Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly);Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;George Nicolaou;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Moscow.

On 6 May 2012 the applicant was arrested during the dispersal of a political rally at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. He was detained at the police station for at least thirty-six hours pending administrative proceedings in which he was found guilty of failure to obey lawful police orders, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention. The parties’ submissions on the circumstances surrounding the public assembly and its dispersal are set out in part A, and the specific facts relating to the applicant are set out in part B below.

On 23 April 2012 five individuals (Mr I. Bakirov, Mr S. Davidis, Ms Y. Lukyanova, Ms N. Mityushkina and Mr S. Udaltsov) submitted notice of a public demonstration to the mayor of Moscow. The march, with an estimated 5,000 participants, was to begin at 4 p.m. on 6 May 2012 from Triumfalnaya Square followed by a meeting at Manezhnaya Square, which was to end at 8 p.m. The aim of the demonstration was “to protest against abuses and falsifications in the course of the elections to the State Duma and of the President of the Russian Federation, and to demand fair elections, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the international obligations of the Russian Federation”.

On 26 April 2012 the Head of the Moscow Department of Regional Security, Mr A. Mayorov, informed the organisers that the requested route could not be allocated because of preparations for the Victory Day parade on 9 May 2012. They proposed that the organisers hold the march between Luzhniki Street and Frunzenskaya embankment.

On 27 April 2012 the organisers declined the proposal and requested an alternative route from Kaluzhskaya Square, down Bolshaya Yakimanka Street and Bolshaya Polyanka Street, followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square. The march was to begin at 4 p.m., and the meeting had to finish by 7.30 p.m. The number of participants was indicated as 5,000.

On 3 May 2012 the Moscow Department of Regional Security approved the alternative route, having noted that the organisers had provided a detailed plan of the proposed events.

On 3 May 2012 the Moscow Department of Regional Security informed the Chief of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Mr V. Kolokoltsev, that a different group of organisers had submitted notification of another public event – a meeting at Manezhnaya Square – which the Moscow authorities had rejected. The organisers of that event had expressed their intention to proceed in defiance of the ban and to squat on the square from 6 to 10 May 2012, ready to resist the police if necessary. The Department of the Interior was therefore requested to safeguard public order in Moscow.

At 8 p.m. on 4 May 2012 the First Deputy Head of the Moscow Department of Regional Security, Mr V. Oleynik, held a working meeting with the organisers of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, at which they discussed the security issues. The Deputy Chief of the Public Order Directorate of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Colonel D. Deynichenko, took part in the meeting. The organisers stated at the meeting that the turnout could significantly exceed the expected 5,000 participants. They were warned that exceeding the number originally declared would be unacceptable. According to the applicant, during that meeting the organisers and the authorities agreed that since there was insufficient time for an on-the-spot reconnaissance, which would otherwise have been carried out, the assembly layout and the security arrangements would be identical to the previous public event organised by the same group of opposition activists on 4 February 2012. On that occasion, the march had proceeded down Yakimanka Street, followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, and the venue of the meeting had included the park at Bolotnaya Square (in some documents referred to as “Repin park”) and the Bolotnaya embankment.

On the same day the deputy mayor of Moscow, Mr A. Gorbenko, instructed the Tsentralnyy district prefect to assist the organisers in maintaining public order and security during the event. He ordered the Moscow Department of Regional Security to inform the organisers that their assembly notice had been accepted and to monitor its implementation. Other public agencies were assigned the duties of street cleaning, traffic control and ensuring the presence of ambulances at the site of the assembly.

On 5 May 2012 the Moscow Department of Regional Security requested the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office to issue a warning to the organisers against exceeding the notified number of participants and against erecting camping tents at the meeting venue, an intention allegedly expressed by the organisers at the working meeting. The Moscow Department of Regional Security also referred to information found on the Internet that the demonstrators would go to Manezhnaya Square after the meeting. On the same day the Tsentralnyy District Prosecutor’s Office issued the relevant warning to two of the organisers, Mr Davidis and Mr Udaltsov.

On the same day the Moscow Department of the Interior published on its website the official information about the forthcoming demonstration on 6 May 2012, including a map. The map indicated the route of the march, the traffic restrictions and an access plan to Bolotnaya Square; it delineated the area allotted to the meeting, which included the park at Bolotnaya Square. Access to the meeting was marked through the park.

On the same day the Police Chief of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Major-General V. Golovanov, adopted a plan for safeguarding public order in Moscow on 6 May 2012 (the “security plan”). The ninety-nine-page security plan was an internal document which had not been disclosed to the public or to the organisers. In view of the forthcoming authorised demonstration at Bolotnaya Square and anticipated attempts by other opposition groups to hold unauthorised public gatherings, it provided for security measures in Moscow city centre and set up operational headquarters to implement them.

Thirty-two high-ranking police officers, including eight major-generals, two military commanders and one emergency-relief official, were appointed to the operational headquarters. The Deputy Police Chief of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Major-General V. Kozlov, was appointed as head of the operational headquarters; the Chief of the SpecialPurpose Operational Centre of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Major-General V. Khaustov, and the Deputy Chief of the Public Order Directorate of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Colonel D. Deynichenko, were appointed as deputy heads of the operational headquarters.

The security plan provided for an 8,094-strong crowd-control taskforce, comprising the police and the military, to police the designated security areas and to prevent unauthorised public gatherings and terrorist attacks. The main contingent was the police squad charged with cordon and riot-control duties in accordance with a structured and detailed action plan for each operational unit. Furthermore, it provided for a 785-strong police unit assigned to operational posts across the city centre, with responsibility for apprehending offenders, escorting them to police stations and drawing up administrative offence reports. They were instructed, in particular, to prepare templates for the administrative offence reports and to have at least forty printed copies of them at every police station. The security plan also provided for a 350-strong police unit for intercepting and apprehending organisers and instigators of unauthorised gatherings. The squad had to be equipped with full protection gear and police batons. Each unit had to ensure effective radio communication within the chain of command. They were instructed to keep loudspeakers, metal detectors, handcuffs, fire extinguishers and wire clippers in the police vehicles.

The security plan set out in detail the allocation and deployment of police vehicles, police buses, interception and monitoring vehicles and equipment, dog-handling teams, fire-fighting and rescue equipment, ambulances and a helicopter. It also made provision for a 1,815-strong reserve unit equipped with gas masks, aerosol grenades (“Dreif”), flash grenades (“Zarya2”), bang grenades (“Fakel” and “Fakel-C”), a 40-mm hand-held grenade launcher (“Gvozd” 6Г-30), and a 43-mm hand-held grenade launcher (ГМ-94); tubeless pistols (ПБ-4СП) with 23-mm rubber bullets and propelling cartridges, and rifles (KC-23). Two water-cannon vehicles were ordered to be on standby, ready to be used against persistent offenders.

All units were instructed to be vigilant and thorough in detecting and eliminating security threats and to be polite and tactful in their conduct visà-vis citizens, engaging in a lawful dialogue with them without responding to provocations. If faced with an unauthorised gathering they were instructed to give a warning through a loudspeaker, to arrest the most active participants and to record video footage of those incidents. The police chiefs were instructed to place plain-clothes officers among the protesters in order to monitor the threat of violence and terrorist attacks within the crowd and to take measures, where appropriate, to prevent and mitigate the damage and to pursue the perpetrators.

The Chief of the Interior Department of the Tsentralnyy Administrative District of Moscow, Police Major-General V. Paukov, was required, among other tasks, to prepare, together with the organisers, the text of the public announcement to be made if the situation deteriorated. The head of the press communication service of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Internal Service Lieutenant-Colonel Y. Alekseyeva, was in charge of communication with the press. The head of the Department for Liaison with Civil Society of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Internal Service Colonel V. Biryukov, had to ensure “coordination with the representatives of public organisations and also coordination and information flow with other services of the Moscow Department of the Interior”.

The units assigned to police the march and the meeting belonged to “Zone no. 8” (Kaluzhskaya Square, Bolotnaya Square and the adjacent territory). The zone commander was the Chief of the Riot Police of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Colonel P. Smirnov, with nine high-ranking police officers (Police Colonel P. Saprykin, Police Colonel A. Zdorenko, Police Lieutenant-Colonel A. Tsukernik, Police Colonel A. Kuznetsov, Police Colonel V. Yermakov, Police Colonel A. Kasatkin, Police Colonel A. Dvoynos, Police Captain R. Bautdinov and Internal Service Lieutenant-Colonel D. Bystrikov) as his deputies.

The units assigned to Zone no. 8 comprised 2,400 riot police officers, of whom 1,158 were on duty at Bolotnaya Square. They were instructed, in particular, to search the demonstrators to prevent them from taking camping tents to the site of the meeting and to obstruct access to Bolshoy Kamenyy bridge, diverting the marchers to Bolotnaya embankment, the site of the meeting. The adjacent park at Bolotnaya Square had to be cordoned off, and the only entrance to Bolotnaya embankment – from Malyy Kamenny bridge – had to be equipped with fourteen metal detectors, which were to be removed just before the march approached the site of the meeting. An exception was made for the organisers and the technical staff, who were allowed access behind the stage through two additional metal detectors. Further arrangements were made for access of the press.

