had approached them and asked to use a telephone; they had allowed him to use L.’s telephone and the man had written a text message on it. The applicant submitted that she had later taken L.’s telephone from A. and given it to V., because she and A. had thought that L. might have sent the text message to V.J. The applicant further stated that on 10 July 2008 (see paragraph 8 above) she had confessed because police officers had threatened her. She submitted that her statement of 22 May 2008 (see paragraph 5 above) was correct, with the clarification that L.’s telephone had been used by the unknown man.

The court heard evidence from several other witnesses. The applicant’s friend A. essentially corroborated the applicant’s statements (see paragraph 12 above). The applicant’s friend V. repeated that the applicant had given him L.’s telephone sometime back in May 2008 (see paragraph 6 above). The musician and member of the judging panel D.K. stated that he knew A. because she was his dentist and that he had seen the applicant in A.’s office a few times. He stated that A. had previously asked him to give better scores to the singer R. and that he had passed that request on to V.J., although the latter could not be persuaded. D.K. believed that A. and R. were friends, also stating that he had once seen R. with the applicant.

The court also heard evidence from three police officers who had been present at different stages of the applicant’s questioning. They stated that the applicant had been duly informed of her rights, including the right to a lawyer, but that she had not requested one until 20 August 2008 (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). The officers denied having put any pressure on the applicant to confess or to give any particular evidence.

On 17 April 2009 the Vilnius City First District Court found the applicant guilty of threatening to kill or seriously injure V.J., under Article 145 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The court noted that during the pretrial investigation and trial the applicant had changed her version of events several times, and that her latest version including an unknown man could not be confirmed “by any evidence” (byloje nėra jokių įrodymų apie tokios situacijos buvimą). The court considered that there were no grounds for doubting the accuracy of her confession (see paragraph 8 above) because her claims of pressure by police officers had not been proven.

The applicant was ordered to stay at home from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. for six months and to find a job or register at an employment office. The court also awarded V.J. 10,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 2,900 euros (EUR)) in non-pecuniary damages.

The applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that she had not committed the criminal offence and that the text message had been sent by an unknown man (see paragraph 12 above). However, on 22 July 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed her appeal and upheld the conviction. The court referred, in particular, to D.K.’s testimony concerning the connection between the singer R. and the applicant’s friend A., and emphasised the fact that the mobile telephone had been disabled immediately after the message had been sent – it considered that these circumstances demonstrated a direct intent to threaten V.J. after the recording of the show. The court also held that witness testimony and other material in the case file sufficiently proved the applicant’s guilt. However, it reduced the amount of non-pecuniary damages to LTL 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,450), having regard to the nature of the criminal offence and the applicant’s financial situation.

The Vilnius Regional Court did not address the question of whether the applicant had been pressured by police officers to refuse a lawyer and to confess; it appears from the judgment that the applicant did not raise that question in her appeal.

The applicant submitted an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court, in which she alleged, inter alia, that her defence rights had been violated. On 9 December 2009 she was informed that the court would examine her appeal on 18 January 2010 and would pronounce its judgment on 2 February 2010.

On that date the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. In respect of her complaint concerning her defence rights, the court noted that the case file contained written documents with the applicant’s signatures, which had been drawn up in line with the relevant domestic law (see paragraph 20 below). This showed that the applicant had been informed of her right to a lawyer and had decided not to exercise it. The court also noted that the applicant had availed herself of her right to a lawyer during questioning on 20 August 2008 and at all subsequent stages of court proceedings (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). Accordingly, it considered that there were no grounds for finding that the applicant’s right to a lawyer had been restricted at any point.

The applicant did not attend the pronouncement of the judgment. She submitted that she had received a copy of it sometime after 15 February 2010.

The relevant part of Article 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania reads:

It shall be prohibited to compel anyone to give evidence against himself, or his family members or close relatives.

A person suspected of committing a crime, as well as the accused, shall be guaranteed, from the moment of his apprehension or first interrogation, the right to defence, as well as the right to an advocate.”

At the material time, the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure read:

“1. A suspected, accused or convicted person has defence rights, [which] shall be ensured from the moment of their detention or first questioning.

The court, prosecutor or investigating officer must ensure that the suspected, accused or convicted person has the opportunity to defend him or herself by the means prescribed by law ...”

“1. A lawyer must be present in the following situations:

1) where the suspect or the accused is a minor;

2) where the case concerns a person who is blind or deaf, or because of a physical or mental impairment cannot exercise his or her defence rights;

3) where the case concerns a person who does not understand the language of the proceedings;

4) where there are conflicts of interest between different suspects or the accused and at least one of them has a lawyer;

5) where the case concerns a crime for which a life sentence may be given;

6) where the case is being examined in the absence of the accused, as provided for by Chapter XXXII of this Code;

7) where the suspect or the accused is in detention;

8) where a decision is to be taken whether to extradite a person or transfer him or her to the International Criminal Court or [another State] under a European Arrest Warrant;

9) where the case is being examined by way of accelerated procedure.”

“1. A suspect or an accused can waive his or her right to a lawyer at any stage of the proceedings ... The right to a lawyer may only be waived at the initiative of the suspected or accused person. The waiver of the right to a lawyer must be recorded in a written report.

