Georgieva;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström;Ksenija Turković

The applicants are Croatian nationals who were born in 1936, 1958, 1967 and 2003 respectively and live in Z. The President of the First Section, to which the case was initially allocated, decided that the applicants’ identities should not be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 § 4). They were represented by Ms I. Bojić, a lawyer practising in Zagreb.

The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The first applicant is the mother of the second and third applicants. The third applicant is the mother of the fourth applicant. They all live in the same household in a flat located on the first floor of a residential building in Z.

Since 2003 the applicants have had various conflicts with their neighbours, Mr M.P. and Ms B.P., who live in a flat on the ground floor of the same residential building. Occasionally, they have also had conflicts with their other two neighbours, Mr D.P. and Ms S.P.

It follows from a report of the Ministry of the Interior (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske) available to the Court, that in the period between 2003 and 2013 there were in total ninety-one police interventions concerning various conflicts between the applicants and their neighbours.

Some of these incidents resulted in the criminal proceedings examined further below (see paragraphs 86-129 below).

The majority of the incidents resulted only in the police issuing a verbal caution or in minor offences proceedings. This in particular relates to the police interventions in connection with the following events.

On 12 May 2003 the police intervened because the first applicant was disturbed by M.P. and B.P. smoking on their balcony.

On 15 June 2003 the intervention of the police was requested in relation to an altercation between the second applicant and B.P. In particular, they exchanged a series of insults in the course of which B.P. also made reference to the second applicant’s Serbian ethnic origin and threw a piece of wood in her direction, causing her a small abrasion on the right thigh. On the same day minor offences proceedings were instituted against both parties to the conflict for breach of public peace and order, but they were discontinued on 3 August 2005 on the ground of prescription.

On 6 July 2003 B.P. requested the intervention of the police because the second applicant had allegedly disposed of some dirt on her balcony, which resulted in a verbal altercation.

On 9 July 2003 the police intervened in connection with B.P.’s insults against P.V. (the first applicant’s late husband) related to his Serbian ethnic origin, and on the same day instituted minor offences proceedings against B.P. for breach of public peace and order. On 19 September 2006 the proceedings were discontinued on the ground of prescription.

On 21 November 2003 B.P. requested the intervention of the police because water was pouring from the applicants’ balcony into their flat.

On 3 February 2004 the police intervened because the first applicant had allegedly disposed of some dirt on the balcony of B.P.

On 25 May 2005 the first applicant requested the intervention of the police after a verbal altercation with M.P. relating to the manner in which she was dusting.

On 27 May 2005 M.P. reported to the police that the first applicant was threatening him. He did not insist on pursuing the matter but requested the police to warn her.

On 18 July 2005 the first applicant had a dispute with D.P. concerning her flowers and therefore she requested the intervention of the police.

On 8 October 2005 police intervention was requested in connection with the first applicant’s and D.P.’s mutual insults related to, inter alia, her Serbian ethnic origin and his Croatian ethnic origin. Minor offences proceedings were instituted on the same day against both participants to the altercation and on 26 March 2007 they were discontinued on the ground of lack of evidence. This decision became final on 21 August 2008.

On 22 September 2006 both the first applicant and B.P. requested the intervention of the police, alleging an attack by the other party. The police intervened at the scene but found their statements confusing to the extent that it was impossible to establish the exact course of the events.

On 1 October 2006 the police intervened on the basis of B.P.’s complaint that P.V. had insulted and attacked her. The police found that both participants in the alleged attack were providing confusing statements.

On 6 December 2006 B.P. requested the intervention of the police concerning a glass that had fallen from the applicants’ flat on to her balcony.

On the same day B.P. lodged a criminal complaint against the first applicant, claiming that she had insulted and threatened her. On 16 January 2007 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zap.) rejected the criminal complaint as ill-founded.

On 13 January 2007 M.P. informed the police that water was pouring from the applicants’ flat and that the first applicant had spat on him.

On 24 January 2007 the third applicant requested the intervention of the police, alleging that B.P. had insulted her and attacked her while she was holding the fourth applicant. The police found that the third applicant had sustained an abrasion on her left forearm but no evidence that the attack had happened in the presence of the fourth applicant. On the same day the police instituted minor offences proceedings against B.P. for breach of public peace and order and on 16 April 2009 the proceedings were discontinued on the ground of prescription. The Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office was also informed of the incident and it requested a medical report concerning the alleged injuries sustained by the fourth applicant during the incident. On 17 May 2007 a doctor who had examined the fourth applicant after the incident informed the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office that he had not found any injuries on the fourth applicant and that the third applicant had refused further medical examinations of the fourth applicant.

On 24 January 2007 B.P. informed the police of a conflict with the applicants.

On 25 January 2007 the third applicant complained to the police about the problems of her family with M.P. and B.P.

On 29 January 2007 B.P. lodged a criminal complaint against P.V. on charges of making threats. On 26 April 2007 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office rejected the criminal complaint on the ground that the alleged conduct did not constitute a criminal offence.

On 9 March 2007 the police received an anonymous call that the fourth applicant had been molested within her family.

On 19 August 2007 the police instituted minor offences proceedings against the first and third applicants, P.V., B.P. and a certain LJ.B. for mutual insults. On 13 December 2007 the proceedings were discontinued on formal grounds.

On 20 August 2007 the third applicant reported to the police that B.P. had threatened her.

On 10 October 2007 B.P. reported to the police that P.V. had threatened her. The complaint was forwarded to the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office, which rejected it on 18 December 2007 on the ground of lack of evidence.

On 15 October 2007 the first applicant called the police about an incident involving B.P.

On 28 October 2007 B.P. complained to the police about an incident involving the applicants’ family.

On 12 August 2008 the second applicant complained to the police about the conduct of B.P. and M.P.

On 17 August 2008 the police received two anonymous calls – one alleging that B.P. had been drunk disturbing public peace and order, and the second alleging that there had been fighting in the applicants’ flat. The police interventions did not confirm any of the allegations.

On 12 September 2008 D.P. requested the intervention of the police, alleging that the second applicant had insulted him.

On 23 September 2008 D.P. requested the intervention of the police, claiming that the third applicant had attacked his son.

On 27 September 2009 the police received an anonymous call alleging domestic violence in the applicants’ family.

On 30 September 2008 the first applicant reported to the police that D.P. had damaged her flowers.

On 11 October 2008 B.P. complained to the police about the conduct of the applicants.

On 13 October 2008 the third applicant called the police concerning the parking of M.P.’s car.

On 28 January 2009 P.V. complained to the police about harassment by B.P.

On 26 February 2009 the second applicant reported to the police that S.P., wife of their neighbour D.P., had unlawfully installed surveillance cameras in the building. The police established that the complaints were unfounded.

On 28 March 2009 the third applicant reported to the police that she had had a verbal altercation with B.P. concerning the fourth applicant.

On 10 April 2009 the second applicant reported to the police a verbal altercation with B.P.

On 8 May 2009 the first applicant called the police, maintaining that she had had verbal altercation with B.P.

On 14 May 2009 the police received an anonymous call that the applicants and B.P. and M.P. had been arguing but the police found no incident at the scene.

On 25 May 2009 the second applicant reported to the police a verbal altercation with M.P.

On 26 May 2009 B.P. requested police intervention, claiming that the first applicant had insulted her.

On 13 August 2009 the police received an anonymous call about an incident involving the applicants but the intervention did not disclose any breach of the law.

On 14 August 2009 the third applicant complained to the police about the conduct of B.P., alleging that she had attacked her.

On the same day B.P. first requested police intervention, claiming that she had been physically attacked, and then she lodged a criminal complaint against P.V. on charges of making threats. The Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office rejected the criminal complaint on 26 August 2009 on the ground of lack of evidence.

On 4 October 2009 the police received an anonymous call that there was fighting in the applicants’ flat but an intervention at the scene did not confirm that.

On 20 October 2009 the third applicant requested the intervention of the police, claiming that B.P. had thrown some garbage in front of her flat.

On the same day B.P. informed the police that there was fighting inside the applicants’ flat but an intervention at the scene did not confirm that. Later on the same day she lodged a criminal complaint against the first and the third applicants and P.V. on charges of making threats and once again requested the intervention of the police, claiming that somebody from the applicants’ flat had thrown a tomato on to her balcony. The criminal complaint lodged by B.P. was rejected by the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office on 20 November 2009 on the ground of lack of evidence.

On 21 October 2009 B.P. requested the intervention of the police in relation to a verbal altercation with the first applicant.

On 15 November 2009 M.P. requested the intervention of the police, claiming that he was being harassed by the second applicant.

On 15 March 2010 B.P. reported to the police that the first applicant had threatened her. She also lodged a criminal complaint which was rejected by the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office on 31 March 2010 on the ground that the event at issue did not constitute an offence prosecuted ex officio.

