Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly);Violation of Article 6+6-3 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3 - Rights of defence;Article 6-3-b - Adequate facilities;Adequate time;Preparation of defence;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)

András Sajó;Elisabeth Steiner;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Baku.

The opposition group Ictimai Palata was planning a demonstration to be held on 19 June 2011 in Baku. On 9 June 2011 the organisers – consisting of several members of that group – gave prior notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”), informing it of the date, time, place and purpose of the demonstration. According to the notice, the assembly was scheduled to take place from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. on 19 June 2011 at the square in front of the Narimanov Cinema in Baku.

The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed another location on the outskirts of Baku.

Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstration in one of the central areas of Baku, namely, near the Puppet Theatre on Seaside Boulevard.

According to the applicant, the demonstration was intended to be peaceful and was conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding free and fair elections, democratic reforms, freedom of assembly, and the release of persons arrested during some previous demonstrations.

The applicant attended the demonstration, but shortly after it had started the police started to disperse it. The applicant was arrested at around 6.10 p.m. during the dispersal operation. He claimed that he had been arrested and taken to a police car by plain-clothed persons. According to the official records, he was arrested by police officers Z.H. and J.M. He was taken to police station No. 9 of the Sabail District Police Office.

Police officers Z.H. and J.M. stated the following in a report (raport) submitted to a superior police officer:

“... at around 6.10 p.m. we were on duty ... when Mammadov Gafgaz Suleyman oglu, whose identity was established later, was attempting to hold an unlawful demonstration. We demanded that he stop his illegal actions, [he] deliberately disobeyed [and] continued his actions, and for that reason we brought him to the [police station] ...”

According to the applicant, he was questioned at the police station.

At 6.50 p.m. on the day of the arrest, an “administrative-offence report” (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) was issued by police officer H.H. in respect of the applicant. The report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with the lawful order of the police during the demonstration, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”).

The applicant refused to sign the report, which contained a preprinted text declaring that “[the arrested person] was familiarised with the report, the reasons for his or her arrest and his or her rights under Articles 371, 400.2, 401.1.6, 401.1.7 of the CAO of the Republic of Azerbaijan were explained”.

Subsequently, police officer H.H. prepared an “administrative-arrest report” (inzibati qaydada tutma haqqında protokol), stating that:

“... the [applicant] was subjected to administrative arrest at 8 p.m. on 19 June 2011 ... in order to ensure issuance of an administrative-offence report, to ensure a correct and timely examination of the case, [and] to ensure the execution of decisions, in accordance with Articles 396.1.2 and 398 of the CAO.”

According to the applicant, he was never served with a copy of the administrative-offence report or with other documents in his case file. He was not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while he was kept in police custody.

On 20 June 2011, the day after his arrest, the applicant was brought before the Sabail District Court.

According to the applicant, he refused the assistance of a Statefunded lawyer and insisted on hiring a lawyer of his own choice, but the judge disregarded his request. His representation by that lawyer was ineffective and of a formalistic nature. The hearing was very brief and members of the public, including human rights defenders and journalists, were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public.

The applicant stated before the court that he was not guilty of disobeying a lawful order of a police officer and that he had participated in the demonstration because he had a constitutional right to freedom of assembly.

According to the record of the hearing provided by the Government, in response to the judge’s question whether the police officers, before arresting him, had issued a relevant notice about dispersal of the demonstration, the applicant gave the following answer:

“There were a lot of police officers and they were demanding that we disperse. But their demand was not lawful because we were exercising our right. Instead of calling on us to disperse, the responsibility of the police should have been to ensure our security.”

The only witness questioned during the court hearing was police officer Z.H., who testified as follows:

“At around 6.10 p.m. on 19 June 2011 ... we noticed that [the applicant], together with a group of other people, was attempting to hold an unauthorised demonstration by shouting out slogans, and ... asked them to observe silence. However, [the applicant] continued his actions, disobeying our requests ...”

According to the record of the hearing, the State-funded lawyer stated that the applicant was not guilty and asked the court to take into consideration the applicant’s age and the fact that he had children.

The court found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in the unauthorised demonstration. The court convicted him under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to five days’ “administrative” detention.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his conviction was in violation of his rights because the demonstration in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrest had been unlawful and that the hearing before the first-instance court had not been fair. He urged the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance court’s decision.

The applicant was represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice.

On 24 June 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court, stating that its findings had been correct.


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

Armen Harutyunyan;Kristina Pardalos;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Pauliine Koskelo;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Yerevan. He is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and at the material time he headed a political movement called “Civil Disobedience”.

On 5 May 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 190 § 3 (1) of the Criminal Code (money laundering) in respect of the applicant.

On 7 May 2007 the applicant was arrested and on 10 May 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of two months, upon an application by the investigator, taking into account the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that the applicant, if remaining at large, could abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings. The applicant objected to that application, arguing that the investigator had failed to submit any wellfounded arguments in support of the allegation that he would abscond or obstruct justice, whereas he had no previous convictions, was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence and stable social life, and was a well-known public figure. The District Court’s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal within fifteen days.

On 11 May 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising similar arguments.

On 24 May 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation.

On 2 July 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant’s detention by two months, upon an application by the investigator, finding that the applicant, if remaining at large, could obstruct the investigation, abscond, exert unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and commit another offence. The District Court’s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal.

On 3 July and 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising arguments similar to those previously raised.

On 24 July 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances and complexity of the case; the investigative measures to be carried out and the applicant’s behaviour, namely his refusal to give any testimony, which was a factor slowing down the investigation, gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and also abscond.

On 31 August 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant’s detention by two months, upon an application of the investigator, on the same grounds as before. The District Court’s decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal.

On 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising arguments similar to those previously raised

On 6 September 2007 the investigator decided to replace the applicant’s detention with a written undertaking not to leave his residence and to release him in view of the fact that the investigative measures would take some time and it was no longer necessary to keep the applicant in detention.

On 17 September 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to leave the applicant’s appeal of 3 September 2007 unexamined in view of the fact that he had been released.


Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Deprivation of liberty);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Moscow. He is a professional politician who has held in the past the posts of Nizhniy Novgorod governor, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister for Energy. He later became one of the best-known opposition leaders, a founder of the political party the Union of Right Forces, and subsequently of the political movement Solidarnost.

On 10 December 2010 eight individuals, none of whom are applicants in the present case, submitted notice of a public demonstration to the mayor of Moscow. They indicated, in particular, that a meeting would be held from 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. on Triumfalnaya Square, Moscow. They estimated that about 1,500 people would take part in the event. The notice stated that the proposed demonstration was intended “to demand respect for the constitutional right to peaceful demonstration and assembly guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation”. The organisers indicated, inter alia, that it would not be necessary to divert the traffic.

On 22 December 2010 the Moscow Government’s Department for Liaison with Security Authorities informed the organisers that the event had been approved by the deputy mayor of Moscow. The number of participants had been limited to 1,000, and a particular sector of Triumfalnaya Square had been designated for the event: “in the area between the First and the Second Brestskaya Streets, opposite the Pekin Hotel and the adjacent road leading to the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall”.

In the meantime, on 16 December 2010 another group of three individuals, none of whom are applicants in the present case, submitted notice of an alternative public demonstration to the mayor of Moscow, at the same time and place as the authorised event and with the same title. It appears that this second public demonstration was not authorised, but on 22 December 2010 a number of alternatives as to the time and place were offered to the organisers. Moreover, none of its organisers could go to the venue on 31 December 2010 because two of them had been arrested earlier on the same day; the third had been abroad.

The authorised meeting began at 6 p.m. on 31 December 2010 at Triumfalnaya Square, as planned. According to the applicant, the perimeter of the square was cordoned off and was guarded by the riot police. The only access to the meeting venue was at Tverskaya Street. The applicant claimed that he had arrived at the meeting with his daughter; he had parked his car at Tverskaya Street and they had entered Triumfalnaya Square from Tverskaya Street through the only opening in the cordon.

During the meeting the applicant addressed the participants with a speech in which he criticised the criminal conviction of Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, the former owner of the Yukos oil company, and Platon Lebedev, his associate. He also condemned the corruption in the State administration. He chanted the slogans “The authorities to resign!”, “Putin to resign!”, “Happy New Year without Putin!”

At the end of the meeting the applicant, accompanied by his daughter, headed across Triumfalnaya Square towards Tverskaya Street. At the exit he saw the riot police arresting one of the participants in the demonstration. Shortly afterwards the applicant was also arrested and put into a police vehicle.