Lastly, the command of Zone no. 8, in particular Police Colonels Smirnov and Saprykin, were under orders to meet the organisers in person at the beginning of the event to remind them of their responsibilities and to have them sign an undertaking. The organisers would undertake to ensure the lawful and safe conduct of the event, and to refrain from any calls for forced change of the constitutional order and from hate speech and propaganda in favour of violence or war. They would also undertake to be present at the venue until the end of the assembly and the departure of the participants. A video recording of the briefing and the signing of the undertaking had to be made.

At about 1.30 p.m. on 6 May 2012 the organisers were allowed access to Bolotnaya Square to set up the stage and sound equipment. The police searched the vehicles delivering the equipment and seized three tents found amid the gear. They arrested several people for bringing the tents, and the installation of the equipment was delayed. During that time communication between the organisers setting up the stage and those leading the march was sporadic.

At the beginning of the march, Police Colonel A. Makhonin met the organisers at Kaluzhskaya Square to clarify any outstanding organisational matters and to have them sign the undertaking to ensure public order during the demonstration. He specifically asked Mr Udaltsov to ensure that no tents were placed on Bolotnaya Square and that the participants complied with the limits on the place and time allocated for the assembly. The organisers gave their assurances on those issues and signed the undertaking.

The march began at 4.30 p.m. at Kaluzhskaya Square. It went down Yakimanka Street peacefully and without disruption. The turnout exceeded expectations, but there is no consensus as to the exact numbers. The official estimate was that there were 8,000 participants, whereas the organisers considered that there had been about 25,000. The media reported different numbers, some significantly exceeding the above estimates.

At about 5 p.m. the march approached Bolotnaya Square. The leaders found that the layout of the meeting and the placement of the police cordon did not correspond to what they had anticipated. Unlike on 4 February 2012, the park at Bolotnaya Square was excluded from the meeting venue, which was limited to Bolotnaya embankment. The cordon of riot police in full protection gear barred access to the park and continued along the whole perimeter of the meeting area, channelling the demonstration to Bolotnaya embankment. Further down the embankment there was a row of metal detectors at the entrance to the meeting venue. By that time the stage had been erected at the far end of Bolotnaya embankment and a considerable number of people had already accumulated in front of it.

Faced with the police cordon and unable to access the park, the leaders of the march – Mr S. Udaltsov, Mr A. Navalnyy, Mr B. Nemtsov and Mr I. Yashin – stopped and demanded that the police open access to the park. According to the protesters, they were taken aback by the alteration of the expected layout and were unwilling to turn towards Bolotnaya embankment; they therefore demanded that the police officers at the cordon move the cordon back to allow sufficient space for the protesters to pass and to assemble for the meeting. According to the official version, the protesters were not interested in proceeding to the meeting venue; they stopped because they had either intended to break the cordon in order to proceed towards Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge and then to the Kremlin, or to stir up the crowd to incite disorder. It is common ground that the cordon officers did not enter into any discussion with the protest leaders and no senior officer was delegated to negotiate. After about fifteen minutes of attempting to engage with the cordon officers, at 5.16 p.m. the four leaders announced that they were going on a “sit-down strike” and sat on the ground. The people behind them stopped, although some people continued to go past them towards the stage. The leaders of the sit-in called on other demonstrators to follow their example and sit down, but only a few of their entourage did so (between approximately twenty and fifty people in total).

Between 5.20 p.m. and 5.45 p.m. two State Duma deputies, Mr G. Gudkov and Mr D. Gudkov, contacted unidentified senior police officers to negotiate the enlargement of the restricted area by moving the police cordon behind the park along the lines expected by the organisers. At the same time Mr V. Lukin, the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, at the request of Police Colonel Biryukov, attempted to convince the leaders of the sit-in to resume the procession and to head towards the meeting venue at Bolotnaya embankment, where the stage had been set up. During that time no senior police officers or municipal officials came to the site of the sit-down protest, and there was no direct communication between the authorities and the leaders of the sit-in.

At 5.40 p.m. one of the meeting participants announced from the stage that the leaders were calling on the demonstrators to support their protest. Some people waiting in front of the stage headed back to Malyy Kamennyy bridge, either to support the sit-down protest or to leave the meeting. The area in front of the stage almost emptied.

At 5.43 p.m. the media reported that Mr Udaltsov had demanded that the protesters be given airtime on Russia’s main television channels, that the presidential inauguration of Mr Putin be cancelled and that new elections be called.

At 5.50 p.m. the crowd around the sit-down protest built up, which caused some congestion, and the leaders abandoned the protest and headed towards the stage, followed by the crowd.

At 5.55 p.m. the media reported that the police authorities were regarding the strike as a provocation of mass disorder and were considering prosecuting those responsible for it.

At the same time a commotion arose near the police cordon at the place vacated by the sit-down protest, and the police cordon was broken in several places. A crowd of about 100 people spilled over to the empty space beyond the cordon. Within seconds the police restored the cordon, which was reinforced by an additional riot police force. Those who found themselves outside the cordon wandered around, uncertain what to do next. Several people were apprehended, others were pushed back inside the cordon, and some continued to loiter outside or walked towards the park. The police cordon began to push the crowd into the restricted area and advanced by several metres, pressing it inwards.

At 6 p.m. Police Colonel Makhonin told Ms Mityushkina to make an announcement from the stage that the meeting was closed. She did so, but apparently her message was not heard by most of the demonstrators or the media reporters broadcasting from the spot. The live television footage provided by the parties contained no mention of her announcement.

At the same time a Molotov cocktail was launched from the crowd at the corner of Malyy Kamenny bridge over the restored police cordon. It landed outside the cordon and the trousers of a passer-by caught fire. The fire was promptly extinguished by the police.

At 6.15 p.m. at the same corner of Malyy Kamenny bridge the riot police began breaking into the demonstration to split the crowd. Running in tight formations, they pushed the crowd apart, arrested some people, confronted others and formed new cordons to isolate sections of the crowd. Some protesters held up metal barriers and aligned them so as to resist the police, threw various objects at the police, shouted and chanted “Shame!” and other slogans, and whenever the police apprehended anyone from among the protesters they attempted to pull them back. The police applied combat techniques and used truncheons.

At 6.20 p.m. Mr Udaltsov climbed onto the stage at the opposite end of the square to address the meeting. At that time many people were assembled in front of the stage, but, as it turned out, the sound equipment had been disconnected. Mr Udaltsov took a loudspeaker and shouted:

“Dear friends! Unfortunately we have no proper sound, but we will carry on our action, we are not going away because our comrades have been arrested, because tomorrow is the coronation of an illegitimate president. We shall begin an indefinite protest action. You agree? We shall not leave until our comrades are released, until the inauguration is cancelled and until we are given airtime on the central television channels. You agree? We are power here! Dear friends, [if] we came out in December [2011] and in March [2012], it was not to put up with the stolen elections, ... it was not to see the chief crook and thief on the throne. Today we have no choice – stay here or give the country to crooks and thieves for another six years. I consider that we shall not leave today. We shall not leave!”

At this point, at 6.21 p.m., several police officers arrested Mr Udaltsov and took him away. Mr Navalnyy attempted to go up onto the stage, but he was also arrested at the stairs and taken away. As he was pushed out by the police officers he turned to the crowd shouting “Nobody shall leave!”

At 6.25 p.m. the police arrested Mr Nemtsov, who had also attempted to address people from the stage.

Meanwhile, at the Malyy Kamenny bridge the police continued dividing the crowd and began pushing some sections away from the venue. Through the loudspeakers they requested the participants to leave for the metro station. The dispersal continued for at least another hour until the venue was fully cleared of all protesters.

On 6 May 2012 Police Colonel Deynichenko drew up a report summarising the security measures taken on that day in Moscow. The report stated that the march, in which about 8,000 people had participated, had begun at 4.15 p.m. and had followed the route to Bolotnaya Square. It listed the groups and organisations represented, the number of participants in each group, the number and colours of their flags and the number and content of their banners. It further stated as follows:

“... at 5.04 p.m. the organised column ... arrived at the [cordon] and expressed the intention to proceed straight to Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge and [to cross it] to Borovitskaya Square. The police ... ordered them to proceed to Bolotnaya Square, the venue of the meeting. However, the leaders at the head of the column – [Mr Udaltsov, Mr Nemtsov and Mr Navalnyy] – ... called on the marchers through the loudspeaker not to move. Together with some thirty protesters they sat on the ground. Another group of about twenty, called by [their leaders], sat as well. The police ... repeatedly warned them against holding an unauthorised public gathering and required them to proceed to the venue of the meeting or to leave. Besides that, two State Duma deputies, Gennadiy Gudkov and Dmitriy Gudkov, the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Lukin, and a member of the Civic Chamber, Nikolay Svanidze, talked to them, but those sitting on the ground did not react and continued chanting slogans ... From 5.58 p.m. to 7 p.m. persons on Malyy Kamennyy bridge and Bolotnaya embankment made attempts to break the cordon, and threw empty glass bottles, fireworks, chunks of tarmac and portable metal barriers at the police officers. From 5 to 6 p.m. music was playing on the stage ... At 5.20 p.m. ... a deputy of the Vologda Regional Duma called on the participants to head to the Malyy Kamennyy bridge to support those sitting on the ground ... At 6 p.m. one of the organisers, Ms Mityushkina ..., went on the stage and declared the meeting closed. At 6.20 p.m. Mr Udaltsov went on the stage and called on the people to take part in an indefinite protest action.

