Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

András Sajó;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained in the Suwałki Prison.

On 30 April 2003 the Suwałki Regional Prosecutor’s Office issued an arrest warrant against the applicant on suspicion of his being the leader of an international organised criminal group and six counts of kidnapping for ransom committed by members of that group. On the same day the Suwałki District Court issued a decision ordering the applicant’s detention on remand, relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. It attached great weight to the possibility that the applicant might attempt to obstruct the proceedings by bringing pressure to bear on witnesses and other suspects.

On 22 April 2003 the applicant was arrested in the Netherlands.

The extradition request, arrest warrant and detention order were sent to the Netherlands. The applicant was transferred to Poland on 20 October 2003.

On 8 April 2004 the Suwałki Regional Prosecutor indicted the applicant before the Augustów District Court. The case was later transferred to the Lublin Regional Court.

The applicant’s appeal against the detention order, his further appeals against subsequent decisions extending his detention, and all his subsequent applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him, were unsuccessful.

In the meantime, in another set of criminal proceedings, on 1 April 2005, the Suwałki Regional Court convicted the applicant of armed robbery and sentenced him to four years and six months’ imprisonment (II K 96/04). The judgment was upheld on appeal. He served this sentence from 21 January 2006 until 20 July 2010.

The bill of indictment was first lodged with the Augustów District Court, which declared itself not competent to deal with the case on 14 April 2004. The case was then transferred to the Lublin District Court, where the trial commenced on 21 September 2004. The court held many hearings and heard witnesses. On 26 January 2006 the prosecutor submitted a request for the case to be transferred to the Lublin Regional Court. Following various appeals and challenges, on 26 September 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal finally decided that the Lublin Regional Court was competent to deal with the applicant’s trial. The trial commenced before the Lublin Regional Court in December 2006. The court held at least sixty-five public hearings lasting up to four hours.

At the hearings before the Lublin District Court and Lublin Regional Court the applicant had the services of a Lithuanian interpreter. On a few occasions a Russian interpreter was provided as the applicant agreed that he spoke Russian well enough. On 4 January 2007 the applicant expressed his preference for a Lithuanian interpreter and one was provided until the end of the trial.

On numerous occasions the applicant, assisted by an interpreter, examined the file. According to the Government, the file was examined on 14 November and 2 December 2007, 3 January, 7, 17 and 31 March and 5 May 2008 at the very least. At the applicant’s request the trial court provided him with translations of documents. In addition, at four hearings in 2005 the applicant requested copies of the relevant documents in Polish.

On 5 October 2007 the applicant asked the trial court to allocate another legal aid lawyer to him. He contended that he had argued with the incumbent lawyer and could not communicate with him. It appears that at the hearing the lawyer endorsed the request made by the applicant, but the court dismissed it.

At the hearing of 7 January 2009 the applicant challenged the presiding judge. However his challenge was dismissed.

On 27 January 2010 the Lublin Regional Court (IV Ka 338/06) convicted the applicant as charged. In particular he was convicted on six counts of kidnapping for ransom and leading an organised criminal gang. The applicant was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The period of the applicant’s detention from 22 April 2003 until 20 January 2006 was credited towards the sentence.

During the trial before the Lublin District and Regional Courts the applicant was represented by Mr M.C. a lawyer from Białystok, appointed for him by the court. The lawyer prepared an appeal on his behalf. In his appeal he raised, inter alia, a breach of the applicant’s defence rights under Article 6 of the Convention and argued that the applicant had not had access to his lawyer in the presence of an interpreter and full access to the case file in his own language.

On 7 December 2010 the Lublin Court of Appeal (II AKa 235/10) upheld the conviction. The court dismissed the allegations regarding the impossibility of communicating with his lawyer, who spoke only Polish, as manifestly ill-founded. The court established that the applicant had had access to a sworn interpreter during the entire trial, including meetings with the lawyer. The appellate court also found that the applicant had not been hindered in his right of access to the case file, which he consulted on many occasions in the presence of his interpreter. The court stated:

“During the entire proceedings the accused benefited from free counsel with whom he could communicate in the presence of an interpreter. The regional court even organised recesses during the hearing in order to enable the applicant to contact his lawyer in the presence of a sworn interpreter. Consequently, one cannot share the accused’s allegation of a breach of Article 6 of the Convention or other provisions. Moreover, throughout the proceedings the first-instance court provided him with copies of the requested documents...”

A new lawyer allocated to the applicant at this stage of the proceedings, Mr A.D., lodged a cassation appeal against the judgment. He argued that the contact with the lawyer during recesses in the trial had occurred in the presence of police officers and sometimes lay judges or judges’ assistants. That rendered respect for the applicant’s defence rights illusory. The requests for unsupervised meetings with the lawyer in the presence of the interpreter had been dismissed by both the trial court and the court of appeal. In the cassation appeal he further argued that the trial court never actually provided the applicant with copies of the translated documents although it had agreed to do it. Moreover, the court had asked the applicant to pay for them although he did not have any financial means.

On 4 April 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal. The translation into Lithuanian of this judgment had been received by the applicant on 7 July 2012. As regards the arguments put forward in the cassation appeal, the court stated that the applicant had been detained on remand and had therefore had to be accompanied by guards during the meetings with the lawyer which had taken place during recesses in the trial court hearing. The court further noted that the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention had been fulfilled as the applicant had had translations of the most important documents necessary for his comprehension of the case, even if not the entire file.

On 21 October 2003 the Suwałki Remand Centre requested to classify the applicant as a so-called “dangerous detainee”. In their request the authorities pointed out that the applicant had been charged with having committed several counts of kidnapping for ransom, robberies and attempted murder and of being a leader of an international, armed, criminal group. The applicant was searched by an arrest warrant and apprehended in Amsterdam. The remand centre authorities stated: “his personal situation, character and behaviour pose a serious danger to society or to the security of a remand centre”. They further indicated that the security of all transfers of the applicant be strengthen “given the character and the manner in which the offences had been committed and the fact that [the applicant] had previously practiced box and combat techniques”. The request ends: “He is a person of high degree of depravity”.

On the same day the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission decided to classify the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. The commission stated that the main reason for the classification was the suspicion that the applicant had committed offences within an organised criminal group (Article 212a § 3 and §4 (c) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences).

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Lublin Regional Prison Service Inspectorate concerning the constant monitoring of his cell, repeated body searches and the lack of unsupervised visits. On 15 February 2010 the complaint was declared manifestly illfounded.

Every three months the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission reviewed and reaffirmed its decision to classify the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. The relevant decisions were limited to short descriptions of the nature of the charges laid against him, and later offences of which he had been convicted which, together with his “personal situation”, justified the maintaining of the previous decisions. In the requests for extension of the regime issued prior to each decision of the commission, the director of the remand centre emphasised the violent nature of the crimes which the applicant had allegedly committed. In the requests of 19 October 2004 and 9 January 2005 the authorities referred to the applicant’s “personal circumstances (ruthless and cruel manner in which the crimes were committed taken together with the knowledge of box and combat techniques)”. In the more recent requests the remand centre authorities pointed out that the applicant had not taken any active part in the “social rehabilitation process” and had been of low moral character. All the commission’s decisions and the requests by the remand centre issued between April 2005 and 2012 had similar wording.

The applicant appealed against some of those decisions. In particular, he appealed against the decision of 2 April 2009, but this was dismissed by the Lublin Regional Court on 8 June 2009. The applicant also appealed against the commission’s decision of 29 April 2011 and on 6 September 2011 the Białystok Regional Court upheld it. In addition to that, the applicant submitted that he had appealed against the decision of 4 August 2011 which was dismissed on 11 October 2011. On 26 March 2012 the Białystok Regional Court dismissed his appeal against the decision of the commission issued on 27 January 2012. The domestic courts examined the legality of the impugned decisions and found that they had been given in accordance with the law and after a thorough analysis of the case. In particular due consideration had to be given to the nature of the offences allegedly committed by the applicant and of which he had been later found guilty. The courts also found that the authorities based their decisions on an exhaustive assessment of the applicant’s behaviour.

On 25 July 2012 the Białystok Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission decided to lift the measure. The commission considered that the applicant no longer posed a threat to the security of the remand centre.

On 11 October 2007 the Lublin Regional Court granted the applicant’s request to be allowed to make phone calls from the detention centre. During his subsequent detention in the Lublin and Suwałki Remand Centres the applicant was authorised to make two telephone calls per week, each lasting ten minutes. For a short period of time in 2010 the use of telephone was limited to once a week but the call duration extended to 15 minutes.