The parties disagreed as to the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest.

The applicant claimed that on the way to his car his passage had been obstructed by police officers and he and his daughter had found themselves in a crowd. They heard the police instruction over a loudspeaker calling for people to stay calm and to pass through. The applicant saw two people being arrested and put in police vans, and then he was arrested too, without any warning or explanation. The applicant claimed that he had not disobeyed or resisted the police; on the contrary, he had followed their instructions “to pass through”. He had been arrested by an officer who had been wearing a fur hat, an indication of his higher rank, as opposed to the crash helmets worn by the riot police troops guarding the cordon.

The applicant alleged that there existed at least three video recordings of his arrest, including the events immediately leading up to it; they had been produced by two media channels and one independent photographer, Mr T. He also maintained that there existed an official video of the public demonstration and the ensuing arrests, which had allegedly been shot by the police and kept at the Moscow Department of the Interior.

According to the Government, at the end of the meeting the applicant had headed towards Tverskaya Street and had begun calling passers-by to take part in another, unauthorised, meeting while shouting out anti-government slogans. They alleged that two police officers, Sergeant X and Private Y, had warned the applicant; they had ordered him to stop agitating the crowd and to return to the authorised meeting. They further contended that the applicant had ignored the warning and had continued shouting out the slogans and disobeying the police. Confronted with this behaviour, X and Y arrested him.

At 7 p.m. on the same day the applicant was taken to the police station of the Tverskoy District Department of the Interior. At 7.10 p.m. Private Y drew up a report stating that the applicant had been escorted to the police station “in order to draw up the administrative material”. Also at 7.10 p.m., the on-duty police officer drew up a report on the applicant’s administrative arrest under Article 27.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, stating, like the other report, that he had been arrested “in order to draw up the administrative material”. The applicant signed both reports, indicating his disagreement with their content.

Both X and Y produced identical duty reports stating, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“... on 31 December 2010 at 18.30 Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov was apprehended [because] he had disobeyed a lawful order of the police in connection with [X and Y] performing [their] duty of maintaining public order and safeguarding the public. He (Nemtsov) stood at 31 Tverskaya Street and began to shout “Down with Putin!”, “Russia without Putin!” as well as insults to President Medvedev, catching people’s attention and calling them to come to the Mayakovskiy monument for a meeting. [X and Y] approached Nemtsov, introduced themselves and warned him that it was unacceptable to hold a meeting at Triumfalnaya Square. They invited him to proceed to the authorised event that was taking place between the First and the Second Brestskaya Streets, opposite the Pekin Hotel. Nemtsov did not react and continued to shout out slogans and call people to hold a meeting. Nemtsov deliberately refused to comply with the lawful orders to cease his actions breaching public order, and continued them ostentatiously. To prevent him from organising an unauthorised meeting at Triumfalnaya Square and to prevent the unlawful acts, he was invited to enter a police van. In response to [these] lawful orders to enter the police van, Nemtsov began to break loose. He pushed us away and shouted insults to us: “Down with the police state!”, “Free-for-all cops!”, attempting to cause mayhem among the citizens surrounding him. By doing so he demonstrated his refusal to carry out the lawful order of the police and prevented them from carrying out their duty, thus committing an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences”.

At 7.30 p.m. X and Y made witness statements, essentially copying the text of their duty reports.

At the same time the district police inspector drew up a report on the administrative offence, stating that the applicant had disobeyed a lawful order of the police in breach of Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant signed that report with the remark “100% lies”.

On the same day the head of the same police station issued a decision to transfer the administrative case file to the Justice of the Peace.

On the same day at about 7.15 p.m. the NTV television channel reported on the series of arrests following the demonstration at Triumfalnaya Square. Police Colonel B. commented on the applicant’s arrest, stating that he had been arrested for instigating an unauthorised meeting.

The applicant remained in detention at the police station until 2 January 2011, pending the determination of the charges against him.

The applicant described the conditions of his detention at the police station as extremely poor. He was detained in a solitary cell measuring 1.5 by 3 metres, with a concrete floor, without windows and with very bleak artificial lighting, which was insufficient for reading. The cell was not equipped with ventilation or furniture, except for a narrow wooden bench without a mattress or any bedding. The walls in the cell had been coated with “shuba”, a sort of abrasive concrete lining. The cell was not equipped with a lavatory or wash basin. The applicant had been obliged to call the wardens to take him to the lavatory when they were available. He was not provided with food or drink; he received only the food and drinking water that was passed to him by his family.

The Government submitted that from 31 December 2010 to 10 a.m. on 2 January 2011 the applicant had been detained in an administrativedetention cell measuring 5.6 sq. m equipped with artificial lighting and mandatory ventilation. They claimed that the applicant had been provided with drinking water and food, as well as with a sleeping place and bedding, but had refused to take them because he had received everything necessary from his family and friends.

On 1 January 2011 two members of a public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited the police station to check the conditions of the applicant’s detention. Their report stated that the applicant had been detained in a cell without a window, which was poorly lit, lacked ventilation and had no sanitary facilities, sleeping place, mattress or bedding. They found that the cell was not adequate for a two-day confinement and noted that the applicant had not been receiving hot food.

On 2 January 2011, following his conviction for an administrative offence, the applicant was transferred to another detention facility until 15 January 2011.

The applicant claimed that the poor conditions of detention had had a negative impact on his health. He submitted a medical certificate indicating that between 3 and 12 January 2011 he had sought medical assistance every day.

On 2 January 2011 the Justice of the Peace of circuit no. 369 of Tverskoy District of Moscow scheduled the hearing of the applicant’s case to take place on the same day.

At 11.30 a.m. the applicant was brought before the Justice of the Peace, who examined the charges.

In the courtroom the applicant discovered that there was no seat for him and he remained standing during the hearing, which lasted for over five hours. The parties disagreed as to the reasons why the applicant had remained standing. According to the applicant, the Justice of the Peace had ordered him to stand. The Government contested that allegation and claimed that the Justice of the Peace had repeatedly asked if anyone in the audience could give their seat to the applicant, but the applicant and his counsel had objected and insisted that he remain standing.

The applicant claimed that standing throughout the trial had been humiliating and physically difficult, especially after having spent two days in detention in poor conditions. He also alleged that it had prevented him from participating effectively in the proceedings because he could only address the judge in writing and had been obliged to write his submissions while standing up. This had further aggravated his fatigue and hampered the conduct of his defence.

The applicant pleaded not guilty and claimed that he had been detained for no reason other than political oppression. He contested the content of the police reports, in particular the statement that the police had given him a warning or an order which he could have disobeyed.

At the hearing the applicant lodged a number of motions. He requested in particular that the court admit as evidence the video footage of his arrest broadcast by two media channels. He also requested that the recording made by Mr T., an independent photographer, be admitted as evidence (see paragraph 15 above).

The applicant also requested that the court obtain from the prosecution the video recording made by the Moscow police at the scene of the public demonstration.

The applicant further requested that the court call and cross-examine Police Colonel B. about the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest, which he had commented on in the media (see paragraph 22 above).

The Justice of the Peace dismissed the applicant’s request to admit the video recordings on the grounds that the provenance of the recordings was not supported by evidence. The court also refused to order that the video recording made by the police be admitted as evidence, stating that the applicant’s request was not “specific enough” and that the applicant had failed to prove the existence of any such recordings. Lastly, the court refused to call and examine Police Colonel B. as a witness, having considered that request irrelevant.

At the applicant’s request the court called and examined thirteen witnesses who had been at the scene of the authorised demonstration. They testified that they had heard the applicant addressing the meeting and that after his speech he had said farewell and left; he had not made any calls to go on to another meeting. Six of those witnesses testified that they had left the meeting at the same time as the applicant and had witnessed his arrest. They explained that the exit from the meeting had been blocked by the riot police and the crowd had begun to build up because those who wanted to leave Triumfalnaya Square could not do so. When the applicant arrived at the cordon the police surrounded him so as to separate him from others wanting to leave the meeting, and arrested him. Eight witnesses stated that the applicant had not been shouting any slogans and had not been acting against the police orders before being surrounded and arrested. One of those witnesses, M.T., stated that she had heard the applicant asking the riot police why the exit had been blocked. She had also heard him shouting that Article 31 of the Constitution guaranteed the freedom of assembly, but he had not shouted any calls or obscenities. The remaining witnesses had not seen the actual arrest. In particular, the applicant’s daughter and her friend testified that they had been walking back to the car with the applicant and talking about the plans for New Year’s eve, and when they had arrived at the police cordon they had lost sight of the applicant in the crowd; one or two minutes later they had called him on his mobile phone and had found out that he had been arrested.