On 25 March 2010 police intervention was requested in connection with a verbal altercation between the first applicant and B.P. On the same day the police instituted minor offences proceedings against both of them on charges of breach of public peace and order. On 15 September 2010 the competent Minor Offences Court acquitted them on the ground of lack of evidence.

On 10 May 2010 the police first received an anonymous call that there was fighting inside the applicants’ flat and then B.P. requested police intervention, claiming that the first applicant had spilled boiling water on her. Both police interventions could not confirm any unlawful conduct.

On 19 August 2010 M.P. lodged a criminal complaint with the police against P.V., alleging that he had threatened him during their verbal altercation on the day before (see paragraphs 98-103 below).

On 20 August 2010 the third applicant and B.P. requested the intervention of the police, accusing each other of making threats.

On 12 September 2010 the first applicant insulted D.P. in the presence of the police officers. She was indicted in the Minor Offences Court and on 13 January 2011 found guilty on charges of breach of public peace and order. This judgment became final on 26 January 2011.

On 14 March 2011 B.P. lodged a criminal complaint against the second applicant on charges of making threats in connection with their conflict of the same day (see paragraphs 107-112 below). On 10 May 2011 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office rejected the criminal complaint on the ground of lack of evidence.

On 30 May 2011 the third applicant requested the intervention of the police, claiming that B.P. had insulted her.

On 15 June 2011 the first applicant requested the intervention of the police, claiming that she was disturbed by the music emanating from M.P.’s flat. The police intervened at the scene and established that there had been a verbal and physical conflict between the parties. Concerning the event the police lodged a criminal complaint against M.P. (see paragraph 121 below) and on 5 July 2011 they instituted minor offences proceedings against B.P. and the first, second and third applicants on charges of breach of public peace and order. On 15 May 2013 the competent Minor Offences Court found them all guilty as charged. It appears that the proceedings are pending on appeal before the High Minor Offences Court (Visoki prekršajni sud Republike Hrvatske).

On 1 July 2012 the first applicant requested the intervention of the police, claiming that her neighbour S.P. usually closed the entrance doors of the building which disturbed her when she needed to walk her dog.

On 30 July 2012 the third applicant called the police in connection with a verbal altercation with B.P. but the police found no evidence to confirm any unlawful conduct.

On 1 August 2012 B.P. reported to the police that the first applicant harassed her child but an intervention did not confirm any such allegations.

On 14 August 2012 B.P. lodged a criminal complaint against the second applicant on charges of making threats.

On 17 August 2012 S.P. requested an intervention of the police, claiming that she had been insulted by the first applicant.

On 26 August 2012 the third applicant requested the intervention of the police, complaining that somebody was knocking on her doors but the police intervention did not confirm any such allegations.

On 29 August 2012 the third applicant reported to the police that B.P. did not allow her to exit the building. The police intervention did not confirm any unlawful conduct.

On 24 September 2012 S.P. requested the intervention of the police because the first applicant was allegedly falsely accusing her of stealing electricity.

On 4 October 2012 the third applicant reported to the police a verbal altercation between B.P. and the first applicant.

On 10 October 2012 the police intervened on the basis of a complaint by B.P. alleging that the third applicant had insulted her. Both parties made allusions to their Serbian and Croatian ethnic origins respectively. On the same day they lodged criminal complaints on charges of making threats.

On 9 March 2013 the first applicant requested the intervention of the police, claiming that D.P. had been provoking her and behaving inappropriately.

On 22 June 2013 B.P. requested the intervention of the police, alleging that the first applicant had insulted her making allusions to her ethnic origin.

On 7 September 2013 the third applicant requested the intervention of the police in connection with an alleged noise emanating from M.P.’s flat but the police intervention did not confirm any such allegations.

On 11 September 2013 B.P. requested the intervention of the police, claiming that the first applicant had insulted and threatened her husband.

On 24 January 2014 S.P. requested the intervention of the police with regard to a dispute she had with the first applicant concerning the electricity bills.

On 4 February 2014 the police received an anonymous call that a noise was emanating from the applicants’ flat but the police intervention did not confirm that.

On the same day the second applicant requested the intervention of the police, referring to the problems with her neighbours.

On 18 February 2014 S.P. requested the intervention of the police, claiming that she had been attacked by the third applicant, but the police intervention could not confirm any unlawful conduct.

On 6 March 2014 B.P. requested the intervention of the police, alleging that the first applicant had insulted her in the presence of her child.

On 4 December 2006 the police informed the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office of the third applicant’s criminal complaints against B.P. of 25 September 2006 and against M.P. of 3 October 2006 on charges of making threats and discriminatory references to her and P.V.’s ethnic origin on 22 September and 1 October 2006.

Based on the allegations contained in the criminal complaint, on 7 December 2006 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office indicted B.P. and M.P. in the Zap. Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zap.).

During the proceedings the Zap. Municipal Court commissioned a psychiatric report concerning B.P.

A report of 10 October 2008 indicated that B.P. had a personality disorder but that she was capable of understanding the meaning of her acts. It also recommended B.P.’s psychiatric treatment although not necessarily by ordering it as a safety measure in criminal proceedings.

On 17 February 2009 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office dropped the charges against B.P. on the ground that they were based on conflicting evidence.

On 20 April 2009 the Zap. Municipal Court found M.P. guilty on charges of making threats and sentenced him to one month’s imprisonment, suspended for one year.

M.P. appealed against this judgment to the V.G. County Court (Županijski sud u V.G.) and on 6 July 2009 the V.G. County Court quashed it and ordered a retrial on the ground that the judgment was based on conflicting evidence.

On 29 September 2009 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office, relying on the findings of the V.G. County Court, dropped the charges against M.P. on the ground that they were based on conflicting statements of the third applicant and P.V.

On 14 July 2009 the police informed the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office of the third applicant’s criminal complaint against B.P. of 26 May 2009 on charges of making threats and discriminatory references to her ethnic origin.

On 24 July 2009 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office indicted B.P. in the Zap. Municipal Court.

On 4 October 2010 the Zap. Municipal Court found B.P. guilty on charges of making threats and sentenced her to three months’ imprisonment, suspended for one year.

This judgment became final on 20 February 2012.

On 18 August 2010 the third applicant requested the intervention of the police in connection with an altercation with M.P. and B.P. She also lodged a criminal complaint against M.P. on charges of making threats.

The matter was reported to the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office and on 14 September 2010 it indicted M.P. in the Zap. Municipal Court on charges of making threats.

On 12 October 2010 the Zap. Municipal Court issued a penal order against M.P. However, he objected to the order and therefore a trial was opened.

Due to a reorganisation of the judicial work, the case file was transferred to the Z. Municipal Criminal Court (Općinski kazneni sud u Z.).

On 13 January 2012 the Z. Municipal Criminal Court found M.P. guilty and sentenced him to two months’ imprisonment, suspended for one year.

This judgment became final on 28 August 2012.

In connection with the incident of 20 August 2010 (see paragraph 62 above), on 10 November 2010 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office indicted P.V. and the first and third applicants in the Z. Municipal Court on charges of making threats against B.P.

On 7 January 2011 the Zap. Municipal Court issued a penal order against P.V. and the first and third applicants. However, based on their objection the penal order was set aside and a trial was opened.

On 1 July 2011 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office dropped the charges against P.V. and the first and third applicants on the ground that the charges were based on conflicting witness statements.

On 16 June 2011 the second applicant instituted a private prosecution in the Zap. Municipal Court against B.P. on charges of causing bodily injury in connection with an incident of 14 March 2011 during which the second applicant had sustained a contusion on the left thigh.

Meanwhile, the case file was transferred to the Z. Municipal Criminal Court (see paragraph 101 above).

At a hearing on 5 July 2013 the second applicant submitted an expert report of 25 May 2007 concerning the fourth applicant indicating that she was under stress in relation to the conflicts of her family with their neighbours and that there was a possibility of her emotional harassment in that respect. However, the expert report did not confirm any acute or chronic signs of trauma or symptoms or indications of any psychiatric disorder.

At the same hearing, a forensic expert confirmed the second applicant’s injury.

On 5 July 2013 the Z. Municipal Criminal Court found B.P. guilty as charged and sentenced her to two months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years.

This judgment became final on 11 October 2013.

On 28 March 2011 the third applicant requested the intervention of the police in connection with damage to the front doors of the applicants’ flat caused by B.P. On the same day the second applicant lodged a criminal complaint against B.P. on charges of causing damage to her property. The complaint was forwarded to the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office.

On 29 April 2011 the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office indicted B.P. in the Zap. Municipal Court on charges of causing damage to the second applicant’s property.

The case file was transferred to the Z. Municipal Criminal Court (see paragraph 101 above).

At a hearing on 11 December 2013 the second applicant set out a civil claim for damages against B.P.

During the proceedings, the Z. Municipal Criminal Court commissioned an expert psychiatric report concerning B.P.

An expert report of 10 January 2014 found that B.P. had developed an addiction to alcohol and that she needed treatment which could be ordered as a safety measure in the criminal proceedings.