At 7 p.m. a group of about 20 individuals including Ms Mityushkina ... attempted to put up three one-sleeper camping tents on Bolotnaya embankment.

From 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. necessary measures were taken to push the citizens away from Malyy Kamennyy bridge, Bolotnaya embankment and Bolotnaya Street and to arrest the most actively resisting ones ..., during which twenty-eight police officers and military servicemen [sustained injuries] of various gravity, four of whom have been hospitalised.

In total, 656 people were detained in Moscow to prevent public disorder and unauthorised demonstrations ...

The total number of troops deployed for public order and security duties in Moscow was 12,759 servicemen, including 7,609 police officers, 100 traffic police officers, 4,650 military servicemen and 400 members of voluntary brigades.

As a result of the measures taken by the Moscow Department of the Interior the tasks of maintaining public order and security have been fully discharged, and no emergency incidents have been allowed to occur.”

On the same day the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened a criminal investigation into suspected offences of mass disorder and violent acts against the police (Article 212 § 2 and Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code).

On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day.

On 22 June 2012 the Investigative Committee set up a group of twenty-seven investigators and put them in charge of the criminal file concerning the events of 6 May 2012.

On an unspecified date two human-rights activists filed a request with the Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation into the conduct of the police in the same events; they complained, in particular, of the suppression of a lawful public assembly. Another petition was filed, also on an unspecified date, by forty-four human-rights activists and members of NGOs, calling for the curbing of repression against those who had been arrested and prosecuted in relation to the events of 6 May 2012 and denying that mass riots had taken place at Bolotnaya Square.

Following an enquiry from the Investigative Committee about publication of the maps of the assembly of 6 May 2012, on 13 August 2012 the Moscow Department of the Interior replied as follows:

“... on 5 May 2012 the Moscow Department of the Interior published on its official website ... a notice on ‘Safeguarding public order in Moscow during the public events on 6 May’. The notice included information about the route, the map of traffic restrictions and information about the location of the socio-political events, which a large number of participants were expected to attend, the security measures and the warning against any unlawful acts during the events.

The decision to publish this notice was taken by the head of the Department on Liaison with the Mass Media of the Moscow Department of the Interior with the aim of ensuring the security of citizens and media representatives planning to take part in the event.

The pictures contained in the notice were schematic and showed the approximate route of the [march] as well as the reference place of the meeting – ‘Bolotnaya Square’ – indicated in the ‘Plan for Safeguarding Public Order in Moscow on 6 May 2012’.

On 4 May 2012 a working meeting took place at the Moscow Department of Regional Security with participants from among [the organisers and the Department of the Interior], where they discussed the arrangements for the march ..., the placement of metal detectors, the stage set-up and other organisational matters.

After the meeting ... the [Moscow Department of the Interior] prepared a [security plan] and map providing for the park at Bolotnaya Square to be cordoned off with metal barriers [and] for the participants in the meeting to be accommodated on the road at the Bolotnaya embankment.

Given that the agreement on the route of the demonstration and the meeting venue had been reached at the aforementioned working meeting at 9 p.m. on 4 May 2012, the [security plan] and the security maps were prepared at extremely short notice (during the night of 4 to 5 May 2012 and the day of 5 May 2012), to be approved afterwards, on 5 May 2012, by senior officials at the Moscow Department of the Interior.

The Department of the Interior did not discuss the security maps and [security plan] with the organisers. Those documents were not published as they were for internal use, showing the placement of the police forces ... and setting out their tasks.”

On an unspecified date eight prominent international NGOs set up an international expert commission to evaluate the events at Bolotnaya Square on 6 May 2012 (“the Expert Commission”). The Expert Commission comprised six international experts whose objective was to provide an independent fact-finding and legal assessment of the circumstances in which the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square had been dispersed. In 2013 the Expert Commission produced a fifty-three-page report containing the chronology and an assessment of the events of May 6 2012. It identified the sources used for the report as follows:

“The work of the Commission was based on the following materials:

- evidence from the official investigation, reports and statements made by the relevant authorities and any other official information available on the case;

- information from public investigations and observations gathered by human rights defenders, journalists and others; and

- reports by observers and journalists, witness testimony and video materials.

In order to provide an objective and complete picture of the events, the Commission developed a series of questions that it distributed to the city administration of Moscow, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, police authorities in Moscow, the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation and event organisers. Unfortunately the Commission did not receive replies from the city administration, police authorities or Investigative Committee. As a result, the analysis contained in this report is based on information from open sources, including materials presented by the event organisers, observers and non-governmental organisations, materials from public investigations and information provided by defence attorneys engaged in the so-called ‘Bolotnaya case’. These materials include: eyewitnesses’ testimony, videos from the media and private actors, documents and some open data about the Bolotnaya criminal case. The experts analysed more than 50 hours of video-records and 200 documents related to the Bolotnaya events. In addition, they met organisers, participants and observers of the events and attended several court hearings of the Bolotnaya case.”

Concerning the way the assembly of 6 May 2012 had been organised, the Expert Commission noted the following:

“... the Moscow Department of Regional Security announced on 4 May [2012] that the event would follow a similar route to the previous rally on 4 February [2012]. The participants were to assemble at Kaluzhskaya Square, set off at 4 p.m. along Bolshaya Yakimanka and Bolshaya Polyanka for a rally in Bolotnaya Square, and disperse at 7.30 p.m. The official notification of approval was issued on 4 May 2012 – just two days before the beginning of the event.

That same day, the [Moscow Department of the Interior] published a plan on its website indicating that all of Bolotnaya Square, including the public gardens, would be given over to the rally, while the Bolshoy Kamenny bridge would be closed to vehicles but would remain open to pedestrians. This was the same procedure [the] authorities had adopted for the two previous rallies on Bolotnaya Square on 10 December 2011 and 4 February 2012.

On the evening of [5 May 2012], the police cordoned off the [park] of Bolotnaya Square. According to Colonel Yuri Zdorenko, who was responsible for security at the location, this was done ‘in order to prevent the participants from setting up a camp and from [carrying out] other [illegal] acts.’ [The] authorities received information [that] the protesters might attempt to establish a protest camp at the site, causing them to decide that the rally should be confined to only the Bolotnaya waterfront area – a much smaller area than had been originally allocated for the assembly.

The police did not, however, inform the organisers of the changes they had decided upon, and they only became aware of the police-imposed changes to the event when they arrived at the site on the afternoon of 6 May [2012].

The City Council did not send out a written announcement that a special representative from the city authorities would be present at the event, nor did the chairman of the Moscow local department of the [Interior], Vladimir Kolokoltsev, issue any special orders on sending a special representative of the Ministry to the event.

The organisers requested 12 hours to set up a stage and sound equipment for the rally; however, on the morning of 6 May, the authorities only allocated six hours of advance access. Furthermore, at 1.30 p.m., the police did not allow vehicles with stage equipment onto the site until they had been searched. The searches revealed a small number of tents, and [the] authorities detained a number of people as a result. The police finally allowed the truck with the stage equipment onto Bolotnaya Square at 2.50 p.m., just 70 minutes before the march was due to begin.”

As regards the circumstances in which the assembly was dispersed, the Expert Commission’s report stated as follows:

“As the march approached Bolotnaya Square, [the] demonstrators found that a police cordon was blocking off most of the square, leaving only a narrow stretch along the waterfront for the rally. The police established a triple cordon of officers on Bolshoy Kammenyy bridge, which prevented any movement in the direction of the Kremlin. The first cordon was positioned close to the junction of Malyy Kamennyy bridge and the Bolotnaya waterfront. Students from the Police College and officers of the Patrol Guard Service (without any protective equipment) made up this line. Behind them were two rows of OMON [riot police – OMOН], a line of voluntary citizen patrol (druzhinniki), and another cordon of the OMON [the riot police]. A number of water cannons were visible between the second and third cordons.

[The report contained two photographs comparing the police cordon on 4 February 2012, a thin line of police officers without protection gear, and the one on 6 May 2012, multiple ranks of riot police with full protection gear backed up by heavy vehicles.]

The police cordons, which blocked off movement in the direction of the Kremlin, created a bottleneck that slowed the march’s progress to such an extent that it came to a virtual stop as demonstrators attempted to cross the bridge. Moreover, just beyond Luzhkov bridge, the marchers had to go through a second set of metal detectors, where progress was very slow since there were only 14 detectors.

