Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić

The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Surfers Paradise, Australia.

In 2003 the applicant, who was represented by a Hungarian lawyer throughout the proceedings, initiated civil proceedings against a public prosecutor assigned to the Hungarian Budapest Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Budapest Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office itself, and the Office of the Attorney General, alleging a violation of his personality rights. Given the subject matter of the dispute, the applicant was exempt from having to advance the court fees, by virtue of section 64 of Act no. XCIII of 1990 on Stamp Duties, as in force at the relevant time.

In particular, the applicant complained that a letter sent in the course of criminal proceedings conducted against him by the public prosecutor to the Pest Central District Court, the trial court in his case, had contained false information about him and thus infringed his right to honour, dignity and reputation.

The applicant subsequently modified his claim, seeking non-pecuniary damages in respect of a violation of his personality rights in the amount of 390,000,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 1,314,000 euros (EUR)). It appears that the amount claimed was an expression of the applicant’s personal estimation of the value of his reputation, rather than a sum deduced from relevant domestic jurisprudence; however, in the ensuing procedure the applicant maintained this claim.

The Budapest Regional Court delivered a judgment on 22 September 2005. It discontinued the proceedings against the Budapest Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office, since it had no procedural standing. As to the remainder of the claims, it held that the applicant’s right to reputation had been violated by the public prosecutor’s statements and ordered the public prosecutor to present her apologies to the applicant. However, it dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation, stating that it was excessive and in any event he could not prove that he had suffered any actual damage. The court further applied section 39 of Act no. XCIII of 1990 on Stamp Duties and ordered the applicant to pay HUF 879,000 (approximately EUR 2,900) in court fees. Under this rule, at the material time, the amount of stamp duty in civil cases was 6% of the claim but should attain a minimum of HUF 15,000 (approximately EUR 50) and should not exceed a maximum of HUF 900,000 (approximately EUR 3,000). In a subsequent supplementary decision on court costs, the court explained that the law required the payment of court fees proportionately to the dismissed part of the claim, and observed that the applicant’s claim was far beyond the amounts normally awarded in similar cases.

Both the applicant and the respondents appealed to the Budapest Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal on 3 October 2006. As regards the costs, the court upheld the position taken by the Budapest Regional Court, that is, that the applicant should pay court fees calculated as a percentage of the dismissed part of his claims. It further ordered the applicant to pay HUF 900,000 (approximately EUR 3,000) in appellate fees.

The respondents sought the review of the final decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that the statements of a prosecutor expressed in the course of criminal proceedings could not violate the accused’s personality rights, even if they were detrimental to him. By a decision of 4 July 2007 the Supreme Court quashed the final decision and dismissed the applicant’s action in its entirety. It found that the opinion of the public prosecutor had been expressed in the context of the criminal proceedings conducted against the applicant and thus constituted a legitimate exercise of her powers as a prosecutor. The Supreme Court further ordered the applicant to pay the court fees related to the first- and second-instance and the review proceedings in the amount of altogether HUF 1,836,000 (approximately EUR 6,000), instead of the aggregate amount of HUF 4,300,000 (approximately EUR 14,200) in principle applicable under sections 42, 46 and 50 of the Act on Stamp Duties (see paragraph 13 below).


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

Carlo Ranzoni;Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in the village of Bajorai in Vilnius Region.

On 29 December 1999, 28 March 2000, 2 May 2000, 4 May 2000, 16 August 2000 and 18 September 2000 the national authorities allocated plots of land to S.J., I.T., E.G., A.G., J.T. and A.I. and E.Š. (thus compensating them for their or their parents’ property nationalised by the Soviet regime (see paragraph 25 below)), who later transferred their property rights to Ž.S. in accordance with requests they had lodged on 28 October 1991, 10 October 1991, 22 November 1991, 8 August 1991 and 9 December 1991 respectively. The land allocated to these third parties was located in the same area as where the applicant’s father’s land was situated before nationalisation following the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940.

On 29 July 2000 the applicant asked the Lithuanian authorities to restore his property rights to 9.5705 hectares of his father’s land by giving him a new plot of land.

On 22 January 2001 the national authorities established that part of the land was unoccupied and could have been returned to the heirs.

On 15 March 2002 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the restoration of property rights of I.T. had been unlawful. As a result, a plot of land of 0.18 hectares was returned to the State.

On 30 July 2002 the applicant changed his initial request (see paragraph 7 above) and asked for his property rights to be restored in natura. The authorities asked the applicant to provide them with some documents necessary to proceed with the restoration of his property rights. In January 2003 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) asked the Vilnius City Municipality (hereinafter “the VCM”) to determine whether or not the land in question was State redeemable. In February 2003 the VCM found that the land was State redeemable and that the question of restitution had to be dealt with by the other means provided for by law. Accordingly, the applicant was asked to express his intentions regarding the form in which he wanted his ownership rights to the property to be restored.

As the plot of land previously owned by the applicant’s father was State redeemable, in March 2003 the applicant asked to be provided with a new plot of land of equal value in Vilnius.

In May 2006 the VCA asked the VCM to demarcate a plot of land, previously owned by the applicant’s father, for the applicant. However, the VCM confirmed that the land was State redeemable because part of it was already being owned by third parties and was a State forest.

In December 2007 the VCA informed the applicant that his father’s land was State redeemable and that the question of restitution had to be dealt with by the other means provided for by law. The applicant was also informed that he was included in the list of persons waiting to have their property rights restored, and was 4,055th in line.

On 5 February 2009 the authorities adopted a decision restoring the applicant’s property rights to 0.18 hectares of his father’s land and informed him that his property rights to the remaining 9.3905 hectares would be restored at a later date.

The applicant lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court and asked it to (i) annul the decisions of the authorities to restore property rights to his father’s land to third parties on the grounds that they were unlawful, (ii) award him 1,422,791 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 412,069 euros (EUR)) in compensation in respect of pecuniary damage and (iii) oblige the authorities to restore his property rights to a specific plot of land. The latter request was later withdrawn. The applicant claimed that the decisions to restore property rights to his father’s land to third parties were unlawful because he had submitted his request when the land had not yet been State redeemable. His property rights therefore had to be restored.

The VCA explained that the applicant had submitted the request to have his property rights restored in 2000, while the third parties had done so in 1991 (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). The VCA also stated that the applicant had not provided any evidence that the requirements of the domestic law had been breached in restoring property rights to third parties.

On 10 April 2009 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the legislation in force at the time did not allow for the return of the land in natura to the applicant because he did not have any buildings on that land as property (see paragraph 24 below). In 2001 the provision in question was declared unconstitutional (see paragraph 23 below). The court also held that the applicant had not lost the opportunity to have his property rights restored. It was also possible that he would be given a more valuable plot of land, therefore it was decided that he had not suffered pecuniary damage.

The applicant appealed. On 15 March 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. It held that the applicant had not asked for the land to be returned in natura until after the property rights to it had already been restored to third parties (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). The court also held that 29 October 2002 was the date when the specific location and borders of the land which the applicant asked to have returned in natura had been established. Furthermore, it did not consider that the domestic authorities had acted unlawfully, which was a precondition for compensation in respect of pecuniary damage.

In February 2012 the National Land Service informed the applicant that in order to accelerate the process of restoring property rights to citizens, the domestic law had been amended and it had become possible for him to receive monetary compensation for the land. He was also informed that if he wished to use that opportunity, he had until 1 June 2012 to provide the authorities with a written request (see paragraph 25 below). The applicant replied in May 2012 that he had not changed his mind and still wanted to receive the land in natura or, if that was not possible, a plot of land of equal value in Vilnius.

In August 2014 the National Land Service asked the VCM whether it was possible to demarcate any vacant land that was not State redeemable and could have been returned to the heirs of the applicant’s father.

In November 2014 the applicant was informed that he could change his mind about the form of restitution and receive a plot of forest of equal value. He was asked by letter to make a decision by 1 March 2015, but it appears that he did not respond.


Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 34 - Actio popularis;Victim);Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for correspondence;Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Dean Spielmann;Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Guido Raimondi;Helena Jäderblom;Ineta Ziemele;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Josep Casadevall;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Luis López Guerra;Mark Villiger;Paul Lemmens;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in St Petersburg.

The applicant is the editor-in-chief of a publishing company and of an aviation magazine. He is also the chairperson of the St Petersburg branch of the Glasnost Defence Foundation, an NGO monitoring the state of media freedom in the Russian regions, which promotes the independence of the regional mass media, freedom of speech and respect for journalists’ rights, and provides legal support, including through litigation, to journalists.

He was subscribed to the services of several mobile network operators.

