No violation of Article 6+6-3-b - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-b - Access to relevant files);Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);No violation of Article 6+6-3-d - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-d - Examination of witnesses;Obtain attendance of witnesses);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Jurisdiction to give orders or grant injunctions;Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Egbert Myjer;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Houten.

The applicant was employed by the AIVD as an audio editor and interpreter. In this capacity he had access to classified information (gerubriceerde informatie), which he was under a duty not to divulge to persons not authorised to have knowledge of it.

The suspicion arose that the applicant had forwarded copies of classified documents to persons outside the service, including in some cases persons who were under covert investigation by the AIVD in connection with possible terrorist activity.

On 30 September 2004 the applicant was arrested. He was charged with divulging State secret information to persons not authorised to take cognisance of it and taken into detention on remand (voorlopige hechtenis).

The AIVD advised the applicant in writing that he was still under an obligation of secrecy. Consequently it would be constitutive of a further criminal offence if he were to discuss matters covered by his duty of secrecy with anyone including his counsel.

The applicant’s counsel were also warned that they might be prosecuted should they divulge any State secret information to third parties.

The trial opened before the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank) on 10 January 2005. It was adjourned several times.

The applicant’s counsel protested against the restrictions affecting communication between themselves and the applicant, which in their submission undermined the effectiveness of the defence. They also asked for certain documents to be added to complete the file: these included the internal AIVD report that was the basis of the prosecution, which was absent from the file altogether, and the documents which had supposedly been leaked, which had been added to the case file in redacted form with parts blacked out. They further repeated a request, made earlier in writing, for the applicant to be released unconditionally from his duty of secrecy in order to conduct his defence (vrijwaring).

The public prosecutor (officier van justitie) announced that some but not all of the documents requested by the defence would be added to the file but refused to release the applicant from his duty of secrecy unconditionally.

On 24 January 2005 the Regional Court gave a decision remitting the case to the investigating judge, to whom it would fall to carry out investigations in such a way as to mitigate, and compensate as far as possible, the handicaps under which the defence laboured.

On 4 March 2005 the head of the AIVD informed the applicant in writing that communication of matters covered by his duty of secrecy was permitted, subject to the following conditions:

He would be allowed to discuss such matters only with his counsel, Ms Böhler and Mr Pestman;

He was not allowed to reveal the identity of any AIVD staff or human sources;

He could discuss only “that which [was] contained in the case file”;

This exemption covered only information that was strictly necessary for the defence;

This exemption was valid only until the final judgment in the domestic proceedings was given.

The letter continues:

“In order to preclude any misapprehension I stress that this release from the duty of secrecy does not apply to the suspect’s counsel. In the event that counsel wish to make use of information obtained from the suspect with a view to the defence of M, this must be done in consultation with the investigating judge. The investigating judge will then determine whether the (answers to the) questions are of any relevance to the criminal proceedings (strafvorderlijk van belang). If this is the case, the AIVD will then indicate to what extent State secrets are at stake in this context.”

On 1 April 2005 the Head of the AIVD wrote to the investigating judge in the following terms:

“... I consider it of great importance that the suspect (verdachte) should be able to defend himself adequately against the matters of which he is suspected. This entails that he will have to consult his counsel for that purpose. To that end I have granted the suspect conditional release from his duty of secrecy. These conditions are necessary and serve the interest of national security. There exists a certain tension within these frameworks, i.e. a (more far-reaching) release (as requested) of the duty of secrecy and the interests of national security. After all, the AIVD can only carry out its statutory duty within a certain measure of secrecy. Three criteria are of importance in this respect, namely that the AIVD should be able to maintain the secrecy of its current levels of intelligence, its sources and its working methods. These are critical thresholds that can be seen as the practical implementation of the so-called ‘jeopardise’ criterion in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.

... Two additional conditions apply:

the release from his duty of secrecy granted [the applicant] shall apply solely to communication between the suspect, his lawyers Böhler and Pestman, Public Prosecutor Z. and the court, and

shall take place within the confines of the offices of the Investigating Judge or in the presence of the trial court in a closed hearing.

The parties to the proceedings are to submit their questions and other requests to you [i.e. the investigating judge]. You then check whether the questions and requests are of any procedural significance (strafvorderlijk belang) in these proceedings, as you have indicated to me with regard to the three subjects mentioned by counsel. In the affirmative, you offer me the opportunity to consider whether the text of the questions in itself can harm national security.

In the (probably most likely) event that the questions in themselves cannot harm national security, the answer can be provided in the accustomed way, i.e. by means of an official AIVD report ...