By 5.15 p.m., the majority of the march was immobile. A number of leaders, including Sergey Udaltsov, Alexey Navalnyy and Ilya Yashin, encouraged demonstrators to sit down on the road in front of the ‘Udarnik’ cinema facing the police cordon to protest [against] the inability of the march to continue and to demand that they be given access to the originally allocated space for the rally on Bolotnaya Square. An estimated 50-200 people joined the sit-down protest. The leaders stressed the need to maintain a peaceful protest and appealed to demonstrators to remain calm. Participants chanted: ‘We will not go away’ and ‘Police together with the people’. The leaders attempted to address the crowds using loudspeakers, but those behind the sit-down protest could not hear or see events as they transpired. The sit-down protest did not completely block the road, but it did restrict the movement of those approaching the police lines and the bottleneck caused by the police cordon. As a result, the crowd grew denser as more demonstrators arrived from Bolshaya Yakimanka Street.

At 5.42 p.m., the chief of the [Moscow Department of the Interior] issued a statement: ‘The organizers of the rally and other participants refuse to proceed to the agreed place of the rally (to Bolotnaya Square). They [have] stopped on the roadway near the ‘Udarnik’ theatre. Some of them [have] sat on the ground and thus blocked the movement of the column. Despite repeated warnings on the part of the police to proceed to the place of the rally, they won’t move thereby creating a real threat of a jam and trauma for the participants. An inquiry commission is working on the spot to document their actions related to appeals to commit mass public disorder with a view to further consider the issue of instituting criminal proceedings.’

Some demonstrators appeared to become frustrated with standing and waiting and began to walk away. Some tried to pass through the police cordon to leave the area, but the police refused to let them through. Instead, they were directed to go back through the crowd to Bolshaya Polyanka Street, even though this was practically impossible.

The police used loud speakers to inform demonstrators of the rally location. They asked participants to pass directly to Bolotnaya Square and not stop at the bridge, despite the fact that the major part of the square was closed to demonstrators. They announced that all actions on the bridge could be considered illegal. However, given the poor quality of the sound equipment, only those nearest the police could hear this information; the majority of protesters did not hear the police instructions.

From the moment difficulties first arose for demonstrators attempting to cross Malyy Kammenyy bridge, demonstrators made repeated attempts to negotiate with the police over moving their cordons to allow protesters onto Bolotnaya Square.

Dmitry Oreshkin, a member of the Presidential Human Rights Council, and Member of Parliament Gennady Gudkov tried to talk to the police authorities at around 5.30 p.m., but there was no response. Shortly after participants broke through the police cordon at 6.20 p.m., a group of human rights activists spoke to Colonel Birukov, head of the [Moscow Department of the Interior]’s press service. At 7 p.m., Member of Parliament Ilya Ponomarev tried to stop violence during the clashes on the embankment by speaking to the authorities, but he did not get a positive response.

Many of those involved in organising the event stated that they tried to engage with [the] police throughout the day to ensure the event took place in a peaceful manner.

Nadezhda Mityushkina: ‘I tried unsuccessfully to find the responsible people in the Ministry of the [Interior] in order to solve the organisational problems. I knew whom to contact in case we needed help when issues arose ... Only at 6 – 6.30 p.m. did a police officer approach me. I knew from previous demonstrations that he was a senior officer responsible for communication with event organisers ... and he told me that the authorities had suspended the demonstration. He told me, as one of the rally organizers, to announce from the stage that the event was over, which I did following our conversation.’

Igor Bakirov: ‘A police officer in a colonel’s uniform contacted me only once, and I showed him the documents [confirming] my credentials as an event organiser. Later clashes with the police erupted, I couldn’t find anyone with whom to communicate and cooperate.’

Sergey Davidis: ‘I personally did not meet nor have time to get into contact with the authorities regarding the fences set up around the perimeter of the rally. I assumed some other organisers had already spoken to the authorities regarding this issue or were speaking with them at that time. There was no one to contact and nothing to talk about. I only saw the OMON officers who behaved aggressively and were not predisposed to get into a conversation.

At 5.55 p.m., as people tried to move through the narrow gap between the police cordon and the waterfront to reach Bolotnaya Square, the police line moved two steps forward, further pressing the crowd. This in turn generated a counter response from the crowd, and protesters began pushing back. In several places, the police cordon broke, and a few dozen people found themselves in the empty space behind the first police line. It is impossible to determine whether the breaking of the cordon was the result of conscious action by sections of the crowd or if the police cordon simply broke due to the pressure from such a large number of people. Some of those who made it past the police lines were young men, but there were also many elderly citizens and others who did not resemble street fighters. Those who found themselves behind the police cordon did not act in an aggressive manner but appeared to move towards the entrance to the Bolotnaya [park], the supposed rally point.

Different demonstrators reacted very differently to the breaking of the police line. Some tried to move away, others called for people to break the cordon, while some tried to restrain the crowd from [trampling on] those who were still taking part in the sit-down protest. As pressure and tension grew, the sit-down protesters stood up rather than risk being trampled. There was a high degree of confusion, and people were not clear on what was happening.

Just after the breaking of the police cordon at approximately at 6 p.m., a single Molotov cocktail was thrown from the crowd. It landed behind the police ranks and ignited the trousers of ... a 74-year-old demonstrator who had passed through the cordon. The police used their fire extinguishers to put out the fire. This was the only such incident recorded during the day ...

Soon after the cordons were broken, the authorities began to detain those who remained behind the police lines, taking them to special holding areas. The police also arrested some protesters at the front of the crowd who had not tried to break the cordon. The police cordon was fully restored after about four minutes.

At 6.10 p.m., Sergey Udaltsov, Alexey Navalnyy and Boris Nemtsov managed to walk from the Udarnik cinema to the stage at the waterfront followed by a large number of people. A police cordon blocked access to the stage, but they were allowed through. As they tried to start the rally, the police intervened ... the OMON officers then detained Sergey Udaltsov on stage and shortly afterwards detained Boris Nemtsov and Alexey Navalnyy as well. By 6.50 p.m. the organizers began to disassemble the stage.

In the two hours between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m., the demonstration was marked by two distinct types of activity. For much of the time, demonstrators and the police stood face to face without much happening. These moments were interspersed with periods when the police advanced and the crowd moved back. There does not appear to have been any clear reason for the police decision to advance other than to divide the crowd up into smaller sections. More than anything, the police advances served to raise tensions and provoke some members of the crowd to push back. There is little evidence that demonstrators initiated the violence. Rather, they appear to have become aggressive only in response to the authorities’ advances.

During these interchanges some protesters threw objects at the police, and the police used their batons freely. The crowd threw plastic bottles, shoes and umbrellas ...

At around 6.20 p.m. the police announced that the rally was cancelled and asked protesters to disperse. The police used a loudspeaker to state, ‘Dear citizens, we earnestly ask you not to disturb public order! Otherwise, in accordance with the law, we will have to use force! Please, leave here, and do not stop. Go to the metro.’ Although the police used a loudspeaker, the announcement was not loud enough to reach the majority of the crowd. It is likely that only those nearest to the loudspeakers could have heard the call to disperse.

There was confusion over the police demands because at the same time ... Colonel Birukov, head of the Moscow [Department of the Interior]’s press service, told a group of human rights defenders (including Vladimir Lukin, Dmitri Oreshkin, Victor Davydov and Nikolai Svanidze) that the demonstrators could continue to Bolotnaya Square to take part in the rally.

By 6.30 p.m. the crowd at the corner of Malyy Kamennyy bridge and the waterfront was cut in two. Those on Malyy Kamennyy bridge were pushed in the direction of Bolshaya Polyanka Street, while those on the waterfront were cut off from both Bolshoy and Malyy Kamennyy bridges.

Around 6.54 p.m., the police cordon that acted as a barrier along the waterfront near the Luzhkov bridge was removed, and demonstrators were able to move freely along the Bolotnaya waterfront. Approximately 15 minutes later, some 200 police officers in protective equipment who had formed a cordon at the Luzhkov Bridge began pushing protesters in the direction of Lavrushinsky Lane, which runs from Bolotnaya Square to the Tretyakovskaya metro station. At the same time, police began to push people back along the Bolotnaya waterfront from the Luzhkov bridge towards the Udarnik cinema. Those who remained on the waterfront linked arms in passive resistance. The police pushed forward, divided the crowd and began to detain demonstrators.

At about 7.47 p.m. ... authorities created a corridor to allow demonstrators to leave the Bolotnaya area.

At 7.53 p.m. a group of OMON officers appeared from the bushes of Bolotnaya Gardens and divided those demonstrators that remained on the square. Those on one side were able to move towards Malyy Kamennyy bridge, while those on the other remain[ed] totally blocked between the police lines.

At 8.08 p.m. the last groups of people slowly left the waterfront along a corridor formed by the policemen. The police also began to move people away from the Kadashevskaya waterfront on the other side of the Obvondoy Channel. Some people were detained, while others were pushed along Bolshaya Polyanka Street in the direction of the Lavrushinsky Lane.

Between 9 and 10 p.m. around two thousand demonstrators moved along Bolshaya Ordynka Street chanting slogans ... and the OMON officers began to detain people and actively disperse the column.”