The court called and examined two policemen, sergeant X and private Y, who had signed the reports stating that they had arrested the applicant because he had disobeyed their orders. They testified that on 31 December 2010 they had been on duty maintaining public order at Triumfalnaya Square. They had seen the applicant at 31 Tverskaya Street. He had been shouting anti-government slogans and calling people around him to hold an unauthorised meeting. They had approached the applicant and requested him to stop agitating outside the authorised meeting; they had asked him to return to the place allocated for the meeting and to speak there. The applicant had not reacted to their requests, so they had asked him to proceed to the police van. The applicant had disobeyed that order and had been arrested; he had put up resistance while being arrested.

On the same day the Justice of the Peace found that the applicant had disobeyed the police orders to stop chanting anti-government slogans and had resisted lawful arrest. The Justice of the Peace based her findings on the witness statements of X and Y, their written reports of 31 December 2010, their written statements of the same date, the report on the administrative arrest of the same date, the notice of the public demonstration of 16 December 2010 and the reply of 22 December 2010 indicating that it had not been authorised (it appears that this reference concerned the events described in paragraph 9 above). The Justice of the Peace dismissed the applicant’s testimony on the grounds that as a defendant, he would have sought to exonerate himself from administrative liability. She also dismissed the testimonies of seven eyewitnesses on the grounds that they had contradicted the policemen’s testimonies and because those witnesses had been acquainted with the applicant, had taken part in the same demonstration and therefore must have been biased towards the applicant. The testimonies of the remaining six witnesses were dismissed as irrelevant.

The applicant was found guilty of having disobeyed a lawful order of the police, in breach of Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. He was sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention.

On 3 January 2011 the applicant wrote an appeal against the judgment and submitted it to the detention facility administration unit. It appears that despite his counsel’s numerous attempts to lodge the appeal directly with the court, it was not accepted before 9 January 2011. On 11 January 2011 his counsel submitted a supplement to the points of appeal.

In his appeal the applicant claimed that his arrest and conviction for the administrative offence had been in breach of the domestic law and in violation of the Convention. He alleged that his right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly had been violated. He contested the findings of fact made by the first instance as regards his conduct after he had left the meeting. He challenged, in particular, the court’s refusal to admit the photographic and video materials as evidence or to obtain the footage of the demonstration shot by the police. In addition, he complained about the manner in which the first-instance hearing had been conducted. In particular, he alleged that the Justice of the Peace had ordered him to stand throughout the hearing, which had been humiliating and had made it difficult to participate in the proceedings. The applicant also complained about the conditions of his detention at the police station from 31 December 2010 to 2 January 2011.

On 12 January 2011 the Tverskoy District Court examined the appeal. At the applicant’s request the court kept the verbatim records of the hearing.

During the appeal hearing the applicant complained of the alleged unlawfulness of his arrest and the poor conditions of his detention at the police station. He asked the court to declare the acts of the police who had detained him for over forty hours before bringing him before a court unlawful.

As regards the merits of the administrative charges, the applicant reiterated before the appeal instance his requests that the court admit three video recordings of his arrest as evidence and that it obtain the video recording made by the Moscow police. He also requested that two photographs of his arrest be admitted as evidence. He asked the court to call and examine photographers T. and V. as witnesses and to cross-examine police officers X and Y again. The court granted the requests to admit one video recording and two photographs as evidence, and decided to call and examine photographer T. as a witness, but rejected all the other requests.

Photographer T. testified at the hearing that he had gone to the meeting to film it and had been waiting for the applicant at the exit from the meeting because he had wanted to interview him. When the applicant approached the exit a big group of policemen rushed over to block his way and there had been a minute’s pause when a crowd began to build up against the cordon, blocking the passage. Then one person was arrested, and about thirty seconds later someone else, and then the applicant. T. saw the applicant’s arrest as he was filming it from a distance of about five or six metres. He was separated from the applicant by several rows of people, of which two rows consisted of policemen. The recording began a few minutes before the arrest and continued without any interruption until the applicant had been put in the police van. He specified that the applicant had not put up any resistance to the officers arresting him. He identified on the photograph the officer wearing a fur hat, who had arrested the applicant, and explained that that person had taken the applicant out of the crowd and then passed him on to another policeman in order to put the applicant into the police van. He also stated that the applicant had not shouted any slogans or insults. The applicant had repeated “Easy, easy” to the policemen while being escorted to the van. T. also testified that the applicant had been standing throughout the first-instance hearing, while his counsel had been sitting on a chair.

The court watched the video recording made by T. However, it decided not to take cognisance of T.’s testimonies, his recording or the photograph, on the following grounds:

“... the footage begins with the image of a large number of people gathered at 31 Tverskaya Street in Moscow, with Mr Nemtsov at the centre. A policeman addresses the citizens through a loudspeaker with a request to disperse and not to block the passage, but Mr Nemtsov remains standing in one place addressing the gathered citizens. The video operator is at such a distance from the applicant that he is separated from him by several rows of people, including the gathered citizens and the riot police, and it is impossible to understand what these citizens and the applicant are saying. Subsequently the recording of the applicant is interrupted as the camera points away onto the policemen putting the first arrested person, and then another one, into the police vans. Only afterwards does the video recording show the applicant being led to a police van by policemen, and he puts up no resistance at this moment of the footage.

In this respect, and taking into account that the footage does not show Mr Nemtsov’s actions immediately before his placement in the police van, the video and the accompanying audio do not depict Mr Nemtsov addressing the citizens before he was detained. The court concludes that the submitted footage does not refute the testimonies of the policemen, and [T.’s] testimony cannot refute them either because he observed only those actions of Mr Nemtsov that appear on the footage.

The photographs submitted during the appeal hearing that depict Mr Nemtsov surrounded by policemen, one of whom is supporting his arm, cannot be considered by the court as refuting the event of the offence or the evidence, including the testimonies of [X and Y], because of the absence of information on the exact time of its taking, or on its connection with the place ... ”

On the same day the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. It found, in particular, on the basis of the testimonies and reports of X and Y, that the applicant had indeed been guilty of having disobeyed a lawful order of the police. It upheld the reasoning of the first-instance court whereby it rejected the testimonies of thirteen witnesses called at the applicant’s request. As regards the testimonies of X and Y, on the other hand, it found no reason to mistrust them because they had had no personal interest in the outcome of the applicant’s case.

In its appeal decision the court addressed the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending the first-instance trial and considered that there had been no breach:

“... after the report on the administrative offence had been drawn up, the information necessary for establishing the circumstances of the committed offence was collected, including the explanations of [X and Y], the notice of the place of the public demonstration of 31 December 2010, the [mayor’s] reply to that notice, as well as the personal characteristics of the person in relation to whom the administrative offence report had been drawn up. A ruling was made by the Justice of the Peace of 2 September 2010 convicting the applicant of an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. Therefore the applicant’s detention during less than 48 hours was not in breach of Article 27.5 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences.”

As regards the conditions of the applicant’s detention between 31 December 2010 and 2 January 2011, the court found that his complaints had been outside the scope of the current proceedings, holding that another type of legal action should have been brought by the applicant to challenge those acts. The court did not specify what procedure the applicant should have followed as an avenue for those complaints.

On 31 March 2011 the applicant lodged before the Tverskoy District Court a complaint under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He challenged his initial arrest and complained of the poor conditions of detention for over forty hours.

On 4 April 2011 the court refused to accept the applicant’s action, holding that the questions concerning the lawfulness of the police acts had to be examined in the relevant administrative proceedings, but could not be dealt with in civil proceedings.