The investigating officer, prosecutor or court is not bound by the waiver of the right to a lawyer where [it] has been submitted by a minor or by a person who cannot exercise his or her defence rights because of a physical or mental impairment, by a person who does not understand the language of the proceedings, or by a person who is suspected or accused of committing a serious or very serious crime and the case is complex or large-scale, or there are any other reasons raising doubts as to his or her ability to defend him or herself.

Waiving the right to a lawyer does not preclude the suspected, accused or convicted person from having a lawyer at any later stage of the proceedings.”

At the material time, Article 145 § 1 of the Criminal Code read:

“1. Anyone who threatens to kill or seriously injure another person, where there is sufficient basis for believing that the threat may be carried out, shall be punished by community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, detention or imprisonment of up to two years.

At the material time, Article 385 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided that all judgments of the Supreme Court must be served on the parties to the proceedings.


No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

Aleš Pejchal;Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Hagen in Germany.

The applicant was arrested on 8 April 2007. His identity papers proved to be forgeries. On 9 April 2007 the Hagen District Court (Landgericht) issued an arrest warrant against the applicant based on possession of forged documents.

On 11 April 2007 the General Public Prosecutor took over the investigation. On 23 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) quashed the arrest warrant and issued a fresh arrest warrant based, inter alia, on the suspicion of membership of a foreign terrorist organisation (the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front, DHKP-C).

On 21 June 2007 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s appeal against the arrest warrant.

On 30 August, 30 October 2007 and 14 February 2008 the Federal Court of Justice upheld the arrest warrant and ordered that the applicant’s detention be continued.

On 27 May 2008 the Federal Court of Justice issued a new arrest warrant. According to the new warrant, the applicant was strongly suspected of having played a leading role in the activities of a foreign terrorist organisation, and of having committed two counts of murder and six counts of attempted murder. The applicant had, in particular, telephoned witness G.G. from Germany to instruct him to carry out a terrorist attack which took place in Istanbul on 1 April 1993 and in which two policemen were killed. The applicant was further suspected of having ordered several terrorist attacks carried out by detonating explosives in Turkey between January 2001 and July 2005.

On 17 June 2008 the Federal Court of Justice ordered the extension of the applicant’s detention.

On 24 June 2008 the General Public Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment against the applicant comprising 286 pages plus a list of evidence covering another 81 pages, based on the same grounds as the arrest warrant dated 27 May 2008.

On 2 October 2008 the Federal Court of Justice ordered the applicant’s continued detention.

On 21 November 2008 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht, no. III-2 STS 1/08), sitting as a first instance court for proceedings concerning State security, decided to open the trial against the applicant. The hearing started on 15 January 2009 and took place on 95 days.

On 28 April 2009 witness G.G. was heard by a court in Istanbul in the presence of all parties to the proceedings.

On 9 June 2009, after 16 days of court hearing, the Court of Appeal quashed the arrest warrant insofar as it had been based on the suspicion that the applicant had ordered the attack which had taken place in Istanbul on 1 April 1993 and ordered the applicant’s continued detention based on the remaining grounds of the arrest warrant. The Court of Appeal considered that witness G.G., relied upon by the prosecution, had not confirmed the testimony he had given to the Turkish authorities in 1993. Conversely, he had stated that he had been tortured by Turkish civil servants and had been forced to sign a prepared protocol. He did not know the applicant. Under these circumstances, no strong suspicion persisted that the applicant had ordered the above-mentioned criminal act.

The Court of Appeal considered that the applicant remained under strong suspicion of having committed the other crimes of which he was accused. There was, in particular, sufficient documentary and witness evidence supporting the allegation that the applicant, as a leading member of a terrorist organisation, was responsible for causing explosions and committing other criminal acts. The Court of Appeal inter alia referred to the minutes and decisions of the founding congress which established that the applicant had been elected as a member of the central committee of the DHKP-C in the beginning of 1999.

The Court of Appeal further considered that the applicant might abscond and that there was a risk of collusion. The court observed that the applicant, who had been residing illegally in Germany, had neither a fixed residence nor sufficient social ties to ensure his appearance before the court. There were thus no milder means available to secure his presence at the trial.

The Court of Appeal further considered that the proceedings were expedited as required in cases involving pre-trial detention. The Court of Appeal included a detailed account of the trial, explaining that on several occasions witnesses could not be questioned by the court because they exercised their right not to testify. The court had heard testimony from nine witnesses and was then hearing four further witnesses. In order to establish whether the applicant had committed the crimes of which he had been accused, testimony from Turkish witnesses was of paramount importance. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal had to make several enquiries by way of letters rogatory in Turkey.

On 4 August 2009 the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) rejected the applicant’s complaint. The Federal Court of Justice confirmed that the applicant remained under strong suspicion of having ordered several explosions causing injuries and death. The court further confirmed that the danger of the applicant’s absconding, and of collusion, remained. The continuation of his detention was not disproportionate in view of the importance of the subject matter and of the considerable punishment to be expected in case of a criminal conviction. Furthermore, the length of the proceedings was due to their complexity, as had been set out in detail by the Court of Appeal.

On 6 October 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, no. 2 BvR 2133/09) refused to consider the applicant’s complaint against the decisions of 9 June and 4 August 2009, without giving further reasons.

On 17 February 2010 witness S.G. and one further witness were heard in Istanbul.

On 17 May 2010 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal extended the arrest warrant on the grounds that there was again a strong suspicion that the applicant had ordered the attack during which two policemen were killed in Istanbul in April 1993. This assessment was, in particular, based on testimony given by witness S.G., who had stated that G.G. had informed him in 1993 that the applicant had given him the order to carry out the attack against the policemen. The Court of Appeal considered that this statement was consistent and credible. Furthermore, there was corroborative evidence from witnesses who had confirmed that the applicant held a leading position in the terrorist organisation at the relevant time.