On 20 March 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy branch of the Investigative Committee dismissed ten individual complaints and two official enquiries made in relation to the matter, one by Mr Ponomarev, a deputy of the State Duma, and another one by Mr A. Babushkin, President of the Public Supervisory Committee of Moscow. The complaints and enquiries concerned the allegedly unlawful acts of the police in dispersing the rally on 6 May 2012, including excessive use of force and arbitrary arrests. The Investigative Committee interviewed one of the ten individuals who had lodged the complaints and four police officers deployed in the cordon around Bolotnaya Square, including squadron and regiment commanders. They stated, in particular, that they had been acting under orders to maintain public safety and to identify and arrest the most active instigators of unrest; only those resisting the demands of the police had been arrested and no force had been used unnecessarily. The police officers stated that when the police had had to intervene, they had used combat manoeuvres and truncheons but not tear gas or other exceptional means of restraint. Squadron Commander S. explained that he had been deployed in the sector adjacent to the stage and that there had been no incidents or disorder in that sector; no one had been arrested. The decision listed thirteen other internal inquiries carried out following individual complaints and medical reports; in six cases the allegations of abuse had been found to be unsubstantiated and in seven cases the police conduct had been found to be lawful. As regards the substance of the complaints at hand, the Investigative Committee found as follows:

“... having crossed Malyy Kamennyy bridge, the column leaders stopped. Many participants in the march bypassed the organisers and proceeded to Bolotnaya Square towards the stage ... When the march participants had filled nearly all of Bolotnaya embankment, limited by the police cordon on one side and by the stage on the other side, the organisers were still at the point between Malyy Kamennyy bridge, Bolotnaya Square, [the park] and the Udarnik cinema ...

At this time the organisers demanded that the police officers let them pass through to the Kremlin. The police told them that they would not let anyone pass through to the Kremlin because the event was authorised to take place at Bolotnaya Square, where the stage had been specially set up, and they were told to proceed. After that, the organisers decided to call a sit-down protest and called upon those present to disobey the lawful orders of the police. After that, the meeting participants congregated opposite the Udarnik cinema, where after a while they attempted to break the cordon, which [the police] did not manage to prevent. Therefore the police began arresting those who had been most actively involved in breaking the cordon; they were put in a police van and then taken to police stations in Moscow. After the confrontation had been localised, the police officers slightly dispersed the crowd, having apprehended the most active perpetrators. From the very beginning of the sit-down protest the police requested the participants through loudspeakers to proceed to the stage, not to act on provocation and not to commit unlawful acts, but these requests had no effect and therefore [it was clear that] the breaking of the cordon had been organised. In suppressing it the police officers acted in coordination and concert. They did not apply force or special means of restraint. However, the work of the officers charged with apprehending offenders did involve the use of force and special means of restraint, in so far as necessary, against persons putting up resistance.

Later on, in the area of Malyy Kamennyy bridge and at the [park] corner some localised confrontations took place ... force and special means of restraint were used. All those detained at Bolotnaya Square were taken to the police stations ... Administrative offence reports were then submitted to the Justices of the Peace for consideration on the merits.

In accordance with Article 42 of the Criminal Code, any acts of a public official connected with the use of his or her official powers which have caused damage to interests protected by law may not be classified as a criminal offence if they were committed pursuant to a binding order or instruction.

After the organisers had decided to call a sit-down protest ... [they] provoked mass disorder, during which the participants threw various objects at the police, thus causing injuries to some of them. Because of this turn of events the police officers detained those participating in the mass disorder with justifiable use of force, and by special means of restraint against those who resisted.

In view of the foregoing, the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers ... is refused for the absence of corpus delicti.”

On 24 May 2013 the first criminal case against twelve individuals suspected of participation in mass disorder was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges (“the first Bolotnaya case”).

On 2 December 2013 Mr Navalnyy gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:

“The political organisers and the formal organisers, we all had a clear idea ... and the Moscow mayor’s office confirmed that the march would be the same as the one that had taken place on 4 February 2012. Bolotnaya Square is a traditional place for holding various opposition events. We all had a clear understanding what the route would be, where the stage would be, what the layout would be. We came there at that time for a rather traditional, customary event, the scenario of which was well-known to everybody ... two days beforehand the maps showing where people would assemble and the direction of the march were published on the official [news] website RiaNovosti; they are still posted there. The map was published on the [police] website ‘Petrovka, 38’ and this map is still posted there. Not only the organisers, but the participants too, they knew where they were going ... When we approached the venue of the meeting ... we saw that the map showing where people would assemble on the square had been essentially altered. It was essentially different from the map of 4 February [2012], and, above all, different from the document which had been agreed with the Moscow mayor’s office and had been published on the website[s] RiaNovosti and ‘Petrovka, 38’ ... [according to which] people were to assemble on Bolotnaya embankment as well as in the park at Bolotnaya Square. However, when we came we saw that the park at Bolotnaya Square, taking up about 80% of the square, was barred and cordoned off ... since [the cordon] did not correspond [to the map] the column stopped. The event organisers and the people who came just waited for this question to be resolved, for the police to remove the wrong cordon, for the police chiefs to reply as to what had changed, why the approved meeting was not being conducted according to the scenario that had been approved ... I had previously [organised events] ... Somebody had taken the map and changed the location of the meeting. This had practically never happened before ... to show visually that we were not moving anywhere, we sat on the ground ... the first line of [the police] cordon was composed of 20-year-old conscripts, and with a thousand people pressing on it the cordon broke. It could only break. This led to an uncontrollable situation, as several policemen were walking and trying to say something through megaphones – impossible to tell what they were saying. Some activists passing by were also speaking through megaphones – impossible to tell what they were saying. No authorities were present on the spot. And [it was] impossible to understand who was in command. So all of that caused the rupture of the police cordon. People started spreading across that spot ...Then I tried to walk over to the stage to try and explain to the gathering what was going on, using the amplifiers. I did not know then that the police had already cut off the amplifiers.

[Question to the witness] Did anybody try to negotiate with the participants of the sit-down protest?

- Attempts had been made as much as possible in the circumstances ... everybody had stopped because we all wanted to understand where the representatives from the mayor’s office were, where the appropriate representative of the Department of the Interior was. All the [high-ranking] police officers were asked, but they only shrugged. Nobody could understand what was going on. The State Duma deputies present on the spot tried to act as negotiators, but ... they said that nobody wanted to come up to us. We could see some police officers resembling chiefs, at a distance ... but it was impossible to get to them ... it was impossible to reach the [police] command. Nobody would come to us. Nobody could negotiate despite everyone’s wish to do so.

... when I was in the detention facility I lodged a complaint about the hindrance of a peaceful public event. This complaint was with the Moscow Department of the Interior. I have set out the arguments [as to why] I considered that there had been ample evidence that the officials of the Moscow Department of the Interior had deliberately provoked the crowd to panic so that [they] could later make claims about mass disorder.”

On the same day Mr Davidis gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:

“The negotiations with the [mayor’s office] were very difficult this time ... I had been the organiser of most events from 25 December 2011. It was always possible to meet the deadline, to find a compromise, [but not this time]. ... It was [only] on 4 [May 2012] that we received the written agreement. On the same day the working meeting took place ... Usually, everything is decided no later than five days before the event. This time there was practically twenty-four hours’ notice. We could not even bring the vehicles carrying the stage to the square before 1 p.m. [on 6 May 2012]. We were put under very harsh conditions ... we had to put up the stage within three hours ... At the [working meeting] technical issues were discussed, but for the previous events we held, as a matter of practice, [there was] an on-site reconnaissance: the representatives of the organisers [together with] the representatives of the police ... would visit the site, walk through the route and determine where the barriers would be put, the stage, the lavatories, so that there was no ambiguity in understanding the event. This time, because [the working meeting] was on 4 [May 2012], and the event was on 6 [May 2012], it was already clear at the working meeting that we wouldn’t have time for an on-site reconnaissance; therefore at Mr Deynichenko’s suggestion it was stated that in organising the event we would follow the example of the assembly held on 4 February [2012]. Then, it was also a march from Kaluzhskaya Square and a meeting at Bolotnaya Square. The only thing that was noted was that this time the stage would be a bit closer to the park at Bolotnaya Square, at the corner of the square, because originally the event had been declared for 5,000 participants. We had a feeling that people were disappointed, somehow low-spirited, and that not many would come. When we realised that there would be more people I told that to Mr Oleynik [the First Deputy Director of the Regional Security Department], but he told us that it was unacceptable. But it was clear that we could not do anything about it. We warned that there would be significantly more participants ... When we called Mr Deynichenko the following day he told [us] that he had had a map drawn up by the Department of the Interior, and that Mr Udaltsov could come during the day to see it to clarify any issues. During the day he postponed the meeting several times and then he was no longer picking up the phone. Therefore it was not possible to see or discuss the map.

[Question to the witness] Was the blocking of the park discussed at the working meeting, or later?

- No, of course not. The event of 4 February [2012] had been organised so that the meeting was held at Bolotnaya Square. Bolotnaya Square is an area comprising the park and Bolotnaya embankment. It was supposed that people would ... turn [like before] towards the park. It was said that everything except the position of the stage, which would be moved forwards 20 metres, would be the same as [the last] time, this was expressly spelled out. We were guided by it.

[Question to the witness] With whom was it discussed that the positioning of the security forces would be the same, [give us] the names?

- This was spelled out at the big working meeting at the office of Mr Oleynik and in his presence. Since we realised that we had no time for an on-the-spot reconnaissance, Mr Deynichenko suggested that it would be like the last time as we had already walked along this route.