On 14 April 2011 the applicant appealed against the refusal to accept his complaint. The Moscow City Court dismissed his appeal on 22 July 2011. It relied, in particular, on Ruling no. 2 of 10 February 2009 by the Plenary Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and held, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“... the courts may not examine complaints lodged under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure against acts or inaction connected with the application of the Code of Administrative Offences, Chapter 30 of which provides for the procedure for challenging them; or acts or inaction for which the Code of Administrative Offences does not provide for a procedure by which they may be challenged. Acts or inaction that are inseparable from the administrative case may not be subject to a separate challenge (evidence in the case, [including] reports on the application of precautionary measures to secure the course of justice in the administrative case). In this case the arguments against the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence or the application of a precautionary measure to secure the course of justice may be put forward during the hearing of the administrative case or in points of appeal against the judgment or ruling on the administrative case. However, if the proceedings in the administrative case are terminated, the acts committed in the course of these proceedings, if they entailed a breach of an individual’s or a legal person’s rights or freedoms, or hindered the exercise of their rights and freedoms, or imposed an obligation after the proceedings had been terminated, [they] may be challenged under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the same procedure one may challenge the acts of officials if no administrative file has been opened.”

The applicant also attempted to challenge the acts of the judiciary involved in his case before the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow. His attempts were, however, unsuccessful.


CASE OF ĐURIĆ AND OTHERS v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions);Respondent State to take measures of a general character (Article 46-2 - Measures of a general character);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

By six judgments of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance (“the Court of First Instance”) of 17 February 2000, 25 October 2000, 12 December 2008, 8 July 2003, 11 February 2003 and 31 August 1999, which became final on 15 May 2001, 18 March 2004, 12 January 2009, 30 June 2005 and 4 December 2000 respectively, the Republika Srpska (an Entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay, within 15 days, the following amounts in respect of war damage together with default interest at the statutory rate:

(i) BAM 21,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 2,300 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 2,350 in respect of legal costs to the Đurićs;

(ii) BAM 31,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 2,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 3,570 in respect of legal costs to the Bošnjaks;

(iii) BAM 28,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 2,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 4,470.60 in respect of legal costs to the Bojanićs and Ms Banjac;

(iv) BAM 40,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and BAM 2,835 in respect of legal costs to the Čolićs;

(v) BAM 19,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and BAM 600 in respect of legal costs to Mr Lazarević;

(vi) BAM 14,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 2,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 1,810 in respect of legal costs to the Komljenovićs.

The Court of First Instance issued writs of execution (rješenje o izvršenju) on 24 August 2001, 16 August 2004, 4 April 2011, 8 August 2007, 27 April 2009 and 28 March 2001.

The applicants complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”).

On 16 January 2013 the Constitutional Court found a breach of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the cases of the Đurićs, Mr Lazarević, the Bojanićs and Ms Banjac. In line with its established practice in cases of this type, it refused the applicantsʼ compensation claims, holding that a finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction.

The cases of the Čolićs, the Komljenovićs and the Bošnjaks are still pending before the Constitutional Court.

On 10 April 2008, 12 November 2010, 13 December 2010 and 18 July 2008 respectively the Đurićs, the Bošnjaks, the Čolićs, Mr Lazarević and the Komljenovićs were paid legal costs and default interest.

Under the new settlement plan (see paragraph 16 below) the Đurićsʼ case was scheduled for enforcement in 2014; the Bošnjaksʼ in 2019; the Bojanićsʼ and Ms Banjacʼs in 2030; the Čolićsʼ in 2024; Mr Lazarevićʼs in 2026; and the Komljenovićsʼ in 2017.


No violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Kaunas.

On 6 February 2004 the applicant was notified by the Financial Crime Investigation Service that a criminal investigation had been opened against him on suspicion of fraud committed in an organised group (Articles 25 § 3 and 182 § 2 of the Criminal Code of 2000). It was suspected that from October 2001 until May 2002 the applicant and his accomplices, using companies founded or acquired for the purpose, had bought large amounts of fish from unspecified persons without paying value added tax (VAT), forged payment documents to show that the applicable VAT had been paid, and then sold the fish to another company for a price that included the applicable VAT – thus appropriating an amount equal to the said applicable VAT. It was suspected that in this manner the applicant and his accomplices had appropriated 261,854.65 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 75,838 euros (EUR)), which should have been paid into the State budget as VAT.

On the same day the applicant was prohibited from going abroad or leaving his home without the approval of the investigating authorities (kardomoji priemonė – rašytinis pasižadėjimas neišvykti).

On 6 May 2004 the prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant was charged with several counts of fraud and forgery of documents committed in an organised group (under Articles 25 § 3, 182 § 2 and 300 § 2 of the Criminal Code of 2000). The indictment noted that the applicant had admitted his guilt and cooperated with the investigative authorities.

On 3 February 2005 the Kaunas Regional Court found the applicant guilty of all charges and ordered him to pay a fine of LTL 18,750 (EUR 5,430).

On 3 February 2006 the Court of Appeal partly amended the judgment of the regional court. It acquitted the applicant of fraud but upheld his conviction for forgery of documents and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment. The sentence was suspended for two years, during which time an injunction (įpareigojimas) was imposed on the applicant: he was prohibited from leaving his home for more than seven days in a row without the approval of the supervising institution (hereinafter, “the sentence for forgery”).

The applicant began complying with the injunction imposed on him by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 17 below).

On 5 December 2006 the Supreme Court partly amended the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It quashed the applicant’s acquittal of fraud and returned that part of the case for re-examination by the Court of Appeal. The remaining of the appellate court’s judgment was upheld.

On 4 July 2007 the Court of Appeal, after re-examining the above-mentioned part of the case, convicted the applicant of fraud. When determining the sentence, the court took into account various aggravating circumstances (the crime had been well organised, the applicant had played a leading role in its commission, and the value of the appropriated property had been high), as well as mitigating circumstances (the applicant had admitted his guilt, he had a family and a job, and he had been complying with the injunction previously imposed on him). As a result, the Court of Appeal sentenced the applicant to imprisonment for two years and three months – a sentence which was close to the minimum sentence stipulated in the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 28-29 below). The court combined this sentence with the one previously imposed on the applicant for forgery of documents (see paragraph 10 above) and ordered a consolidated sentence (subendrinta bausmė) for the two crimes – imprisonment of two years and three months. The Court of Appeal stated that because the crime of fraud was serious (sunkus nusikaltimas), the consolidated sentence could not be suspended (see paragraph 32 below).

The applicant submitted a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court. He asked the court to quash the sentence of imprisonment for the crime of fraud ordered by the Court of Appeal and instead restore the fine imposed by the Kaunas Regional Court in its judgment of 3 February 2005 (see paragraph 9 above).

On 31 July 2007 the Supreme Court delayed the execution of the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 4 July 2007 until the applicant’s cassation appeal was examined. The Supreme Court’s decision did not explicitly indicate whether the applicant had to continue complying with the injunction imposed on him during the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery (see paragraph 17 below). Nonetheless, during the period of the delay the applicant continued complying with the injunction.

On 8 January 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal. It found that when determining the sentence the Court of Appeal had correctly assessed the gravity of the crime, the applicant’s personality, and all relevant mitigating and aggravating circumstances. It also reiterated that the Criminal Code excluded the possibility of suspending the sentence in the event that the individual concerned had been convicted of a serious crime, such as fraud. However, the Supreme Court partly amended the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 4 July 2007 by applying the terms of a 2002 law on amnesty and reducing the applicant’s sentence of imprisonment by one fifth. Thus, the applicant’s final consolidated sentence was one year and nine months of imprisonment (hereinafter, “the consolidated sentence”).

After the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 3 February 2006 (see paragraph 10 above), the applicant began complying with the injunction imposed on him during the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery. The applicant was not allowed to leave his home for more than seven days without the approval of the supervising institution. He was also obliged to report to the local prison department every two months, which he did from March 2006 until January 2008. At the applicant’s request, on 1 February 2008 the local prison department issued a certificate stating that he had been complying with the injunction and that the term of suspension of his sentence for forgery would end on 3 February 2008.

In January 2008 the applicant submitted a request to the Kaunas Regional Court to be released from serving the consolidated sentence. The applicant stated that he had nearly completed serving the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery by complying with the injunction imposed by the Court of Appeal. According to the applicant, given that the sentence for forgery (two years of imprisonment) was longer than the consolidated sentence (one year and nine months of imprisonment) and given that he had served the former, he should be released from serving the latter; otherwise he would have to serve two sentences for one crime.

On 28 January 2008 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request. The court reiterated that the applicant had been convicted of two crimes – one of which (fraud) was serious and the other (forgery of documents) less serious (apysunkis) – and the Criminal Code did not permit the suspension of a sentence for a serious crime.