The Court of Appeal further found that there remained a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the other crimes of which he was accused. Referring to its previous decisions, the Court of Appeal considered that the danger of the applicant’s absconding persisted. This danger had further been aggravated by the fact that another Chamber of the Court of Appeal had, in the meantime, allowed the applicant’s extradition to Turkey. According to an intelligence report dating from 2009, a leader of the terrorist organisation had ordered that the applicant be taken out of the country immediately if released from detention. It was furthermore known that the terrorist organisation had the necessary means to put this plan into action.

The Court of Appeal finally considered that the prolongation of the pre-trial detention was not disproportionate, having regard to the importance of the subject matter and to the seriousness of the penalty to be expected in case of a criminal conviction.

On 23 September 2010 witness S.G. was once again heard in Istanbul.

On 10 February 2011, on the sixty-eighth day of the hearing, the Court of Appeal closed the hearing of evidence and heard the prosecutor’s pleadings. Upon defence counsel’s request, the hearing of evidence was reopened and the Court of Appeal limited the charge to two counts of murder committed in April 1993, while discontinuing the proceedings concerning the other charges originally brought against the applicant.

On 27 September 2011 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of two counts of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On the basis of the evidence presented during the hearing, the Court of Appeal found it established that the applicant had ordered the assassination of the policemen by telephone from Germany at the end of March 1993. The court primarily based the applicant’s conviction on testimony from witness S.G. The Court of Appeal further considered that this finding was in line with the command structure inside the terrorist organisation and was not called into question by G.G.’s allegations that he did not know the applicant. During his hearing before the Turkish court, G.G. had refused to make any more specific statements. Under these circumstances, the vague statement that the applicant did not have anything to do with the attack was not sufficient to call S.G.’s testimony into question.

The Court of Appeal finally considered that the length of detention and of the main hearing did not violate the applicant’s rights under Article 6 of the Convention. The specific circumstances of the instant case did not allow for an earlier termination of the proceedings. This was due to the extent and the complexity of the criminal charges. Apart from two counts of murder, of which he had been convicted, the applicant had been accused of holding a leading role in a foreign terrorist organisation and of having participated in causing a considerable number of explosions in Turkey. The case-files consisted of approximately 130 large volumes. As the applicant had been arrested by chance, the examination of the relevant facts could begin only after his arrest. The Turkish authorities had submitted a large number of documents such as expert opinions, sketches and records of witness testimony, which had to be translated and examined before the issue of the indictment on 24 June 2008. Due to the volume of the case-file and to the complexity of the subject matter, the main proceedings could not be opened before 21 November 2008. During the hearing, the progress of the taking of evidence had been determined by several requests by letters rogatory to the Turkish authorities. Members of the court and representatives of the parties travelled to Turkey four times in order to attend the hearing of witnesses before Turkish courts. Each taking of evidence by letters rogatory took considerably more than half a year. Following this, the taking of evidence was closed on 10 February 2011, but re-opened altogether three times at the request of the defence. The reading out of the applicant’s last word alone took four days.

On 29 November 2012 the Federal Court of Justice quashed the judgment of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal and remitted the case to another Chamber of that court. The Federal Court of Justice considered that the assessment of the evidence by the Court of Appeal had been erroneous as that court had wrongly assumed that the testimony given by S.G. on the circumstances of his alleged conversation with G.G. was consistent and without contradictions.

The Federal Court of Justice further considered that it could not be ruled out that this error had been decisive for the Court of Appeal in reaching its verdict. There were further reasons to review critically S.G.’s testimony. Firstly, S.G. had not directly witnessed the applicant ordering the attack, but was merely a hearsay witness. Furthermore, the witness was not heard by the trial court, but by a Turkish court at the trial court’s request. Finally, S.G., who had been arrested in Turkey in 2002, had collaborated with the Turkish police and had thus benefited from a milder sentence and early release from prison.

On 17 January 2013 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal (no. III6 STS 3/12) ordered the applicant’s continued detention. The further detention was justified because the applicant was under strong suspicion of having committed a serious crime and because there was the risk that he might abscond. That court considered that the applicant remained under strong suspicion of having ordered the attacks carried out on the policemen on 1 April 1993. This was not called into question by the Federal Court of Justice’s decision to quash the judgment. The potential contradictions in the statements made by witness S.G. had to be examined in the new main proceedings. The Court of Appeal further considered that there were no milder means available to secure the applicant’s appearance before the court and that the length of his detention was not yet disproportionate. The fact that the Federal Court of Justice had quashed the judgment of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal did not lead to a violation of the obligation to expedite the proceedings, as there was no obvious procedural error. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal had respected the obligation to expedite the proceedings by preparing the requests for letters rogatory in order to begin the main hearing by the end of April or the beginning of May 2013.

On 19 March 2013 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s complaint. That court confirmed that the applicant remained under strong suspicion of having ordered the attack in Istanbul. This suspicion was primarily based on testimony given by witness S.G. during the main hearing on 17 February and 23 September 2010 and statements made by witness G.G. during his interrogation by Turkish police on 2 May 1993. This was not called into question by the fact that the judgment of the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal had been quashed on the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The contradiction in S.G.’s testimony did not concern the core content of his statement, which remained unchanged.