In addition to that, the applicant was often granted additional telephone conversations with his family, daughter, lawyer, or diplomatic representatives. In 2010 these took place on eight occasions and in 2011 on seven occasions. At his request, on seven occasions in 2010 the authorities extended the allotted time to fifteen minutes.

The visits by the applicant’s family, his common-law wife and daughter, were subject to restrictions, but he had been able to receive them regularly. The first visit from his common law wife took place in August 2004, followed by two other in the same year. From the list of visits submitted by the Government and not contested by the applicant, it appears that between 2004 and 2009 he had had between two and four visits every year at least. In 2010 he had in total eight visits mostly from his wife and daughter. Each visit lasted between thirty minutes and two hours.

The applicant was not restricted in receiving correspondence from his family.

The Government acknowledged that during the hearings before the Lublin Regional Court the applicant had been held in a metal cage separating him from the judges and the public, and whilst in the cage, his hands had remained handcuffed.

The parties failed to provide a detailed description of the cage, in particular its dimensions. It is also not clear whether the guards were positioned inside the cage with the applicant or next to it.

The parties disagreed as to the number of hearings during which the applicant remained in the cage. The applicant stated that he was placed in the metal cage, with his hands and legs shackled, during all the hearings before the trial court, approximately 104 of them. The Government submitted that he was placed in the cage, handcuffed, during some hearings before the Lublin Regional Court but not all of them.

The Government also submitted that on 7 October 2010 the applicant received disciplinary punishment for having verbally threatened a prison guard.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Velké Dravce, Slovakia.

The applicant and his former spouse, also of Slovakian nationality, found employment in Hungary and settled there in 2004. They married in Slovakia in 2005. Their child, also a Slovakian citizen, was born in Hatvan, Hungary, in 2007.

As their marriage deteriorated, the wife lodged a divorce action and a custody claim with the Hungarian Hatvan District Court on 18 June 2008.

The applicant filed an objection contesting the jurisdiction of the Hungarian courts. The District Court held a hearing and dismissed the case, accepting the applicant’s argument. Furthermore, the court noted that the applicant had filed a divorce action before the Slovakian Rimavská Sobota District Court.

On appeal, the Hungarian Heves County Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision on 19 February 2009, for further circumstances to be clarified, namely the exact date of filing the action before the Slovakian court. The Regional Court noted that the law applicable by the Hatvan District Court was the Slovakian one.

In the resumed proceedings, the Hatvan District Court ascertained that the action before the Slovakian court had been filed on 24 June 2008, that is, six days later than the one before the Hungarian court. During the procedure the court obtained the necessary translation of the Slovakian law.

The District Court rejected the applicant’s jurisdictional objection on 10 March 2010, holding that the Slovakian case had been pre-empted by the Hungarian one. On his appeal, the second-instance court upheld the decision on 16 June 2010.

Meanwhile, the applicant filed a complaint about the protraction of the proceedings. The objection was dismissed by the Heves County Regional Court on 18 May 2010. The court held that there was no unreasonable delay or omission to be observed during the proceedings.

The first hearing on the merits was held by the Hatvan District Court on 5 October 2010 in the absence of the applicant. Although two more hearings were held on 8 February and 28 April 2011, the applicant, properly summoned, failed to appear.

Meanwhile, the applicant had brought several actions against his former spouse before the Slovakian Rimavská Sobota District Court. The applicant’s contact with his child was also regulated with provisional measure by that court on 22 December 2008.

On 28 April 2011 the Hatvan District Court dissolved the applicant’s marriage and ordered him to pay child maintenance.

The applicant appealed but the Hungarian Eger High Court upheld the first-instance decision on 15 February 2012. This decision was served on the applicant on 15 June 2012.

The applicant lodged a petition for review. On 14 May 2013 the Kúria rejected the request since it was excluded by law in such cases.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Reasonable time);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

On the dates set out in the appended table domestic courts delivered decisions according to which the applicants were entitled to various pecuniary amounts and/or to have certain actions taken by State authorities in their favour. However, the applicants were unable to obtain the enforcement of the decisions in due time.


No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);No violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice)

The applicant was born in 1969 and is currently detained in Lannemezan Prison.

The applicant was a member of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut – “the FIS”) and left Algeria prior to the dissolution of that political group by a judgment of the Algiers Administrative Court dated 19 March 1992. After spending some time in Pakistan he entered the United Kingdom in January 1993 using the false name of Elias Serbis. On 26 February 1993 he applied for political asylum in that country, claiming to have been forced to leave Algeria because of his membership of the FIS. His application was refused on 10 August 1994.

On 25 July, 17 and 26 August, 3, 4 and 7 September and 6 and 17 October 1995 eight terrorist attacks were carried out in France.

Although no organisation explicitly claimed responsibility, certain factors, such as the existence of virulent press statements against France and the mode of operation of the attacks, pointed to the involvement of the Armed Islamic Group (Groupement Islamique Armé – “the GIA”).

In the course of the judicial investigation aimed at identifying the perpetrators, telephone tapping operations carried out on public payphones used by a certain B.B. led to a number of persons being arrested and to the search being focused on the United Kingdom and an individual named Elyes (also known as Elyesse or Eliass). The sources of these names or pseudonyms were a telephone conversation of 1 November concerning Elyes and the Western Union bank, a search of B.B.’s home during which a document was found showing that a sum of money had been transferred to B.B. from that bank on 16 October 1995, and the decoding of a list of telephone numbers found on B.B.’s person and at his home and featuring three numbers in England preceded by the name “Elyesse” or “Eliass”. B.B., who was arrested on 1 November 1995, also directly implicated “Ylies”, claiming that he had funded the campaign of attacks from London and had been kept informed of their progress.

On 3 November 1995 the French National Surveillance Directorate informed the investigators that the individual known as “Elyes, Ilyes, Lyes, Iliesse, Eliass or Elyasse”, whom B.B. had identified as having funded the attacks, might be the applicant. The latter, who was living in London, was suspected of being one of the leaders of the GIA in the United Kingdom, in particular because of his involvement with the publication Al Ansar (or Al Ansaar) which the GIA used as a mouthpiece abroad.

The investigations carried out in London established that the applicant had a home there and had a set of keys to a second London address, which served as the offices of the magazine Al Ansar and as a meeting place for all the persons involved in publishing and distributing it. On the premises the investigators found, among other items, the following: contracts for three mobile phones in the names of three of the applicants’ acquaintances and corresponding to the numbers identified at the home of B.B., who had rung the numbers before and after each attack; a receipt for the rental of a post-office box in the name of Fares ELIASS with the applicant’s fingerprints on it; letters and statements from the FIS; a statement saying that only the GIA was entitled to conduct the jihad; a letter from the GIA to the French President calling on him to convert to Islam; a letter commenting on the attacks carried out in France; copies of press articles on anti-terrorism mentioning the names of judges and members of the intelligence service; a piece of paper on which “Notre Dame 3314354-46-12” was written, corresponding to the telephone number of the Western Union branch at 4 rue du Cloître Notre Dame in Paris; and a receipt dated 21 July 1995 issued by a branch of Thomas Cook in London for a sum of 5,000 pounds sterling (GBP).

The applicant was arrested and placed in police custody from 4 to 7 November 1995 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

On 7 November 1995 the applicant was detained pending extradition under the terms of an international arrest warrant issued on the same day in connection with the investigation into the attack carried out on 6 October 1995 close to the Maison Blanche metro station.

Three further international arrest warrants were issued concerning the applicant: on 24 November 1995 in relation to the attack of 17 October at the Gare d’Orsay station; on 29 January 1996 in the case concerning a conspiracy to prepare terrorist attacks; and on 16 January 2001 in relation to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995 at the Saint-Michel suburban rail station.

The applicant lodged habeas corpus applications which were dismissed in June 1997 and in 2001. On 8 October 2001 the British Home Secretary ordered his removal to France, but that order was quashed by the High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, on 27 June 2002.

On 6 April 2005 the Home Secretary signed a fresh order for the applicant’s extradition in the light of the assurances provided by the French authorities concerning the safeguards of a fair and impartial trial in France. On 14 October 2005 the High Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant.

On 1 December 2005 the applicant was handed over to the French authorities and was remanded in custody the following day.

By an order of 5 February 1999 the applicant was committed for trial in the Paris Criminal Court for involvement – in France and in England, from an unspecified date until 4 November 1995 – in an association or conspiracy formed with a view to the preparation, in the form of one or more material acts, of one of the terrorist acts in question. The investigating judge stated, in particular, as follows:

“- [the applicant] was responsible for distributing the journal Al Ansar, a propaganda outlet of the Armed Islamic Group;

- ... was involved on this account in disseminating propaganda for that organisation, which is banned in France;

- ... was the main contact person in Europe for [D.Z.], alias Abou Abderhamane Amine, in organising and carrying out the GIA’s activities in Europe;

- ... was tasked with sending money to GIA members still in France to enable them to fund and carry out attacks;

- ... was in contact with numerous persons involved in and convicted of criminal conspiracy with a view to a terrorist enterprise.”