On 10 February 2014 the Z. Municipal Criminal Court found B.P. guilty and sentenced her to five months’ imprisonment, suspended for three years. It also ordered B.P. to undergo treatment for her alcohol addiction. The second applicant was instructed that she could claim damages in respect of her front doors in separate civil proceedings.

This judgment became final on 1 April 2014.

On 15 June 2011, following a verbal altercation, M.P. physically attacked the second applicant with a wooden stick, causing her injuries to the head and contusions on the left arm, chest and shoulder. On the same day the police intervened at the scene, arrested M.P. and took the necessary actions to investigate the matter.

The case was reported to the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office and on 14 July 2011 it indicted M.P. in the Zap. Municipal Court on charges of attempted grave bodily injury.

On 15 July 2011 the Zap. Municipal Court ordered M.P. not to approach or otherwise contact the first, second and third applicants.

During the proceedings before the Z. Municipal Criminal Court the second applicant set out her civil claim for damages against M.P.

After several unsuccessful attempts to summon the defendant, a hearing was held on 19 March 2012 at which M.P. pleaded not guilty. Further hearings were held on 15 May and 15 October 2012 and a hearing scheduled for 28 January 2013 was adjourned because M.P.’s lawyer withdrew from the case. The Z. Municipal Criminal Court held further hearings on 21 March and 24 May 2013.

Following a hearing on 5 July 2013 the Z. Municipal Criminal Court found M.P. guilty and sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment suspended for two years. The second applicant was instructed that she could seek damages in separate civil proceedings.

On 3 December 2013, based on an appeal of the State Attorney’s Office, the Z. County Court (Županijski sud u Z.) quashed the first-instance judgment and ordered a retrial on the ground of conflicting reasoning of the judgment.

According to the applicants, in the resumed proceedings M.P. was found guilty and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment. He appealed and the appeal proceedings are still pending.

On 3 January 2013 B.P. requested the Zap. Social Care Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Zap.) to facilitate a settlement of her disputes with the third applicant.

A meeting at the Zap. Social Care Centre was scheduled for 10 January 2013 but the parties failed to appear.

The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 56/1990, 135/1997, 8/1998, 113/2000, 124/2000, 28/2001, 41/2001, 55/2001, 76/2010, 85/2010 and 5/2014) read as follows:

“Everyone in the Republic of Croatia shall enjoy rights and freedoms regardless of their race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other belief, national or social origin, property, birth, education, social status or other characteristics.

All shall be equal before the law.”

Article 23

“No one shall be subjected to any form of ill-treatment ...”

“Everyone has the right to respect for and legal protection of his or her private and family life, dignity, reputation and honour.”

The relevant provision of the Criminal Code (Kazneni zakon, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, with further amendments) provides:

“(1) Criminal proceedings in respect of criminal offences shall be instituted by the State Attorney’s Office in the interest of the Republic of Croatia and its citizens.

(2) In exceptional circumstances the law may provide for criminal proceedings in respect of certain criminal offences to be instituted on the basis of a private prosecution or for the State Attorney’s Office to institute criminal proceedings following [a private] application.”

The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 110/1997, 27/1998, 58/1999, 112/1999, 58/2002 and 62/2003) provided:

“(1) Criminal proceedings shall only be instituted and conducted upon the order of a qualified prosecutor. ...

(2) In respect of criminal offences subject to public prosecution the qualified prosecutor shall be the State Attorney and in respect of criminal offences that may be prosecuted privately the qualified prosecutor shall be a private prosecutor.

(3) Unless otherwise provided by law, the State Attorney shall undertake a criminal prosecution where there is a reasonable suspicion that an identified person has committed a criminal offence subject to public prosecution and where there are no legal impediments to the prosecution of that person.

(4) Where the State Attorney finds that there are no grounds to institute or conduct criminal proceedings, the injured party may take his place as a subsidiary prosecutor under the conditions prescribed by this Act.”

“Nobody can be tried twice for an offence for which he or she has been tried and in respect of which a final court decision has been adopted.”

Articles 47 to 61 regulated the rights and duties of private prosecutors and of injured parties acting as subsidiary prosecutors. A private prosecutor (privatni tužitelj) was an injured party who brought a private prosecution in respect of criminal offences for which such a prosecution was expressly allowed by the Criminal Code (these were offences of a lesser degree). An injured party acting as a subsidiary prosecutor (oštećeni kao tužitelj) was a person taking over criminal proceedings in respect of criminal offences subject to public prosecution where the relevant prosecuting authorities, for whatever reason, had decided not to prosecute (Article 55). When acting as a subsidiary prosecutor, the victim had all rights in the proceedings which the State Attorney’ Office would have had as public prosecuting authority, save for those vested in the State Attorney’s Office as a state body.

Pursuant to Article 58, the State Attorney’s Office was authorised, on a discretionary basis, to take over a prosecution from a subsidiary prosecutor at any point before the end of the trial.

Relevant provisions concerning the processing of criminal complaints provided:

“(1) The State Attorney shall reject a criminal complaint by a reasoned decision if the offence in question is not an offence subject to automatic prosecution, if the prosecution is time-barred or an amnesty or pardon has been granted, or other circumstances excluding criminal liability or prosecution exist, or there is no reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed the offence. The State Attorney shall inform the victim about his decision ... within eight days (Article 55) and if the criminal complaint was submitted by the police, he shall also inform the police.

The relevant provision of the Minor Offences Act (Prekršajni zakon, Official Gazette no. 107/2007) provides:

“A minor offence is an act which breaches the public order, social discipline or other social values and is not listed as an offence under the Criminal Code or other regulation listing offences.”

“(1) The competent prosecutor is:

State administrative body,

victim.”

The relevant part of the Minor Offences against Public Order and Peace Act (Zakon o prekršajima protiv javnog reda i mira, Official Gazette nos. 5/1990, 47/1990 and 29/1994; hereinafter: the “Public Peace and Order Act”) reads:

“Whoever in a public place fights, argues, yells or otherwise breaches public order and peace, shall be liable to a fine ... or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding sixty days.”

The relevant parts of the Civil Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette nos. 35/2005, 41/2008 and 125/2011), read as follows:

Section 19

“(1) Every legal entity and every natural person has the right to respect for their personal integrity under the conditions prescribed by this Act.

(2) The right to respect for one’s personal integrity within the meaning of this Act includes the right to life, physical and mental health, good reputation and honour, the right to be respected, and the right to respect for one’s name and the privacy of one’s personal and family life, freedom et alia.

Section 1046

“Damage is ... infringement of the right to respect for one’s personal dignity (non-pecuniary damage).”

“Anyone may request a court or other competent authority to order the cessation of an activity which violates his or her rights of personality and the elimination of its consequences.”

The relevant parts of the Prevention of Discrimination Act (Zakon o suzbijanju diskriminacije, Official Gazette no. 85/2008) provide:

“(1) This Act ensures protection and promotion of equality as the highest value of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia; creates conditions for equal opportunities and regulates protection against discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic origin or skin colour, gender, language, religion, political or other conviction, national or social origin, state of wealth, membership of a trade union, education, social status, marital or family status, age, health, invalidity, genetic inheritance, gender identity, expression or sexual orientation.

(2) Discrimination within the meaning of this Act means putting any person in a disadvantageous position on any of the grounds under subsection 1 of this section, as well as his or her close relatives.

“This Act shall be applied in respect of all State bodies ... legal entities and natural persons ...”

“Anyone who considers that, owing to discrimination, any of his or her rights has been violated may seek protection of that right in proceedings in which the determination of that right is the main issue, and may also seek protection in separate proceedings under section 17 of this Act.”

“(1) A person who claims that he or she has been a victim of discrimination in accordance with the provisions of this Act may bring a claim and seek:

(1) a ruling that the defendant has violated the plaintiff’s right to equal treatment or that an act or omission by the defendant may lead to the violation of the plaintiff’s right to equal treatment (claim for an acknowledgment of discrimination);

(2) a ban on (the defendant’s) undertaking acts which violate or may violate the plaintiff’s right to equal treatment or an order for measures aimed at removing discrimination or its consequences to be taken (claim for a ban or for removal of discrimination);

(3) compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the violation of the rights protected by this Act (claim for damages);

(4) an order for a judgment finding a violation of the right to equal treatment to be published in the media at the defendant’s expense.”


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The first applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Rinschnach. The second applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Linz.

In 1997 the Wels Regional Court (Landesgericht Wels, “the Regional Court”) instituted preliminary investigations (Vorerhebungen) against the two applicants and several other persons on account of the suspicion of aggravated fraud (schwerer gewerbsmässiger Betrug) by having set up and managed an internationally operated gambling system which was based on a pyramid scheme.

On 19 January 1999 the Regional Court decided that the proceedings against the applicants were to be separated from those of the co-suspects to avoid delays.

On 9 December 1997 the Regional Court issued an international arrest warrant (Steckbrief) in respect of the first applicant. He was in detention on remand from 26 to 27 May 1998.