The Federal Court of Justice further observed that witness G.G. had stated, during interrogations by the Turkish authorities on 2 May 1993, that the applicant had given him the order to carry out the attack on 1 April 1993. The court considered that it was not prevented from taking into account this statement by G.G.’s repeated claims that he had made this statement under torture, as his vague and general allegations were not confirmed.

The Federal Court of Justice finally considered that the length of detention (almost six years) was not disproportionate. The court gave a full account of the proceedings and concluded that the length of the proceedings was primarily determined by the complexity of the subject matter and by the very strong international dimension of the case. Conversely, there had not been any considerable delays imputable to the trial court.

On 15 May 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court (no. 2 BvR 790/13), relying on its Rules of Procedure, refused to accept the applicant’s constitutional complaint for adjudication.

On 6 May 2013 the fresh hearing of the applicant’s case started before the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal.

On 4 October 2013 the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s continued detention on the basis of the arrest warrant of 27 May 2008.

On 4 February 2014, following a new request lodged by the applicant on 20 January 2014, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal quashed the arrest warrant and ordered the applicant’s release from detention. The applicant was released on that same day.

The Court of Appeal considered that the further execution of detention would be disproportionate. According to that court the applicant remained firmly suspected of having ordered the attack of 1 April 1993, in which two policemen were killed. This assessment was based on the testimony given by S.G. in the first set of proceedings as well as on further corroborative evidence. The Court of Appeal considered that to prolong the detention would be disproportionate. In cases involving pre-trial detention, the criminal courts were under a constitutional obligation to expedite the proceedings (Beschleunigungsgebot). This principle had to be applied even more strictly given the long duration of the applicant’s detention. The Court of Appeal considered that it could not foresee when it would hear witness testimony from S.G., who was the primary witness for the prosecution. In spite of several reminders, the requests for letters rogatory lodged with the Turkish authorities in April and September 2013 had not so far been disposed of. As it was unclear when the witness could be heard, the Court of Appeal considered that it was unable duly to expedite the proceedings as would have been necessary in view of the fact that detention had already lasted almost seven years. The Court of Appeal noted that the statements made by witness G.G. to the Turkish Authorities in 1993 could not be used because it could not be ruled out that they had been obtained by torture.

In August 2014, the criminal proceedings were still pending before the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal.


Preliminary objection dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award

George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Riga. She is the mother of Mr Oļegs Petrovs (the applicant’s son), a Latvian national who was born in 1979 and who died on 29 May 2002.

On 26 May 2002 at approximately 7 a.m. the applicant’s son sustained very serious injuries in a car accident near Bauska. At approximately 8.45 a.m. he was taken to hospital in Bauska. Later, at 2.45 p.m., he was transferred to Riga’s First Hospital (Rīgas 1. slimnīca – “the Hospital”) – an entity that was registered as a “non-profit municipally-owned limited-liability company” (Rīgas pašvaldības bezpeļņas organizācija sabiedrība ar ierobežotu atbildību) at the material time – where surgery was carried out on his head. Following the operation his condition remained very serious; he remained in the emergency department of the Hospital (reanimācijas nodaļa) and did not regain consciousness.

At 11.50 p.m. on 28 May 2002 a call from the Hospital was received by the transplantation centre of Pauls Stradiņš Clinical University Hospital – an entity that was registered as a “non-profit State-owned joint stock company” (bezpeļņas organizācija valsts akciju sabiedrība) at the material time – providing information about a potential donor who was undergoing resuscitation. A coordinator from the transplantation centre, together with another doctor, went to the Hospital.

At 0.45 a.m. on 29 May 2002 the applicant’s son’s condition was noted in his medical record as being fatal. It was noted that medical resuscitation had been started. The death of the applicant’s son was recorded at 1.20 a.m. in his medical record at the Hospital.

Between 1.35 a.m. and 3.45 a.m. a laparotomy was performed on the body, in the course of which the kidneys and the spleen were removed for organ transplantation purposes. This operation was carried out by the transplantation centre’s transplant surgeon, urologist and operating nurse, in the presence of the coordinator and the Hospital’s resuscitation specialist. On the death certificate the time of death was recorded as 2.45 p.m. on 29 May 2002 (probably by mistake – see 15 below).

According to the applicant, during her son’s stay in the Hospital she was in permanent contact with the doctors there. On 29 May 2002, although her son’s condition was deteriorating, the applicant was not informed of it. She was also not asked whether her son had consented to being an organ donor and whether she would consent to organ transplantation in the absence of any wishes expressed by her son.

According to the Government, the Hospital did not have information on record providing the contact details of any relatives, and they had informed the police about the son’s hospitalisation by dialling the emergency telephone number for the police. It had therefore, not been possible to contact any relatives. In this regard the Government referred to information provided by the Hospital which stated that “given the fact that no telephone numbers of any relatives were recorded on the patient’s medical card ... there was apparently no contact with the applicant”.

On 30 May 2002, in the context of criminal proceedings against the person held liable for the car accident, a forensic (post-mortem) examination on the applicant’s son’s body was carried out. It was noted, inter alia, that on 29 May 2002 between 1.35 a.m. and 3.45 a.m. a laparotomy had been performed on the body. The applicant obtained a copy of the forensic report on 11 February 2003 and realised only then that nine months earlier certain organs had been removed from her son’s body for transplantation purposes.