In a judgment of 29 March 2006 accompanied by over thirty pages of reasoning, the Criminal Court first of all set out the facts with regard to the “political/religious background”, the emergence of the FIS and then the GIA, the “background to the attacks” in 1995 – which it listed and described as attributable in all likelihood to the GIA – and the “context surrounding Rachid Ramda”.

Ruling on the criminal charges, the court began by examining the case against the applicant. It found that it could be established with certainty, on the basis of precise and concurring physical evidence, that the applicant had indeed used various false names and aliases which had come up in the course of the investigations, a fact the court described as “beyond doubt and indisputable”. With regard to the GIA’s funding the court, having noted the prosecution’s claims that the applicant had funded the GIA groups which carried out the attacks in France during the second half of 1995, examined the factual evidence in the case file at length and in detail. It observed in particular that, according to one witness who was a GIA member, the organisation’s groups had different specialisations depending on their location, with the London group being responsible for sending funds. The court further noted that the applicant had transferred GBP 5,000 on 16 October 1995, two days before the attack of 17 October 1995. This was established by the statements of the British police officers tasked with keeping the applicant under surveillance and of the staff of the Western Union branch where the transfer had been made, and also by the discovery of the applicant’s fingerprints on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union branch. The court also observed that one of the perpetrators of the attacks, B.B., had stated that the money used in preparing the various attacks had always been supplied by the applicant from London. The court inferred that the facts as a whole “demonstrate[d] that Rachid Ramda was indeed responsible for funding terrorist groups on French soil”. Furthermore, in response to the public prosecutor’s submissions concerning the applicant’s role in disseminating GIA propaganda, the first-instance court also considered the various items of factual evidence before it, and in particular the wealth of correspondence and propaganda documents relating to the GIA’s views and actions that had been found during the searches of the various premises used by the applicant, as well as the statements by a GIA member confirming the applicant’s role as a member of the team publishing the magazine Al Ansar, which was the GIA outlet used in particular to claim responsibility for attacks. It also noted the presence at the applicant’s home of pamphlets promoting terrorism and killing with specific reference to France. The court concluded that the applicant had played a part in disseminating GIA propaganda and ideas.

Turning next to the applicant’s involvement in a criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise, the court found this offence to have been made out, as the investigation had shown that several groups located in the Lyons area, in Paris and in Lille had been behind the 1995 attacks. All the members had either been directly involved or had played an indirect role by aiding and abetting and providing resources, and all of them were either known activists or claimed to be activists within the GIA. The court found that the applicant’s contacts with the various members of these networks, who had the shared goal of carrying out attacks, were sufficient to establish his conscious and deliberate participation in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts on French soil. In its judgment the court set out, among other findings, the facts showing the existence of links to eight members of three groups forming a support network for the GIA.

Accordingly, the Criminal Court found the applicant guilty of criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise, on the basis of Articles 450-1 and 421-1 of the Criminal Code. It sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. The court cited as reasons for imposing the prison sentence the fact that “by providing funding and issuing propaganda on behalf of the GIA, Rachid RAMDA not only enabled the attacks to be carried out but acted as a propagandist, potentially attracting new members to strengthen the networks spread over several European countries”. It further cited the fact that “his double talk reveal[ed] both his bad faith and his complete lack of regret or remorse”. The court awarded one euro (EUR) in damages to the association SOS Attentats, which had joined the proceedings as a civil party.

In a final judgment of 18 December 2006 the Paris Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. While referring expressly to the statement of facts as established in the judgment, it devoted some thirty pages to analysing the charges against the applicant, giving reasons. First of all, the Court of Appeal gave further details concerning the evolution and operation of the GIA. It also specified that the case before it concerned “the series of attacks carried out in France in the summer and autumn of 1995”, and that “the facts of the case at hand concern[ed] the preparation of the attacks and the actions enabling the attacks, which started in France in July 1995, to be carried out”. The Court of Appeal went on to list the eight attacks carried out between 25 July and 17 October 1995. With particular reference to the evidence of the existence of an information hub based in London which the applicant had allegedly managed, it found this to be established on the basis of the telephone calls made on the day after the killing of the imam S. in Paris; two days before the attack on the Saint-Michel suburban rail station; on the day of that attack and the day after the attempted attack on the ParisLyon high-speed railway line at Cailloux-sur-Fontaines; on 12 September 1995, a few days after the attack of 3 September on Boulevard Richard Lenoir in Paris, the attempted attack of 4 September on Place Charles Vallin in Paris and the attack of 7 September in rue Jean-Claude Vivand in Villeurbanne; the day after the shooting at the Col de Maleval and the arrest of three people; five days before the attack of 6 October and two days after it; on 16 October 1995, in other words just before the attack of 17 October; and, finally, on 1 November 1995, immediately after a telephone conversation between B.B. and S.A.B. concerning preparations for an attack on the Wazemmes market in Lille, with B.B. stating that the purpose of the call was to report to the applicant on the “final preparations” for the Lille attack.

The Court of Appeal also emphasised the existence of several items of factual evidence pointing to the applicant’s involvement as the supervisor of a structure set up to fund the GIA’s activities. These included the fact that the applicant had sent funds from England on 16 October 1995 under the false name of Philippe Hervier, which had been received by B.B. at the Rivoli branch of the Rivaud bank under the false name of A. Benabbas, and which matched an entry in A.T.’s accounts book marked “36,800 francs, Lyseo” and B.B.’s statements; the payment by the applicant of GBP 5,000 and 50,000 French francs (FRF), as shown by an entry in A.T.’s accounts book which mentioned funds sent by “Walid”, a false name used by the applicant or the first name of one of his acquaintances who could be contacted in order to reach him; statements from several individuals concerning services offered in return for payment, fundraising, the sending of substantial sums of money, a transfer of EUR 4,000 to M. and the existence of a receipt for GBP 100.

Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted a series of facts demonstrating, firstly, that the applicant had been “the main contact person ... in organising and carrying out the GIA’s activities in Europe”, as was clear in particular from a telephone conversation of 2 December 1995, from the statements of a witness who was a GIA member, and from the detailed content of several documents seized in London (press statements, authorisations to conduct the jihad, documents on the management of funds, articles and handwritten notes on the activities of Islamist groups in Europe and anti-terrorist activities, notes on military weapons and the handling of explosives, and so on); secondly, that he had been “the GIA’s main propaganda agent outside Algeria”, with “his role on the magazine Al Ansaar” (particularly in the light of documents seized at the applicant’s London address, namely a note on how to make the magazine more dynamic, a letter explaining the means of distributing it, a piece of computer equipment which the applicant would have been unable to afford, letters from readers and GIA sympathisers, a large number of magazines detailing the GIA’s ideas and violent actions, a substantial amount of correspondence relating to Algerian and Islamic issues, some testimonies, and a list of post-office boxes in numerous countries, used by the magazine’s subscribers); thirdly, that he had been at the centre of “the London cell which revolved around [him and which] also served as a rallying point for young recruits passing through”, as demonstrated by the personal histories of four of them; and fourthly, that he had been a leader with “a strategic role in the GIA’s external organisation”, as demonstrated by his links to members and correspondents of other Islamist terrorist groups worldwide.

The Court of Appeal echoed the reasons given by the Criminal Court and added that there was sufficient evidence in the case to demonstrate that the applicant had been contacted regularly in order to be kept informed of events, that he had been responsible for funding GIA operations in Europe, that he had acted as a conduit for the GIA’s military command and as a propaganda agent for that organisation, especially through the magazine Al Ansar, that he had given shelter to fugitives passing through London and had sometimes been called upon to coordinate the GIA’s external activities. The Court of Appeal therefore concluded as follows:

“The Court of Appeal, like the first-instance court, therefore finds it established that the GIA created ‘an external structure’ in Europe designed to enable it to pursue its goal of overthrowing the Algerian regime, including by attacking institutions and people in countries that supported or were deemed to support that regime, by setting up networks in Belgium and France in particular which provided support to the Algerian guerrillas by supplying weapons, munitions and various items of equipment, supplying jihadists and providing safe havens (accommodation and false identity papers) to fighters who were fleeing the maquis or had arrived to carry out attacks, organised and coordinated by a cell in London in charge of fundraising and using funds acquired lawfully or unlawfully.