On 18 February 2008 the first applicant filed a request for the acceleration of the proceedings under Section 91 of the Courts Act (Fristsetzungsantrag). The Linz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht, “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the request on 11 September 2008, stating that it could only be directed against delays caused by the courts, not the Public Prosecutor.

On 2 May 2013 the Regional Court acquitted the first applicant of all charges. The decision was served on his counsel on 15 October 2013.

On 18 April 1997 the Regional Court issued an international arrest warrant in respect of the second applicant. He was in detention on remand from 22 May 1997 until 6 August 1999.

On 12 April 2002 the preliminary investigations against the second applicant were closed and the file was transferred to the Wels Public Prosecutor (Staatsanwaltschaft, “the Public Prosecutor”) for further processing. However, no indictment was brought against him.

On 4 December 2007 the second applicant filed a request for the acceleration of the proceedings under Section 91 of the Courts Act. The Court of Appeal dismissed the request on 11 September 2008, stating that it could only be directed against delays caused by the courts, not the Public Prosecutor.

On 2 April 2010 the Public Prosecutor brought an indictment against the second applicant. The second applicant lodged an appeal against the indictment and a motion requesting the discontinuation of the proceedings. On 28 February 2011 the Court of Appeal rejected the indictment, but did not discontinue the proceedings.

On 13 October 2011 the Public Prosecutor discontinued the proceedings against the second applicant.


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Civil rights and obligations;Fair hearing;Adversarial trial);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Iulia Motoc;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Naujoji Akmenė.

In November 1989 he started military service in the armed forces of the Soviet Union. Medical records dated 20 June 1990 drafted by a panel of doctors in his military unit in Riazan (Russia), stipulated that at that time he had problems communicating with others and was autistic, though he had a normal memory and level of intelligence. He was diagnosed with sluggish schizophrenia, which he had developed during military service. On those grounds, he was released from military service.

Having returned from the army to Lithuania, by 2005 he had been treated in psychiatric institutions no less than fifteen times. In 2004 he was diagnosed with residual and then paranoid schizophrenia.

In February 2006 the applicant attempted suicide by setting himself on fire. He was admitted to the trauma unit of a hospital.

In reply to a prosecutor’s request for information, on 14 November 2006 the Akmenė District Psychiatric Health Centre (Akmenės rajono psichikos sveikatos centras) confirmed that the applicant had been attending there since 1999, and continued to be treated there for schizophrenia. In 2004 episodes of the applicant’s illness became more frequent. That year the applicant attempted to commit suicide; he did not accept that he was ill. He was admitted to the Šiauliai Psychiatric Hospital (Šiaulių psichiatrijos ligoninė), where he spent about a month before being released for outpatient care at his own request. Since July 2005 the applicant stopped attending the Akmenė District Psychiatric Health Centre and taking his medication, because he firmly refused any consultations with the psychiatrists. He would also submit numerous complaints to various authorities.

On 24 November 2006 the applicant’s mother asked a prosecutor to initiate proceedings with a view to her son being declared legally incapacitated. According to her, his mental illness started when he was in the Soviet army. She and her husband lived in a house separate from him in neighbouring Akmenė. By 2006 the applicant’s condition reached such a stage that he was afraid to leave his apartment or let his parents in, and he did not take care of himself. He even attempted to take his own life by setting himself on fire.

On the same day, the prosecutor sent the request by the applicant’s mother to the Akmenė District Court, together with an extract from the applicant’s medical records. It was noted that his schizophrenia had worsened and that he had become a danger to himself. He was thus in need of help from others. It was indispensable to ascertain whether there was a basis for declaring him legally incapable, if psychiatrists established that he could not understand or control his actions. The prosecutor relied on Articles 2.10, 3.242 § 1 and 3 of the Civil Code, Articles 135, 462-465, 491493 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Article 19 of the Law on Prosecution Service.

By a ruling of 29 November 2006 the Akmenė District Court ordered an expert examination to ascertain (i) whether the applicant was suffering from mental illness, (ii) whether he could understand his actions and (iii) whether he could take part in court proceedings. His mother was to be informed of that decision.

Having examined the applicant in person and scrutinised his medical records, on 8 January 2007 a psychiatrist concluded that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. He was also very mistrusting and had strong feelings of persecution. Psychiatrists took into account the letters by his mother to the Akmenė District Psychiatric Health Centre and the prosecutor to the effect that the applicant did not take care of his daily needs, and had social and health issues and suicidal thoughts. The psychiatrist thus established that the applicant could not correctly understand or control his actions, and noted that he “could not take part in court proceedings, could not be questioned, and court documents could not be served on him”.

In a one page form sent to the Akmenė District Court on 29 January 2007, Akmenė District social services ticked a box to say that they “agreed” with the prosecutor’s request for the applicant to be declared incapacitated. They also indicated that they would not take part in the court hearing, which was scheduled for 31 January 2007.

On 23, 24, 25 and 30 January 2007 attempts were made by the Akmenė District Court to personally serve the applicant with the summons concerning the forthcoming hearing for his legal incapacitation and care. The copy of the summons indicated that it had not been served because, according to his next door neighbour, the applicant was mentally ill and opened the door to no one.

At a public hearing on 31 January 2007 the Akmenė District Court, relying on Articles 465-468 of the Code of Civil Procedure, granted the prosecutor’s request for the applicant to be declared incapacitated, on the grounds that he could not understand or control his actions. The prosecutor and the applicant’s mother were in attendance. The applicant’s mother testified about her son’s history of mental illness. She also stated that he had recently been living away from his parents, but could not take care of himself, did not pay maintenance fees for his apartment, and would not go out or take his medication.

The ruling stipulated that it could be appealed against within thirty days.

The Government submitted that, given the fact that it had not actually been possible to serve the summons on the applicant, the decision of 31 January 2007 had only been sent to the interested parties in the case, that is to say the applicant’s mother, the prosecutor and social services.

On 5 February 2007 the applicant drafted what appears to be a response to the prosecutor’s request of 24 November 2006 to incapacitate him. Therein he mentions that he received a copy of the prosecutor’s request on 30 January 2007. The letter appears essentially to be a complaint about his treatment in psychiatric hospitals and diagnosis with schizophrenia. He concludes by stating that because of obvious forgery of his medical examination results and clear bias on the part of the prosecutor, the applicant refused to undergo medical examination in Lithuania. A stamp on the letter indicates that it was received by the Akmenė District Court on 5 February 2007.

Having established that the applicant was legally incapacitated, by a ruling of 6 March 2007 the Akmenė District Court appointed the applicant’s mother as his guardian and the administrator of his property. The decision was taken at a public hearing in which she, a prosecutor and a representative from social services took part. The ruling stipulated that the applicant had not taken part because of ill-health.

The applicant was forcibly admitted to the Šiauliai Psychiatric Hospital on 9 March 2007, after showing signs of agitation and behaving aggressively towards his parents. The police and some firemen had to break down the door of his apartment to get to him. On 11 March 2007 he consented to treatment until 13 March 2007, when he refused any further treatment in writing.

On 13 March 2007 the Šiauliai Psychiatric Hospital asked the State Guaranteed Legal Aid Service (“the Legal Aid Service”) to provide legal aid to the applicant, who was to be forcibly hospitalised. It was granted the same day, and a lawyer was appointed to represent him.

Later that day, in the presence of a psychiatrist and the appointed lawyer, the Šiauliai District Court granted a request by the psychiatric hospital for the applicant to be forcibly hospitalised. The court noted that the applicant was absolutely uncritical of his own behaviour, and that his state of mind at that time meant that he posed a danger to himself and others. The ruling was final and not appealable. It indicated that on 31 January 2007 the applicant had been declared legally incapacitated, and that on 6 March 2007 his mother had been appointed as his guardian.

The Government submitted to the court an extract from the applicant’s medical records, which indicated that he had been at the Šiauliai Psychiatric Hospital from 9 March until 22 June 2007. The doctor indicated in that record that a copy of the court ruling of 13 March 2007 had been given to the applicant. It is not clear when that was done.

The Government submitted that the court decision of 13 March 2007 had been handed to the applicant by his treating doctor on 15 March 2007.

On 6 April 2007 the applicant signed a document certifying that his treatment plan from the Šiauliai Psychiatric Hospital had been explained to him and that he agreed to follow it.

Having been released from the psychiatric hospital, on 26 November 2008 the applicant approached the Legal Aid Service. In his application he wrote that by a ruling of 31 January 2007 he had been declared legally incapacitated, and that he would need the time-limit for appealing against it to be renewed. He also indicated that in March 2007 his mother had been appointed his guardian and the administrator of his property. He noted that he had not known about the two decisions until 9 March 2007, upon his admission to the Šiauliai Psychiatric Hospital. He also expressed a wish to appeal against them.

On 31 December 2008 the Legal Aid Service refused the request as having no prospect of success. It noted that the applicant fell into the category of people entitled to legal aid; however, given that the proceedings for his incapacitation had been terminated, his request for legal aid was clearly irrelevant.