In response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, on 12 March 2003 the Hospital stated that the transplantation had been carried out by the transplant doctors in accordance with domestic law. It was noted that the applicant had not been informed of her son’s health condition because she had not visited the doctors at the Hospital.

In response to further complaints by the applicant to the police and the prosecutor’s office, several examinations were carried out.

In response to a query by the Security Police (Drošības policija), the Inspectorate of Quality Control for Medical Care and Working Capability (“the MADEKKI”) analysed the medical file and met with doctors and managers from the two medical institutions involved – Riga’s First Hospital and Pauls Stradiņš Clinical University Hospital. On 7 May 2003 it completed the examination and informed the Security Police of its conclusions. The MADEKKI provided an answer to the question of whether the medical practitioners had complied with the applicable domestic law in the following terms:

“In taking the decision [to remove organs] and in carrying out the removal of organs, the medical practitioners have complied with section 10 of the Law on Protection of the Body of a Deceased Person and Use of Human Organs and Tissue and provisions of regulation no. 431 (1996) ...

There is no information at the MADEKKI’s disposal as to whether there was a stamp in Mr Petrovs’ passport signifying his objection to the use of his body tissue and organs.

[The applicant] was not informed about the possible removal of organs (the kidneys and the spleen) for transplantation purposes.”

The MADEKKI also explained in their letter to the Security Police that the time of biological death was 1.20 a.m. on 29 May 2002 and not 2.45 p.m. as recorded, probably by mistake, on the death certificate.

On 27 May 2003 the Security Police replied to the applicant on the basis of the MADEKKI report that the organs of her son had been removed in compliance with domestic law. They relied on section 10 of the Law on Protection of the Body of a Deceased Person and Use of Human Organs and Tissue (“the Law”) and regulation no. 431(1996). The applicant was forwarded a copy of the MADEKKI’s letter to the Security Police.

On 17 June 2003 the prosecutor’s office forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Security Police with a view to instituting an additional inquiry.

On 15 July 2003 the MADEKKI replied to questions put by the Ministry of Health, which had been contacted by the National Human Rights Bureau further to a complaint by the applicant. They answered that there was no information at their disposal as to whether, at the time of her son’s death, any refusal of or consent to the use of his body, organs or tissue after his death had been recorded in the Population Register (Iedzīvotāju reģistrs). They also answered that the applicant had not been informed of the possible removal of organs (the kidneys and the spleen) for transplantation purposes. There was no information at the MADEKKI’s disposal as to whether there had been a stamp in Mr Petrovs’ passport signifying an objection to the use of his body tissue and organs. On 13 August 2003 the Ministry of Health, replying in turn to the National Human Rights Bureau, concluded on the basis of the information provided by the MADEKKI that, because the applicant had not been informed about the possible transplantation, she had neither consented to it nor refused it.

On 29 July 2003 the Security Police informed the applicant that her complaint was still being examined.

On 12 November 2003 the Security Police adopted a decision not to institute criminal proceedings. For the same reasons as were given in the above-mentioned reports, it was concluded that the transplantation had been carried out in compliance with domestic law. The reports indicated that in his lifetime Mr Petrovs had not indicated any objection to the use of his body tissue and organs after death and that no objection to the use of his organs had been received from his relatives before the start of the transplantation. The coordinator of the transplantation centre had been responsible for informing the relatives about the issues pertaining to transplantation, and for obtaining records, consent, signatures and other relevant information. Taking into account the fact that the relatives had not been at the hospital at the time of the son’s biological death and that the removal of organs in such cases has to be performed immediately, it had not been possible to obtain their consent or refusal in relation to the organ removal.

On 14 November 2003 the applicant was informed of this decision.

On 23 January 2004 the National Human Rights Bureau replied to the applicant. According to the information at their disposal, there was nothing on record in the Population Register indicating whether Mr Petrovs would have allowed or refused the use of his body, tissue and organs after his death. According to the information provided by the Ministry of Health and on the basis of the conclusions established by the MADEKKI, the applicant had not been informed about the imminent removal of her son’s kidneys and spleen, and she had therefore neither consented to it nor refused it. Finally, the applicant was advised that she should contact the prosecutor’s office because the Security Police had not indicated any procedure or time-limits for lodging an appeal.

On 4 March 2004, further to a subsequent complaint, a meeting was convened at which the Minister for Health discussed with the representatives of the Hospital and the transplantation centre the case of the removal of the applicant’s son’s organs. The Minister for Health was of the opinion that the relatives should have been informed about the organ removal and that their consent should have been obtained. The representatives stated that the organ removal had been conducted in compliance with the applicable law. The meeting record contained a note to the effect that in autumn 2003 a working group which had been established by the Ministry of Health had prepared amendments to the above-mentioned Law in order to define its provisions more clearly. They had made two proposals. The first proposal was to include in the Law a provision stating that on all occasions inquiries were to be made about the deceased person’s wishes with his or her closest relatives. The second proposal was to rely on the person’s wishes as expressed during his or her lifetime and, in the absence of any such wishes, to presume consent (no inquiries made with the closest relatives). It was also noted that the relevant committee of the Parliament had opted for the second option (see paragraph 41 below for the adopted text). It was also noted that once the proposed amendments were passed by the Parliament, the occurrence of such “problematic situations would be practically ruled out”. On 17 March 2004 the applicant received reply from the Ministry of Health to this effect.