On 28 February 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the regional court’s judgment. The court firstly found that the applicant had not yet finished serving the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery: the completion of the term had to be confirmed by a decision of the relevant district court, but no such decision had been adopted as at that date (see paragraph 33 below). The Court of Appeal further held that the imposition of an injunction during the term of suspension of a sentence (įpareigojimai, paskirti nuosprendžio vykdymo atidėjimo metu) did not amount to the serving of that sentence (bausmės atlikimas); therefore, the applicant had not actually served his sentence for forgery, so the question of “double punishment” did not arise. The fact that he had been complying with the injunction was relevant only during the determination of the final consolidated sentence, and that had been done by the Supreme Court.

The judgment was final and not subject to appeal.

Subsequently the applicant submitted a request to the Kaunas District Court, asking it to confirm that he had completed the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery. On 18 March 2008 the court refused to examine the applicant’s request because, under domestic law, a request for the term of suspension of a sentence to be declared completed could only be submitted by the supervising institution and not by the convicted person (see paragraph 33 below).

On 15 April 2008 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court stated that that the applicant had been prohibited from leaving his home since 6 February 2004 (see paragraph 7 above), so during the entire time he had been complying with that restrictive measure and not with the injunction relating to the suspended sentence. The court further held that the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 4 July 2007 had annulled the suspension of the sentence for forgery, but that the domestic law did not provide for the possibility to release a convicted person from the obligation to serve a sentence due to the fact that he or she had been complying with an injunction which had subsequently been annulled.

Around the same time the applicant submitted a request to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court, asking it to order the local prison department to request a district court to affirm that the applicant had completed the term of suspension of the sentence for forgery (see paragraph 21 above). On 9 April 2008 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that it did not have the competence to examine the applicant’s request because that request only related to matters of criminal sentencing and not acts of public administration. On 13 May 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the lower court on the same grounds.

On 16 April 2008 the applicant began serving the consolidated sentence in the Pravieniškės Correctional Facility. After serving one-third of the sentence, on 26 January 2009 he was released on probation.


Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6-2 - Presumption of innocence);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Impartial tribunal;Independent tribunal)

Aleš Pejchal;Kristina Pardalos;Ledi Bianku;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paul Mahoney

The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Konstancin Jeziorna.

On 27 December 2002 the Gazeta Wyborcza – a major daily newspaper – published an article with the headline: “A law in exchange for a bribe: when Rywin pops by to see Michnik” (Ustawa za łapówke, czyli przychodzi Rywin do Michnika).

The article was about bribery in connection with the legislative procedure for the amendment of the Broadcasting Act. According to the article, in July 2002 Lew Rywin (the applicant), a well-known film producer, had offered a bribe to representatives of the company that published the Gazeta Wyborcza newspaper, Agora S.A. The applicant was said to have been acting on the instructions of a purported “group in power” (grupa trzymająca władze), which allegedly included certain high-ranking State officials, among them the Prime Minister. More specifically, the applicant had reportedly offered the representatives of Agora his assistance in amending the Broadcasting Act so that the company could buy the private television channel Polsat, and had asked for the following, among other things, in return: payment of 17.5 million United States dollars (USD), his appointment as chairman of the channel Polsat and an undertaking from the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza to refrain from publishing any criticism of the government. The above-mentioned proposal was said to have been made by the applicant during a meeting with Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza. The meeting had been recorded by the latter and transcriptions from the recording were later included in the article published by his newspaper.

A. The criminal proceedings against the applicant, the work of the Parliamentary commission of inquiry and the media coverage

After the case was revealed in the press, the public prosecutor at the Warsaw Court of Appeal brought proceedings against the applicant, on 31 December 2002, on a charge of influence peddling (przestępstwo płatnej protekcji), under Article 230 of the Criminal Code.

On 10 January 2003, the Sejm – lower house of Parliament – passed a resolution (uchwała) setting up a parliamentary commission of inquiry (“the commission”). Under that resolution the commission was set up with the following aims:

“(1) To investigate the circumstances surrounding the attempted extortion by Lew Rywin of material and political gains in exchange for his assistance in preventing an amendment of the Broadcasting Act that would be unfavourable to private media and in guaranteeing that the Broadcasting Media Council would decide in favour of such media; and to determine the identity of any persons that may have taken steps to this effect, as revealed by the Gazeta Wyborcza newspaper and other media.

(2) To examine, in the light of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the parliamentary procedure for the amendment of the Broadcasting Act.

(3) To examine whether the authorities’ response to the media revelations concerning the affair mentioned under point 1 above was regular.”

The resolution stated that the commission’s meetings would be held in public, unless otherwise provided by law or by the Sejm’s rules of procedure.

On 14 January 2003, the commission, consisting of ten MPs, began its work.

On the same day the public prosecutor questioned the applicant and notified him of the charge against him. The applicant was obliged to present security in the form of a registered charge against his property and his passport was seized.

On 23 February 2003 issue number 8 of the weekly magazine Wprost was published with, on the cover, a photomontage showing the applicant with his head emerging from a toilet bowl while three hands of unknown persons were pressing the flush button. The photomontage was accompanied by the following caption: “How many men in power will Rywin bring down with him?” (Ilu ludzi wladzy pociagnie za soba Rywin ?). Inside the same issue of Wprost was an article headed “Rywinotherapy” (Rywinoterapia), on the subject of corruption in Poland.

Following that publication the applicant brought proceedings against Wprost for the protection of his reputation, complaining about a breach of his right to be presumed innocent.

On 25 June 2003 Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, finding in particular as follows:

“Until the final conviction has been handed down, the complainant must be treated as a person presumed innocent. It is nevertheless true that he had been charged with specific offences, that a bill of indictment had been preferred against him, and that the matter is being examined by a parliamentary commission of inquiry. It must be emphasised that the general public have been informed about the “group in power” [sic]. In that situation, the journalists had not only the right but also a duty, under the Press Act, to ask questions about any figures in power who may be implicated in this affair ...

In the lower court’s opinion, the complainant’s picture was widely known to the public in the context of the ‘Rywin affair’ even before the article was published. The image of Lew Rywin had appeared on a number of occasions in the media in connection with this matter. The complainant was interviewed by the parliamentary commission of inquiry in the course of hearings that were broadcast on television. Having regard to this context, the publication by the weekly Wprost of the applicant’s picture did not harm his reputation.

What is important in the present case is the fact that the cover does not contain any material that may prejudge the complainant’s guilt in [what is known as] the ‘Rywin’ affair. According to the court below, the cover may be seen by readers as a [mere] indication that the complainant was involved in the case. His implication in this affair, of which the public were well-informed before the impugned publication, is therefore not attributable to the latter. ...

The seriousness of the bribery justified, in the present instance, the use of scathing expressions and very expressive symbols. ... Bribery is so harmful and blameworthy that the fact of representing it using a toilet bowl as a symbol is no exaggeration ... The picture where the complainant’s head is seen emerging from the toilet bowl – a symbol of corruption – only means that he may be implicated in the affair and that its elucidation may lead to establishing the identities of others involved ...”

In the meantime, the criminal investigation and the work of the commission were ongoing. The commission sat throughout 2003 and until 5 April 2004, when its last session was convened.

The sessions held by the commission between 8 February and 21 November 2003 were devoted to the hearing of witnesses, such as the executives of Agora, high-ranking government officials starting with the Prime Minister, journalists, members of the Warsaw public prosecutor’s office and businessmen representing the media. The applicant, who appeared before the commission on 22 February 2003, refused to answer any of its questions. The commission’s hearings were public and broadcast live on radio and television. Only two of the witness hearings were apparently held in private. The transcripts of the commission’s hearings, consisting of more than 8,000 typed pages, were systematically published on the Parliament’s website.

The commission’s work was widely reported in the media, including comments by its members.

Pursuant to the Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry Act (see paragraph 83 below), the commission worked in close cooperation with the Warsaw public prosecutor conducting the criminal investigation in respect of the applicant.

Thus in February 2003 the president of the commission asked the public prosecutor’s office to conduct certain investigative acts, and in particular: to obtain the transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations; to determine the places where his documents were kept; to seize the hard drives from his computer; and to carry out a search of his private and professional premises.

On 6 February 2003 the public prosecutor conducting the investigation authorised the commission to disclose, in the context of the proceedings before it, the material in the criminal investigation file. On 6 March 2003 the national public prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this measure, observing that the disclosure of such material was authorised provided it was not prejudicial to the outcome of the case.