The Legal Aid Service noted that the decisions the applicant wished to challenge had been taken in January and March 2007. Given that he had not requested legal aid until 28 November 2008, he had missed the deadline for appeal against those decisions. Representing him in such proceedings would have had no prospect of success.

As to the appointment of the applicant’s mother as his legal guardian, the Legal Aid Service indicated that he had given no grounds for doubting her ability to perform her duties as guardian and the administrator of his property. Lastly, it observed that guardianship could be revoked at the request of a prosecutor or social services. Given that the applicant himself could not apply to the court with such a request, there was no legal basis for providing him legal assistance.

On 15 December 2008 the applicant requested that the Akmenė District Court give him a copy of the court rulings regarding his incapacitation and the appointment of his legal guardian.

On 16 December 2008 a judge of the Akmenė District Court wrote to the applicant informing him that those court rulings would not be given to him, because his mother had been appointed as his legal guardian and the administrator of his property.

In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, sent to the Court on 2 May 2012, the Government noted that at that time the applicant had lived separately in his own apartment. He had been unemployed but had received disability pension. His guardian had helped him with daily chores. He had also received regular outpatient treatment at the Akmenė District Psychiatric Health Centre.

On 13 August 2014 the applicant complained to the Šiauliai prosecutor’s office that in 2004 he had been forcibly admitted to the Šiauliai Psychiatric Hospital and made to undergo medical treatment. The applicant asked that a pre-trial investigation be opened regarding his allegations.

By a final ruling of 11 November 2014, the Šiauliai Regional Court held that the applicant’s complaints about events in 2004 were unfounded.


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Deprivation of property;Peaceful enjoyment of possessions;Possessions);Pecuniary damage - award;Just satisfaction partially reserved

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Nebojša Vučinić;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Peer Lorenzen

Maggio and Others v. Italy (nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and 56001/08, 31 May 2011).

The applicants worked in Switzerland for the following periods of time, in total, over the relevant years:

Mr Stefanetti: approximately 23 years between 1959 and 1996;

Mr Rodelli: approximately 31 years between 1962 and 1996;

Mr Negri: approximately 13 years between 1954 and 1997;

Mr Della Nave: approximately 28 years between 1962 and 1989;

Mr Del Maffeo: approximately 32.5 years between 1959 and 1996;

Mr Cotta: approximately 26 years between 1962 and 1987;

Mr Curti: approximately 28 years between 1962 and 1997;

Mr Andreola: approximately 10.5 years between 1967 and 1977.

In 1982 Italy changed its pension system from a contributory one, where the amount received in pension was dependent on the contributions paid, to an earnings- or remuneration-based (“retributivo”) one.

The applicants, who had transferred to Italy the contributions they had paid in Switzerland, requested the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (“INPS”) to calculate their pensions, in accordance with the 1962 Italo-Swiss Convention on Social Security (see Relevant domestic law and practice below), on the basis of the contributions paid in Switzerland for work they had done there over a number years (see appended table for details). As a basis for the calculation of their pensions (in respect of their average remuneration over the last ten years), the INPS employed a theoretical remuneration (“retribuzione teorica”) instead of the real remuneration (“retribuzione effettiva”). The former resulted in a readjustment on the basis of the contribution rate applied in Switzerland (8%) and that applied in Italy (32.7%), which meant that the calculation had as its basis a pseudo-salary with the result that the applicants received a lower pension than expected. According to the applicants, their pension was approximately a third of what it should have been.

As an example, the pension the applicants actually received in 2010 and an estimation, calculated by them, of what they should have received in that same year had this method of calculation not been applied is appended.

Consequently, in 2006 the applicants instituted judicial proceedings, contending that this was contrary to the spirit of the Italo-Swiss Convention. Various individuals in the applicants’ position had done the same and had been successful. The domestic courts had determined that people who had worked in Switzerland and had subsequently transferred their contributions to Italy should benefit from the remuneration-based pension calculations based on the wages they had earned in Switzerland, irrespective of the fact that the transferred contributions had been paid at a much lower Swiss rate.

While their proceedings were still pending, Law no. 296/2006 (see Relevant domestic law and practice below) entered into force on 1 January 2007.

The applicants’ claims were rejected in separate judgments of the Sondrio Tribunal (filed in the relevant registry as mentioned below), in view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006:

Judgment (no. 149/09) of 30 November 2009 in respect of Mr Stefanetti;

Judgment (no. 96/09) of 27 October 2009 in respect of Mr Rodelli;

Judgment (no. 09/10) of 28 January 2010 in respect of Mr Negri;

Judgment (no. 104/09) of 27 October 2009 in respect of Mr Della Nave;

Judgment (no. 09/10) of 28 January 2010 in respect of Mr Del Maffeo;

Judgment (no. 166/09) of 10 December 2010 in respect of Mr Cotta;

Judgment (no. 112/09) of 10 November 2009 in respect of Mr Del Curti;

Judgment (no. 96/09) of 27 October 2009 in respect of Mr Andreola.

None of the applicants appealed further, deeming it to be futile given that Law no. 296/2006 had been found legitimate by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 23 May 2008, no. 172 (see Relevant Domestic Law and Practice below), which other courts were then bound to uphold.


Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Narva.

On 17 September 2012 the applicant, in misdemeanour proceedings, was fined 80 euros (EUR) by a police officer of the East Prefecture of the Police and Border Guard Board for a breach of public order (breaking a glass panel of a bus shelter).

The applicant contested this decision before the Viru County Court. He argued that he had not committed the act in question and challenged the assessment of witness statements. He complained about the failure of the police to present him to a witness for identification. Lastly, he complained that the police had not indicated in its decision the specific provisions of the local rules on public order which he had allegedly breached.

The County Court sent summons to the applicant for a hearing scheduled for 21 March 2013 at 12.30 p.m. It was noted in the summons that the applicant’s participation in the hearing was mandatory. Furthermore, it was noted, with reference to Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure (Väärteomenetluse seadustik), that if a complainant failed to appear at the hearing, although he had been notified of the obligation to participate, and the hearing was not adjourned, the court would refuse to examine the complaint. The applicant’s counsel, a representative of the police prefecture and witnesses were also summoned.

The summons sent to the applicant’s address, which he had used throughout the proceedings and which had been indicated in his complaint, could not be served on him personally as he was not present on 4 February 2013 when the court’s security officer attempted to serve the summons. His mother refused to accept the summons and said that the applicant was living abroad. The applicant’s counsel received the summons on 8 February 2013. The witnesses also received the summons in the beginning of February.

On 20 March 2013 the County Court issued a ruling by which the applicant’s complaint was admitted for the proceedings. According to the ruling the hearing was scheduled for 21 March 2013 at 12.30 p.m. and the names of persons to be summoned to the hearing were set out.

On 21 March 2013 the County Court held its hearing. The applicant did not appear. His counsel asked the court to examine the matter without the applicant’s presence as the applicant was abroad and it was not known when he would return to Estonia. According to the applicant’s father, who was in the courtroom as a spectator, the applicant was not to return to Estonia within the next five years. The County Court refused to examine the applicant’s complaint. It delivered its decision in writing on 2 April 2013.

According to the County Court’s decision, the applicant had failed to inform the authorities of his new address. However, as the applicant’s father was aware of the time of the court hearing and of the applicant’s intention not to return to Estonia within the next five years, the court concluded that the applicant’s parents were communicating both with the applicant and his counsel. Thus, the applicant must have been aware of the court hearing and summons sent to him.

The County Court found that in view of the substance of the misdemeanour case and the court’s duty to hear a misdemeanour matter in its entirety, regardless of the limits of the complaint filed, and to verify the factual and legal circumstances on the basis of which the body conducting the extra-judicial proceedings (that is, the police) had made its decision, it was not possible to examine the case without the applicant’s participation. It noted that one of the complaints made by the applicant had been that the body conducting the extra-judicial proceedings had not presented the applicant for identification to the witness. Thus, interviewing of the applicant and presenting him for recognition to the witness were important steps for the adjudication of the matter which could not be accomplished without the applicant’s participation. The court considered that adjourning the hearing would serve no purpose since the applicant was not to return to Estonia within a month – the time-limit for which a hearing could be adjourned under the law of procedure. Moreover, the applicant’s counsel had not requested an adjournment but examination of the complaint without the applicant’s presence. However, for the above reasons the court did not consider it possible to examine the case without the applicant. Relying on Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure – which provided that if a complainant failed to appear at the hearing although he had been notified of the obligation to participate in the court hearing – the County Court refused to examine the complaint.

The applicant’s counsel appealed, relying, inter alia, on Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention according to which a person had the right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing. The receipt of the summons was not disputed.