On 23 December 2003 he brought judicial proceeding against three mobile network operators, claiming that there had been an interference with his right to the privacy of his telephone communications. He claimed that pursuant to Order no. 70 (see paragraphs 115 to 122 below) of the Ministry of Communications’ predecessor, the State Committee for Communications and Information Technologies, the mobile network operators had installed equipment which permitted the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) to intercept all telephone communications without prior judicial authorisation. The applicant argued that Order no. 70, which had never been published, unduly restricted his right to privacy. He asked the court to issue an injunction ordering the removal of the equipment installed pursuant to Order no. 70, and to ensure that access to mobile telephone communications was given to authorised persons only. The Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies (hereafter “the Ministry of Communications”) and the St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Department of the FSB were joined as a third party to the proceedings.

On 5 December 2005 the Vasileostrovskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed the applicant’s claims. It found that the applicant had not proved that the mobile network operators had transmitted any protected information to unauthorised persons or permitted the unrestricted or unauthorised interception of communications. The equipment to which he referred had been installed to enable law-enforcement agencies to conduct operational-search activities in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The installation of such equipment had not in itself interfered with the privacy of the applicant’s communications. The applicant had failed to demonstrate any facts which would warrant a finding that his right to the privacy of his telephone communications had been violated.

The applicant appealed. He claimed, in particular, that the District Court had refused to accept several documents in evidence. Those documents had included two judicial orders authorising the interception of mobile telephone communications retrospectively and an addendum to the standard service provider agreement issued by one of the mobile network operators. One of the judicial orders in question, issued on 8 October 2002, authorised the interception of several people’s mobile telephone communications during the periods from 1 to 5 April, from 19 to 23 June, from 30 June to 4 July and from 16 to 20 October 2001. The other judicial order, issued on 18 July 2003, authorised the interception of a Mr E.’s mobile telephone communications during the period from 11 April to 11 October 2003. As to the addendum, it informed the subscriber that if his number were used to make terrorist threats, the mobile network operator might suspend the provision of the telephone service and transfer the collected data to the law-enforcement agencies. In the applicant’s opinion, the judicial orders and the addendum proved that the mobile network operators and law-enforcement agencies were technically capable of intercepting all telephone communications without obtaining prior judicial authorisation, and routinely resorted to unauthorised interception.

On 26 April 2006 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. It confirmed the District Court’s finding that the applicant had failed to prove that his telephone communications had been intercepted. Nor had he shown that there was a danger that his right to the privacy of his telephone communications might be unlawfully infringed. To establish the existence of such a danger, the applicant would have had to prove that the respondents had acted unlawfully. However, mobile network operators were required by law to install equipment enabling law-enforcement agencies to perform operational-search activities and the existence of that equipment did not in itself interfere with the privacy of the applicant’s communications. The refusal to admit the judicial orders of 8 October 2002 and 18 July 2003 in evidence had been lawful, as the judicial orders had been issued in respect of third persons and were irrelevant to the applicant’s case. The City Court further decided to admit in evidence and examine the addendum to the service provider agreement, but found that it did not contain any information warranting reconsideration of the District Court’s judgment.

It can be seen from a document submitted by the applicant that in January 2007 an NGO, “Civilian Control”, asked the Prosecutor General’s office to carry out an inspection of the Ministry of Communications’ Orders in the sphere of interception of communications in order to verify their compatibility with federal laws. In February 2007 an official from the Prosecutor General’s office telephoned “Civilian Control” and asked for copies of the unpublished attachments to Order No. 70, saying that the prosecutor’s office had been unable to obtain them from the Ministry of Communications. In April 2007 the Prosecutor General’s office refused to carry out the requested inspection.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan.

The applicant was employed by the State Revenue Service (“the Service”), division no. 2. On 23 February 2009 the head of the Service decided to terminate the applicant’s employment.

On 2 April 2009 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Service seeking to 1) have the decision of 23 February 2009 annulled; 2) be reinstated in her previous position; and 3) recover her average salary starting from the moment of her dismissal until her reinstatement to the previous position.

On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant’s three claims. In particular, it annulled the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned its decision, inter alia, by stating that while the Service had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time.

This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and it became final on 4 November 2009.

On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 2,131 euros (EUR) at the material time) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009.

On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution.

On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (“the DEJA”) initiated enforcement proceedings. On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks.

It appears that no further actions were taken by the DEJA and the Service in relation to the enforcement of the judgment of 17 September 2009 between the period of 25 February 2010 and 18 July 2011.

On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant.

On 29 May 2012 the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings.

On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant’s request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings. On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to 1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; 2) reinstate the applicant to her previous position; and 3) pay her her average monthly salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position.

On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life);Pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Berezniki, Perm region, together with her son, born in 2001. She is a single mother.

At the material time the applicant was teaching physical education in a secondary school in Berenzniki.

In November 2007 the applicant learnt that a photograph of her son had been published on the cover page of a booklet prepared by the Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support of the Usolskiy District, Perm region (“the Centre”), entitled “Children need a family”.

The booklet consisted of six pages, including the cover page. The boy’s photograph occupied the major part of the cover page and showed his face. Above the photograph there was a slogan “Children need a family”. At the bottom of the cover page, just under the photograph were the words: “Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support, town of Usoliye”. The second page contained two more photographs of other children, with citations from the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Russian Family Code. The third page was headed “Forms of replacing family care” and presented the various arrangements: adoptive family, tutorial family, foster home and others. The remaining pages informed the readers about the creation in the district of the Municipal Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support, the role of which was to protect orphans and assist families in adopting them. They explained what kind of support and advice families could seek in the Centre and how they could help orphans. On the last page the following was written:

“If you wish to save a child from loneliness and give him a hearth and home, come to us!”

The applicant alleged that she had not been informed about the booklet, let alone asked for authorisation for a photograph of her son to be published.

In November 2007 the applicant asked the local department of the interior and the prosecutor’s office to carry out an investigation into the unauthorised publication of her son’s photograph on the booklet.

In December 2007 the department of the interior replied that there were no grounds to institute criminal proceedings.

On 9 January 2008 the district prosecutor informed the applicant that the booklet had been prepared and published by a publishing company, A., at the request of the Centre. In total, 200 copies of the booklet had been published. The photograph of the child had been placed on the booklet by Mr P., who had been engaged by that company to prepare the layout of the booklet and who had found the photograph of the applicant’s son on the Internet. It was impossible to establish from which website the photograph of the child had been taken. The prosecutor advised the applicant to bring court proceedings to protect her rights.

The applicant did not lodge any judicial appeal against those replies.

In March 2008 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Centre before the Usolskiy District Court, Perm Region (“the District Court”) on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son.

In her statement of claim the applicant complained that her and her son’s honour, dignity and reputation had been damaged by the unlawful publication of her son’s photograph in a booklet calling for adoption. In particular, the photograph had been published without her authorisation and knowledge. The booklet had been distributed in various organisations in the town of Usoliye and in the Usolskiy District, Perm region (libraries, hospitals, police departments) and had provoked a negative attitude towards her and her son on the part of her colleagues, neighbours and those close to her. People thought that she had abandoned her son. The boy had become a victim of mockery in the kindergarten. The publication of the photograph had also affected her honour and dignity and her reputation as a schoolteacher. She requested that the court, with reference to Articles 151 and 152 of the Russian Civil Code (see Relevant domestic law and practice below), award her non-pecuniary damages and order the publishing company to apologise for the publication of the photograph.

On 23 April 2008 the District Court held, with the applicant’s consent, that the Centre was not a proper respondent in the case and that the claim should have been made against the publishing company and Mr P. The Centre was invited to take part in the proceedings as a third party.

The publishing company contested the applicant’s claims. It submitted that the material which had been presented to the court showed that a certain Mr Sh. had taken the photograph of the applicant’s son with the knowledge of the applicant. Mr Sh. had not informed the applicant of his intentions or the ways in which the photograph might be further used. Nor had he received any written authorisation from the applicant for its use. Mr P., who had been engaged by the company for the preparation of the layout of the booklet, had found the photograph on the Internet and placed it on the cover page of the booklet.

The publishing company considered that it had not been obliged to verify whether prior consent had been received for publication of the photograph in the booklet for two reasons. First, it was not responsible for the actions of Mr P., who had been working for the company on a contractual basis. Secondly, under Article 152.1 of the Civil Code (see Relevant domestic law below), consent to the use of a photograph was not required when the image was being used in the interests of the State, or in social or other public interests. By ordering the booklet, the Centre had been pursuing social and public interests and calling for mercy to be shown to orphans. The company concluded that the damage had been caused to the applicant by Mr Sh. and, therefore, the company should be exempted from liability for damage.