In addition, and if the parties to the proceedings consider it necessary, more specific answers can be given by means of, for example, the hearing of witnesses. Perhaps unnecessarily I would observe that section 86(2) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten) applies.

In the event that the line of questioning (vraagstelling) in itself is capable of endangering national security, it is my responsibility, pursuant to section 15 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, to ensure the secrecy of the information that should remain so and accordingly the classification of that information. I therefore propose that you do not place this information, after I have classified it, in the case file and to request the Regional Court to deal with those questions at a closed hearing. I am of the opinion that the above procedural proposal serves the interests of all parties to the proceedings, taking into account the interests involved in national security.

The second condition, which is that the suspect should not be allowed to disclose the identities of AIVD members or human sources, appears clear enough to me. All information that, whether or not in combination with other information, may lead to the identities of AIVD members or human sources becoming known, falls within the scope of the second condition for release [from the duty of secrecy].

As regards the third and fourth conditions, I am of the view that these too are sufficiently clear: [the applicant] is released from his duty of secrecy vis-à-vis his counsel Dr B. Böhler and Mr M. Pestman in so far as consultation between the suspect and his counsel [Dr] Böhler and Mr Pestman relates to the crimes with which he is charged. In the event that counsel wish to discuss documents with the suspect which they may wish to add to the case file, the third and fourth conditions should be interpreted to mean that the documents must be relevant and directly necessary for the defence in this case and may possibly be added to the case file. [These requirements of] relevance and direct necessity also apply to the preparation of requests and defences.

As to the latter condition: if and when such a procedure becomes a real possibility I will consider, if asked, whether release from the duty of secrecy, conditional or not, is possible.

Fourthly, you have asked me to react to the witnesses requested by counsel. I presume that you mean the AIVD members. I am of the opinion that this is above all a matter of criminal procedure, the public prosecutor indicating in her letter that the questions counsel would like to ask relate primarily to the working methods of the AIVD, the spreading of the leaked information and the internal investigation into this. I can agree with the position taken by the public prosecutor that these questions can most probably be answered by me or my deputy during a witness hearing. Whether and to what extent national security permits the questions to be answered will have to be seen for each question. This will require me first to have the questions intended to be asked at my disposal, so that the Ministers of Justice and of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations can decide together and in due time on the application of section 86(2) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act.

As to the possible questioning of AIVD members as witnesses, I would ask you to make it possible, in pursuance of Article 187c of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for special access to be granted to an additional AIVD member. This person can consider the interests of national security for each specific question during the interrogation. This will also permit the defence to put ‘sub-questions’, questions arising from the questions previously submitted in writing. The hearing of witnesses will thus, in my opinion, considerably speed up the pace of the proceedings – at least as far as the hearing of witnesses is concerned – since the (additional) AIVD member present will in many cases be able to decide almost immediately whether the said sub-questions can be answered. This acceleration of the proceedings, in my opinion, benefits all parties to the proceedings. I am prepared to advise the Ministers of Justice and of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, on the basis of section 86(2) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, to consider this in any exemption decision.

On 15 April 2005 the Regional Court gave a decision in which, following the public prosecutor, it refused to make the exemption unconditional. It expressed the view that it would serve no useful purpose to allow the applicant to disclose the identities of AIVD staff members and informants to his counsel. The interests of the applicant were sufficiently protected inasmuch as the exemption covered information strictly necessary for his defence. The Regional Court ordered the investigating judge to hear thirteen witnesses referred to by name and seven witnesses referred to by a code name or number. It refused to order the hearing of fifteen other witnesses referred to by a number and one named witness immediately, leaving that decision to be taken by the investigating judge after a particular witness, an AIVD staff member called B., had been heard. As to the partially blacked-out documents, the Regional Court noted that it too was thereby prevented from considering whether they held secret information within the meaning of Articles 98 and 98a of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht, see below); even so, the prosecution interest in maintaining secrecy prevailed.

The named witness B. was heard on 23 May 2005 and 6 June 2005. It appears that he refused to answer certain questions because of his duty of secrecy.

It appears that on 9 June 2005 the investigating judge decided to refuse to hear the sixteen witnesses requested by the defence for lack of available time (agendatechnische redenen).

On 17 June 2005 the investigating judge decided that the unnamed witnesses permitted to be questioned would be heard at a secret location, under heavy disguise and with the use of voice distorting equipment. A representative of the AIVD and legal counsel of the State would attend in addition to the prosecution and the defence.

The defence lodged an objection against the investigating judge’s decision of 17 June 2005 with the Regional Court, stating also that they would not cooperate in any witness hearing held at a secret location. They also asked for the named witnesses already heard to be relieved of their duty of secrecy and to be heard anew.