On 23 May 2013 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the ruling of the first-instance court. It noted that under Article 126 § 1 of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure the court could decide on a discretionary basis whether a complainant’s participation in the court hearing was necessary and, if needed, oblige the person in question to appear. In the case at hand the County Court had given reasons as to why the applicant’s participation was required and it was not possible to examine the case in his absence. The Court of Appeal pointed out that the applicant had challenged in his complaint to the County Court the failure of the police to present him to witnesses for identification. It was, however, unclear, how the County Court could have eliminated this deficiency in the applicant’s absence.

No appeal lay against the Court of Appeal’s ruling.


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)

Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Vigonza (Padua).

The applicant met his former partner, K.S., a Hungarian national, in 2008. They began living together in Abano Terme (Italy) and had a daughter, who was born on 15 September 2011.

According to the applicant, after the baby was born K.S. began engaging in obsessive behaviour and their relationship deteriorated.

In November 2011 K.S. spent a week in Hungary with their daughter. In December of the same year she again travelled to Hungary with the baby. It was agreed that the applicant would fetch them on 30 December and drive them back to Italy. While on his way to Hungary, the applicant was informed by K.S. that she did not intend to return to Italy.

The applicant first returned to Italy (without having reached Hungary); he then set off again for Hungary, where (after arriving) K.S. initially denied him access to his daughter. After several days, K.S. allowed the applicant to see the baby and informed him that he could see her again, provided that he agreed to let his daughter stay in Hungary with K.S. and pay 500 euros (EUR) per month in child support. The applicant rejected this proposal and on 9 January 2012 returned to Italy.

On 21 February 2012 the applicant lodged an application with the Venice Minors Court requesting that the court strip K.S. of parental authority over their daughter, order the return of the child to Italy and grant him exclusive custody.

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a request with the Pest Central District Court for the child’s return, pursuant to the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter, “the Hague Convention”).

On 13 September 2012 the Pest Central District Court found that K.S. was keeping the child in Hungary illegally and ordered that she return the child to the applicant’s residence in Italy by 21 September 2012. Alternatively, the child should be handed to the applicant or his proxy in Budapest no later than 24 September 2012.

Following an appeal by K.S., on 8 November 2012 the Budapest High Court upheld the decision of the Pest Central District Court and ordered that the child be returned to Italy by 30 November 2012 or to the applicant or his proxy in Budapest by 4 December 2012.

Following a further appeal by K.S., that decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 22 January 2013; nevertheless, the child was not returned to the applicant.

An enforcement order based on the second-instance decision of 8 November 2012 was issued on 21 January 2013 against K.S. The bailiff of the Mezőtúr District Court instructed the mother to comply with the final decision and return the child to the applicant within fifteen days and ordered her to pay a fine of 152,400 Hungarian forints (HUF – approximately EUR 490).

Criminal proceedings against K.S. were initiated in 2013 by the Padua public prosecutor and a European arrest warrant was issued against her.

On 14 January 2013 the Venice Minors Court found that it had jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s case pursuant to articles 8, 10, 11 and 42 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 (see paragraph 49 below), allowed the applicant’s application (see paragraph 11 above), stripped K.S. of her parental authority and, like its Hungarian counterpart, ordered the immediate return of the child to Italy.

On 18 January 2013 the preliminary-investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) issued an arrest warrant against K.S. for the offence of international child abduction.

On 23 January 2013 a European arrest warrant was issued against K.S. by the Padua Court.

On 15 February 2013 the court bailiff sent a copy of the return order to the guardianship office of Mezőtúr District in order to enable the said authority to serve it on K.S. and to inform her of the consequences of failing to comply with the order.

On 28 February 2013 two members of the Mezőtúr guardianship office’s staff attempted to serve the order on K.S.; they were unsuccessful as they were unable to enter her home. As K.S.’s post box was in a locked part of the building, they were not able to leave behind any notification either. They went to the registered address of K.S.’s mother but they could not find anybody there either. They left behind a notification in the post box there informing K.S. of their attempt to enter her home and of the date of the next visit by guardianship office staff.

On 4 March 2013 guardianship office staff again visited the registered permanent address of K.S. and the registered residential address of her mother but again failed to serve the enforcement order on her.

In March 2013 the Department of International Private Law of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice conducted mediation proceedings through the legal representatives of K.S. and the applicant in order to try to reach an amicable agreement.

On 6 March 2013 the Padua public prosecutor lodged by means of a letter rogatory an application with the Budapest Prosecutor’s Office for judicial assistance. The application was dismissed on 29 October 2013 on the grounds that the judgment of the Venice Minors Court (see paragraph 18 above) was not yet enforceable (see paragraph 31 below) and the requirement of dual criminality was not satisfied.

On 20 March 2013 the Mezőtúr District Court allowed an application lodged by K.S. for the return order issued by the Budapest High Court (see paragraph 14 above) to be suspended, but this decision was subsequently quashed by the Szolnok High Court on 19 June 2013. On 16 October 2013 the Mezőtúr District Court refused another similar application lodged by K.S. Following an appeal by K.S., the latter decision was upheld by Szolnok High Court on 4 December 2013.

On 5 September 2013 the deputy court bailiff, accompanied by police officers and guardianship office staff, visited K.S.’s registered address and the residential address of her mother, but no one answered the door.

On 20 September 2013 the bailiff attempted to serve the enforcement order at the same addresses, but with no success, as K.S. and her daughter had absconded. The guardianship office informed the court bailiff that they had no useful information concerning the whereabouts of K.S. and her daughter.

On an unspecified date, K.S. lodged an application for the enforcement proceedings to be terminated; that application was refused by the Pest Central District Court on 4 October 2013. That judgment was upheld by the Budapest High Court on 10 December 2013.

On 21 January 2014 an international search warrant was issued by the Mezőtúr police.

On 17 March 2014 the Szolnok District Court declared the judgment of the Venice Minors Court (see paragraph 18 above) enforceable. On 30 June 2014, following an appeal by K.S, that decision was quashed by the Szolnok High Court.

The Mezőtúr district prosecutor’s office ordered an investigation in respect of K.S. concerning the unauthorised custody of a minor and the endangering of a minor on 17 February and 18 March 2014 respectively.

On 5 May 2014 K.S. was summoned as a suspect, but she failed to appear.

On 19 May 2014 an arrest warrant was issued against K.S.

On 5 November 2014 the bailiff unsuccessfully tried to serve the enforcement order on K.S. at her registered residential address. Residents of the area were not able to provide any useful information to the bailiff.

Following an appeal by the applicant against the Szolnok judgment of 30 June 2014 (see paragraph 31 above), on 25 November 2014 the Kúria declared the judgment of the Venice Minors Court (see paragraph 18 above) enforceable.

On 23 December 2014 the Padua public prosecutor lodged by means of a letter rogatory a further application for judicial assistance and requested that the Padua police be authorised to assist the local judicial police with the execution of the arrest warrant. On 18 March 2015 the Budapest Prosecutor’s Office dismissed this application on the grounds that the conduct described in the criminal complaint could be classified as kidnapping under the Italian Criminal Code, but not under Article 190 of the Hungarian Criminal Code.

On 10 and 12 March 2015 staff of the Mezőtúr guardianship office visited K.S.’s registered address and her mother’s home, but their attempts to serve the enforcement order failed.

The Government pointed out that several searches and other procedural actions had failed to generate any results. In order to identify K.S.’s place of residence, they had checked the database of the National Health Insurance Fund and requested data from all those of the country’s financial institutions that provided payment services. Moreover they had requested data from the mobile phone companies, the Hungarian State Treasury, the Hungarian tax and customs authorities, and regional and local tax and customs agencies; they had also run checks in the databases of companies providing card services to regular customers in the territory of Hungary.

On 13 October 2016 the Mezőtúr District Court, during the criminal prosecution against K.S. for child abduction, heard M.A., the child’s paediatrician. M.A. said that she had visited the child several times over the years. In particular, on 1 September 2016 she had issued a medical certificate which had been required for the child’s enrolment in a kindergarten.

By a letter dated 13 December 2016 the Italian Central Authority informed the applicant that the Hungarian authorities were still not able to execute the return order because they had still not identified K.S.’s place of residence.

At the hearing of 15 December 2016 the Mezőtúr District Court heard four of K.S.’s relatives, who all stated that K.S. was living in hiding.

On 20 April 2017 K.S. was acquitted by the Mezőtúr District Court. The text of this judgment was not produced before the Court.

The Mezőtúr Attorney-General lodged an appeal against this judgment with the Szolnok High Court.

On 10 May 2017 the Padua public prosecutor lodged by means of a letter rogatory a further application for judicial assistance. This application was dismissed.

According to the latest information received by the Court, in February 2018 the criminal proceedings against K.S. were still pending Szolnok High Court and the return order of the applicant’s daughter had not yet been enforced.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Torture)

The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Orenburg.

The facts of the applicant’s ill-treatment were established in a judgment of the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg of 15 December 2011, as upheld on 14 February 2012 by the Orenburg Regional Court, and are as follows.