Mr P. submitted to the court that in 2004 he had gone travelling together with his friend Sh., who was a photographer. Sh. had openly taken photographs of other tourists, including a photograph of the applicant’s son. After their return, Sh. had sent him electronic copies of those photographs and since that time they had been saved in his computer. In 2007 he (Mr P.) had been temporarily working for the publishing company and had been asked to prepare the layout of the booklet. The text and some photographs had been provided by the Centre. He searched in his computer for more photographs to be placed in the booklet and saw the picture of the applicant’s son, which seemed to fit the booklet well. He therefore placed it on the cover page. He did not know who the boy on the photograph was.

The representative of the Centre, acting as a third party, submitted that the use of the photograph of the applicant’s son had not been agreed with the Centre. He also submitted that the booklet did not call for adoption; it was intended to provide information about the Centre. He replied to a question put by the court that after publication of the booklet, a number of people had called the Centre and asked whether it was possible to adopt the child whose photograph was on the cover page of the booklet.

It appears from the record of the court hearings that the applicant’s representative, G., submitted to the court that it had been established that the photograph of the applicant’s son had been used on the booklet without his parent’s consent, contrary to the requirements of Article 152.1 of the Civil Code. That provision was concordant with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) protecting private and family life. The publication of the photograph in the booklet constituted unlawful interference with the applicant’s private life and therefore the publishing company was under an obligation to pay compensation for nonpecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.

The publishing company contested the application of Article 152.1 of the Civil Code in the case and considered that the applicant’s consent to the publication of her son’s photograph had not been required.

On 20 June 2008 the District Court examined and dismissed the applicant’s claims. The judgment consisted of a summary of the submissions of the parties and the third party, a summary of the relevant domestic law, a summary of the witnesses’ submissions and other evidence examined by the court, and several paragraphs of conclusions. In particular, the District Court held as follows:

“... The court has established that the honour, dignity and professional reputation of the plaintiff were not affected by the publication of the booklet with the photograph of the plaintiff’s son. Thus, all witnesses submitted that they did not have any hostile feelings towards Mrs Bogomolova, the attitude [towards Mrs Bogomolova] of all those questioned [in the court hearing] remained the same: friendly, amicable; they were not aware of any instances of insults, reproaches in respect of the plaintiff. In the subjective view of the witnesses, the booklet in itself had a positive scope. The plaintiff’s professional reputation was not affected by the publication of the booklet in any way, since the plaintiff had provided the court with positive references from her workplace, where her pedagogical competences were highly appreciated.

The content of the booklet had a positive scope aimed at providing information, did not contain any defamatory details; the photograph on the booklet did not have any defects, and the text in the booklet did not contain any defamatory details either. None of the information in the booklet indicated that defamatory information had been disseminated; it did not diminish the honour, dignity and reputation of Mrs Bogomolova or of her minor son.

Therefore, the evidence submitted [to the court] has demonstrated [that the booklet had] a strictly value character, and did not contain any defamatory details, diminishing the plaintiff’s and her son’s honour, dignity and reputation in the public’s opinion and the opinion of certain individuals.

To make negative assumptions in respect of the booklet with the photograph of the plaintiff’s son on the front page amounts to an individual value judgment, which has not been included in the content and meaning of that information booklet. The court takes into account that on several occasions in 2004 the plaintiff authorised Mr Sh., a photographer familiar to her, to take photographs of her son. Sh. then forwarded the photographs to painter Mr P., who [in his turn] then placed [one of] the photograph[s] in the booklet. Mrs Bogomolova did not place any restrictions or conditions on the use of those photographs, did not seek to find out what had happened to those photographs. In addition, it follows from witness statements that after publication of the booklet, the plaintiff showed it to persons around her and at her workplace and annotated it in an emotionally skewed way, and thus disseminated false information about herself and her son with reference to the photograph [on the booklet].

Taking into account that it has not been established in the court hearing that there was any information discrediting the honour, dignity and reputation of the plaintiff and her minor son, her claims of compensation for non-pecuniary damage should be dismissed. The court also considers that the plaintiff’s claims concerning the imposition of an obligation on the defendant to provide public apologies in the SMI [mass media] ... should be dismissed ...”

On 25 June 2008 the applicant resigned from her job.

In an appeal against the judgment of 20 June 2008 the applicant submitted, in particular, that in taking its decision the District Court had not applied the provisions of Article 152.1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation concerning the protection of one’s image or the provisions of Article 8 of the Convention. She argued that in the absence of parental consent to the use of her son’s photograph, her claim should have been granted in accordance with the above provisions. She expanded on her position with the following arguments.

The booklet had been distributed in several towns in the Perm region, including Usoliye, where her parents lived, and Berezniki, where she and her son lived. She had worked for a long time in those towns and a lot of people knew her and her family. After seeing her son’s photograph on the booklet, people who knew her, including the parents of her pupils, thought that she could no longer take care of her son because she had been deprived of her parental rights. She had had to explain to her neighbours, friends and colleagues that her family was doing well and that her son was living with her. Since the publication of the booklet, children in the kindergarten had started calling her son “little vagrant” and “poor orphan”. She had been obliged to quit her job because of comments made by the parents of her pupils. The booklet provoked a feeling of pity towards children abandoned by their parents and at the same time it aroused feelings of indignation towards their parents.

On 19 August 2008 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 20 June 2008, finding it lawful and duly reasoned. Regarding the applicant’s argument about the District Court’s failure to examine her claims under Article 152.1 of the Civil Code, the Regional Court held that the court had taken a decision on the claims as they had been submitted by the applicant, in accordance with Article 196 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see Relevant domestic law and practice below). The applicant’s claims were based on the infringement by the defendants of her right to honour, dignity and reputation. She had not raised any claims on the grounds contained in Article 152.1 of the Civil Code.

By a judgment of 20 January 2009 the Justice of Peace of the Bereznikovskiy Circuit granted the Centre’s claim for recovery from the applicant of the legal costs it had incurred when it had taken part in the libel proceedings as a third party, in the amount of 5,200 Russian roubles.


Aleš Pejchal;Angelika Nußberger;Ganna Yudkivska;Helena Jäderblom;Josep Casadevall;Síofra O’Leary

The applicant, Ms Veronika Sergeyevna Abusisi (Abu Sisi), is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1978. In 1998 she married Dirar Abu Sisi of Palestinian origin, born in Jordan. It appears from the available information that by 2011 the couple and their six children lived in Palestine, where Mr Abu Sisi occupied the post of technical director of a power plant in Gaza.

On 27 January 2011 the applicant’s husband arrived in Ukraine and on 9 February 2011 he lodged an application for a residence permit with the Department of the Interior of the Kharkiv Region.

On 18 February 2011 the applicant’s husband boarded a night train in Kharkiv bound for Kyiv, where he was supposed to meet up with Y.A., his brother.

On 19 February 2011 O.Sh., an acquaintance of the applicant’s husband, notified the Railway Police that the latter had disappeared from the train and demanded a criminal investigation of his purported abduction. In a statement given to the police O.Sh. explained that on 18 February 2011 he had dropped Dirar Abu Sisi at the train station in Kharkiv. At about 10.55 p.m. on that day Dirar Abu Sisi had told him by telephone that he had been on his way to Kyiv in seat 36 of carriage 6 on train no. 63. The following day, having unsuccessfully attempted to contact Dirar Abu Sisi by telephone, O.Sh. had called Y.A. and learned that Dirar Abu Sisi had not arrived in Kyiv. O.Sh. had then managed to identify and contact A.Z., the attendant of train carriage no. 6, who had told him that at about 1.30 a.m. on 19 February 2011 two strangers had taken Dirar Abu Sisi off the train at Poltava Station without any explanation.

On 20 February 2011 Y.A. also contacted the Railway Police and made a similar submission.

On 21 February 2011 the applicant came to Ukraine and alerted the prosecutor’s office, the State Security Service, the National Ombudsman and other authorities to her husband’s purported abduction.

On 27 February 2011 the applicant received a brief telephone call from her husband informing her that he was in custody in Petah Tikva, Israel. He provided her with the contact details of M.O., his lawyer there, who confirmed by telephone the information provided by her husband.

On 16 March 2011 the State Border Control Service of Ukraine informed the National Ombudsman, who had made an enquiry on the applicant’s behalf, that the only information they had in their database concerning Dirar Abu Sisi was that he had lawfully entered Ukraine on 27 January 2011.