On 6 May 2004 a prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning the refusal of 12 November 2003 to institute criminal proceedings. She relied on section 11 of the Law and indicated that consent from parents or from a legal guardian was required only in cases relating to the removal of organs for transplantation purposes from a dead child’s body. Accordingly, the actions of the medical practitioners did not constitute a crime and the 12 November 2003 decision had been lawful.

On 29 June 2004 a superior prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning the prosecutor’s decision of 6 May 2004. He stated that – according to the information provided by the Ministry of Health – the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (see paragraph 28 below) had not been ratified by the Latvian Parliament and that Latvia had not even signed the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin; Latvia was therefore not a party to this Convention. The prosecutor relied on Article 17 of the Additional Protocol and indicated that at the relevant time (May 2002) in Latvia these issues were regulated in sections 4 and 11 of the Law. These provisions did not require consent from close relatives unless the removal was from the body of a dead child. The rules relating to transplantation coordinators obliged them to obtain relatives’ consent only in cases prescribed by law. The prosecutor concluded that there were no grounds to consider that the medical practitioners, in taking the decision to remove organs and in carrying out the removal of those organs, had infringed legal provisions. Therefore, there were no grounds to charge them with a crime under section 139 of the Criminal Law; at that time no other person had been charged with the crime. At the same time, the applicant was informed about the 2 June 2004 amendments to sections 4 and 11 of the Law, in which it was specified that the organs of a deceased person might be removed for transplantation purposes if there was no information recorded in the Population Register indicating any objection and if the relatives of the deceased had not, before the start of the transplantation, informed the hospital in writing of the deceased person’s objection – expressed during his or her lifetime – to the use of his or her organs and tissue after death.

On 23 August 2004 the Prosecutor General in a final decision dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning the decision of 29 July 2004. He also referred to sections 4 and 11 of the Law and noted that these provisions prohibited removal in cases where a refusal or objection had been received but not in cases where wishes of the closest relatives had not been established. These provisions, as in force in May 2002, therefore did not oblige medical practitioners to actively search for and inform the closest relatives of a deceased person about the possible removal for transplantation purposes of his or her body tissue and organs unless that person was a child. On 29 May 2002 the medical practitioners did not have any information at their disposal concerning a refusal of or objection to the removal of Mr Petrovs’ organs. He concluded that the organ removal had been performed in accordance with domestic law. The Prosecutor General also observed that activities performed on the body of a deceased person could not be treated as interference with his or her private life.


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Procedural guarantees of review);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life);No violation of Article 9 - Freedom of thought conscience and religion (Article 9-1 - Manifest religion or belief);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Budapest. He submits that he is a practicing Catholic. According to the documents in the case-file he is a teacher of religion by profession.

On 2 June 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of misuse of explosives.

On 11 May 2007 the Central Investigation Prosecutor’s Office indicted the applicant in the Pest County Regional Court on charges of incitement to aggravated murder and unlawful possession of firearms and explosives.

The first hearing in the case took place before the Pest County Regional Court on 17 December 2007. Up until 10 March 2009 the trial judge, Ms K.B.H., held 24 hearings.

Later, the applicant was charged by the Budapest Chief Prosecutor’s Office with armed robbery. The two sets of criminal proceedings were joined by the Pest County Regional Court on 22 June 2009.

The applicant challenged the trial judge for bias, which motion was dismissed. At the applicant’s renewed request, the trial judge recused herself. A new judge, Ms Gy.Sz., was appointed to try the case. She held 11 hearings in the period June to December 2009. This judge eventually declared herself biased; and the case was assigned to yet another judge, Ms A.F., who held 23 hearings between September 2010 and April 2011.

Meanwhile, on 25 October 2010 the applicant was indicted by the Komárom-Esztergom Regional Prosecutor’s Office for aggravated murder. The case was joined to the ongoing criminal proceedings on 28 January 2011 by the Pest County Regional Court.

On 17 April 2011 applicant challenged Ms A.F. for bias. On 24 June 2011 the Budapest Court of Appeal dismissed this motion. It pointed out that the trial judge had declared herself impartial, along with the four other eligible judges of the Pest County Regional Court. Despite the decision of the Court of Appeal, the trial judge eventually recused herself, since, in her view, the applicant’s letters addressed to the Regional Court had infringed her dignity.

Subsequently, in July 2011 the case was assigned to another judge at the Pest County Regional Court, Mr S.P., who did not hold any hearing. On 25 January 2012 he also recused himself following the applicant’s different motions, apparently containing insinuations. The remaining three judges of the Pest County Regional Court declared themselves biased as well. On 31 January 2012 the Budapest Court of Appeal appointed the Budapest High Court to try the case. The trial judge at the High Court held the first hearing on 7 May 2012.

On 28 February 2014 the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 30 years.

On 2 July 2015 the second-instance court quashed this judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance. The case is currently pending there.

In the context of the above proceedings, on 4 June 2005 the Kaposvár District Court remanded the applicant in custody.

His detention was repeatedly prolonged at the statutory intervals until 30 May 2008 when the Budapest Court of Appeal suspended his detention and ordered him to serve a prison sentence which had become enforceable in connection to other criminal proceedings unrelated to the present case.

On 21 May 2010, on the new charges of aggravated murder put forward by the Komárom-Esztergom Regional Prosecutor’s Office, the Tatabánya District Court again remanded the applicant in custody. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Komárom-Esztergom Regional Court on 1 June 2010.