... [the applicant] knowingly played a decisive role, by means of the material acts referred to by the Criminal Court and by this court above, in the achievement of the GIA’s goal, participating from London in the implementation of the group’s external structure, and played a vital role within the organisation whose aim was to prepare, assist in and carry out the attacks which took place.”

In a judgment of 14 March 2007 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant.

In a judgment of 13 February 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal indicted B.B., S.A.B. and the applicant for the attack of 17 October 1995 and committed them for trial before the Paris special Assize Court. The applicant was charged with aiding and abetting the crimes of attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing mutilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection principally or incidentally with a terrorist enterprise, and with the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise.

On 3 August and 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the orders issued by the Paris investigating judge on 27 April (concerning the attack of 25 July 1995) and 13 July 2001 (concerning the attack of 6 October 1995) for the indictment of the applicant and B.B. and their committal for trial before the special Assize Court. The applicant faced trial for aiding and abetting the crimes of murder, attempted murder, destroying or damaging property belonging to others by the use of an explosive substance causing death, mutilation or permanent disability and temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days or of a maximum of eight days, in connection with a terrorist enterprise, and for the related offence of a breach of the explosives legislation in connection with a terrorist enterprise.

These three judgments of the Investigation Division specified that the applicant had aided and abetted by: transmitting instructions from the GIA ordering attacks with explosives and providing B.B. with instructions on manufacturing; relaying to the GIA leadership operational information provided by the perpetrators of the attacks; providing the perpetrators with the funds needed not just to manufacture the explosive devices but also to make all the logistical arrangements for preparing and carrying out the attacks. The judgments of 13 February and 3 August 2001 added the fact that the funds had also been intended, if necessary, to enable the perpetrators based in France to flee.

In these judgments the judges noted in particular the following facts in relation to the applicant. The three mobile phones used by the applicant had received calls from B.B. on 16 and 22 October and 1 November 1995; a receipt for an exchange transaction performed on 16 October 1885 at 3.50 p.m. (Paris time) for an amount of FRF 36,800 had been discovered at B.B.’s home, together with a notice of transfer of FRF 38,000 from an English branch of Western Union, and the checks carried out established that the applicant had gone into a Londis shop in Wembley containing a Western Union office at 2.34 p.m. on 16 October 1995 and had re-emerged at 3.26 p.m. (London time); the applicant’s fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip kept by the Western Union office in the Londis shop; the words “LYESO – FF 36,600” had been found in the credit column of B.B.’s accounts and the words “West Union” and “West-Union Bank” had also been entered by B.B. in a document logging the details of the 17 October attack; the applicant had possessed the details of the Western Union branch in rue du Cloître in the Notre-Dame district of Paris; an exchange receipt dated 21 July 1995, for an amount of GBP 5,000 exchanged at a rate of 7.5%, had been found at the applicant’s home, with the number of a public payphone in Corbeil-Essonnes used by A.T. written on the back, and an entry had been made in the credit column of B.B.’s accounts for the sum of “5,000 pounds sterling from [W.], converted at a rate of 7.5%”; a sum of GBP 6,945 had been sent on 20 July 1995; between 20 and 25 July 1995 the sum of FRF 300 had been entered as expenditure for the purchase of a “GB ticket”, demonstrating that the funds, after being exchanged in England, had been transported to Paris in the days leading up to the attack at the SaintMichel suburban rail station; and a letter from British Telecom had been found, addressed to “Walid” at 122 Hamlet Gardens, the applicant’s address. The judges also noted, as evidence against the applicant, the content of a hard disk found in a London flat to which the applicant had keys, containing two financial reports, one relating to the activities of the GIA in Belgium and the other to a set of accounts for the period from September 1994 to 1 November 1995, the date of B.B.’s arrest.

In its judgment of 13 February 2001 concerning the attack of 17 October 1995 the Investigation Division observed in particular that the applicant’s three telephone numbers had been called repeatedly from payphones used by B.B., around the time of the different attacks and in particular on the day before the attack of 17 October 1995. It compared these calls with the statements made by B.B. and a further accomplice, who had been planning an attack on Lille city market, according to which they had reported to the applicant on preparations for the operations, and in particular for the attack of 17 October 1995. The Investigation Division also noted that the applicant had made a transfer of FRF 36,800 from London the day before that attack – as shown by the fact that his fingerprints had been found on the transfer slip in the Western Union office in London – which had been received by B.B. in Paris on the same day. The link between that transfer and the attack of 17 October 1995 had also been established by B.B.’s statements and by a call made to the applicant’s mobile phone the same day, after the money had been received.

In its judgment of 3 August 2001 relating more specifically to the attack of 25 July 1995, the Investigation Division stressed that the applicant’s English mobile phone had been called two days before that attack from a public payphone in Paris close to B.B.’s home from which other calls had been made, including a call to a mobile phone belonging to a member of the French GIA network, made one minute before the applicant was called. Furthermore, the day before the attack and then on the day itself, the applicant had received calls from France on his various numbers, including from a payphone close to the previous one, concerning his role as an intermediary between the perpetrators of the attacks and the person masterminding them in Algeria. Above all, the Investigation Division noted that the applicant had on 2 and 20 July 1995 sent sums of GBP 5,000 and GBP 6,945 respectively which were directly linked to the attack carried out on 25 July 1995.

Lastly, in its judgment of 27 November 2001 the Investigation Division also noted that it was clear from these different elements that the applicant had sent funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, not just in relation to the campaign of attacks as a whole but also for use directly in carrying out the attack of 6 October 1995. With regard to the latter, it noted that the instructions issued by the GIA concerning the campaigns, which had been accompanied by advice on the manufacture of explosives, had been transmitted via the applicant, who had also funded all the operational arrangements put in place in France in order to ensure the success of the attacks, and that the recipients had been required to report to him on how the money had been used. A number of telephone calls had established that the applicant had been kept informed of the progress of the attacks, and in particular of the attack of 6 October 1995, which had been followed by a telephone call on 8 October 1995 telling the applicant that everything had gone well on 6 October.

On 26 October 2007 the Paris special Assize Court, composed of seven professional judges, found the applicant guilty as charged in connection with the three attacks. It sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years. The applicant appealed on 29 October 2007.

The appeal proceedings before the Paris special Assize Court, this time composed of nine professional judges, took place from 16 September to 13 October 2009. One hundred and ninety-six individuals joined the proceedings as civil parties, as did the RATP (the Paris public-transport operator), the SNCF (the French national rail company), the Guarantee Fund for victims of terrorist acts and other crimes, the Government Law Officer and the association SOS Attentats.

At the hearing of 16 September 2009 counsel for the applicant made submissions requesting the termination of the proceedings and a finding that the prosecution was null and void, on the basis of the ne bis in idem principle. Citing Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 and the judgment in Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, delivered by the Grand Chamber of the Court on 10 February 2009, they argued that the material acts which the Assize Court was called on to examine were the same as those of which the applicant had previously been convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal in its final judgment of 18 December 2006. In counsel’s view, the material acts alleged in the Assize Court proceedings, namely the transfer of funds to the perpetrators of the attacks, the transmission of instructions to the same perpetrators, and the monitoring of the preparation and carrying-out of the attacks, had also been alleged in the Criminal Court proceedings.

In an interlocutory judgment of 17 September 2009 the special Assize Court dismissed the objection regarding a breach of the ne bis in idem principle, finding as follows:

“Although Rachid RAMDA’s defence counsel correctly points out that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second ‘offence’ in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same, the following factors need to be taken into consideration in the present case:

- The facts on which the criminal courts based their finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty, while they related to criminal acts dealt with in the current set of proceedings, were by no means confined to them. In finding the offence of criminal conspiracy to be made out – a separate offence that is provided for and punishable under Article 450-1 of the Criminal Code – the courts considered all the elements apt to substantiate the accused’s involvement in the conspiracy, which was aimed at organising, developing and ensuring the continuation of a movement that was bent on imposing its cause, in particular by using clandestine methods and material and intellectual resources (recruitment of and regular contact with activists, dissemination of information on the GIA’s activities and views, fundraising, seeking donations of weapons and various items of equipment, etc.), without necessarily pursuing the sole objective of carrying out the attacks that are the subject of the proceedings.

- The facts to be considered by this court differ substantially from the earlier ones in that they relate to criminal conduct aimed at the achievement of one-off objectives which were determined with precision and were not inextricably linked, and which were driven by a specific motivation consisting in particular in providing others, in full knowledge of the situation, with the means of deliberately harming human life or individuals’ physical or mental integrity by the use of explosives.