On 24 March 2003 the commission forwarded to the public prosecutor, at his request, the transcripts and recordings of its hearings, including the witness hearings.

Information was exchanged between the commission and the public prosecutor on several occasions. In that connection, members of the commission’s presidium had meetings with the national public prosecutor and the public prosecutor leading the investigation.

In June 2003 the criminal investigation in respect of the applicant was completed and the indictment, together with a case file of eighteen volumes, was presented to Warsaw District Court. Mr Rywin was indicted for attempted influence peddling, an offence under Article 230 of the Criminal Code combined with Article 12 of the same Code.

On 8 August 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal ordered the case to be sent to Warsaw Regional Court on the ground of its exceptional nature and its importance (sprawa szczególnej wagi), having regard to the positions held by the individuals implicated in the case, the media and public interest and the work of the commission.

On 6 October 2003 Warsaw Regional Court declared that the public prosecutor’s decision of 6 February 2003 (see paragraph 17 above) applied to the judicial phase of the criminal proceedings.

Noting that the commission had been privy to the whole of the investigation case file concerning the applicant, the court pointed out that if the material in the file were used in the proceedings before the commission it would have to be careful not to cause any prejudice to the persons concerned by that investigation, such as the witnesses and the applicant.

On 20 October 2003 the case was assigned to a bench of three professional judges.

On 2 December 2003, when the trial opened, Warsaw Regional Court authorised the broadcasting of the hearings live on radio and television, emphasising that journalists should not impede the smooth running of the proceedings and should abide by the rule that testifying witnesses were not to be apprised of the statements of the other witnesses.

The court also authorised the media disclosure of the applicant’s identity and picture, observing that the public interest in following the proceedings prevailed over any contrary interest of the persons on trial.

Warsaw Regional Court heard testimony from a number of witnesses, including those who had already been interviewed by the commission. During these hearings, the court systematically compared the statements before it with those that the same witnesses had given to the commission.

The Regional Court and the commission exchanged, on a number of occasions, information they had gathered in their respective proceedings.

On 31 March 2004, after the closing of the witness hearings, the court made public all the evidence, including that which it had received from the commission.

The court informed the parties that there might be a change in the legal classification of the charges against the applicant, which might fall under Article 13 § 1 combined with Article 286 § 1 of the Criminal Code, corresponding to the offence of attempted fraud (usiłowanie doprowadzenia do niekorzystnego rozporzadzenia mieniem).

In response to a request by the defence for the adjournment of the proceedings for a maximum of one week, the court postponed the trial until 14 April 2004, fixing 16 April 2014 as the date of the last round of oral argument.

On 14 April 2004 the court rejected a defence request for the admission of new evidence.

In response to a request by the defence, the court then adjourned the trial until 20 April, declaring that judgment would be given on 26 April.

On 21 April 2004 the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza published an article with the heading “Before the judgment” (“Przed wyrokiem”), beginning as follows:

“The biggest corruption scandal of the Third Republic will certainly end in a failure for the justice system – regardless of the charges on which Lew Rywin is convicted or the sentence handed down.

... I think that the judgment will be disappointing in terms of the intention and capacity of the justice system to succeed in discovering the truth – this indeed being the mission of the courts and the public prosecutor – beyond the politics. After the Rywin affair, citizens will still be convinced that laws are not enacted but purchased and that even the high-ranking officials of the State – and I quote the public prosecutor – ‘place their personal interests above those of society’; in other words – to call a spade a space – [that they] are corrupt.

In a judgment of 26 April 2004 Warsaw Regional Court found the applicant guilty of attempted fraud, under Article 13 of the Criminal Code combined with Article 286 § 1, Article 294 § 1 and Article 12 of the same Code, and sentenced him to two years and six months’ imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 zlotys (PLN). In its reasoning the court found as follows:

(a) that it was established that between 15 and 22 July 2002, the applicant had attempted to incite Wanda Rapaczyńska, chair of Agora’s board of directors, and Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, to dispose of that company’s property with detrimental effect thereto for a value equivalent to USD 17.5 million;

(b) that it had not been established that the applicant had been instructed by the Prime Minister or any figures in his entourage.

One of the judges on the bench submitted a separate opinion, taking the view that the applicant should have been given a suspended sentence with probation, in view of his age, his professional background and his state of health.

After the delivery of the judgment, the president of the trial court of Warsaw Regional Court published a statement. He commended the efforts of his fellow judges to bring the trial to its conclusion in a calm manner, notwithstanding the various comments about the procedure that had been reported in the media. Noting that some of those comments could be regarded as an attempt to influence the court’s work, the president emphasised the following points: that throughout the trial the judges had acted pursuant only to the provisions of criminal law; that the purpose of the trial was different from that of the parliamentary commission of inquiry; and that as professional judges the members of the bench had been able to resist any pressure that might result from the media statements made in connection with the case by various journalists and politicians, or even by certain members of the commission. Pointing out that a statement such as his in the present case was unusual, in view of the judiciary’s duty of discretion, the president explained that he could not refrain from mentioning the remarks made by the author of the article entitled “Before the judgment”, which had been published in the period when the case was under deliberation and which could be regarded, in his view, as an attempt on the part of the journalist to influence the outcome; such statements were, in his view, inadmissible and blameworthy, even in connection with a case which, like the present one and rightly so, had attracted significant media interest.

On 23 August 2004 the applicant and the public prosecutor’s office each appealed against the judgment of 26 April 2004. In his statement of appeal the applicant alleged, among other things, that on account of the influence of the commission’s work on the judges, exacerbated by the press coverage of the two sets of proceedings, his trial had been devoid of the requisite fairness under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

At the end of its last session on 5 April 2004, the commission adopted its final report, concluding that the applicant had acted alone. Several commission members submitted their own draft reports to the Sejm. After examining it at the plenary of 28 May 2004, the Sejm rejected the commission’s report and expressed its preference for that of the MP Zbigniew Ziobro, which was regarded as the most radical. It can be seen from the file that this report was drafted with a view to having the persons concerned held to account before the Tribunal of State. In view of doubts as to the weight of the vote of 28 May, the Sejm endorsed the report by the MP Zbigniew Ziobro by its final vote of 24 September 2004. The position taken in that report was as follows:

“Leszek Miller, Prime Minister, Aleksandra Jakubowska, junior minister in the Ministry of Culture, Lech Nikolski, the Prime Minister’s chief of staff, Robert Kwiatkowski, chair of the board of directors of the company TVP S.A., and Wlodzimierz Czarzasty, member of the Broadcasting Media Council, committed, by deliberate and concerted action in July 2002, the offence of bribery, within the meaning of Article 228 § 5 of the Criminal Code taken together with Article 13 § 1 thereof; in that they, [while] influencing the content of the Broadcasting Act being amended and the parliamentary proceedings related thereto, in July 2002, through the intermediary of Lew Rywin, acting as agent of the ‘power-holding group’, made a corrupt proposal to the representatives of Agora S.A, namely on 15 July 2002 to Wanda Rapaczyńska and Piotr Niemczycki and on 22 July 2002 to Adam Michnik, consisting in demanding a financial reward of 17.5 million US dollars (USD), the appointment of Lew Rywin as chairman of the channel Polsat and an undertaking from the company Agora that the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza would refrain from publishing any criticism of the Prime Minister or government. In return, provisions would be inserted in the Broadcasting Act that would be beneficial for Agora, allowing it to purchase the television channel Polsat.

The evidence gathered in this case renders highly plausible (w wysokim stopniu uprawdopodabnia) the above-mentioned account, to the extent of justifying the prosecution of the above-named persons.”

The report, disseminated by the media, was widely discussed and commented on by the various public stakeholders.

In the meantime, the applicant’s trial continued before the Warsaw Court of Appeal.

On 23 November 2004 the Court of Appeal informed the parties that the charge against the applicant was likely to be reclassified to aiding and abetting influence peddling (pomocnictwo do płatnej protekcji), an offence under Article 18 § 3 of the Criminal Code taken together with Article 230 of that Code.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings until 8 December 2004 to allow the defence to adapt its strategy to the intended change of classification. On the scheduled date the defence submitted their observations.

In a judgment of 10 December 2004 the Court of Appeal found Mr Rywin guilty of aiding and abetting influence peddling (pomocnictwo do płatnej protekcji), an offence under Article 18 § 3 of the Criminal Code taken together with Articles 230 and 12 of that Code, and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of PLN 100,000.