On 17 March 2011 T.I., an investigator with the Poltava Railway Police, refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s husband’s purported abduction owing to lack of evidence of a crime. He noted that A.Z., the carriage attendant, had told the police that he had not noticed any criminal or other unusual activity during the trip and that the information provided by Dirar Abu Sisi’s relatives and acquaintances had been insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that he had been abducted or otherwise forced to leave the train.

On 25 March 2011 the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Ukraine informed the National Ombudsman that, according to the information obtained from the Israeli law-enforcement authorities, Dirar Abu Sisi had been detained on suspicion of having been involved in terrorist activity as a member of Hamas. They also noted that, following an order of a competent court in Israel, the information concerning the applicant’s husband’s arrest had been classified and was not subject to disclosure. On 12 May 2011 the Security Service of Ukraine provided similar information to the applicant.

On 28 March 2011 the Israeli Prison Department issued a certificate confirming that Dirar Abu Sisi was being held in Shikma Prison, Ashkelon, Israel.

On 26 April 2011 the applicant complained of her husband’s purported abduction to the United Nations Human Rights Committee.

On 17 May 2011 the United Nations Human Rights Committee informed the applicant that in order for her complaint to be registered, she needed to provide further substantiation and to show that she had duly exhausted domestic remedies.

On an unspecified date the applicant, represented by A.K., a lawyer practising in Ukraine, instituted proceedings in the Pecherskiy District Court of Kyiv (“the Pecherskiy Court”) complaining that the General Prosecutor’s Office had failed to act in investigating her husband’s disappearance.

On 22 August 2011 the Pecherskiy Court held a hearing in the applicant’s absence, having noted that she had been duly informed of the date and time, as shown in a return slip of the summons contained in the case file. The court further dismissed the applicant’s allegations against the General Prosecutor’s Office and stated that, in so far as the applicant’s submissions could be understood as challenging the refusal of the Railway Police to institute criminal proceedings, this complaint fell under the jurisdiction of the Leninskiy District Court of Poltava (“the Leninskiy Court”). The Pecherskiy Court then decided to forward the relevant parts of the case file to the Leninskiy Court for examination.

On 21 October 2011 the Leninskiy Court dismissed the complaint. A copy of that decision was not provided to the Court by the applicant.

In the meantime, on 19 September 2011, the applicant had contracted Y.K., a lawyer practising in Kyiv, to represent her in Ukraine.

As of 20 January 2012 Y.K. was also mandated to represent Dirar Abu Sisi before the Ukrainian courts and other authorities.

On 31 August 2012 Y.K., acting on Dirar Abu Sisi’s behalf, challenged the decision of the Railway Police of 17 March 2011 before the Poltava transport prosecutor.

On 12 September 2012 his complaint was rejected on the grounds that the decision of 17 March 2011 had been well-founded.

Following a further appeal to court, on 14 November 2012 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal (“the Regional Court”) discontinued the proceedings on the grounds that they related to essentially the same matter which had already been finally decided by the Leninskiy Court decision of 21 October 2011.

On 18 December 2012 Y.K. lodged an appeal against the decision of 21 October 2011.

On 4 February 2013 the Leninskiy Court decided that the appeal of 18 December 2012 had procedural shortcomings. Among other issues, it was lodged outside the statutory time-limit without an extension request. The court gave the applicant’s counsel a period within which to rectify the issues with the appeal.

A rectified appeal was lodged. In this document, Y.K. noted that he had only learned of the decision taken by the Leninskiy Court on 21 October 2011 in the course of the court proceedings instituted with a view to challenging the decision of the Railway Police of 17 March 2011. The applicant, for her part, had only learned of it from Y.K.’s electronic mail in the beginning of December 2012.

On 1 April 2013 the Leninskiy Court rejected the request for an extension of the time-limit, finding that no good reason for missing it had been provided.

On 29 May 2013 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 1 April 2013.

On 16 July 2013 Y.K., who had not been present at the court hearing, obtained a copy of the decision of 29 May 2013.

On 13 October 2013 Y.K. lodged a cassation appeal against the decisions of 1 April and 29 May 2013 with the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court (“the Higher Court”).

On 21 October 2013 the Higher Court refused to consider the appeal of 13 October 2013, having found that it had been lodged outside the three-month statutory time-limit which began on the date of the appellate court’s decision that was to be appealed against. It further noted that in this situation it fell to the appellant to obtain an extension of the time-limit from the Leninskiy Court in order to lodge a cassation appeal.

On an unspecified date Y.K. requested that the Leninskiy Court extend the time-limit. He stated that the delay in lodging his cassation appeal had been a result of the technical difficulties in establishing contact with the applicant, who had been in Gaza, an area of constant political unrest and tension, and also a result of the delay in notifying him of the decision of 29 May 2013.

On 9 December 2013 the Leninskiy Court rejected the request for extension of the time-limit for lack of sufficient reasoning.

On 27 January and 9 October 2014 the Regional Court and the Higher Court, respectively, upheld the decision of 9 December 2013. The Higher Court noted, in particular, that Y.K. had failed to provide good reasons for not lodging the appeal between 16 July (when he had received a copy of the decision of 29 May 2013) and 29 August 2013 (when the three-month statutory time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal expired).

According to public sources, on 30 March 2015 Dirar Abu Sisi was convicted by the Beersheba District Court of membership of a terrorist organisation and production of illegal weaponry after pleading guilty to several incriminating charges. He is still in custody in Israel.

The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 (“the CCU”), in operation at the material time, read as follows:

“An appeal against a decision of an ... investigator... refusing to institute criminal proceedings may be lodged by a person whose interests it concerns, or his or her representative, with the local district (town) court ... within seven days of the date on which a copy of the decision was received ...”

“Judgments and rulings of the court of appeal taken following appeal proceedings may be reviewed in cassation proceedings.

Judgments of the local courts ... other rulings (decisions) of these courts ... which impede further examination of the case, rulings of the appellate courts taken with respect to these judgments [or] rulings (decisions) ... may also be reviewed in cassation proceedings.”

“Cassation appeals against the court decisions mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 383 of the present Code may be lodged within three months of the date on which they enter into force ...”

“... Decisions and rulings of the appellate and cassation courts shall enter into force immediately upon their delivery, except in cases envisaged by this Code ...”


Ineta Ziemele;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant, Ms Selvi Beçaj, is an Albanian national, who was born in 1983 and lives in Tirana. She was initially represented by Ms E. Meli and, subsequently, by Ms E. Kokona, lawyers practising in Tirana.

The Albanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their then Agent, Ms L. Mandia and, subsequently, by Ms A. Hicka of the State Advocate’s Office.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 10 February 2010 the applicant was appointed, pursuant to a service contract (kontratë shërbimi), as first secretary at the Permanent Mission of Albania to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna, Austria (“the Permanent Mission”).

On 5 December 2011 the applicant went on maternity leave. She gave birth to a child on 9 January 2012.

On 24 January 2012 the Minister of Foreign Affairs (“the Minister”) decided to terminate the applicant’s employment as from 24 February 2012.

On 24 February 2012 the Minister appointed the applicant to work as a specialist at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“the Ministry”) in Tirana. The applicant declined the offer.

On 22 March 2012 it was confirmed that the applicant had been divested of her diplomatic status and the benefits that derived from the exercise of her job as first secretary.

On 23 February 2012 the applicant challenged the Minister’s decision of 24 January 2012 before the Tirana District Court (“the District Court”).

On 4 May 2012 the District Court partially accepted the applicant’s civil action. It found that the termination of her employment while she was on maternity leave was in breach of Articles 105/a and 107 § 1 of the Labour Code. It therefore annulled the Minister’s decision of 24 January 2012 and ordered the applicant’s reinstatement. The District Court further held that the reasons advanced by the applicant’s employer for the termination of her employment, such as the commission of traffic offences in Austria, did not prevail over the legal guarantees afforded to women during the post-natal leave period. The District Court decided that its decision should be provisionally enforced in accordance with Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”). Having regard to the applicant’s situation and the position she occupied, the District Court ordered that, in addition to her reinstatement, the applicant’s accreditation should be renewed and her benefits restored, including the grant of a residence permit, provision of accommodation, payment of salary and provision of medical examinations which had started in the applicant’s place of residence on account of her employment (paditësja vlerësohet se duhet të kthehet në një detyrë, e cila për nga rëndësia dhe specifikat e saj, implikon procedura të caktuara që lidhen me akreditimin dhe ripërfitimin e benefiteve (leja e qendrimit, përfitimi i pagës, ekzaminimet mjekësore të nisura në vendin e qendrimit për shkak të punës)). The Ministry appealed.