- In these circumstances the finding that Rachid RAMDA was guilty and his conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal cannot lead the Assize Court to find that his prosecution has lapsed and to declare the criminal proceedings against him null and void.

- It is thus the task of the Assize Court, on conclusion of the proceedings and in the light thereof, to rule, by answering the questions raised before it, as to whether or not Rachid RAMDA is guilty of aiding and abetting as charged ...”

In an interlocutory judgment of 24 September 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal deferred its decision on a request for further information and eventually rejected the request in a further interlocutory judgment of 8 October 2009.

Sixty-three questions concerning the applicant alone were put to the special Assize Court of Appeal. Twenty-six related to the circumstances surrounding the attack of 25 July 1995, eighteen to the events surrounding the attack of 6 October 1995 and nineteen to the attack of 17 October 1995. The questions gave precise details of the various alleged acts and where and when they had been committed, and listed the names of dozens of victims of killings and attempted killings, mutilation or permanent disability, injuries resulting in unfitness for work of up to eight days or more, and victims of damage to their property. The answer to sixty-one of the questions was “yes”, by a majority (some questions, followed by a list of victims and requiring an individual reply in each case, were also found partly “devoid of purpose”), and two questions were found to be “devoid of purpose”. Besides details regarding the places and dates concerned in each instance, as well as the indication of the victims according to the damage suffered (death, mutilation or permanent disability, temporary total unfitness for work of over eight days and of a maximum of eight days, destruction of or damage to property), the questions related in particular to whether or not the applicant’s actions had been premeditated (questions nos. 2, 8, 28 and 46), and to incitement of others to commit certain acts (questions nos. 5, 11, 20, 25, 31, 36, 43, 49, 57 and 62), the assistance lent by the applicant to the perpetrators of the attacks (questions nos. 10, 19, 24, 30, 35, 42, 48, 56 and 61) and whether the applicant had issued instructions to others to commit certain crimes (questions nos. 6, 12, 21, 26, 32, 37, 44, 50, 58 and 63). The parties did not comment on these questions.

An affirmative answer was given to the questions whether the applicant had knowingly assisted in the manufacture or possession of explosive devices and in issuing instructions to that effect, in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 6 and 17 October 1995, and whether he had knowingly incited others to manufacture or possess such devices in the context of the attacks of 25 July and 17 October 1995.

In a judgment of 13 October 2009 the special Assize Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a minimum term of twenty-two years, and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory. It adjourned the civil hearing for a later date. The applicant appealed on points of law.

On 15 June 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. Regarding his ground of appeal to the effect that no reasons had been given for the finding of guilt, based in particular on Article 6 of the Convention, it found as follows:

“Firstly, the impugned questions, which were put in accordance with the law, established in all aspects the acts of aiding and abetting of which Mr Ramda was found guilty.

Secondly, the judgment convicting Mr Ramda included the answers which the judges comprising the special Assize Court of Appeal gave immediately after the oral proceedings, on the basis of their personal conviction and by a majority following a secret vote, to the questions concerning his guilt which were put to them in accordance with the operative provisions of the committal orders and were the subject of adversarial argument.

Accordingly, and given that steps were taken to ensure the prior investigation of the charges contained in the indictment, the free exercise of the rights of the defence, and the public and adversarial nature of the proceedings, the requirements laid down by the statutory and Convention provisions relied on were satisfied.”

As to the ground of appeal concerning a breach of the ne bis in idem principle on account of the applicant’s final conviction by the Paris Court of Appeal on 18 December 2006 on the basis of identical facts, the Court of Cassation held that criminal conspiracy was a separate offence from the crimes prepared or committed by its members and also from the offences characterised by certain material acts that embodied it.


Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

On 5 April 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the Vyborgskiy District Court”) declared the applicant legally incapable in her absence. The applicant submitted that she had only learnt about that judgment on 19 April 2004. She lodged her appeal twice, accompanied by requests that the court reset the time-limit for lodging the appeals. On 11 October 2004 the Vyborgskiy District Court rejected the applicant’s latest request that the court examine her appeal. On 22 December 2004 the St Petersburg City Court upheld that decision on appeal.

On 27 February 2009 the Constitutional Court of Russia declared unconstitutional the practice of divesting people of their legal capacity in their absence, unless their absence resulted from specific circumstances.

On 8 June 2009 the applicant sought the reopening of her case in view of the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 27 February 2009. After an initial refusal, on 24 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the judgment of 5 April 2004 and remitted the applicant’s case for a fresh examination.

On 26 November 2009 the Vyborgskiy District Court discontinued the incapacitation proceedings, as the plaintiff, the applicant’s daughter, had failed to attend. The applicant thus regained her legal capacity.

On 7 March 2008 an emergency doctor was called to attend to the applicant and found that she required hospitalisation. A psychiatrist examined the applicant on her admission to the hospital and confirmed that she was in need of in-patient care.

On 10 March 2008 the applicant’s brother, who was her legal guardian at the relevant time, consented to her confinement. Four days later his status as a legal guardian was cancelled and transferred to the hospital. On 31 March 2008 the hospital, in that capacity, agreed to the applicant’s involuntary confinement.

According to the applicant, the hospital dismissed her requests to be discharged, and she was not allowed to use a mobile phone, send correspondence or receive visitors. When the applicant contacted her lawyer allegedly seeking to update her application before the Court and to challenge her involuntary confinement, he attempted to meet her at the hospital on 13 March and 1 April 2008, but was refused permission to do so.

The applicant’s lawyer then lodged a complaint against the hospital, asserting his right to communicate with his client. The lawyer supported his complaint with a copy of the power of attorney that the applicant had issued to him on 21 June 2005 for her application to the Court. On 9 February 2009 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the Primorskiy District Court”) dismissed the complaint, having noted that the applicant lacked legal capacity to appoint a lawyer.

On 10 March 2009 an expert commission issued a two-page report diagnosing the applicant with schizophrenia. It relied on the applicant’s medical history since 2001 and her state of health leading to her hospitalisation in 2008. The experts further stated that during her stay at the hospital, the applicant had been avoiding contact; she had been complaining about her confinement; she had remained suspicious and negative and had maintained her delusional ideas about her neighbours, doctors and other patients. They concluded that the applicant required further psychiatric treatment in the hospital.

On the same day the Primorskiy District Court held a hearing concerning the applicant’s involuntary treatment in the psychiatric hospital. The applicant’s doctor presented to the court the expert commission’s report of 10 March 2009 and her own opinion confirming that the applicant needed compulsory treatment in the hospital. The applicant was absent from the courtroom during that presentation, but her State-appointed lawyer, Ms L., was present. After the presentation the applicant was brought into the courtroom and was informed about her rights. She then said that she wanted to go home and did not wish to continue her treatment. The judge did not ask her any other questions. Ms L.’s only intervention during the whole hearing was to state that she “had no objections” to the applicant’s continued confinement in the psychiatric hospital. The Primorskiy District Court concluded that the applicant required involuntary treatment in the hospital.

On 21 April 2009 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the judgment of 9 February 2009, having flagged a violation of counsel’s right to meet with his client. On 25 May 2009 the applicant met her lawyer.

On 8 June 2009 the applicant asked the court to reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 10 March 2009. On 30 June 2009 the District Court rejected the request.

On 15 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the decision of 30 June 2009 and reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 10 March 2009. On 30 September 2009 the St Petersburg City Court examined the appeal and found the applicant’s involuntary treatment lawful.

Once the applicant had regained her legal status on 26 November 2009 (see paragraph 10 above), she refused to continue her treatment in the hospital and was discharged on 31 December 2009.

On 11 November 2010 the Petrodvortsovyy District Court of St Petersburg (“the Petrodvortsovyy District Court”) declared the applicant legally incapable. It noted that in view of the fact that Russian law did not provide for partial incapacitation to take into account the degree of a person’s mental disorder, it had no alternative but to deprive the applicant of her full legal capacity. On 17 March 2011 the St Petersburg City Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant, having fully endorsed the Petrodvortsovyy District Court’s reasoning.

On 27 June 2012 the Constitutional Court of Russia examined a complaint lodged by the applicant in relation to her incapacitation and invited Parliament to amend the legislation and introduce the possibility of partial incapacitation (see paragraph 39 below). On 30 December 2012 the Russian Civil Code was amended accordingly; the entry into force of the amendment was delayed until 1 March 2015 (see paragraph 40 below).

Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling, on 26 March 2013 the Petrodvortsovyy District Court remitted the applicant’s case for a fresh examination. However, on 6 August 2013 the Petrodvortsovyy District Court confirmed its previous decision stripping the applicant of her full capacity, having stated that the amendment to the law had not yet entered into force. On 28 November 2013 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment on appeal.