... Nadezhda Mityushkina called me several times and complained that they were having trouble bringing in the equipment ... that they could not find anyone in charge. Usually it is the police representative who is responsible for the event, separately for the march and for the meeting. When I crossed [to] the area allocated to the march, even before passing through the metal detectors, Colonel Makhonin, who is traditionally in charge of the march, called me. We met. I gave him a written undertaking not to breach the law ... I told him that [two members of staff] had been arrested [at the stage area] ... he promised to release them ...

[Question to the witness] What exactly did Colonel Makhonin say? The areas allocated to the march and to the meeting, were they determined in front of the camera?

- No we did not discuss it ...

... at the turning [from Malyy Kamenny bridge] the procession came to a standstill ... some people sat on the ground ... those who sat down had justifiably asked for an expansion. I could not push through to get there. I learned that both [State Duma deputies] were conducting negotiations; I thought that it was probably going to settle this situation ... at a certain point Ms Mityushkina called me and said that the police were demanding to close the event. I explained ... that if [the police] considered that there had been breaches, they had to give us time to remedy these defects, they could not end the event at once. I called Mr Udaltsov ... and said that we were coming, [that there was] no need to end anything. Actually when I reached the corner the sit-in protest had already ended. The organisers who had participated in the sit-in protest and [other] people tried to approach the stage ...

The official website of the Moscow [Department of the] Interior published the map on which it was shown, just as agreed [and] just as on 4 February 2012, [that] the border [of the meeting venue] was outlined at the far end of the park and not the near one ... all agreements were breached.

[Question to the witness] During the working meeting on 4 [May 2012] or at the beginning of the [march], did the Department of the Interior warn you about any preparations for provocations, breach of public order, the campsite?

- No, there were no such talks with the police.

[Question to the witness] If one has a badge, does it help in principle for talking to the police?

- No, it does not make any difference. I personally called Mr Deynichenko and asked him to take measures. There was no communication with the police. The police officers did not pick up the phone calls. [I] did not manage to find anyone in charge of the police.

[Question to the witness] When, according to the rules, ... should the appointments be made to coordinate ... on the part of the organisers and the mayor’s office?

- The law does not expressly say [when] ... we received no documents from the [Moscow Government] or the Department of the Interior. We had no information as to who was responsible.

[Question to the witness] That means that at the beginning and during the event you did not know the names of those in charge?

- Except for the officer in charge of the march, Colonel Makhonin.

[Question to the witness] When the emergency occurred, who did you try calling at the Department of the Interior command ...?

- By then I was no longer trying to call anyone. I had heard that [the two State Duma deputies] were holding negotiations. I called Mr Udaltsov to tell him that they were trying to close the meeting, but he told me that they were already heading to the stage, that they had ended the sit-in protest.

[Question to the witness] Why did the police announce that the event was banned?

- I cannot explain why such a decision was taken. They themselves impeded the conduct of the event and then they ended it by themselves ...

[Question to the witness] The reason why [the event was] closed was the sit-down protest?

- As I understood from Ms Mityushkina, yes.

[Question to the witness] How did the police make their demands? Through loudspeakers?

- I would not say that it was some sort of large-scale [announcement]. It was more through physical force. But some demands were made via megaphones, there were no other means.”

On 5 December 2013 Mr Nemtsov gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:

“... I was not one of the organisers of the event, but I was well informed about the way it had been authorised. On the website of the Moscow Department of the Interior a map was posted showing the location of the police [cordon] and the access points. The map was in the public domain and one could see that the park of Bolotnaya Square should have been opened. But it turned out to be closed. Moreover, we openly announced on the Internet, and it was reported in the media, that the route would be exactly the same as on 4 February 2012 ... On 4 February 2012 there was an authorised event ... all of [Bolotnaya] Square was open, no cordons on Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge. We easily turned into the square, there had been no scuffles ... we were sure that on 6 May 2012 it would be exactly the same picture ... but the police had deceived us, blocked Bolotnaya Square, having left a very narrow passage for the demonstrators. We understood that it would be hard to pass through this bottleneck. We stopped, and to show the police that we were not going to storm the Kremlin and the [Bolshoy] Kamennyy bridge we sat on the ground ... Mr Gudkov [the State Duma deputy], ... offered to be an intermediary in the negotiations between the protesters and the police ... we waited, all was peaceful ... he several times attempted to negotiate but this came to nothing. It became clear that ... the crowd were about to panic. We got up. And an awful scuffle began ... I was moving [to the stage] ... when I arrived there I saw a strange scene for an authorised event. The microphones had all been switched off, Mr Navalnyy and Mr Udaltsov had been arrested just before me. The police never act like that at authorised events. I took a megaphone and addressed the people. I did not speak for long. Within a few minutes the police apprehended me. ...

[Question to the witness] Why, as you say, were the police particularly aggressive?

- The demonstration took place just one day before Mr Putin’s inauguration. Naturally, the police had received very strict orders. Naturally, they were paranoid about ‘Maidan’. The fact that they had treacherously breached the agreement and closed off the square, this proves that there were political orders. I was particularly surprised at Mr Gorbenko, the deputy mayor, with whom Mr Gudkov was negotiating. He is a reasonable man, but here he was like a zombie, he would not negotiate with Mr Gudkov. This was strange ... he did not want to talk like a human. ...

[Question to the witness] Did you know about the intention to set up tents, or about the breaking of the cordon?

- No, I did not know about it then.

We demanded only that [the authorities] implement what had been agreed with [the organisers].”

On 18 December 2013 Ms Mirza, the head of the Ombudsman’s secretariat, gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. She testified, in particular, as follows:

“... [on 6 May 2012] I was present as an observer ... unlike the usual events held at Bolotnaya Square, [this time] the park was cordoned off ... when we passed the metal detectors ... Mr Biryukov called and asked us to return urgently because ... at Malyy Kamennyy bridge ... [protesters] had sat down on the ground ... [The Ombudsman] tried to persuade these people to stand up and to go and conduct the meeting ... At this time the [second] riot police cordon, which had stood between Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge and Malyy Kamenny bridge, apparently approached the crowd, therefore the pressure built up from both sides ... I tried to leave the congested area ... showed my observer’s badge ... but the riot police were not listening to me, laughed slightly and continued to press, there was no reaction on their part. This somewhat surprised me because we found ourselves there at the request of the Moscow Department of the Interior.

Usually there was no such multi-layered defence. Bolshoy Kamenny bridge was blocked as if it was warfare, beyond what was required, as we thought ... among the protesters we saw several people in masks, and we reported that to the police, [as] this was unusual. The mood of the Department of the Interior was also unusual, and so was the mood of the riot police. A police chief from the Moscow Department of the Interior, Mr Biryukov, told me, for example, that he could do nothing, that he was not in charge of the riot police and that the riot police reported to the [federal] police, and this was also unusual to us. I spoke to the deputy mayor ... and saw how upset he was, and his very presence there was also [a rare occasion].

As I was later told by Mr Biryukov from the Department of the Interior, [the protesters had sat down on the ground] because the passage had been narrowed down. The passage had indeed been narrowed down, I can confirm that, I saw that, the passage was much narrower than usual, and there were metal detectors which were not supposed to be there.

Mr Biryukov was in charge on behalf of the Moscow Department of the Interior – this is absolutely certain because he is always in charge of such events. His name, his function and his telephone number were written on our badges so that he could be contacted if any questions or doubts arose. As to the [representative of the mayor’s office], [I am not sure].

[Question to the witness] You have explained about the cordon. Why was it not possible, for example, to move it [back] so as to prevent a scuffle?

- Mr Biryukov is a very constructive person and he knows his job, but he could not explain to me why he could not influence the riot police.

... [the deputy mayor also] told me that he could not do anything, it was said to me personally. At this time the breaking of the cordon occurred. [The Ombudsman] and our staff, together with a few other people, walked out through [the gap] ...

[Question to the witness] Did you receive any information while at the cordon? Perhaps you heard from the police officers about the official closure of the public event?

- No.

... After the cordon had already been broken, when the arrests had begun, [then] they were telling us through a megaphone to disperse, that the meeting was over, I heard it.”

On 23 December 2013 Mr N. Svanidze, a member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:

“... [on 6 May 2012] I was present as an observer ... [when] everybody headed towards the narrow bottleneck at the embankment ... it created a jam. Several dozen people sat on the ground, and the cordon moved towards them ... I asked ‘Why won’t they open up the passage?’, but Viktor Aleksandrovich [Biryukov] would turn his face away and would not answer when told that the passage had to be opened. I understood that there was no point talking to him, he was not in command.

[Question to the witness] Did [the Ombudsman] or anyone else attempt to negotiate the widening of the passage?

- We could not do anything. We requested it, [Ms Mirza] requested it and I think that [the Ombudsman] did too, but nothing was done. The passage was not widened.

[Question to the witness] Were there any calls to move towards the Kremlin?

- No.

[Question to the witness] During your presence at the event did you know on what territory the meeting had been authorised?

- Yes, I was convinced that [it was] Bolotnaya Square and the park at Bolotnaya Square.”