On 22 November 2012 the Tirana Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision.

On 17 December 2012 the Ministry appealed to the Supreme Court. The proceedings are currently pending before that court.

On 22 June 2012 the District Court issued a writ of execution in respect of its decision of 4 May 2012 in accordance with Articles 510 and 511 of the CCP.

On 9 July 2012 the bailiff unsuccessfully requested the Ministry to comply voluntarily with the District Court’s decision, as upheld by the Court of Appeal.

On 27 July 2012, having regard to the Ministry’s failure to comply with the District Court’s decision voluntarily, the bailiff decided to proceed with the mandatory enforcement thereof.

On 12 December 2012, having regard to the Ministry’s failure to enforce the decision, the bailiff warned the Ministry that it would be fined in accordance with Article 606 of the CCP.

The Government submitted that on 19 December 2012, at the applicant’s request, the bailiff decided to terminate the enforcement proceedings (pushimin e ekzekutimit me kërkesë të kreditorit). It transpired from the bailiff’s decision that the applicant had decided to transfer the file to another bailiff’s office for supervision and enforcement (për ta transferuar te një përmbarues tjetër).

The Government further submitted that pursuant to the Minister’s order no. 222 of 13 May 2013 the applicant had been appointed as first secretary, a position equivalent to the one she used to hold, at the Consulate General of Albania in Istanbul, Turkey (“the Consulate General”). The Ministry’s letter to the Consulate General of 14 May 2013, as submitted by the applicant, stated that “the Ministry undertakes to pay Ms Beçaj only her monthly salary (Ministria...merr përsipër vetëm shpenzimet e pagës mujore)”.

On 1 August 2013 the State Advocate’s Office sent a letter to the Ministry, the relevant extracts of which read as follows:

“Having regard to the circumstances in which the applicant, Ms Beçaj, has lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights about the delayed enforcement of the District Court’s decision of 4 May 2012, as upheld by the Court of Appeal’s decision of 22 November 2012, and the recent development whereby the applicant has already taken up employment as first secretary at the Consulate General of the Republic of Albania in Istanbul, we request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contact Mr Beçaj and ask her to withdraw the application [lodged] with the European Court of Human Rights, in so far as the State complied with its obligation to enforce the court decision by way of order no. 222 of 13 May 2013, notwithstanding the applicant’s withdrawal from the enforcement proceedings (kërkojmë nga ana e Ministrisë së Punëve të Jashtme të bëjë të mundur kontaktimin me Znj. Beçaj dhe kërkimin prej saj të heqjes dorë prej aplikimit në Gjykatën Evropiane të të Drejtave të Njeriut, për sa kohë detyrimet e shtetit ndaj ekzekutimit të vendimit gjyqësor të sipërpërmendur janë plotësuar nëpërmjet urdhrit nr. 222 datë 13.05.2013, pavarësisht prej heqjes dorë prej saj nga ekzekutimi i këtij të fundit).”

On 6 August 2013 the Ministry sent a letter to the Consulate General, the relevant extracts of which read as follows:

“In their request for the protection of the State’s interests, the State Advocate’s Office request the Ministry, having regard to Ms Beçaj’s appointment as first secretary at the Consulate General, [to ask her] to withdraw the application she has lodged with the European Court of Human Rights (Avokatura e Shtetit në kërkesën e saj për mbrojtjen e të drejtave të shtetit shqiptar kërkon nga MPJ që duke u nisur nga kushtet kur Znj. Beçaj është emëruar si Sekretare e Parë në Konsullatën e Përgjithshme të RSH-së në Stamboll të heq dorë nga e drejta e ankimit pranë GJEDNJ-së).”

On 20 December 2013, as part of her observations, the applicant submitted a statement, which she had signed on 27 August 2013, withdrawing her application from the Court. The statement reads as follows:

“Further to the State Advocate’s Office’s letter ... about my position concerning the application lodged by me, Silvi Beçaj, before the European Court of Human Rights, I inform [you] that I withdraw from pursuing this application before that court (referuar shkresës së Avokaturës së Shtetit...mbi qendrimin tim personal mbi çështjen e ngritur prej meje, Silvi Beçaj, në Gjykatën e të Drejtave të NJeriut, Strasbourg, informoj se jap dorëheqjen për vazhdimin e kësaj çështje pranë kësaj gjykate).”

She maintained that the statement was made as a result of pressure exerted by the Government.

Article 104 § 1 provides that the duration of maternity leave is thirtyfive days in respect of pre-natal leave and forty-two days in respect of post-natal leave. Article 105 § 2 states that when the period of post-natal leave is over, a woman may decide whether she wishes to return to work or benefit from social insurance entitlements. Under Article 105/a, in the event that a woman’s employer terminates her employment during her pregnancy or following her return to work after the birth of a child, the employer must prove that the reason for the termination was not the woman’s pregnancy or the birth of the child. Under Article 107 § 1 the termination of employment is void if it takes place during the period in which the woman is entitled to social insurance payments subsequent to the birth of a child.

Under Article 317 a court decision may be provisionally enforced if it concerns payment of damages owing to unjust dismissal from work. Its provisional enforcement may also be ordered, if, owing to the delay in enforcement, the plaintiff may suffer significant damage which cannot be remedied or if the enforcement would become impossible or would be made exceedingly difficult.

Article 510 provides that a court decision which orders provisional enforcement thereof constitutes an execution title. Under Article 511 the execution title is enforceable at the creditor’s request.


Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Luis López Guerra

The applicant, Mr Jude Kasangaki, is a Ugandan national, who was born in 1977 and lives in Dronten. He was represented before the Court by Mr G.J. Dijkman, a lawyer practising in Utrecht.

On 19 February 2010 the applicant lodged a request for asylum.

On 12 October 2011 the Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Policy (Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel) gave a decision rejecting the applicant’s request as lacking an established basis in fact. This constituted a return decision (terugkeerbesluit).

The applicant lodged an appeal (beroep).

The Regional Court held a hearing on 24 January 2012. It sat in a formation consisting of a single judge, Judge L.

On 30 October 2012 the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague, sitting in Zwolle, gave a decision dismissing the appeal. The decision states that it was given by two judges, Judge L. and Judge S. It was signed by Judge S. and the registrar (griffier).

The applicant lodged a further appeal (hoger beroep) with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State) (hereafter “the Administrative Jurisdiction Division”). In addition to challenging the decision of the Regional Court on substantive grounds, he submitted a ground of appeal to the effect that the Regional Court had given its decision in a different composition than that which had held the hearing, and an illegal two-judge composition at that.

On 26 March 2013 the Regional Court informed the Administrative Jurisdiction Division at its request that the hearing had been presided over by Judge L. and that Judge L. and the registrar had discussed the case together. However, circumstances had led to the decision that the case should be further dealt with by Judge S. Judge S. and the registrar had discussed the case in private. The parties had not been informed of this development except through the decision in issue.

The Administrative Jurisdiction Division gave its decision on 18 April 2013. Noting that neither party had assented to the replacement of Judge L. without a new hearing and the decision had been signed by a different judge than the one who had presided over the hearing, it allowed the appeal without going into any of the other grounds, quashed the decision of the Regional Court and remitted the case for rehearing.

The Court has not been informed of the outcome of any subsequent proceedings.

On 29 November 2012, the applicant’s appeal having been dismissed by the Regional Court, the applicant was questioned by a police officer. The official record drawn up by the latter includes the following:

“I [the police officer] gave the alien the requisite information. He stated: I have had discussions with the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en naturalisatiedienst; ‘IND’) and with my lawyer Mr Gerben Dijkman. I know that I am to leave the Netherlands. My lawyer has lodged an appeal. That was dismissed. I know that I should have left the Netherlands on 30 October 2012. My lawyer has told me that I had 28 days after 30 October 2012 to leave the Netherlands. I had an appointment yesterday to discuss this. I was collected today from the asylum seekers’ centre in Almere. I have no work. I have lived at the asylum seekers’ centre continuously. I had food and drink there and I could sleep there. I have no money. I have no residence permit for any other European country. I have no relatives in the Netherlands or any other European country. I receive medication against stress and nightmares. I have no business interests in the Netherlands or any other European country.

I asked the alien whether he had understood me. He stated that he had understood me and understands what I have told him.

I have told him that I am placing him in aliens’ detention (vreemdelingenbewaring) because I do not trust him to leave the Netherlands, considering that he had 28 days to leave the Netherlands after 30 October 2012 and today is Thursday 29 November 2012. The alien had no satisfactory explanation for this. He did not wish to contact the Ugandan embassy or consulate.”