On 29 June 2009 the Promyshlennyy District Court of Stavropol, acting in the applicant’s absence, stripped him of legal capacity. The judgment of 29 June 2009 was not appealed against and it therefore became final.

In October 2012 the applicant sought the restoration of his legal capacity. On 6 March 2013 the Kochubeyevskiy District Court of the Stavropol Region (“the Kochubeyevskiy District Court”) dismissed the applicant’s request. On 4 June 2013 the Stavropol Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal.

On 25 July 2016 the Kochubeyevskiy District Court granted the applicant’s application to be declared partially capable.

On 27 January 2009 the Koptevskiy District Court of Moscow (the “Koptevskiy District Court”) declared the applicant legally incapable in his absence. The judgment of 27 January 2009 was not appealed against and it therefore became final.

On 20 January 2013 the applicant appealed against the judgment of 27 January 2009, having asked a court to reset the time-limit for lodging the appeal as he had not been informed about the incapacitation proceedings, had not attended them and had not received a copy of the judgment.

On 14 February 2013 the Koptevskiy District Court reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal. On 10 September 2013 the Moscow City Court quashed that decision and dismissed the applicant’s request to have the time-limit for submitting his appeal reset.

On 7 August 2003 the Dmitrovskiy District Court of the Moscow Region (“the Dmitrovskiy District Court”) divested the applicant of full legal capacity in his absence. The judgment of 7 August 2003 was not appealed against and it therefore became final.

The applicant allegedly learnt that he had been stripped of legal capacity only in 2012. On 24 December 2012 he asked the Dmitrovskiy District Court to reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the judgment of 7 August 2003. On 22 January 2013 the Dmitrovskiy District Court dismissed the request.

On 29 May 2013 the Moscow Regional Court examined an appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision of 22 January 2013. It reset the time-limit and at the same hearing examined the merits of an appeal lodged by the applicant against the judgment of 7 August 2003. Having found that in 2003 the Dmitrovskiy District Court had examined the applicant’s case in his absence despite the lack of any information on the applicant’s ability to attend, the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment of 7 August 2003. It then proceeded to re-examine the merits of the case. After having heard the parties and basing its findings on a medical expert report of 2003, the Moscow Regional Court again declared the applicant legally incapable.

On 4 September 2006 the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow (“the Zyuzinskiy District Court”) declared the applicant legally incapable. The applicant, who was being treated in a psycho-neurological facility at the time, did not attend the hearing.

The applicant allegedly only learned about that judgment in 2013. She asked the court to reset the time-limit for lodging an appeal in view of the lack of notification about the proceedings and her absence from the hearing.

On 24 October 2013 the Zyuzinskiy District Court refused to reset the time-limit, having also noted that the Russian law in force at the material time had not called for the mandatory presence of the applicant at the court hearing. On 28 January 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 24 October 2013 on appeal.


No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Iran);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Iran)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Ann Power-Forde;Helena Jäderblom;Mark Villiger;Paul Lemmens

The applicant is an Iranian national who was born in 1962 and is currently in Sweden.

The applicant applied for asylum and a residence permit in Sweden on 16 November 2009. Before the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) he stated the following. In Iran, he had worked with persons, connected to different universities, who were known to oppose the regime. He had mainly worked on creating and publishing web pages. He and one of the other persons had been arrested in April 2007. He had been released after 24 hours and then hospitalised for ten days due to high blood pressure. Before the elections on 12 June 2009, the applicant had worked with the Green Movement, who had supported Mousavi for the presidential position, by spreading their message via the Internet. The day before the elections, he and his friends had been arrested, questioned and detained in the polling station overnight. After the elections, the applicant had participated in demonstrations and other activities. He had been arrested once again in September 2009 and imprisoned for twenty days. In October 2009 he had been taken before the Revolutionary Court, which had released him after a day on condition that he cooperate with the authorities and spy on his friends. He had agreed to the demands and given his business premises as a guarantee. He had also assured them that he would not participate in any demonstrations and that he would respond to their summons. Following his release in a park, he had found that his business premises had been searched. He had kept politically sensitive material there, which the authorities must have noticed, and his passport and other documents were gone. On 2 November 2009 the applicant had been summoned to appear before the Revolutionary Court. He had contacted a friend who, in turn, had obtained the help of a smuggler to enable him to leave the country. He had converted to Christianity after coming to Sweden. The applicant submitted, inter alia, a summons from the Revolutionary Court which stated that he should present himself at Evin prison in Teheran on 2 November 2009.

On 29 April 2010 the Migration Board rejected the request. It first stated that the applicant had not proven his identity but that he had made it and his citizenship probable. Turning to the applicant’s asylum story, the Board held that participation in demonstrations or affiliation with the Green Movement could not, of itself, give rise to a risk of persecution, ill-treatment or punishment on return to Iran. The Board noted that the applicant had changed his story in some parts during the proceedings; in particular, he had changed his statements concerning how many times he had been arrested. Furthermore, he had not been able to name the park where he had been released. Thus, the Board found reason to question whether he had been arrested at all. The Board further considered that the applicant’s political activities had been limited. After the questioning in 2007 and until the elections in 2009, he had been able to continue working with the web pages that contained the critical material, even though the authorities at this time were allegedly aware of his activities. For these reasons, the Board found that the applicant could not have been of interest to the authorities on account of his activities and the material he had in his possession. As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, the Board noted that he had not submitted a baptism certificate and that he had initially been unwilling to refer to his religious affiliation as grounds for asylum since this, he claimed, was a private matter. In these circumstances, it was not plausible that the applicant would risk persecution in Iran due to his religious affiliation. In conclusion, the Board found that the applicant had not shown that he was in need of protection in Sweden.

The applicant appealed to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen), maintaining his claims and adding the following. The reason why, at first, he had not wanted to refer to his religious affiliation was that he had not wanted to trivialise the seriousness of his belief. He submitted a baptism certificate to the court. During the oral hearing, the applicant added that his computer had been taken from his business premises while he was in prison. Material that was critical of the regime was stored on his computer, since he had visited some web pages and had received caricature drawings via email. Therefore, there was enough evidence to prove that he was an opponent of the system. The summons to appear before the Revolutionary Court was submitted to the Migration Court. The applicant had not been summoned again and his family had not been targeted, or at least they had had no problems with which they wanted to burden him. He did not claim that his conversion constituted grounds for asylum but contended that it would clearly create problems for him if he had to return to Iran.

On 9 March 2011 the Migration Court rejected the appeal. It did not question the applicant’s story or that the uncertainties that had been pointed out by the Migration Board had been satisfactorily explained. However, as regards the summons to the Revolutionary Court which had been submitted to the Migration Board, the court found that, regardless of the authenticity of the document, it could not of itself substantiate a need for protection for the applicant. This was because the document was merely a summons and because no reason was given as to why the applicant should present himself at Evin prison. Turning to the applicant’s asylum story, the court considered that the information concerning his political activities had been vague and lacked details. The applicant had only stated that he had participated in the campaign for the opposition before the elections in 2009 by joining demonstrations and having contact with students and the student movement in order to help them with their web pages. Moreover, the applicant had stated that the material he had had in his possession when he was questioned in 2007 had not differed from the material he had in 2009. These circumstances, together with the fact that he had not been summoned again to appear before the Revolutionary Court after November 2009 and that his family had not been targeted, made the court doubt that his political activities had been of such a nature and extent to have resulted in the consequences he had alleged. The court found that the applicant had exaggerated the importance of his political activities and their consequences and therefore also the authorities’ interest in him. For these reasons, the court considered that the applicant had not made out that the Iranian authorities had a special interest in him and, thus, he was not in need of protection.

The applicant appealed to the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen) which, on 8 June 2011, refused leave to appeal.

In September 2011 the applicant requested the Migration Board to stay the enforcement of his expulsion and to reconsider its previous decision due to new circumstances. He stated, inter alia, that the act of converting from Islam to another religion was punishable by death in Iran.

On 13 September 2011 the Migration Board found that no new circumstances had been presented which could justify staying the enforcement of the applicant’s expulsion order or granting him a residence permit. The Board noted that the applicant had, in the previous proceedings, stated that he had been baptised by a Christian church and that he had converted to Christianity. The Board also noted that the applicant had stated that his conversion was a personal matter which he did not wish to invoke as a ground for asylum. In the Board’s view, it was remarkable that the applicant now raised the question of conversion when he had been given the chance to elaborate on it during the oral hearing before the Migration Court but had declined to do so.

The applicant appealed to the Migration Court, maintaining his claims.