At around 7 p.m. on 30 August 2009 the applicant was arrested at a bus stop by police officers of the criminal investigation unit and taken to a police station in Orenburg (УВД по г. Оренбургу). From 8 p.m. to midnight on 30 August 2009, and from 12 noon to 6 p.m. on 31 August 2009, police officers K. and M. subjected the applicant to physical and psychological violence in order to obtain a confession from him about a drug-related crime which they suspected him of having committed.

The facts of the ill-treatment on 30 August 2009 were established as follows. Officers K. and M. pushed the applicant to the floor and punched and kicked him numerous times in the head, face, chest, arms and legs. K. placed a plastic bag over his head, closing off his access to air, while M. held him down. As regards the ill-treatment on 31 August 2009, officers K. and M. punched the applicant numerous times in the head and threatened to detain him.

At 8 p.m. on 31 August 2009 the applicant was formally arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs and placed in a temporary detention facility.

On 2 September 2009 the applicant was released after giving an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. On the same day he sought medical help at a traumatology centre (TP no. 2). According to his medical records, he had abrasions on his forearms, a bruise under his right eye, a bruise in the left lumbar region and abrasions on his legs.

On 3 September 2009 the applicant made a complaint to the Orenburg regional investigative committee regarding his illtreatment.

On 4 September 2009 he underwent a forensic medical examination ordered by the investigation authority. According to report no. 6368, he had the following injuries: (i) a haematoma (swelling) of the soft tissues in the parietal region of the head, measuring 4 by 3 cm; (ii) four bruises of indefinite form on the right infraorbital region of the face, on his neck, on the left side of his chest and around the right iliac (hip) bone, measuring up to 4 by 3 cm each; and (iii) seventeen abrasions, some linear and some of indefinite form, on both forearms, his right hip and left lower leg, measuring from 0.8 by 0.5 cm to 2.5 by 1 cm each. The expert concluded that the applicant’s injuries had resulted from being struck repeatedly with a hard, blunt object with a limited surface area on the day of the alleged incident, and had not caused any “health damage”. Subsequent forensic medical expert reports of 4 December 2009 and 21 October 2010 came to similar conclusions. It was stated in the first of those reports that the applicant’s injuries had been caused by at least twenty traumatic blows to his body.

Officers K. and M. were convicted under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code and banned from exercising official duties for three years. They were also given a three-year suspended sentence with a three-year probation period, which required them to appear monthly before the Service for the Execution of Sentences and disclose any change of place of work or residence.

The following circumstances were taken into account in sentencing the police officers. The fact that officer K. had a child under 14 years old was considered a mitigating circumstance, while the fact that he and M. had committed the crime with a group of other officers was considered an aggravating circumstance. It was further taken into account that K. and M. had positive references from their places of work and residence, had no previous convictions, and had led a law-abiding way of life without committing any administrative offences for more than two years since the crime had been committed.

On 31 November 2009 criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 228 § 2 of the Criminal Code (possession of large quantities of drugs) were terminated for absence of a crime, pursuant to Article 24 § 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In 2012 the applicant brought a civil claim against the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 2,655,936 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for his unlawful detention and illtreatment in police custody by K. and M.

On 28 June 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg allowed the applicant’s claim in part and awarded him RUB 20,000. In determining the amount of compensation, the court found that the applicant had sustained injuries as a result of the police officers’ actions and had experienced physical and mental suffering, but that this had not caused him any “health damage”.

The applicant appealed against that judgment to the Orenburg Regional Court, which on 19 September 2012 increased the amount of compensation to RUB 80,000.


Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition)

Aleš Pejchal;André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Josep Casadevall;Síofra O’Leary;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicants were born in 1983, 1984 and 1974 respectively and are currently detained in the Corradino Correctional Facility (Paola, Malta).

The first applicant was arraigned in court on 8 May 2012 and was remanded on the same day on drug-related charges. He is currently in pretrial detention.

The first applicant submitted that in May 2012 when he arrived in prison he had been placed in Division 6, a disciplinary division with very strict standards and no privacy. No one spoke his language in that division. He was eventually moved to Division 13, where again no one spoke his language. The applicant alleged that items belonging to him had been stolen and the prison authorities had ignored his complaints, as a result of which he went on hunger strike for three days between 11 and 13 June 2012 (the latter action is indicated in the applicant’s medical records submitted to the Court). According to the Government, from the official records (which were not submitted to the Court) it did not appear that the applicant had ever complained about the matter to the prison authorities.

After two weeks the first applicant was transferred to Division 3. The records held by the prison authorities show that he is currently being held in cell no. 152, which is situated in Division 3. This division is located in the older section of the prison building that has undergone various stages of upgrading and renovation. However, the possibilities for further improvements are limited owing to the manner in which the building is constructed, such as with high windows and thick walls.

The first applicant has been occupying cell no. 152 as sole occupant.

The applicant submitted that in order to make his cell habitable he had had to paint it himself and equip it with proper lighting. By the Government’s admission, the painting of cells appears to be the normal procedure amongst inmates and the paint is provided by the authorities free of charge. However, the Government contended that the cell had already been equipped with artificial lighting, which was dealt with by the prison electrician, not inmates.

There are two ventilators and a window in cell no. 152. The wallmounted ventilator measures 20 cm by 15 cm and is covered by a rectangular piece of cardboard and there is another smaller ventilator in the ceiling. The applicant submitted that when it rained, water would pour in through the wall-mounted ventilator, which he considered was simply a hole in the wall, and which was covered by cardboard to stop the wind entering in the winter months – in consequence it rendered the room devoid of any ventilation.

The cell has a window, behind which are two iron grids and a third layer of exterior iron bars. The window consists of both a perspex section that allows daylight to enter and a wooden part. Both sections can in principle be opened and closed from within the cell. The window is situated at a height of 250 cm and measures 76.5 cm in width by 46 cm in height. According to the Government (and from the photographs submitted) the window in cell no. 152 is always kept closed by the occupant, despite the fact that he could open and close it by climbing onto the bed. The applicant submitted that windows in other divisions were much lower.

In his cell, in order to attempt to open the window he had to stand on the sink and reach for the lock by means of a piece of wood. The window, once opened, had to be kept open by means of some support, such as a metal or wooden plank, which was not usually allowed in prison. The applicant, who is of a heavy build, is unable to open such a window without the help of other lighter inmates. The Government contested that allegation, arguing that the window could be opened by using a tool (a two-foot arm) which is available to inmates for opening and closing windows as necessary. In any case, the applicant could climb onto the bed to open and close the window.

Lighting in cell no. 152 consists of a ceiling light and two wallmounted portable lamps, which may be moved about throughout the cell as required (both 25 Watts).

According to the first applicant, there was often no running water in the cell and any water was surely not potable. However, according to the Government, running water was available in each cell, including cell no. 152 (photographs submitted), and Maltese tap water flowing through the Corradino Correctional Facility was certified for human consumption, as outlined by the certificate issued by the Director of Environmental Health, dated 24 January 2014, submitted to the Court. Furthermore, according to the Government, each division was equipped with a purified potable water system, which could be accessed by all inmates.

Inmates are also permitted to buy bottled water from the tuck-shop (a pack of six bottles cost 2.10 euros (EUR) or EUR 0.35 per bottle). Every inmate is given “gratuity” money for such purchases amounting to EUR 27.95 monthly. The first applicant received EUR 117 as gratuity money during 2012 and EUR 363.35 during 2013. Inmates are also given the opportunity to work against a nominal payment of EUR 18.63 monthly. The first applicant received EUR 13.39 during 2012 and EUR 242.19 during 2013 for his work.

The Government admitted that there was no combined flushing toilet system installed in Division 3 due to the nature of the structure of the building, so inmates had to flush their own personal toilet by means of a water bucket provided within each cell. To this end, there were wall-mounted water taps in order to fill the buckets with water. Combined flushing toilets were available in the new part of the prison. The first applicant alleged that there was often no running water for flushing.

All inmates have access to showers at divisional level and no cell is provided with an in-cell shower. Furthermore, all inmates can use the showers numerous times daily, for as long as necessary; the showers are open for approximately twelve hours a day. However, the first applicant claimed that there were only three shower cubicles, one of which had no running water but just a plastic bottle of water, while another did not have a showerhead. Thus, only one of the showers was functional. The Government contested that allegation, arguing that sometimes the showers were damaged by the inmates. Other inmates fixed them temporarily until the authorities in turn fixed the outlets appropriately.

According to the first applicant, hot water was often not available in winter and frequently no water was available in summer. He submitted that complaints about the lack of water were often made to the prison guards, but they were not noted down. The Government submitted that water supply was available all year round. The same applied to hot water, which was however subject to short time lags until the water reheated whenever the water was running continuously. The authorities also made available an external water supply in the event of shortages (particularly in summer, when water bowsers were brought in to increase the water supply).

According to the Government, no cell in any part of the prison building (either the old block or the new block) is equipped with a heater. During summer, the inmates are allowed fans to cool down their cells. The first applicant has two fans in his cell.