In its reasoning, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant had facilitated the perpetration by other individuals – whose identity had not been established – of the offence of bribery. In this connection it found it established that, on 15 and 22 July 2002, the applicant had presented to Wanda Rapaczyńska and Adam Michnik an offer devised by the above-mentioned individuals who, on the strength of their positions at the level of the State, had proposed their assistance as intermediaries to amend the Broadcasting Act in a manner favourable to Agora, thereby enabling it to purchase the television channel Polsat, in exchange for USD 17.5 million, a sum that was to be paid to the Social Democrat Party (SLD) via the bank account of a company belonging to the applicant.

In response to the applicant’s complaint that the proceedings of the commission and their media coverage had undermined the fairness of his trial, the Court of Appeal found that this complaint was not substantiated by any tangible evidence; the applicant had not explained concretely how the media reports on the commission’s work had influenced the reasoning of the judges in their deliberations or the outcome of the criminal proceedings, or how the commission’s proceedings and report might have had any impact on the impartiality of the judges or on the reliability of the testimony given before the trial court. The Court of Appeal took the view, in sum, that this was tantamount to implying that only an adjournment of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the commission’s work could have preserved its fairness. Noting that the courts were frequently confronted with media interest in a given case, the Court of Appeal was of the view that this fact, in itself, did not suffice for the fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant to be called into question.

As to the applicant’s complaint that the testimony used in support of his conviction had been vitiated by the fact that the witnesses had been heard by the Regional Court after being questioned on the same circumstances by the commission, in public sittings that had received significant media attention, the Court of Appeal regarded it as ill-founded; testimony was always assessed by judges in accordance with the rules in Article 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the light of all the evidence. In the present case, the Court of Appeal could not identify any circumstance that would lead it to believe that the witnesses heard by the Regional Court had been influenced by the content of their previous statements to the commission or by those of other witnesses.

With reference to the applicant’s complaint that the reasoning of the Regional Court’s judgment was insufficient, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that in certain respects the reasoning had been succinct. Nevertheless, it endorsed that reasoning to a large extent, noting that the Regional Court had examined the relevant aspects of the case and that its conclusion was justified.

Lastly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning the Regional Court’s refusal to admit in evidence certain items proposed by the defence; the court below had rightly found them superfluous for the outcome of the case. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the exercise of defence rights could not consist in requests made ad infinitum , and in particular those that were irrelevant for its resolution.

The applicant and the public prosecutor’s office appealed on points of law.

In a decision (postanowienie) of 20 October 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the two appeals, endorsing the reasoning given by the Court of Appeal. ...


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-b - Non-compliance with court order);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-e - Persons of unsound mind)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Dubna, Moscow Region.

On 4 February 2003 she was charged with contempt of court and criminally insulting the presiding judge and parties at a hearing on 22 December 2002 in which she had acted as a defendant’s representative.

An outpatient forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant was ordered in the course of the pre-trial investigation. On 2 July 2003 she was apprehended and taken to a psychiatric facility for examination. On 3 July 2003 she was examined by a panel of psychiatrists, who concluded that her clinical state was unclear and that no answers could be given concerning her mental health state. She was released, the panel recommending a placement in the State Academic Centre for Social and Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow (Государственный научный центр социальной и судебной психиатрии им. В.П. Сербского) (“the Forensic Psychiatry Centre”) for an inpatient forensic psychiatric examination.

On 27 October 2003 the Dmitrov Town Court of the Moscow Region (Димитровский городской суд Московской области) (“the Town Court”), having considered the applicant’s complaint of unlawful apprehension and deprivation of liberty between 2 and 3 July 2003, ruled in her favour. The court reasoned that the detention had been unlawful, since the sanction for the crime she was suspected of did not provide for any form of deprivation of liberty. The applicant did not initiate any further proceedings in this regard.

On 4 November 2003 the prosecution made an application for the court to order an involuntary forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant at the Forensic Psychiatry Centre.

On the same day the Town Court granted the prosecutor’s application. The relevant part of its order reads:

“By virtue of paragraph 1 of Article 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may be placed in a psychiatric hospital if a forensic psychiatric examination requires his assessment in the hospital.

... the court considers that it should allow the application by the investigator, Ms D., to place [the applicant] in [the Forensic Psychiatry Centre] for a forensic psychiatric evaluation, because [the applicant] is in need of such a hospital examination.”

The applicant and her representative did not attend the hearing, because they had not been summoned to it. However, both the prosecutor and the investigator attended and made oral submissions.

On an unspecified date the applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that she had not been given an opportunity to present her case to the Town Court.

Between 25 December 2003 and 5 April 2004 the applicant applied to adjourn her appeal hearing five times. Her application was granted on each occasion. On 29 December 2003 during the appeal hearing in a separate set of proceedings she accused the judges of criminal conspiracy and attempted murder.

On 15 January 2004 the applicant was also charged with criminal slander of certain judges during the hearing of 29 December 2003. The proceedings in respect of the two criminal cases were joined.

On 9 April 2004 the applicant was apprehended by the authorities and transferred to the Forensic Psychiatry Centre. On 13 April 2004 a panel of psychiatrists issued a report, concluding that the applicant suffered from “paranoid personality development”, and that she had not been able to understand or control her actions during the events of 22 December 2002 (contempt of court) and 29 December 2003 (criminal slander). The report further stated that she presented a danger to others and therefore needed compulsory treatment in a psychiatric facility. On the same day the applicant was released.

Two weeks later on 27 April 2004 the Moscow Regional Court (Московский областной суд) (“the Regional Court”) held a hearing on the applicant’s appeal against the the Town Court’s decision of 4 November 2003 authorising psychiatric examination, and rejected it. As regards the applicant’s complaint about the hearing taking place in her absence, the Regional Court noted that Article 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided for ex parte hearings where there was judicial authorisation of investigative actions, including internment in a psychiatric facility for forensic examination (as set out in Article 203 of the Code).

On 14 September 2004 the Moscow City Court (Московский городской суд) (“the City Court”) adopted decisions in two sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant. The first decision terminated the criminal proceedings relating to the contempt of court charges in respect of the events of 22 December 2002. The applicant’s statements, while offensive, were found to have been lacking the degree of insult requisite for incurring criminal liability. In the second decision, the City Court established the principal facts of the events of 29 December 2003. Concluding that the applicant had acted in a state of insanity, it terminated the criminal proceedings against her and ordered her to undergo compulsory medical treatment in a psychiatric facility. It relied on the findings and recommendations of the Forensic Psychiatry Centre’s report of 13 April 2004 in its reasoning.

On 22 December 2004 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the lower court’s decisions.

It appears from the parties’ submissions that the applicant was not detained and did not receive any treatment pursuant to the City Court’s order until 2006.

On 23 March 2006 the applicant was involuntarily admitted to Moscow Regional Psychiatric Hospital no. 14 (Московская областная психиатрическая больница № 14) for compulsory psychiatric treatment.

On 16 May 2006 a panel of hospital psychiatrists concluded that the applicant’s mental health had improved and she no longer posed a danger to society. On the same day an application to discharge the hospital order and discontinue the compulsory treatment was sent to the Town Court.

On 22 May 2006 the Town Court scheduled the hearing of the application for the next day. However, it was adjourned until 2 June 2006, because the applicant’s representative failed to appear and additional medical records and statements had to be obtained. Two subsequent hearings were adjourned following applications by the applicant’s representatives.

On 10 July 2006 the Town Court ordered the applicant’s compulsory treatment to be discontinued. Her representative lodged an appeal, arguing that the proceedings should have been discontinued from the very beginning, and that the applicant should have been released, since there had been no need for any compulsory treatment. On 31 August 2006 the Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision.

The applicant was released from hospital on 15 August 2006.


András Sajó;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicants, whose names and places of residence are set out in the appendix, are Turkish nationals. They are represented before the Court by Ms Deniz Karakurt, a lawyer practising in Izmir.

summarised as follows.

The applicants were the mayors of 190 municipalities at the time of lodging their application with the Court.

On 6 March 2008 the Parliament of Turkey adopted Law no. 5747 “on establishing districts within the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities and amending various laws”, which was published in the Official Gazette of 22 March 2008 and entered into force on that date. Law no. 5747 stipulated, inter alia, that the legal personality of a number of municipalities, including those headed by the applicants, would be abolished and that either those administrative units would become villages/neighbourhoods and join other municipalities, or a certain number of them would together constitute new municipalities. Law no. 5747 further stipulated that the legal personality of those municipalities, as well as their authority and rights, would continue to exist until the next general local elections were held.