The applicant was actually placed in pre-trial detention again on 2 February 2011, after having served his prison sentence. He submitted that under the law, his detention should have been reviewed within six months, that is, on 2 August 2011 at the latest but that this had not taken place.

On 10 February 2011 the applicant filed an interlocutory application for his immediate release and placement in house arrest with the Pest County Regional Court. The court dismissed the application on the same day. The applicant appealed without success. His further requests for release or, alternatively, a less coercive measure were to no avail.

On 21 November 2011 the Budapest Appellate Public Prosecutor’s Office requested the Budapest Court of Appeal to review the applicant’s pre-trial detention under section 132(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

On 5 December 2011 the detention was extended until the delivery of the first-instance judgment under section 129(1)(b) and (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risks of absconding and of reoffending). The Budapest Court of Appeal held that there was a risk that the applicant might abscond given the seriousness of the charges and the gravity of the punishment and reoffend given that he was a multiple recidivist and the number of offences he was charged with.

The Kúria endorsed this decision on 6 January 2012, holding that the impending severe punishment substantiated the risk of absconding, due to which the applicant’s presence at the proceedings could not be ensured in any other way. It also observed that the last offence had been committed by the applicant during his conditional release from his nine-year imprisonment, thus there was a real risk of reoffending. The court dismissed the arguments put forward by the applicant concerning his health status, unspecified, and concluded that his personal conditions did not militate for a less severe measure.

The applicant’s pre-trial detention reached the statutory time-limit of four years on 2 February 2012. On 23 January 2012 the Budapest Surroundings High Court placed the applicant under house arrest with continuous police surveillance, to be carried out in the flat of Ms I.T, an acquaintance of the applicant. The applicant was allowed to leave the flat every second Wednesday of the month, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. The court noted that the reasons for the applicant’s detention were still valid, and a less restrictive measure was to be applied only because the statutory fouryear time-limit for pre-trial detention had expired. The court also dismissed the applicant’s request for release on the undertaking not to leave his place of residence. According to the court, the applicant’s argument concerning his mother’s ill health and the modest financial situation of his host could not serve as a ground for the application of a less stringent measure.

On 8 February 2012 the Budapest High Court extended the applicant’s house arrest until the adoption of the first-instance judgment. It noted that the applicant was charged with a crime punishable with 10 to 15 years’, or life, imprisonment which in itself demonstrated the risk of absconding. It also relied on the applicant’s previous criminal conduct and the number of offences the applicant had been charged with to find that there was a risk of reoffending

On 5 March 2012 the Budapest High Court granted the applicant’s request for leave for 21 March 2012 to visit his mother in hospital between 8 a.m. and 12 noon and to undergo dental treatment.

On 8 March 2012 the applicant requested his release from house arrest, pointing out that he had no income on his own and intended to work. He also produced a job offer from a company. His request was dismissed on 14 March 2012 by the Budapest High Court on the ground that no new circumstances existed that would affect the necessity of the house arrest.

On 16 April 2012 the applicant was granted exceptional leave from house arrest for every last Friday of the month between 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. to visit his hospitalised mother. The remainder of the applicant’s request, that is leave from house arrest twice a week, was dismissed.

His further request for extraordinary leave to visit his mother for five hours on 21 June 2012 and to study his case file at the premises of a non-governmental organisation was granted on 18 June 2012.

On 16 July 2012 the applicant was granted leave to visit his father in the town of Pápa on 28 July 2012 between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.

The applicant’s further request for leave for medical reasons was granted on 18 July 2012. However, the Budapest High Court dismissed his application for leave so as to look after his mother on a daily basis, in particular to assist her with insulin injections. The court reasoned that Ms I.T., the applicant’s acquaintance and a co-defendant in the criminal proceedings, who lived in the flat of the applicant’s mother, could do so in his stead. The court also stated that lengthy daily leave would be incompatible with the house arrest.

The applicant’s further motions for leave to accompany his mother to medical examinations were granted on 20 July and 1 August 2012 for 23 July (between 3 p.m. and 10 p.m.) and 3 and 15 August 2012, respectively.

The applicant lodged further requests for leave in August 2012 to visit his terminally ill father in Pápa twice a month, to take his mother home after her hospitalisation and to make certain arrangements with her bank and her previous workplace, since she was under guardianship proceedings.

By a decision of 14 August 2012 the Budapest High Court granted the applicant leave to visit his father every fourth Saturday between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m., and to accompany his mother coming home from hospital on 22 August between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m. His request to visit his mother’s financial institution and workplace was dismissed, since he had not specified their addresses, whereas under section 138(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, leave could be granted only for a specific time and destination. As regards the applicant’s more frequent visits to his father, the court noted that regular, long-term leave from the house arrest would jeopardise its purpose of securing the applicant’s presence throughout the proceedings. The applicant appealed, arguing that the time period to assist his mother was too short, that his father’s health was deteriorating fast, requiring more frequent visits, that is, every second week, and that he had already submitted the contact details of his mother’s financial institution and workplace. On 1 October 2013 the Budapest Court of Appeal, acting as a second-instance court, found that the applicant’s appeal concerning the restricted time to assist his mother was well-founded, nonetheless no longer pertinent, because she had already left the hospital. The remainder of the applicant’s appeal was dismissed.

The applicant’s further requests for leave to visit his ill father, lodged on 14 August and 2 September 2012, were not granted. The applicant’s father died on 8 October 2012.