The Regional Court held a hearing in camera on 5 July 2005. The defence outlined its provisional strategy, which was to aim for an acquittal by identifying potential sources of the leaks other than the applicant and by demonstrating that the documents leaked did not contain State secrets properly so-called. They also wished to establish the applicant’s attitude to his work for the AIVD. This strategy required the applicant’s former direct colleagues to be questioned and uncensored copies of the documents in question to be made available to the defence and the court.

On 8 July 2005 the Regional Court gave an order for two further named witnesses to be heard but dismissed the defence’s objection for the remainder.

On 14 July 2005 the defence challenged two judges of the trial chamber who had also taken part in the decision of 8 July 2005, arguing on various grounds that positions taken in the latter decision prejudged the outcome of the trial.

The following day, 15 July 2005, the challenge was dismissed and the trial hearing was resumed. The defence asked for documents to be added to the file, including all those found in the applicant’s desk. The Regional Court remitted the case to the investigating judge for the hearing of the witnesses authorised to be heard, in so far as they had not already been heard, and requested the prosecutor to add documents to the file including a description – to be prepared by the AIVD – of the documents found in the applicant’s desk.

Witnesses were heard on various dates. In so far as they were unnamed AIVD staff members, they were identified by a number; they were heavily disguised and they were placed in a box that left only their upper body visible; and their voices were distorted. The applicant states that it was impossible to discern their body language and facial expressions. He further states that an AIVD official was present, who could – and did – prevent named and unnamed witnesses from answering a proportion of the questions put by the defence, and that this was permitted by the investigating judge.

The trial hearing was resumed on 30 August 2005. Finding no indication that the AIVD information had been leaked by someone else, the Regional Court yet again refused to hear the named witness and the fifteen unnamed witnesses. As to AIVD staff members who refused to disclose certain information based on their duty of secrecy, it stated that the final decision whether to allow this lay with the trial court itself but found that it could not set precise limits as the prosecution wanted.

The trial hearing was resumed on 6 and 7 October 2005. The applicant made no statement.

On 30 November 2005 the trial hearing resumed. The prosecution and the defence made their closing statements.

The Regional Court gave judgment on 14 December 2005. It convicted the applicant and sentenced him to four years and six months’ imprisonment.

The applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague.

The appeal hearing opened on 28 September 2006. Among other things, the applicant’s counsel objected to the refusal, in the proceedings at first instance, to allow the defence an unconditional exemption that would allow the applicant and his counsel to communicate unimpeded; to the hearing of unnamed witnesses under heavy disguise, in a closed box that partially hid them from view and with the use of voice distortion, even though they were the applicant’s former direct colleagues; to the withholding of evidence by the witnesses, based on their duty of secrecy as AIVD staff members; and to the withholding of documentary evidence requested by the defence. The prosecuting Advocate General (advocaatgeneraal) conveyed an offer by the AIVD to allow an independent expert to see uncensored AIVD documents and report on their content; the expert proposed had previously been a member of a committee appointed to investigate the internal functioning of the AIVD itself. The defence protested that this expert lacked independence precisely for that reason.

The Court of Appeal delivered an interlocutory judgment on 12 October 2006. Its reasoning included the following:

“The duty of secrecy arising from the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act Serviced Act is subject only to the exceptions set out in that Act. The implication is that only the possibility offered by section 86(1) of that Act offers a solution for the applicant’s present predicament.

The interests of State security, which the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and Article 98 and following of the Criminal Code seek to protect, stand in the way of a complete release from the duty of secrecy as the defence would wish and a complete exemption from prosecution for disclosing State secrets to be granted by the Public Prosecution Service. It is obvious that the said duty of secrecy constitutes a restriction of – normally entirely – free and confidential consultation between the suspect and his counsel and that – if it remained in force in its entirety – it would prevent a fair trial. In the present case, the suspect has been granted conditional release from that duty by the AIVD, based on the latter section of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Service Act, as have his two counsel. The conditions accompanying that release, all of which concern interests of State security in relation to interests of the defence in the present criminal proceedings, appear to the Court of Appeal neither unreasonable within the framework of the interests of State security nor unworkable within the framework of the interests of the defence.

Finally, it is the case that if the suspect and the defence, if they consider that the space left to them by the said release is not sufficient to conduct a defence meeting the requirements of the Convention and they consider, in their assessment, that he/they have to transgress his/their duty of secrecy further than the conditions governing the release allow, they can plead justification (rechtvaardigingsgrond), namely the interest of a proper defence within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The Advocate General gave the assurance at the hearing of 28 September 2006 that no prosecution would be brought if a violation of the duty of secrecy by the suspect – and as the Court of Appeal presumes, his counsel as well – was justified by invoking Article 6 of the Convention.”

and

“The Court of Appeal assumes that the defence request [for access to the internal AIVD investigation materials] comprises all investigations undertaken by the AIVD after it had become known that a third party, i.e. S., possessed [a copy of a classified AIVD document]. It does not appear from the file that these internal investigations were set out in any report. The case file contains criminal complaints (aangiftes) based on those investigations.