On the same day Mr Vasiliev, a staff member at the Ombudsman’s office, gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:

“... [on 6 May 2012] I was present as an observer ... on that day we gathered at the press centre of the Department of the Interior, we were given maps, instructions on how to behave, the list of public observers ...

... the Ombudsman asked [the protesters sitting on the ground] why they were not going to the meeting venue. I could not hear the answer, they got up and headed on, after that, congestion occurred ... [the Ombudsman] began looking for the officer responsible for the cordon. There was [the chief press officer] Mr Biryukov there, [the Ombudsman] told him: ‘let’s move the cordon back so that people can pass’ [but] Mr Biryukov told him that it was outside his powers. [The Ombudsman] asked in whose powers it was; he replied ‘I don’t know’. At that moment the police began splitting the crowd ...”

On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow delivered a judgment in the first Bolotnaya case. It found eight individuals guilty of participation in mass disorder and of violent acts against police officers during the public assembly on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and four years; one of them was released on parole. Three co-defendants had previously been pardoned under the Amnesty Act and a fourth had his case disjoined from the main proceedings.

On 22 May 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy branch of the Investigative Committee dismissed five complaints by individuals who had sustained injuries on 6 May 2012, allegedly through the excessive use of force by the police. The complaints had originally been a part of the criminal investigation file concerning the mass disorder, but were subsequently disjoined from it. During the investigation of the mass disorder case, confrontations were conducted between those who had lodged complaints (in the capacity of the accused in the criminal case) and the police officers accused of violence (in the capacity of victims in the criminal case). The relevant part of the decision read as follows:

“In suppressing attempts to break the police cordon, the police officers acted in coordination and concert, without applying physical force or special means of restraint; however, the work of the officers charged with apprehending offenders did involve physical force and special means of restraint, in so far as necessary [to restrain] those resisting.

After the crowd of protesters had calmed down and thinned out a little, the police officers began to tighten the cordon, [and] by doing so encouraged the citizens to proceed to the stage. At the same time many participants in the meeting who did not want to go there began to return to Bolshaya Yakimanka Street in Moscow. The police also accompanied them.

Later, in the area of Malyy Kamennyy bridge and at the corner of the park [at Bolotnaya Square] confrontations took place between the provocateurs, the persons calling for defiance and the persons displaying such defiance. During the apprehension of those persons force was used by the police because of their resistance, and in a number of cases, special means of restraint were also used for apprehending the most active instigators.

Because of such a turn of events the police officers justifiably used physical force to apprehend the participants in the mass disorder, and also special means of restraint in relation to some of them who attempted to resist.”

On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 21 February 2014, having slightly reduced the prison sentences for two of the defendants.

On 24 July 2014 the Moscow City Court found Mr Udaltsov and Mr Razvozzhayev guilty of organising mass disorder on 6 May 2012. The judgment contained the following findings:

“The witness Mr Deynichenko testified that on 4 May 2012 he had taken part in a working meeting at the Moscow Department of Regional Security... as a follow-up to the meeting a draft security plan was prepared, and all necessary agreements were reached with the organisers concerning the order of the march and meeting, the movement of the column, the stage set-up, access to the meeting venue, barriers and the exit from the stage; the [organisers] had agreed on that. The question of using the park at Bolotnaya Square was not raised because the declared number of participants was 5,000, whereas over 20,000 people could be accommodated in the open area of the square and the embankment, and [the organisers] had known that in advance. It had been discussed with them how the cordon would be placed from Malyy Kamennyy bridge to the park of Bolotnaya Square, so the organisers knew about the cordon in advance. The placement of the cordon was indicated in the [security plan]. This document was for internal use and access to it was only given to the police; the location of the forces could be changed in an emergency by the operational headquarters. The organisers did not insist on an on-the-spot visit; such visits are held at the initiative of the organisers, which had not been requested because they had known the route ... and the meeting venue ... [The witness Mr Deynichenko] had known that at the beginning of the march the event organisers, including Mr Udaltsov, had discussed between them that they were not going to turn towards the meeting venue but would stop and try to break the cordon to proceed to Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge.

The witness N. Sharapov testified that Mr Udaltsov had known the route of the march and had not raised a question about opening up the park at Bolotnaya Square. Moreover, the park was a nature reserve with narrow lanes ... the park had been opened up previously [for a public event], as an exception, on only one occasion, on 4 February 2012, but then it was winter, it was snowing and the declared number of participants had significantly exceeded 5,000. No such exception was made for 6 May 2012.

... according to the statement of the Moscow City Security Department, ...the meeting venue at Bolotnaya embankment could accommodate 26,660 people ...

The fact that no map of the assembly route or the placement of the police had been produced at the working meeting of 4 May 2012, that these questions had not been expressly discussed, ... that the event organisers present at the working meeting had not been shown any maps, was confirmed by them.

... the court concludes that no official map had been adopted with the organisers and, in the court’s opinion, [the published map] had been based on Mr Udaltsov’s own interview with journalists ...

Therefore the map presented by the defence has no official character, its provenance is unknown and therefore unreliable and it does not reflect the true route of the demonstration and the placement of the police forces.

... the witness Mr Makhonin ... testified that on 5 May 2012 he received the [security plan] ... Before the start of the march he personally met the event organisers Ms Mityushkina, Mr Udaltsov [and] Mr Davidis and in the presence of the press and with the use of video recordings explained to them the order of the meeting and the march, warned against the breach of public order during the conduct of the event; and stressed the need to inform him personally about any possible provocations by calling the telephone number known to the organisers. He asked Mr Udaltsov about the intention to proceed towards the Kremlin and to cause mass disorder because the police had received information about it from undercover sources; Mr Udaltsov had assured him that there would be no breaches of order at the event and that they had no intention to move towards the Kremlin ... He (Mr Makhonin) arrived at Bolotnaya Square after the mass disorder had already begun ... After the mass disorder began he tried calling Mr Udaltsov on the phone but there was no reply. Mr Udaltsov did not call him ... Other event organisers had not asked him to move the cordon. Given the circumstances, Ms Mityushkina, at his request, announced the end of the meeting, and the police opened additional exits for those willing to leave. In addition to that, the police repeated through a loudspeaker the announcement about the end of the meeting ...

... the witness Mr Zdorenko ...testified that ... following information received [from undercover sources] about the possible setting up of a camp site, at about 9 p.m. on 5 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square and organised a search of the area including the park. The park was cordoned off and guarded ... if necessary, at the decision of the operational headquarters, the venue allocated for the meeting could be significantly extended at the expense of the park [at Bolotnaya Square]. However, there was no need for that given that there were no more than 2,500-3,000 persons on Bolotnaya Square ... [others being stopped at] Malyy Kamennyy bridge.

The witness A. Zharkov testified that ...while the stage was being set up he had seen an unknown man smuggling four camping tents in rubbish bins.

The witness M. Volondina testified that ... before the beginning of the march, police information came through from undercover sources that the event organisers intended to encircle the Kremlin holding hands to prevent the inauguration of the Russian President.

The witness M. Zubarev testified that ... he had been [officially] filming ... while Police Officer Makhonin ... explained the order ... and warned the organisers ... and asked Mr Udaltsov to inform him of any possible provocations. Mr Udaltsov stated that they would act lawfully and that he had requested the police to stop any unwanted persons from joining the public event ...

The witness Y. Vanyukhin testified that on 6 May 2012 ... at about 6 p.m. Mr Udaltsov, while on the way to the stage, told people around him that they were going to set up a campsite ...

... the witness Ms Mirza testified that ... Police Officer Biryukov had asked her and [the Ombudsman] to come to Malyy Kamennyy bridge where some of the protesters, including Mr Nemtsov and Mr Udaltsov, had not turned right towards the stage but had gone straight to the cordon, where they had begun a sit-in protest on the pretext that access to the park of Bolotnaya Square had been closed and cordoned off ... While [the Ombudsman] was talking to those sitting on the ground they remained silent and did not reply but would not stand up.

The witness Mr Babushkin testified that ... after the first confrontations between the protesters and the police had begun, the latter announced through a loudspeaker that the meeting was cancelled and invited the citizens to leave.

The witness Mr Ponomarev testified that ... the police cordon had been placed differently from [the cordon placed for] a similar march on 4 February 2012 ... he proposed to Mr Udaltsov that the cordon be pushed back so that the police would go back a few steps and widen access to Bolotnaya Square, and the latter replied that he would figure it out when they reached the cordon ... he knew that Mr G. Gudkov was negotiating with the police about moving the cordon, which had now been reinforced by the riot police.

... the witnesses Mr Yashin and Mr Nemtsov testified that ... during the steering committee meeting the question of setting up tents during the public event had not been discussed ... while [Mr G. Gudkov] and [Mr D. Gudkov] were negotiating with the police ... the crowd built up [and] suddenly the police began moving forward, the protesters resisted and the cordon broke ...