On 6 October 2011 the Migration Court rejected the appeal. It observed that the authorities had already been aware of the applicant’s conversion in the previous proceedings. Therefore, the conversion could not be considered as a “new circumstance”. The fact that the applicant had previously chosen not to invoke the conversion as a ground for asylum did not change the court’s assessment in this regard.

The applicant appealed to the Migration Court of Appeal which, on 22 November 2011, refused leave to appeal.

On 12 July 2011 the applicant lodged his application with the Court and requested it to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order to stay the enforcement of his expulsion. He stated that he had been active against the regime in Iran prior to, and during, the presidential elections in 2009. More importantly, he had converted to Christianity a couple of years earlier. The conversion had taken place prior to any decisions in his asylum proceedings. Conversion from Islam to another religion or faith was harshly punished by the Iranian system and society.

In support of his claims the applicant submitted, inter alia, a copy of a certificate, dated 13 April 2011, in which a pastor and a congregation member stated that they had first met the applicant in the summer of 2010, that he had converted from Islam to Christianity and that he had been a member of their congregation since February 2011. They also stated that their church services were broadcast on the Internet, meaning that anyone could have access to the transmissions.


Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Security of person);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicants are:

(1) Mr Salambek Ireziyev, who was born in 1959,

(2) Mr Imaddi Iriziyev (also spelled as Ireziyev), who was born in 1965,

(3) Mr Sidyk Ireziyev, who was born in 1967.

The first applicant lives in Grozny and the second and third applicants live in Avtury, the Chechen Republic.

The applicants are the brothers of Mr Aslan Ireziyev (also spelled as Iriziyev), who was born in 1975.

In May 2002 Mr Aslan Ireziyev lived with the second and third applicants and their families in two neighbouring houses in Avtury. At the material time Mr Khaseyn Suleymanov, the applicants’ nephew, was staying together with Mr Aslan Ireziyev. The settlement was under curfew. Checkpoints of the federal forces were functioning on the roads leading to and from Avtury.

At about 4 a.m. on 7 May 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 7 May 2003) masked men in camouflage uniforms with machineguns and rubber truncheons arrived in two APCs and a UAZ car in the village. They split in two groups of up to ten persons and broke into the two houses. The men spoke unaccented Russian. They took Mr Aslan Ireziyev and Mr Khaseyn Suleymanov to the backyard, locking the remaining family members inside. Having checked their passports, the men pulled sacks over their heads and put them in one of the APCs.

At dawn the applicants, together with the head of the Avtury administration, followed the tracks left by the vehicles. They found that one of the APCs had entered the premises of the Avtury collective farm (совхоз Автуринский), where a Russian military base was located (for the description of the premises see, for example, Dovletukayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 7821/07, 10937/10, 14046/10 and 32782/10, § 25, 24 October 2013 and Gakayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 51534/08, 4401/10, 25518/10, 28779/10, 33175/10, 47393/10, 54753/10, 58131/10, 62207/10 and 73784/10, §§ 138 and 141, 10 October 2013), and the other one had driven in the direction of Shali. The servicemen and the head of the Shali administration denied seeing the vehicles.

On 13 May 2002 Mr Salambek Bisultanov, the deputy head of the Shali district department of fight against organised crime, informed the first applicant that Mr Aslan Ireziyev and Mr Khaseyn Suleymanov had been brought to the Main Federal Military Base in Khankala, and promised to arrange their release at 5 p.m. in Argun. At the specified time four camouflaged servicemen brought Mr Khaseyn Suleymanov in a UAZ car. They promised to set Mr Aslan Ireziyev free on the following day, which did not happen. Later Mr Bisultanov told the applicants that he had not managed to obtain Mr Aslan Ireziyev’s release.

According to Mr Khaseyn Suleymanov, after the arrest the men took him and Mr Aslan Ireziyev to the Avtury collective farm. There they were handed over to other men, put in a UAZ car and driven away, passing through several roadblocks. At a certain point the men stopped and placed him and Mr Aslan Ireziyev in a cellar. The men introduced themselves as officers of the Special Task Police Unit (the OMON) from St. Petersburg. They questioned them about involvement in illegal armed groups and beat them up.

Some time later the applicants learnt that during the night raid of 7 May 2002 the men had killed their neighbour, Mr Sultan Saykhadzhiyev.

The applicants have not seen Mr Aslan Ireziyev since his abduction on 7 May 2002.

The applicants’ description of the circumtances surrounding the abduction is based on the following statements: the first applicant’s statement dated 2 August 2007, the third applicant’s statement dated 23 April 2007, the statement of Mr Khaseyn Suleymanov dated 2 August 2007, the statement of the applicants’ relatives Ms Z.I. dated 2 August 2007 and Ms L.K. dated 22 April 2007, and the copies of documents from criminal case file no. 3518 opened into the abduction of Mr Aslan Ireziyev.

On 8 May 2002 the applicants complained of their brother’s abduction by military servicemen to the head of the Avtury town administration.

On 9 May 2002 the applicants complained of their brother’s arrest by military servicemen to the Shali district military commander.

On 18 November 2002 the applicants complained of the abduction to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20116 stating that Mr Aslan Ireziyev had been detained by their military servicemen.

On 22 November 2002 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20116 replied to the applicants that they had forwarded requests for information concerning Mr Aslan Ireziyev’s possible arrest and detention to the Chechnya FSB, the Military prosecutor’s office of the UGA (the United Group Alignment) and other law-enforcement agencies.

On an unspecified date in November 2002 and then on 25 March 2003 the applicants wrote to the Envoy of the Russian President in Chechnya on Human Rights and Freedoms (the Envoy) complaining of their brother’s abduction on 7 May 2002 by military servicemen in two APCs.

On 5 April 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA forwarded the applicants’ complaint of Mr Aslan Ireziyev’s abduction by military servicemen to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20116 for examination.

On 8 July 2003 the applicants complained to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office of their brother’s abduction from home on 7 May 2002 by military servicemen in APCs.

On 29 July 2003 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 22110. The decision mistakenly stated that the abduction had taken place on 7 May 2003. The applicants were informed of the initiation of the criminal investigation.

On 9 August 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the Court. In particular, the applicant stated that the abduction took place on 7 May 2002 and that the abduction had been perpetrated by armed men in uniforms who had arrived in two APCs.

On 11 August 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status. The decision stated that the abduction had taken place on 7 May 2002. On the same date the first applicant was questioned again. He reiterated his previously given statement, stressed that the abductors had arrived in two APCs and then had taken his brother Mr Aslan Ireziyev to the main military base of the federal forces in Khankala.

On 12 August 2003 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected.

On 13 August 2003 the investigators questioned the third applicant and the applicant’s relatives Ms L.N. and Ms Z.I. whose statements concerning the abduction were similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the Court.

On 18 August 2003 the Shali district prosecutor instructed the investigators to establish, amongst other things, whether any law enforcement agencies or military structures had carried out a special operation against Mr Aslan Ireziyev. No replies in the positive were received.

On 22 September 2003 the investigators questioned the third applicant’s wife Ms L.K. who stated that Mr Aslan Ireziyev had been abducted in May 2002 by military servicemen who had arrived at their household in two APCs, had been of Russian appearance and spoke unaccented Russian.

On 22 September 2003 the investigators questioned the applicants’ brothers Mr M.I. and Mr I.I. both of whom also stated that their brother Mr Aslan Ireziyev had been abducted in May 2002 by military servicemen who had arrived in military vehicles.

On 22 October 2003 the investigators again questioned the third applicant’s wife Ms L.K. who stated that Mr Aslan Ireziyev had been abducted by unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms.

On 22 October 2003 the investigators also questioned the third applicant whose statement was similar to that of Ms L.K.

On 23 or 27 October 2003 the investigators again questioned the first applicant. No new information was obtained.

On 29 October 2003 the criminal proceedings were suspended. The applicants were informed thereof.

On 11 May 2005 the supervising prosecutor examined, upon the applicants’ request to this end, the investigation file in criminal case no. 22110 and concluded that the suspension of the investigation on 29 October 2003 was substantiated and lawful.

On 19 April 2007 the first applicant complained to the Shali district prosecutor of his brother’s abduction on 7 May 2002 by military servicemen in two APCs and requested that the investigation be resumed and that he be granted access to the case file.

On 28 May 2007 the Shali district prosecutor’s office rejected the first applicant’s request stating that there were no grounds to resume the proceedings and that he would be able to access the contents of the case file only upon completion of the investigation.

From the documents submitted it follows that the criminal investigation is still pending.

The Government stated that the investigation had not obtained any evidence proving that State agents had been involved in the disappearance of the applicants’ brother or that he was dead.