According to the photographs submitted, the state of cell no. 152 was tidy.

Inmates were permitted to purchase other non-essential items for their cells, including televisions or monitors, DVD players, or game consoles upon request. The first applicant’s requests have all been granted.

The first applicant claimed that his cell was damp and humid. According to the Government, an inspection of cell no. 152 conducted by prison officials detected no mould in the cell.

The first applicant alleged that he had been asked to pay for his own medication, but as he had been unable to pay, he had remained in pain. The Government submitted that he had been in receipt of various medicines provided free of charge through the Public Health Service (PHS) in line with Regulation 31 of the Prisons Regulations (Subsidiary Legislation 260.03). According to the records held by the authorities (submitted to the Court), it also transpired that the first applicant had been visited eleven times by a doctor between 27 August 2012 (following the applicant’s admission on remand) and 30 December 2013. On eight occasions, the prescription of medicines had been required and in fact twelve medicines had been provided to the applicant. Those medicines were supplied by the PHS except for the Bioflor sachets, where a generic alternative was provided instead. It transpires that the applicant has not made any purchases relative to “self-recommendations” (the non-acceptance of generic medicine against branded medicine, see paragraph 53 below).

The first applicant claimed that he had not been allowed to make telephone calls at 12.15 p.m., which was the only time he could reach his relatives.

The Government referred to the relevant regulations (see Relevant Domestic Law, paragraph 56 below) but stated that in practice, all inmates were allowed any number of calls between 9.30 a.m. and 11.45 a.m. As from 1 January 2014 the times were changed to between 8.30 a.m. and 11.45 a.m. and between 2 p.m. and 8 p.m. Inmates who work were granted a specific period between noon and 12.15 p.m. No calls could be made between 12.25 p.m. and 2 p.m., during which time inmates were confined to their cells.

Inmates are given two EUR 5 telephone cards every month on the first day of the month. The first applicant has been in receipt of those cards since his arrival in prison. From the records held by the authorities it also transpires that the applicant availed himself of the opportunity to call abroad using his cards on average 4.5 times a day during the period 1 January to 6 February 2014. This refers to calls lasting a minimum of three minutes. Shorter calls were also made. A detailed analysis of the calls lasting more than three minutes shows that seventy-six of them lasted over ten minutes, while some lasted over twenty minutes. In terms of the time during which the calls were made, fifty (30% of the calls) were registered during the morning between 9.08 a.m. and 11.58 a.m., while the remaining 117 calls (70%) were registered between 2.30 p.m. and 7.54 p.m. It also transpires that the applicant has availed himself of incoming call times ranging from 10 a.m. to 12.11 p.m. (69% of the calls were registered between 22 May 2012 and 7 December 2013). The rest of the calls (31%) were registered between 2.05 p.m. and 6.44 p.m. He received thirty-five incoming calls in 2012 and 175 in 2013. According to the Government the applicant has never submitted a written request to the director for permission to make calls at 12.15 p.m.

The second applicant is currently serving a term of imprisonment for drugrelated offences. He was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment and fined EUR 23,000 by the Criminal Court on 5 December 2013.

From the prison authorities’ records, it transpires that the second applicant is being held in cell no. 130, situated in Division 3 of the Corradino Correctional Facility. While the applicant complained of a lack of living space in the dormitories of ten persons (sic.), the Government argued that he had been occupying the said cell as sole occupant. It does not appear that he has made any prior complaint about his cell or any specific aspect of his detention to the prison authorities, nor has he requested to change cell.

The complaint and the general conditions of detention pertaining to the second applicant are the same as described in respect of the first applicant (above), with a few differences as set out below.

The second applicant submitted that he generally left his window open. He claimed that it was not possible to open the window by climbing onto the bed. The window was situated 1.5 metres above the sink, and thus it was only by standing on the sink that one could open it. Lighting consisted of a ceiling light and one wall-mounted portable lamp, which he had purchased himself – he had not requested an additional lamp, although inmates were in fact allowed two lamps.

According to the second applicant there was often no running water in the cell. However, according to the Government, tap water was available in each cell, including cell no. 130 (photographs submitted).

The second applicant received gratuity money amounting to EUR 293.44 during 2012 and EUR 363.35 during 2013, as well as EUR 130.41 during 2012 and EUR 242.19 during 2013 for work carried out by him.

The second applicant submitted that he had two fans in his cell. He claimed that in winter the cold was terrible and made him ill. He maintained that he often did not have bed linen or blankets, sometimes not even a bed to sleep on. The Government contested the allegation, asserting that each inmate, including the second applicant, was provided with two sets of bed linen and two blankets, that further blankets were available on request and that beds were a staple in every cell. No record of such a complaint had been found by the Government.

According to the Government, the second applicant kept his cell in a disorderly and unkempt state. When the prison authorities, through the correctional supervisor, had brought this to the applicant’s attention, he had replied that the mess was due to his ongoing personal family troubles and he promised to clean his room.

The second applicant’s requests for non-essential items have all been granted.

A part of cell no. 130 shows signs of dampness, which produces mould (approximately one square metre as transpires from a photograph submitted). The applicant submitted that the photograph was not realistic and that in reality there was mould in a larger part of the cell. This had given him asthma, a condition he had never suffered from before.

The Government pointed out that the second applicant had been in receipt of various medicines provided free of charge through the PHS. According to the Government, it transpires from the records held by the authorities that he had been visited forty-three times by a doctor between 5 October 2011 (date of the applicant’s admission on remand) and 23 January 2014. On twenty-nine occasions, prescriptive medicines had been required and in fact fifty medicines had been provided to him. Those medicines had been supplied by the PHS, except for a specific shampoo, where a generic alternative had been provided instead.

The second applicant claimed that he had had to purchase some medicines himself. However, according to the Government, that was a choice made by the applicant himself. From the records held by the authorities, it transpires that a number of “self-recommendations” (see paragraph 53 below) were registered on the applicant’s behalf. They concerned ear drops to remove ear wax, Voltaren gel, a number of vitamins and Daktarin powder.

Lastly, the second applicant claimed that he had been made to take medicine without any explanations, and that he was not allowed access to the yard.

On 30 January 2012 the Criminal Court sentenced the third applicant to twelve years’ imprisonment and to a fine of EUR 23,000 for drugrelated offences.

From the prison authorities’ records, it transpires that the third applicant is being held in cell no. 137, which is situated in Division 3. At the time of the introduction of the application he had been in Division 3 for three years and ten months. He has been occupying the said cell as sole occupant. He has never made any complaint relative to his cell or to any specific aspect of his detention to the prison authorities, nor has he requested a transfer from one division to another. The general conditions of detention pertaining to the third applicant are the same as for the other two applicants (above), with a few differences as set out below.

According to the third applicant, there was only one ceiling ventilator in his cell, which he claimed did not work. The Government contested that statement. The applicant submitted that there were two portable lamps –the ceiling lamp was controlled centrally and could not be switched on or off as needed. From the photographs submitted it appears that cell no. 137 is kept in a relatively tidy state. The third applicant has been allowed to acquire other non-essential items in the cell. He claimed that they did not require authorisation. He also alleged that one of his personal fans had been removed from his cell after the photographs had been taken. The Government submitted that apart from the ceiling fan, the applicant had another fan in his cell, and that only one box fan per inmate was allowed.

According to the Government, an inspection of cell no. 137 conducted by the prison officials did not detect any mould. However, the third applicant submitted that there was some 50 cm of mould around his sink.

The third applicant also complained of a lack of running water (contested by the Government) and flushing toilet system. He claimed that the lack of water, particularly the inability to flush the toilet, created unhygienic conditions. Also, the relevant equipment to clean the room was not provided. He alleged that he had been regularly sick because of the tap water in his room and that the doctor had told him that he should not drink it. The Government submitted that according to the doctor’s report (submitted to the Court), the applicant had never complained of bowel problems or complained to the doctor about the tap water. Nor had it been substantiated that he had received such a reply from the doctor. The applicant pointed out that the result of the tests carried out by the Government had not referred to water collected in his room, as no water had been collected.

The third applicant received EUR 101.28 as gratuity money during 2011, EUR 363.55 during 2012 and EUR 363.35 during 2013. He also received EUR 18.63 during 2011, EUR 111.78 during 2012 and EUR 93.15 during 2013 (between August and December 2013) for work he had carried out.

The third applicant also received various medicines provided free of charge through the PHS. From the records held by the authorities it also transpires that he was visited thirty-one times by a doctor between 26 April 2011 (following the applicant’s admission in detention on remand) and 21 January 2014. On fifteen occasions, the prescription of medicines was required and in fact twenty-eight medicines were provided to him. Those medicines were supplied by the PHS, except for cold-relief tablets and a cream, for which a generic alternative was provided. It transpires that two “self-recommendations” were registered on behalf of the applicant: a pain killer and a cream which was only available free of charge through the PHS if it had been prescribed by a consultant dermatologist, which was not the case for the applicant.