The witness Mr G. Gudkov [deputy of the State Duma] testified that ... at the request of the organisers, who had told him that they would not go anywhere and would remain sitting until the police moved the cordon back and opened up access to the park at Bolotnaya Square, he had taken part in the negotiations with the police on that matter. He had reached an agreement with the officers of the Moscow Department of the Interior that the cordon would be moved back, but the organisers who had filed the notice [of the event] should have signed the necessary documents. However, those who had called for a sit-in, including Mr Udaltsov, refused [to stand up] to go to the offices of the Moscow Department of the Interior to sign the necessary documents, although he (Mr Gudkov) had proposed several times that they should do so ...

... the witness Mr D. Gudkov [deputy of the State Duma] testified that ... together with Mr G. Gudkov he had conducted negotiations with the police ... an agreement had been reached that the cordon at the Malyy Kamennyy bridge would be moved back and the access to the park would be opened up, but at that point some young men in hoodies among the protesters began first to push the citizens onto the cordon provoking the [same] response, after that the cordon was broken, the [police] began the arrests and mass disorder ensued.

... the court [rejects] the testimonies to the effect that it was the police who had begun moving towards the protesters who were peacefully sitting on the ground and thus provoked the breaking of the cordon ... [and finds ] that it was the protesters, and not the police ... who began pushing against the cordon, causing the crowd to panic, which eventually led to the breaking of the cordon and the ensuing mass disorder.

The court takes into account the testimony of Mr Davidis that ... at about 6 p.m. Ms Mityushkina, who was responsible for the stage, informed him about the demand of the police that she announce, as an event organiser, that it was terminated. He passed this information on to Mr Udaltsov by phone, [and he] replied that they were standing up and heading towards the stage ... he knew that on 6 May 2012 [some] citizens had brought several tents to Bolotnaya Square, but Mr Udaltsov had not informed him about the need to put up tents during the public event.

The court takes into account the testimony of Mr Bakirov ..., one of the [formal] event organisers ..., that nobody had informed him about the need to put up tents during the public event.

[The court examined] the video recording ... of the conversation between Mr Makhonin and Mr Udaltsov during which the latter assured Mr Makhonin that they would conduct the event in accordance with the authorisation, he would not call on people to stay in Bolotnaya Square and if problems occurred he would maintain contact with the police.

... [the court examined another video recording] in which Mr Makhonin and Mr Udaltsov discussed the arrangements. Mr Makhonin showed Mr Udaltsov where the metal detectors would be placed; after that they agreed to meet at 3 p.m. ... and exchanged telephone numbers ...

According to [expert witnesses Ms N. and Ms M.], the borders of Bolotnaya Square in Moscow are delimited by Vodootvodnyy channel, Serafimovicha Street, Sofiyskaya embankment and Faleyevskiy passage, and the [park] forms a part of Bolotnaya Square. During public events at Bolotnaya Square the park is always cordoned off and is not used for the passage of citizens.

These testimonies are fully corroborated by the reply of the Head of the Yakimanka District Municipality of Moscow of 27 July 2012 and the map indicating the borders of Bolotnaya Square.

[The court finds] that the place of the sit-in ... was outside the venue approved by the Moscow authorities for the public event ...

The organisation of mass disorder may take the form of incitement and controlling the crowd’s actions, directing it to act in breach of the law, or putting forward various demands to the authorities’ representatives. This activity may take different forms, in particular the planning and preparation of such actions, the selection of groups of people to provoke and fuel mass disorder, incitement to commit it, by filing petitions and creating slogans, announcing calls and appeals capable of electrifying the crowd and causing it to feel appalled, influencing people’s attitudes by disseminating leaflets, using the mass media, meetings and various forms of agitation, in developing a plan of crowd activity taking into account people’s moods and accumulated grievances, or guiding the crowd directly to commit mass disorder.

... this offence is considered accomplished as soon as at least one of the actions enumerated under Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code has been carried out ...

... the criminal offence of organisation of mass disorder is considered accomplished when organisational activity has been carried out and does not depend on the occurrence or non-occurrence of harmful consequences.

There are no grounds to consider the closure of access to the park of Bolotnaya Square and the placement of a guiding police cordon at the foot of Malyy Kamennyy bridge to be a provocation ... since it was only to indicate the direction and it did not obstruct access to the meeting venue at Bolotnaya Square.

... the reinforcement of the cordon ... was necessary in the circumstances ... to prevent it from breaking ... but the police [cordon] did not advance towards the protesters.

It is therefore fully proven that the mass disorder organised by Mr Udaltsov [and others] ... led to the destabilisation of public order and peace in a public place during the conduct of a public event, put a large number of people in danger, including those who had come to fulfil their constitutional right to congregate in peaceful marches and meetings, and led to considerable psychological tension in the vicinity of Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, accompanied by violence against the police ... and the destruction of property ...”

The Moscow City Court sentenced Mr Udaltsov and Mr Razvozzhayev to four and a half years’ imprisonment. On 18 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 24 July 2014, with a number of amendments.

On 18 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined another “Bolotnaya” case and found four individuals guilty of participating in mass disorder and committing violent acts against police officers during the demonstration on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and three and a half years; one of them was released on parole. That judgment was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 November 2014.

On 6 May 2012 the applicant arrived at Bolotnaya Square at about 6 p.m. to take part in the meeting. He stood in front of the stage on Bolotnaya embankment, within the area designated as the meeting venue.

According to the applicant, between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. the area around him remained peaceful, although there was general confusion. He claimed that he had not heard any announcement about the termination of the meeting; he had heard the police orders made through a megaphone to disperse, but in the general commotion he was unable to leave immediately and remained within the authorised meeting area until 7 p.m., when he was arbitrarily arrested by the police dispersing the demonstration. The applicant denied that he had received any warning or orders before being arrested. The police apprehended him and took him to a police van, where he waited for an hour before it left Bolotnaya Square for the police station. According to the applicant, there was no traffic at Bolotnaya Square at the time of his arrest; it was still suspended.

According to the Government, the applicant was arrested at 8.30 p.m. at Bolotnaya Square because he was obstructing the traffic and had disregarded the police order to move away.

At 9.30 p.m. the applicant was taken to the Krasnoselskiy District police station in Moscow. At the police station an on-duty officer drew up a statement on an administrative offence (протокол об административном правонарушении) on the basis of a report (рапорт) by Police Officer Y., who had allegedly arrested the applicant. Y.’s report contained the following handwritten statement:

“I [Y.] report that on 6 May 2012 at 9.30 p.m., at 5/16 Bolotnaya Square, together with Police Lieutenant [A.], I arrested Mr Frumkin.”

The rest of the report was a printed template stating as follows:

“... who, acting in a group of citizens, took part in an authorised meeting, went out onto the road and thus obstructed the traffic. [He] did not react to the multiple demands of the police to vacate the road ..., thereby disobeying a lawful order of the police, who were fulfilling their service duty of maintaining public order and ensuring safety. He thereby committed an administrative offence under Article 19.3 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences.”

The statement on the administrative offence contained an identical text, but indicated that the applicant had been arrested at 8.30 p.m. The applicant was charged with obstructing traffic and disobeying lawful police orders, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. His administrative detention was ordered with reference to Article 27.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences (протокол об административном задержании). The “reasons” section of the order remained blank.

At 2 p.m. on 7 May 2012 the applicant was taken to court, but his case was not examined. After having spent the day in a transit van without food or drink, at 11.55 p.m. he was taken back to the cell at the Krasnoselskiy District police station. A new order for the applicant’s administrative detention was issued, indicating that he had been detained “for the purpose of drawing up the administrative material”.

At 8 a.m. on 8 May 2012 the applicant was brought before the Justice of the Peace of circuit no. 100 of the Yakimanka District, who examined the charges. The applicant requested that the case be adjourned on the grounds that he was unfit to stand trial after the detention; he also requested that the hearing be opened to the public and that two police officers be examined as witnesses. Those requests were rejected in order to expedite the proceedings. A further request for the examination of several eyewitnesses was partly refused and partly granted. Three witnesses for the defence were examined.

On the basis of the report written by Police Officer Y., the court established that at 8.30 p.m. on 6 May 2012 the applicant had been walking along the road at Bolotnaya Square and obstructing the traffic, and that he had then disobeyed lawful police orders to vacate the venue. The Justice of the Peace rejected as unreliable two eyewitnesses’ testimonies to the effect that the police had not given the applicant any orders or warnings before arresting him. The applicant was found guilty of disobeying lawful police orders, and was sentenced under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences to fifteen days’ administrative detention.

On 11 May 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined an appeal lodged by the applicant. At the applicant’s request the court examined Ms S. as a witness. She testified that at 7.46 p.m. on 6 May 2012 she had been looking for her son when she saw the applicant in a police van and spoke to him. She also testified that at 9.03 p.m. she had been at Bolotnaya Square; the site had been fully cordoned off and the traffic had not resumed. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that the police report and the police statement were inconsistent as regards the time of his arrest and found that the correct interpretation of those documents was that the time of arrest had been 8.30 p.m. and the detention at the police station 9.30 p.m. The court dismissed the video recording submitted by the applicant on the grounds that it did not contain the date and the time of the incident, but found that the applicant’s guilt had been proved by other evidence. It upheld the first-instance judgment.

On 11 January 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court examined the applicant’s administrative case in supervisory-review proceedings and upheld the earlier judicial decisions.