On 9 April 2008 three members of parliament from the CHP, the main opposition party, Mr H.S. Okay, Mr K. Anadol and Mr K. Kılıçdaroğlu, the party leader, made an application to the Constitutional Court of Turkey. The MPs requested the Constitutional Court to repeal certain provisions of Law no. 5747, including those applicable to the applicants’ municipalities. The MPs claimed, inter alia, that there was no public interest in abolishing the legal personality of certain municipalities and that Law no. 5747 had been adopted so that the governing party, the AKP, could win the local elections in the areas in issue. They further submitted that a referendum should have been held in the municipalities in question, in accordance with the Law on Municipalities (Law no. 5393), and that Law no. 5747 was in contravention of the provisions of the Law on Elections in Local Administrations (Law no. 2972) and the Constitution. On this last point, the MPs submitted that, according to Article 67 of the Constitution, a legislative amendment concerning elections would not be applicable to elections held within one year of the entry into force of those amendments and that the local election process of 2009 would start on 1 January 2009, in line with the provisions of Law no. 2972. They therefore considered that Law no. 5747 should not be applied to the local elections of 29 March 2009.

On 31 October 2008 the Constitutional Court rendered its decision in the case (case no. 2008/34, decision no. 2008/153) and dismissed the case in so far as it concerned the municipalities headed by the applicants. The court noted at the outset that the MPs had not requested the repeal of the provision which concerned the entry into force of Law no. 5747, and that therefore their submissions regarding the compatibility of Law no. 5747 with Article 67 of the Constitution could not be examined.

As regards the submission that a referendum should have been held in accordance with Law no. 5393 and that the provisions of Law no. 5747 were incompatible with Law no. 2972, the Constitutional Court held that a legal norm could be reviewed only in the light of the relevant constitutional norm and not in relation to another legal norm. It further held that the legislature had the authority to make, amend and repeal laws and the responsibility to maintain harmonisation between laws. The Constitutional Court concluded that it could therefore not review the compatibility of the provisions of Law no. 5747 with those contained in Law no. 5393 and Law no. 2972.

Lastly, as to the allegations that the provisions of Law no. 5747 lacked public interest and that this law had been passed for political reasons, the Constitutional Court noted at the outset that it had the authority to examine whether certain legislation had been passed with the purpose of serving the public interest. The court further noted that the question of whether a legal norm was compatible with the needs of the country was political in nature and that the legislature was permitted a degree of discretion on that point. The court considered that it could not assess the existence of a public interest on the basis of the political choice of the legislature alone. The Constitutional Court further noted that in accordance with the Constitution, the administrative units were to be determined, through laws, by the legislature and taking into account their geographical features, economic circumstances and need for public services. The court observed that the petition lodged by the MPs for the repeal of certain provisions of Law no. 5747 did not contain any concrete argument as to how those provisions did not serve the public interest but were the result of the political considerations of the governing party. The Constitutional Court also observed that the aim of the changes brought about by Law no. 5747 was the efficient functioning of the public services provided by the local administrations and the efficient and productive use of public resources by the central administration. The Constitutional Court held that there was no evidence demonstrating that the amendments had been made with the aim of acquiring political or personal gain. The court lastly noted that since, in accordance with Law no. 5747, the legal personality of the municipalities in question, as well as their authority and rights, would continue to exist until the first general local elections were held, the legislature had respected the will of the electorate regarding the last five-year election period in the areas concerned.

On 29 March 2009 the local elections were held and as a result the legal personality of the municipalities headed by the applicants ceased to exist on that day.

Article 7 of the Constitution provides:

“Legislative Power

Article 7 - Legislative power is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of the Turkish Nation. This power cannot be delegated.”

Articles 123 and 127 of the Constitution provide:

“A. Fundamentals of the Administration

Integral Unity and Public Legal Personality of the Administration

Article 123 - The administration forms a whole with regard to its structure and functions, and shall be regulated by law.

The organisation and functions of the administration are based on the principles of centralisation and local administration.

Public corporate bodies shall be established only by law, or by the authority expressly granted by law.”

Article 127 of the Constitution provides:

“C. Organisation of the Administration

Local administrative bodies

ARTICLE 127 - Local administrative bodies are public corporate entities established to meet the collective local needs of the inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts and villages, whose decision-making organs are elected by the electorate as determined by law, and whose principles of structure are also determined by law.

The formation, duties and powers of the local administration shall be regulated by law in accordance with the principle of local administration.

The procedures dealing with objections to the acquisition by elected organs of local government or their status as an organ, and their loss of such status, shall be resolved by the judiciary. However, as a provisional measure, the Minister of the Interior may remove from office those organs of local administration or their members against whom an investigation or prosecution has been initiated on grounds of offences relating to their duties, pending judgment.

The central administration has the power of administrative trusteeship over the local governments in the framework of the principles and procedures set forth by law with the objective of ensuring the functioning of local services in conformity with the principle of the integral unity of the administration, securing uniform public service, safeguarding the public interest and meeting local needs in an appropriate manner.”

Articles 3 and 59 of the Law on Municipalities (Law no. 5393) provide, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“Definitions

Article 3 - The terms listed below shall have the following meanings wherever they are used in this Law;

a. Municipality: A public-law legal entity with administrative and financial autonomy, whose purpose is to meet the collective needs of the local residents and whose decision-making body is made up of members elected by direct suffrage.

“Income of the Municipality

Article 59 – The Municipality draws its income from the following sources;

a. Taxes, levies, charges and contributions, as specified in the laws.

b. Its share of the tax income of the general budget.

c. Payments to be made by the administrations within the general and special budgets.

f. Income from interest and fines.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the domestic courts’ failure to ensure their participation in hearings in the civil proceedings to which they were parties.


CASE OF CIRNEROVÁ AND OTHERS v. SLOVAKIA

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Alena Poláčková;Helen Keller;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 27 November 1987 a claim was lodged with Košice-okolie District Court against some of the applicants or their predecessors. With this claim, the plaintiffs were seeking a judicial ruling declaring them to be the owners of an area of grassland. The other applicants entered the proceedings as defendants on different dates and on the basis of different legal entitlements as outlined in the annexed table.

Between 1988 and 2009 the first-instance court held a number of hearings, ordered expert opinions, dealt with other relevant evidence, and heard witnesses. It also took some time to determine the parties who were actually to be sued in the proceedings in view of multiple deaths among the original defendants and various transactions made in respect of the property in question.

On 27 April 2010 the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment, finding that the applicants’ (or their predecessors’) right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been violated by the District Court. It ordered the District Court to proceed without undue delay and to reimburse the complainants’ legal costs. It also awarded just satisfaction in respect of nonpecuniary damage in the amount of EUR 300 to the applicants listed under points 1 to 17 and EUR 500 to those listed under points 18 to 28 and to the deceased predecessor of the applicants listed under points 29 to 32 of the Appendix. The Constitutional Court noted inter alia that the District Court had failed to proceed with the matter between 1995 and 2009. It also observed some of the applicants’ lack of interest in those proceedings. That judgment became final on 19 July 2010.

On 22 November 2011 the District Court delivered a judgment on the merits of the case, which was not served on the parties to the proceedings until seven months after its delivery.

On 19 March 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected a fresh constitutional complaint that had been lodged by the applicants (except those listed under points 30 to 32). It found no further undue delays in the proceedings before the District Court after the constitutional judgment of 27 April 2010. It noted the delay of seven months which the District Court had taken to serve its judgment on the parties. However, it did not consider it unconstitutional.

On 15 May 2013 the District Court transferred the case file to Košice Regional Court following an appeal lodged by the applicants listed under points 9 and 18 and some other defendants in the proceedings.

On 12 March 2014 the Regional Court had to identify and deal with successors of some of the deceased parties to the proceedings. It partly upheld the District Court’s judgment and partly dismissed the claim concerning some of the contested property. It also rejected the remainder of the appeal. The judgment became final on 10 July 2014.

On 8 August 2014 the applicants listed under points 4 and 30 to 32, together with several other defendants in the proceedings, lodged an appeal on points of law. On 21 January 2015 the proceedings in respect of that appeal were discontinued without examination of its merits due to the appellants’ failure to pay the court fees. That decision became final on 13 February 2015.