The police officer, acting in the name of the Deputy Minister for Security and Justice (Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, by this time the successor to the Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Policy), ordered the applicant taken into aliens’ detention pursuant to section 59(1), introductory sentence and sub a, of the Aliens Act 2000 ((Vreemdelingenwet 2000), see below). According to the decision (a tick-box form), the measure was required by:

“the interests of public order because

there is a danger that the person concerned will evade supervision

the person concerned is evading or impeding the preparation of his departure or the expulsion procedure;

which is borne out by the facts or circumstances that the alien

has previously received a visa, decision, information note or order from which the duty to leave the Netherlands is apparent and he has not done so of his own accord within the time-limit implied therein or set for that purpose;

has no fixed abode;

has no adequate means of subsistence[.]”

On various occasions the applicant was invited to cooperate in obtaining the requisite Ugandan travel documents and leave the country voluntarily. Each time he refused.

The applicant lodged an appeal against the detention order with the Regional Court (section 94(1) of the Aliens Act 2000; see below), which, having held a hearing on 10 December 2012, gave a decision on 17 December 2012 finding that the applicant’s detention was lawful. The applicant lodged a further appeal against this decision with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, which was dismissed on 25 January 2013.

The applicant lodged two more appeals with the Regional Court of The Hague challenging his continued detention. The applicant sought his release on the ground that there was no realistic prospect of his actually being expelled. Decisions continuing the applicant’s detention were given on 29 January 2013 and 12 March 2013.

The applicant lodged a fourth appeal, invoking the same ground, on 10 April 2013.

A hearing took place on 23 April 2013 before the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Utrecht. Neither the applicant nor the Deputy Minister attended. On the same day the Deputy Minister informed the Regional Court by fax that the detention measure had been lifted.

Invited to comment, the applicant’s representative replied by fax the following day that he wished to continue the proceedings in order to claim damages under section 106 of the Aliens Act 2000 (see below). He argued that the applicant’s detention had become retrospectively unlawful as a result of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division’s decision of 18 April 2013 (see above).

On 4 June 2013 the Regional Court gave a decision dismissing the appeal. Its reasoning included the following:

“The Regional Court considers that the fact that the decision of the Regional Court, sitting in Zwolle, of 30 October 2012 was overturned by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division and [the case] was remitted to the Regional Court does not mean that the continuation of the detention was unlawful at the time. The circumstance that in retrospect the asylum proceedings were in the appeal stage at the time of the period of detention in issue and the effect of the decision of the [Deputy Minister] was suspended constitutes, in the opinion of the Regional Court, only a temporary impediment. Moreover, there appear to be no reasons to believe that the appeal will not be decided in the foreseeable future (binnen afzienbare tijd). Already for this reason the Regional Court cannot follow the [applicant]’s arguments on this point. [The Deputy Minister] has lifted the measure of detention because of the decision of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of 19 April 2013 and after having consulted this Regional Court, sitting in Zwolle. The Regional Court takes the view that the Deputy Minister] should be allowed a little time to consider the follow-up steps to be taken. [Since the detention was terminated] five days (including three working days) after the [Administrative Jurisdiction Division]’s decision the Regional Court sees no reason to hold that the detention was unlawful before 23 April 2013.”

No further appeal lay against this decision.

Administrative cases brought before the Regional Court shall normally be dealt with by a single-judge chamber (enkelvoudige kamer, section 8:10(1) of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht)), which may refer them to the multi-judge chamber (meervoudige kamer, section 8:10(2)).

Save as otherwise provided, a multi-judge chamber of a jurisdictional body shall consist of three judges (section 6(2) of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie)).

The relevant substantive provisions are the following:

“1. If necessary in the interests of public order, or if national security so requires, Our [competent] Minister may, for the purpose of expulsion (uitzetting), order the detention of an alien who:

(a) is not lawfully resident; ...

An alien’s detention shall not occur, or shall be terminated, as soon as he expresses the wish to leave the Netherlands and the opportunity to do so exists.

... detention pursuant to the first paragraph shall not be of longer duration than six months.

In derogation from the fifth paragraph ... detention pursuant to the first paragraph may be extended by no more than twelve months if it is apparent that despite all reasonable efforts expulsion will take longer because of the alien’s failure to cooperate in his expulsion or the documents from third countries necessary for that purpose are still missing. ...”

“1. If the Regional Court orders the lifting of a measure entailing deprivation of liberty, or the deprivation of liberty is lifted before the request for its lifting is considered, it may award the alien compensation at the expense of the State. Damage shall include non-pecuniary damage. [Article 90] of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering) shall apply by analogy. ...

The first paragraph shall apply by analogy if the Administrative Jurisdiction Division orders the lifting of the measure entailing deprivation of liberty.”

“1. Compensation shall be awarded in each case if and to the extent that the court, taking all circumstances into account, is of the opinion that there are reasons in equity to do so. ...”

The relevant legal remedies are prescribed by the Aliens Act 2000, which, in its relevant parts, provide as follows:

“In derogation from Article 37 § 1 of the Act on the Council of State (Wet op de Raad van State), no further appeal lies against a decision of the Regional Court

a. about a decision or act based on ... Chapter 5 [i.e. including section 59];

d. about the grant of compensation as referred to in section 106.”

“1. Our [competent] Minister shall notify the Regional Court of a decision to impose deprivation of liberty as referred to in [section 59] no later than the twenty-eighth day after communication of the decision, unless the alien himself has lodged an appeal first. As soon as the Regional Court has received the notification, the alien shall be deemed to have lodged an appeal against the said decision imposing deprivation of liberty. The appeal shall also constitute a request for the award of damages.

The Regional Court shall set the date for the examination of the appeal at the hearing immediately. The hearing shall take place no later than the fourteenth day after the notice of appeal or the notification, as the case may be, is received. The Regional Court shall summon the alien to appear either in person or represented by an authorised representative, and the competent Minister to appear represented by an authorised representative, in order to be heard. In derogation of section 8:42 of the General Administrative Law Act, [this time-limit] cannot be extended.

The Regional Court shall give its decision orally or in writing. If in writing, the decision shall be given no later than seven days after the closure of the examination of the appeal. In derogation of section 8:66 of the General Administrative Law Act, [this time-limit] cannot be extended.

If the Regional Court finds on appeal that the application or implementation of the decision [to impose deprivation of liberty] is contrary to this Act or is – on consideration of all the interests involved – not reasonably justified, it shall accept the appeal. In such a case the Regional Court shall order that the deprivation of liberty be terminated or the manner of its implementation altered.

The first, third and fourth paragraphs shall apply by analogy to a decision extending a measure entailing deprivation of liberty as referred to in section 59(6). ...”

“1. In derogation from section 84 under a., a further appeal against the decision of the Regional Court referred to in section 94(1) shall lie to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division. ...”

“1. If the appeal referred to in section 94 has been dismissed and the alien appeals against the continuation of the deprivation of liberty, the Regional Court shall terminate its preliminary investigation (vooronderzoek) within one week after receiving the notice of appeal. In derogation from section 8:57 of the General Administrative Law Act, the Regional Court may decide even without the assent of the parties that there shall be no hearing.

If the Regional Court in considering the appeal finds that the imposition or execution of the measure is contrary to this Act or not reasonably justified on a balance of all the interests involved, it shall declare the appeal well-founded. In that case the Regional Court shall order the lifting of the measure or a change in the way in which it is executed. ”

On 21 March 2011 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division gave a decision (no. 201100307/1/V3, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BP9280) in which it held inter alia that although there was a close interconnection between the return decision on the one hand and an order of aliens’ detention on the other, joint consideration of the two in a single appeal was possible only if both were included in a single decision. If the return decision was given separately, then the system of legal remedies provided by the Aliens Act 2000 prevented the competent administrative tribunal from considering the lawfulness of the return decision together with the order of aliens’ detention. In the latter event, it was only if the return decision was held to be unlawful in the dedicated proceedings that the tribunal called upon to consider the lawfulness of the aliens’ detention could be faced with the question what consequences might result for the lawfulness of aliens’ detention. This did not mean that the alien was denied a legal remedy in this respect, since the lawfulness of the return decision could be challenged in separate administrative proceedings and the possibility existed to seek an order for a provisional measure from the provisional measures judge (voorzieningenrechter) if need be.