The applicants submitted that it had been established “beyond reasonable doubt” that State agents had been involved into the abduction and disappearance of Mr Aslan Ireziyev. In support of that assertion they referred to the ample evidence contained in their submission as well as the contents of the criminal investigation file. They also submitted that they had made a prima facie case that their brother had been abducted by State agents and that the Government failed to provide a plausible explanation to the events. In view of the absence of any news of Mr Aslan Ireziyev for a long time and the life-threatening nature of unacknowledged detention in the region at the relevant time, they asked the Court to consider him dead.

The Court shall examine the application at hand in the light of the general principles applicable in cases where the factual circumstances are in dispute between the parties (see El Masri v. “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” [GC], no. 39630/09, §§ 151-53, ECHR2012).

The Court has addressed a whole series of cases concerning allegations of disappearances in Chechnya. Applying the abovementioned principles, it has concluded that if applicants make a prima facie case of abduction by servicemen, this is sufficient for them to show that their relatives fell within the control of the authorities, and it is then for the Government to discharge their burden of proof either by disclosing the documents in their exclusive possession or by providing a satisfactory and convincing explanation of how the events in question occurred (see, among many examples, Aslakhanova and Others, cited above, § 99). If the Government fail to rebut that presumption, this will entail a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its substantive part. Conversely, where applicants fail to make a prima facie case, the burden of proof cannot be reversed (see, for example, Tovsultanova v. Russia, no. 26974/06, §§ 77-81, 17 June 2010; Movsayevy v. Russia, no. 20303/07, § 76, 14 June 2011; and Shafiyeva v. Russia, no. 49379/09, § 71, 3 May 2012).

The Court has also found in many cases concerning disappearances that a missing person may be presumed dead. Having regard to the numerous cases of disappearances in Chechnya which have come before it, the Court has found that in the particular context of the conflict in the region, when a person has been detained by unidentified State agents without any subsequent acknowledgment of the detention, this could be regarded as lifethreatening (see, among many others, Yandiyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 34541/06, 43811/06 and 1578/07, 10 October 2013, and Dovletukayev and Others v. Russia, cited above).

The Court has made findings of presumptions of deaths in the absence of any reliable news about the disappeared persons for periods ranging from four years (see Askhabova v. Russia, no. 54765/09, § 137, 18 April 2013) to more than ten years.

Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the documents from the investigation file furnished by the Government (see, for example, paragraphs 20-24 and 28-29 above) demonstrate that the applicants’ brother, Mr Aslan Ireziyev, was detained at home in the early hours of 7 May 2002 by a group of armed men and gone missing since. In their submissions to the authorities the applicants consistently maintained that their brother had been abducted by State agents (see, for example, paragraphs 15-17, 20 and 28-29 above). The investigators took steps to verify this theory (see paragraphs 18 and 27 above). In view of all the materials in its possession, the Court finds that the applicants have presented a prima facie case that their brother was detained by State agents and subsequently disappeared.

The Government did not provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation for the events in question. Their arguments are in contradiction to the evidence reviewed by the Court and insufficient to discharge them of the burden of proof which has been shifted to them in this case.

Bearing in mind the general principles enumerated above, the Court finds that Mr Aslan Ireziyev was taken into custody by State agents on 7 May 2002. In view of the absence of any reliable news of him since that date and the life-threatening nature of such detention (see paragraph 58 above), the Court also finds that Mr Aslan Ireziyev may be presumed dead following his unacknowledged detention.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Kyrgyzstan);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in 1991. He is currently detained in a special facility for temporary detention of foreign nationals in Moscow.

The applicant is an ethnic Uzbek who lived in Jalal-Abad Region, Kyrgyzstan. In June 2010 the region was a scene of mass disorders and inter-ethnic clashes between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.

In June 2010 the applicant was present at the barricades raised by ethnic Uzbeks near Suzak village. On 12 June 2010 he was wounded by a Molotov cocktail and was admitted to hospital on account of severe burns. He was released from hospital on 24 June 2010.

Eventually the applicant fled Kyrgyzstan to Russia, together with many other ethnic Uzbeks, to avoid ethnically motivated violence.

In 2012 the Kyrgyz authorities opened a criminal case against the applicant charging him with a number of violent crimes allegedly committed in the course of the riots of June 2010. On 26 June 2012 the Suzak District Court in the Jalal-Abad region ordered in absentia the applicant’s detention.

On 27 January 2015 the applicant was arrested in Moscow because he was not carrying an identity document. He was placed in the Special Facility for the Temporary Detention of Foreign Nationals, Moscow (“the detention centre for aliens”), run by the Russian Federal Migration Authority (“the FMS”).

On 28 January 2015 the Gagarinskiy District Court, Moscow (“the district court”) found the applicant guilty of an administrative offence punishable under Article 18.8 § 3 (“breach of rules on entry and stay of foreign nationals in Moscow, St Petersburg, the Moscow Region and the Leningrad Region”) of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”) and sentenced him as follows: “[...] a punishment in the form of an administrative fine in the amount of 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB) [combined] with administrative removal and placement in the centre for detention of foreign nationals, [where he will remain] until the entry into force of that decision and until administrative removal from the Russian Federation under Article 32.10 of the Code of Administrative Offences”.

On 4 February 2015 the applicant appealed against the District Court’s decision arguing that in Kyrgyzstan he would be subjected to illtreatment like many other ethnic Uzbeks. It appears that the appeal documentation reached the District Court on 12 February 2015. The appeal hearing was scheduled for 10 March 2015 but was then postponed until 20 March 2015.

On 10 March 2015 the Court granted the applicant’s request for interim measures and indicated to the Government that the applicant should not be expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Kyrgyzstan or another country for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.

On 12 March 2015 the applicant’s relatives were told by the officials of the detention centre for aliens that the applicant would be expelled from Russia on that day. At about 8.30 p.m. the applicant contacted his lawyer stating that he was in Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow. At 9.30 p.m. the lawyer arrived at the airport and was informed by the border control personnel that the applicant had not boarded the plane scheduled for Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. State bailiffs informed the lawyer that the applicant had been brought to Sheremetyevo but had later been returned to the detention centre for aliens. At 10 p.m. a duty officer of the detention centre confirmed to the lawyer that the applicant was back in the facility.

On 20 March 2015 the Moscow City Court (“the Appeal Court”) upheld the District Court’s decision of 28 January 2015 on appeal. The Appeal Court dismissed the applicant’s allegations of the risk of illtreatment stating that “the documents submitted by the [applicant’s] defence d[id] not demonstrate a breach of rights and freedoms of the person in question” and reasoned that “[a]ssessment of actions by law-enforcement agencies of a foreign State, as well as of [legal] acts carried out by them f[ell] outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court examining a case concerning an administrative offence committed in the Russian Federation by a foreign national”.

On 10 April 2015 the Government informed the Court that “the proceedings on the administrative removal of the applicant have been suspended” and that the applicant “continues to be held in the detention centre for foreign nationals of the Moscow department of the Federal Migration Service” (“the Moscow FMS”).

On 4 February 2015 the applicant applied for refugee status arguing that in Kyrgyzstan he would face persecution based on his ethnic origin.

On 12 March 2015 the Moscow FMS dismissed the applicant’s request for refugee status. The parties have not provided the Court with a copy of the decision.

The applicant challenged the decision before the Basmannyy District Court, Moscow. The proceedings are pending.

According to the applicant, on 24 February 2015 he was severely beaten by officers of a special police squad in the detention centre for aliens. He received rubber-truncheon blows to his back, buttocks and heels.

The applicant notified his lawyer accordingly and provided mobile phone photos of his injured back.

On 25 February 2015 two lawyers visited the applicant along with several other persons awaiting expulsion in the detention centre for aliens. The applicant and other detainees informed them that regular beatings of detainees had begun on 17 February 2015 following unsuccessful suicide attempts by several inmates. The applicant claimed that the officers of the special police squad had beaten him on 24 February 2015 with rubber truncheons on his back, heels and buttocks.

On 26 February 2015 the lawyers reported the beatings to the main investigative department of the Moscow Investigative Committee. They emphasised that the medical staff of the detention centre had refused to enter the detainees’ injuries into the medical logs. The lawyers requested that the beatings of the detainees, including the applicant, be investigated. In support of their request they enclosed, among other things, the applicant’s photos showing injuries to his back.

On 19 March 2015 the lawyers’ complaint was forwarded to the Troitskiy district investigation department of the Moscow Investigative Committee.

It appears that no investigation into the applicant’s alleged beatings in the detention centre for aliens has been instituted.