On 10 October 2012 the court granted the applicant leave for the period 15 to 17 October 2012 to make arrangements concerning the funeral of his father.

On 3 December 2012 the Budapest High Court released the applicant from house arrest with an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. The court observed that there were no grounds to believe that the applicant would pervert the course of justice or reoffend. Nonetheless, in its view, he was charged with a serious offence requiring a coercive measure.

On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the first-instance decision and placed the applicant under house arrest on 20 December 2012. It noted that given the seriousness of the offence there existed a danger of his absconding and given his previous multiple convictions, a risk of reoffending.

On 21 December 2012 the Budapest High Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for leave to attend Mass on every Sunday between 7 a.m. and 11 a.m. and his further request for leave on 27 and 28 December 2012 and 2 and 4 January 2013. The court observed that the applicant, being a teacher of religion by profession, was not disproportionately restricted in the exercise of his religious conviction. This decision was upheld on appeal on 24 January 2013, the Court of Appeal holding that the applicant’s religious conviction did not justify the granting of permissions of leave from the house arrest; and that such permissions were normally to reflect an intervening change in the detainee’s personal circumstances. The court noted that such a request could only be granted if it was submitted concerning a specific place and purpose.

Meanwhile, the applicant’s host, Ms I.T. complained on a number of occasions to various authorities that the police officers surveying the applicant interfered with her private life. She also submitted that, as she had indicated from the beginning of the house arrest, she did not have the necessary financial means to accommodate the applicant.

On 7 January 2013 Ms I.T. submitted a motion to the Budapest High Court stating that the applicant was to leave her flat since she could not further provide for him. On the same day, the applicant requested the court to establish the place of his house arrest at a camping site in Nagyteve. He was informed by the court that, according to information received by the relevant authorities, the camping site was not suitable for residence during the winter. Notwithstanding this information, the applicant maintained his request.

A new decision was issued by the investigating judge on 8 January 2013 establishing the place of the applicant’s house arrest at the Nagyteve camping site. On 8 January 2013 the Pápa Police Department issued a report on the applicant’s presence at the camping site, stating that the “weather conditions, the lack of food supply and the poor hygienic conditions” endangered the applicant’s health. On 9 January 2013 the Veszprém County Chief Police Department lodged a request with the Budapest High Court to amend its decision of 8 January 2013 since the camp site was unsuitable for long-term residence.

On 14 January 2013 the applicant sought the termination of his house arrest again. His motion was dismissed on 16 January 2013 by the Budapest High Court, which stated that there was no reason to overturn the decision of 20 December 2012 and that he had been aware of the conditions of the camping site when he had requested to be committed there.

On 18 January 2013 the local general practitioner arranged for the applicant to be admitted to Pápa Hospital. The examinations carried out at the hospital did not result in the finding of any such disease as warranting the applicant’s further treatment, so he was released on the same day and placed in a social care institution in Pápa.

On 21 January 2013 the Budapest High Court amended its decision of 8 January 2013 and ordered the applicant’s house arrest to be carried out in the flat of Ms I.T. again. The applicant’s appeal against this decision was to no avail. In its decision of 26 February 2013 the Budapest Court of Appeal reiterated that the applicant was a multiple reoffender charged with serious crimes, thus the risk of absconding and reoffending existed. The court also noted that had the statutory maximum of detention on remand not expired, the most restrictive measure should have been applied. It further argued that the measure was not disproportionate, since the protraction of the proceedings had been compensated for by the statutory discontinuation of the applicant’s detention on remand. The court also dismissed the applicant’s argument that some co-defendants were released from house arrest.

On 10 July 2013 the Budapest High Court carried out the statutory review of the applicant’s house arrest and, at the same time, decided on the applicant’s request for release. During the court hearing the judge presented to the applicant and the prosecutor a letter allegedly originating from one of the applicant’s previous cellmates. The writer of the letter informed the court that the applicant intended to obstruct the criminal proceedings by physically threatening the investigating judge and subsequently requesting his exclusion for bias, initiating criminal proceedings against the trial judge for judicial errors and absconding and inciting the co-accused to do so. The applicant sought direct access to the document, arguing that without receiving information on the author’s identity he was unable to challenge this latter’s motivation and the credibility of the content of the letter. Relying on the protection of the author’s personal data as provided in section 60(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the court dismissed the applicant’s request.

The court upheld the applicant’s house arrest because of the risk of reoffending and absconding as provided in section 129(2)(b) and (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In its decision the court relied on the seriousness of the crimes and the gravity of the impending punishment in holding that there was a likelihood that the applicant would abscond. It also held that given the fact that the applicant was a recidivist, there was a risk of reoffending. In its decision the court mentioned the letter as one of the factual elements to consider.

On 22 July 2013 the Budapest High Court authorised the applicant to leave house arrest to undergo physiotherapy every second weekday in the period 22 July to 15 August 2013.

On 8 August 2013 the applicant’s request for leave to take up a job and to look after his ill mother on a daily basis was dismissed by the Budapest High Court, which found that such a daily leave would defeat the purpose of house arrest.

On 12 September 2013 the applicant was appointed as his mother’s guardian.

The applicant stayed in house arrest until 8 November 2013, when he was placed in pre-trial detention in connection with criminal proceedings concerning another offence.

As of 2 July 2015 the applicant has been again in pre-trial detention following the second-instance court’s decision to quash his conviction and remit the case to the first-instance.


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helena Jäderblom

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the excessive length of their pre-trial detention.