On 14 May 2012 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division gave a decision (no. 201200935/1/V3, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BW6197) in which it held obiter dictum that if a return decision was annulled on the ground that it was unlawful, then any aliens’ detention ordered in pursuance of that decision became retrospectively unlawful and entitled the alien concerned to compensation under section 106 of the Alien’s Act notwithstanding any previous judicial decision finding the detention to be lawful. The actual case, however, was different in that the return decision had not been annulled on grounds of unlawfulness.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Georges Ravarani

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 25 March 1996 the applicant brought a compensation claim for damages suffered as a consequence of an expropriation of his property against the Municipality of Bar and one of the local primary schools before the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Bar.

On 11 April 1996 the applicant’s representative informed the Court of First Instance that he had initiated a separate set of proceedings to determine the value of the above-mentioned damages. The Court of First Instance suspended the above mentioned civil proceedings pending the final resolution of this matter.

No document was submitted by the parties as to whether or not the compensation proceedings have ended in the meantime. Accordingly, it would appear that the said two sets of proceedings are still pending before the Court of First Instance.

On 2 February 2004 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Court of First Instance in Bar, against his neighbour, seeking a demarcation between their two plots of land.

On 25 March 2004 the applicant amended his proposal to this effect.

On 14 September 2004 the applicant and the respondent reached a friendly settlement which was approved by the Court of First Instance on the same day.


Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Helena Jäderblom;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Nona Tsotsoria;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Vilnius.

From 2 March 1992 to 2 January 2006 the applicant worked at the Swedish embassy in Vilnius.

She began as a receptionist and translator and was later promoted to be cultural, information and press officer.

On 9 February 2001 the applicant wrote a letter to the Swedish ambassador in Vilnius. She stated that since 1998 a major change had been made to her work description – she had started managing cultural affairs, enjoying partial independence in decision-making and a high degree of responsibility for financial matters. She was considered as being responsible for certain categories of business because she had to draft budgets for cultural projects. Unfortunately, up to that point no adjustment in her contract had been made.

The contract drawn up by the Swedish embassy in Vilnius on 19 November 2001, which the applicant and the ambassador signed, read as follows:

“Work description – Sniege Naku – information officer (cultural affairs, social secretary etc.)

Ms Naku’s work description is as follows:

- handles cultural and information matters in consultation with the Ambassador and the Cultural Attaché in Riga

- programme-maker for visitors from Swedish Government Offices as well as for other Swedish authorities

- social secretary – mainly to the Ambassador but if needed also to the Counsellor, First and Second secretary’s

- replacement for D.Z. and I.N.”

The applicant submitted several letters of recommendation to the Court which were written between 1994 and 2006 by her Swedish colleagues at the embassy, including the ambassador to Lithuania between 1991 and 1994. The letters attested to her loyalty, dedication, communication skills and good working record.

The applicant also submitted another letter, signed on 30 June 2011 by her former Swedish colleague, Ms G. F. In the letter Ms G. F. stated that between 2003 and 2004 she had been posted as cultural attaché to the Baltic states, stationed in Riga, but also accredited to Vilnius, where she worked approximately one week a month. Ms G. F. stated that during that time she had worked closely with the applicant and that they had planned and carried out various projects. All the major projects had been cleared with the ambassador. The budgets had been relatively modest. Ms G. F. also stated that for the four years she had worked with the applicant she had never felt that the applicant had made a single payment without asking her, or without clearing them with the ambassador.

According to the Swedish Government, in 2003 and 2004 a new routine was introduced at the Vilnius embassy by which diplomatic staff had to take decisions on financial support payments, and the applicant lost her authority to deal with those matters independently. It was around that time that a new ambassador, Mrs M. K., was appointed.

The accreditation certificate issued to the applicant by the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry on 6 October 2004 stated that the applicant was “part of the administrative technical staff at the embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden (Švedijos Karalystės ambasados administracinio techninio personalo narė)”. The other page of the certificate stated that the applicant “did not enjoy any diplomatic immunities or privileges (asmens imunitetai ir privilegijos: NĖRA)”. It also said that pursuant to Article 38 § 2 of the Vienna Convention jurisdiction over the applicant was to be exercised so that the functioning of the embassy would not be disturbed (see paragraph 53 below).

On 3 November 2004 the applicant and the Swedish ambassador M. K. signed a document entitled “Terms and conditions of employment for locally engaged personnel at the Embassy of Sweden in Vilnius”. The document read that Lithuanian laws applied to the employment relationship between the applicant and the embassy regarding conditions such as the payment of tax, social security contributions, overtime, sick leave, the right to leaves of absence or severance payments. Pursuant to section 17 of that document, Lithuanian legislation was to be complied with as regards dismissal from work and the employer had to have “objective grounds for dismissal”. Under section 18, an employee could be dismissed for committing a criminal act, seriously neglecting his duties, or committing further breaches of the requirements of his duties despite warnings having been given.

The applicant was also the chairperson of the trade union for locally employed staff at the embassy, which was registered in 1999. Between October 2004 and June 2005 the trade union made several written complaints to the embassy about working conditions. The letters complained of a deteriorating and oppressive working atmosphere, the confused delegation of tasks, incomplete job descriptions or changes in job descriptions without local employees being consulted, a lack of clear communication, and a lack of trust. The union expressed the view that a collective agreement between the locally employed staff and the embassy could resolve such issues.

The applicant’s job description of 21 March 2005, although not signed by either the Swedish ambassador or the applicant, gave her title as “Cultural, Information and Press Officer”, who worked “in cooperation with and under the guidance of the Counsellor for Political Affairs/Cultural Attaché or in relevant matters with the Second Secretary”. The applicant’s functions were described as follows:

“Operates, coordinates and assists in cultural/information events and general promotion projects;

Coordinates the annual and long-term cultural/information and general promotion planning;

Coordinates the cultural and information budget;

Operates and assists in matters regarding press, TV and radio;

Assists the Second Secretary with the communication strategy;

Handles and prepares correspondence and inquiries related to cultural, information and press matters Responsible for the ‘cultural calendar’ on the home page;

Prepares and Processes applications for financial and other support;

Processes the annual report on culture and other relevant reports;

Responsible for the Head of Missions newspapers’ review and certain translations;

Prepares and makes drafts of speeches on certain occasions;

Acting as interpreter on certain occasions;

Responsible for collecting, filing and translating various cultural and other adequate information;

Handles customs’ matters, as well as relevant notes, and setting arrangements for other proceedings including transportations of individuals and exhibitions;

Setting arrangements for cultural events in cooperation with the Counsellor for Political Affairs/Cultural Attaché for lunches, dinners and receptions, including making guests lists writing invitation, bookings and other general assistance;

Responsible for the information material from the Swedish Institute - including ordering, filing and distribution and as well the information room;

Responsible for the ‘interpreters’ list’ and the ‘cultural board’;

Handles the annual ‘book list’;

Accepts and performs other duties assigned by the Head of Mission.”

By a letter of 17 May 2005 the Lithuanian State Civil Servants’ Trade Union (Lietuvos valstybės tarnautojų profesinė sąjunga) also wrote to the Swedish ambassador to Lithuania. The letter expressed concern that local personnel at the embassy were treated unfairly. The union also considered that diplomatic immunity in labour relations applied only to diplomats and their families. In contrast, labour relations between a diplomatic representation and staff who were permanent residents of Lithuania were regulated by Lithuanian law. This also flowed from the 1961 Vienna Convention, which did not grant diplomatic immunity from the civil jurisdiction.

On 14 July 2005 the ambassador replied to the union that the embassy was “very anxious to be a good employer”. However, the embassy “had not signed, and would not sign, collective agreements. The embassy as a diplomatic representation is subordinated by the Vienna Convention and thus does not have to adhere to the Lithuanian Labour Code”.

On 26 July 2005 Swedish radio announced and other media published articles about a report by the Swedish Labour Inspector that locally employed staff at Swedish embassies received less pay and had worse working conditions than their Swedish colleagues. The Swedish trade unions also stated that although there was no lack of legal regulation, locally employed staff would often not assert their rights for fear of losing their job.

According to the Swedish Government, in the autumn of 2005 a new post of counsellor for cultural affairs was established at the embassy, which was taken up by a Swedish diplomat, Mr T. S., who became the applicant’s immediate superior. The Swedish Government also stated that according to internal embassy memorandums drafted by T.S. the applicant was a source of conflict at the embassy. There were long but fruitless discussions concerning the applicant’s work description. According to T.S., the applicant ignored his decisions and instructions, took decisions on her own on granting financial support, failed to follow agreed plans and lacked skills in a number of areas.

On 8 November 2005 the embassy drafted a new job description for the applicant. She was named “Officer for Cultural and Information Affairs”, and was to handle “cultural matters in consultation with the Counsellor for Cultural Affairs T.S.”. Her functions were essentially identical to those given in the job description of 21 March 2005 (see paragraph 15 above). The same day, the applicant informed the embassy in writing that she did not agree with that job description because it lacked a clear definition of her responsibilities and those of T.S. She expressed a wish to involve a neutral person in negotiations over her working duties.

The following day, 9 November 2005, the ambassador presented the applicant with a “Letter of caution”. According to the letter, the ambassador saw no future for the applicant at the embassy, due to the applicant’s “difficulties to cooperate”, “lack of performance”, “constant questioning and arguing over duties to be performed” and “inability to cope with changes in [the] Embassy’s and/or [the applicant’s] own tasks”. The applicant was given two days to hand in her resignation, or the embassy would “take other action”.

According to a statement written by one of the applicant’s former Lithuanian colleagues at the embassy, D.K., on 9 November 2005 the applicant was asked to hand over her keys to the embassy and leave the premises immediately. The following day the applicant came to work as usual but was not let into the embassy. According to D.K., he saw the applicant “waiting in terrible cold for around one hour outside until the reception opened for visitors. Then she walked in, sat for a while and then left. The next day she fell seriously ill and never returned [again]”.

On 11 November 2005 the applicant went on sick leave. The sick leave certificates, issued by the Central Polyclinic (Centro poliklinika) in Vilnius, confirm that she was on sick leave as of that date. The leave was prolonged on a weekly basis and without interruption until 2 March 2006. At one point during that time, in January 2006, she was admitted for two weeks to Vilnius University Hospital’s neurology unit, where she was diagnosed with reversal ischemic neurological deficit in the vertebrobasilar basin. The applicant was also on sick leave in December 2006 and for some months in 2007.

Whilst the applicant was on sick leave, on 21 November 2005, the Lithuanian trade union confederation (Lietuvos profesinių sąjungų konfederacija) organised a protest in front of the Swedish embassy building in Vilnius against the applicant’s dismissal. The protest was covered by news outlets in Sweden. According to a statement by one of the applicant’s former Lithuanian colleagues at the embassy, K.M.P., the local staff of the embassy did not attend the protest for fear of negative repercussions.

On 23 November 2005 the Swedish embassy sent a decision to the applicant’s home address which stated that a disciplinary sanction would be imposed on the applicant – dismissal from work for gross misconduct. The ambassador stated that she had been informed on 4 and 9 November 2005 that the applicant had accused her Swedish colleague T.S. of being “unbalanced”, that on several occasions the applicant had breached security rules at the embassy by opening a window on street level that had no bars, and that she had conducted a private meeting at the embassy, which was an unacceptable use of her working time.

In written replies of 5 and 8 December 2005, the applicant noted that she had indeed called T.S. “unbalanced” during an employee meeting at the embassy, but that that had been because he had earlier shouted at her and had never apologised. The applicant also stated that staff at the embassy had never signed any safety or security regulations. Lastly, the meeting referred to by the ambassador had concerned asking a cleaning company to come to the embassy, and that such a practice had been begun by Swedish staff and had been used continually during previous years. The applicant noted that she had never received any prior warning of the accusations against her, which were a pretext to get rid of her because of her trade-union activities.

On 20 December 2005 the embassy sent a letter to the applicant’s home, stating that the embassy had had confirmation of the applicant’s sick leave from the social insurance office (Sodra), attesting that the applicant had been ill up to 3 December. The applicant was asked to present a continuous or new doctor’s certificate no later than 30 December, including an indication of when she would recover.

On 30 December 2005 the Swedish embassy dismissed the applicant from her post, effective as of 2 January 2006. The order referred to Article 136 § 3 (2) of the Lithuanian Labour Code, which permits an employer to terminate an employment contract without giving prior notice to the employee if the latter has committed an act of gross misconduct. The embassy referred to its decision of 23 November 2005 in order to impose such a sanction on the applicant (see paragraph 25 above). The embassy also stated that on 5 December 2005 it had received a sick leave certificate from the applicant that was valid until 3 December, but that no medical certificates had been presented thereafter, despite a written request. According to the applicant’s version of events, and as attested in writing by her former Lithuanian colleague D.K., in November and December 2005 she had kept the Swedish embassy informed of her illness, with her husband also taking sick leave certificates to the embassy in person. An internal embassy memorandum shows that on 5 January 2006 the applicant’s husband had taken a sick leave certificate to the embassy for the period up to 2 January 2006.

The applicant’s dismissal was subsequently mentioned on the internet site of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions as one of the mistreatments which had taken place in 2005. The report stated:

“the explanation given by [the ambassador], when interviewed by Swedish radio, was that Ms Naku was dismissed for not doing her job properly, but she declined to give further details. However, before the new ambassador took office, Ms Naku had not received any complaints about her work during her fourteen years of service. Meanwhile, [the ambassador] explained to the Baltic Times newspaper ... that, as a diplomatic representation, the embassy did not have to comply with Lithuanian labour legislation, that the tone of trade union letters was rude and that there could not be any collective agreements in a diplomatic mission.”

Arguing unlawful dismissal, the applicant brought proceedings against the Swedish embassy in the Vilnius Regional Court. She submitted that “for the last seven years I have been the Head of Culture and information projects at the embassy (pastaruosius septynis metus esu ambasados Kultūros ir informacios projektų vadovė)”, and asked to be reinstated to her former post. She also sought pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. The applicant argued that she had been dismissed while on sick leave, which was a clear breach of Lithuanian law (see paragraph 48 below). She also challenged the allegation that she had committed acts of gross misconduct as the grounds for her dismissal, contrary to what had been suggested by the embassy. Lastly, she noted that as a result of her arbitrary dismissal she had suffered loss of reputation and her health had significantly deteriorated. She stated that she had been destroyed, both psychologically and physically.

On 19 May 2006, the Kingdom of Sweden claimed immunity from the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian courts:

“Reply to civil claim – re Mrs Sniege Naku

With reference to the Court’s letter/announcement of March 6, 2006, regarding civil case No. 2-1479/41/06, the Swedish Government demands that the plaintiff’s case is refused with reference to acknowledged case law of the Republic of Lithuania (V.Stukonis vs. US Embassy and A.Cudak/Senkevic vs. the Embassy of the Republic of Poland).


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Dmitry Dedov;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev

The applicant was born in 1968 and lived in St Petersburg before the events of the case.

In 2004 several criminal cases were opened against the applicant on suspicion of kidnapping, extortion and planning an assassination.

By final judgments of 15 March 2007 and 8 October 2009, the Supreme Court of Russia found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to a total of twenty-three years’ imprisonment.

Starting from 10 March 2004, the date of his arrest, the applicant was detained in various custodial facilities in connection with the criminal proceedings against him. In particular, on 15 January 2010 the applicant was transported from a prison hospital to remand prison IZ-47/1 of St Petersburg, where he stayed until 18 February 2010. According to the applicant, the facility was overcrowded. Thus, cell 456 measuring 8 sq. m accommodated up to three inmates. The applicant further claimed that he had been denied the necessary medical treatment there. In support of his allegations, the applicant submitted several photographs of his cell.


The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Budapest.

On 22 February 2002 the applicant, then head of the Budapest Public Administration Authority, was dismissed from the civil service, as a disciplinary measure. In the ensuing labour action the parties reached a friendly settlement on 22 March 2002; the applicant was reinstated and obtained damages. However, on the same day, the Prime Minister revoked his mandate to preside over the Authority. As a consequence, the applicant left the Authority.

From this labour dispute, four sets of proceedings ensued. On 2 May 2002 the applicant brought a labour action, claiming unlawful revocation of his mandate. In parallel, the Authority brought a civil action against the applicant, claiming the invalidity of the friendly settlement and seeking the reimbursement of the compensation received by the applicant. The applicant also brought labour proceedings, claiming the unlawfulness of the disciplinary measure imposed on him on 22 February 2002 as well as his salary arrears.

The friendly settlement was annulled by a final judgment of the Baranya County Regional Court, acting as a second instance court, on 3 November 2005.

On 2 February 2010 the Baranya County Regional Court, acting as a second instance court, adopted a final judgment establishing the unlawfulness of the revocation of the applicant’s mandate on 22 March 2002.

In the labour action concerning the disciplinary measure, the Zalaegerszeg Labour Court found for the applicant in an interim judgment on 3 April 2007 and established the unlawfulness of the sanction.

As regards the applicant’s claim for salary arrears and the Authority’s action for the repayment of compensation, the proceedings appear to be still pending before the Kúria and the Budapest Surroundings High Court, respectively.