It must be noted in the first place that the defence request does not concern documents in the possession of the Public Prosecution Service within the meaning of Article 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; none of the participants in the proceedings is aware of the content of the internal investigations, save for what has been stated by witnesses in this respect, and what is set out in the said criminal complaints. There is therefore no violation of the principle of ‘equality of arms’.

Quite apart from the question whether the AIVD, given its duty and responsibility ..., would be willing to submit its report or any written documents concerning its internal investigation to the public prosecution service to be added to the file, the question needs to be considered whether these documents, which do not emanate from any investigatory body, can in reason be relevant to the defence.

The defence has not, in the present case, suggested, let alone shown, that the materials compiled by the AIVD within the framework of its internal investigation have been obtained unlawfully or are unreliable, but only that the documents and information provided by that service have been accepted uncritically (voor zoete koek aangenomen) first by the National Police Internal Investigations Department (Rijksrecherche) and then by the Public Prosecution Service and cannot be checked.

The Court of Appeal takes the provisional view – without wishing to prejudge its final decision [on the question whether the trial was fair] – that the said materials can be assessed based on the statements of the witnesses questioned, albeit, as far as AIVD members are concerned, subject to some restrictions owing to their duty of secrecy.”

It noted the “particular tension between fundamentally opposed interests”, namely the applicant’s interest as a defendant in a criminal trial and the State interest in maintaining the secrecy of AIVD information, but rejected the protests put forward on the applicant’s behalf. The judgment took note of a promise made by the Advocate General not to prosecute for a violation of the duty of secrecy if that violation was justified by reliance on Article 6 of the Convention (gerechtvaardigd is door een beroep op artikel 6 EVRM). It asked the prosecution to submit certain official reports but not the uncensored AIVD documents requested by the defence.

The appeal hearing was resumed on 12 February 2007. The applicant announced that he might, in his own defence, have to reveal State secret information. This prompted the Court of Appeal to exclude the public from the interrogation of the applicant, despite the latter’s protests.

In the course of questioning by his counsel the applicant mentioned the names of particular AIVD staff members; these are not recorded in the official record of the hearing. The Advocate General protested against the mentioning of these names in so far as they were not already to be found in the case file, which in his view was not justified by Article 6 of the Convention, and announced his intention to prosecute if the applicant should “transgress those limits” (mocht hij die grenzen overschrijden). The applicant’s counsel replied that the defence needed these names in order to decide whether to call the persons concerned as defence witnesses and pointed out that the public had been excluded. After the president decided that the Advocate General should be entitled to state a view on the acceptability of questions put to the applicant by his counsel, the applicant stated that he would for the remainder of the hearing comply with his duty of secrecy. Thereupon the hearing was reopened to the public.

On 14 February 2007 the applicant’s counsel Mr Pestman sent the Advocate General a letter by fax, to which was appended a list of questions he and Ms Böhler would have wished to ask the applicant in support of the case for the defence. These questions concerned AIVD working methods and procedures and AIVD members. One question asked the applicant to identify individual AIVD members on a handwritten anonymised organigram by name. Other questions asked the applicant to state the names of AIVD members other than himself who would have had access to the documents found to have been leaked.

The hearing continued on 15 February 2007. The Advocate General announced his intention to prosecute the applicant should he answer questions naming AIVD sources, providing an insight into AIVD working methods or relating to the blacked-out parts of the redacted documents. Responding to protests by the defence, the Court of Appeal referred to its interlocutory judgment of 12 October 2006 (see paragraph 34 above), in which it had stated that if the applicant considered a breach of his duty of secrecy in the interest of his defence he would, if prosecuted, be able to pray the right under Article 6 of the Convention to defend himself in justification. The decision to prosecute, however, belonged to the Public Prosecution Service alone to the exclusion of the courts.

The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 1 March 2007. It quashed the judgment of the Regional Court on the technical ground that the Regional Court’s judgment could not be simply endorsed, convicted the applicant and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment.

The evidence relied on was the following:

Statement by the applicant at the hearing of the Court of Appeal (12 February 2007), to the effect that:

He worked for the AIVD and accordingly had the documents mentioned in the charges at his disposal;

Knew some of the targets personally;

Had written down names and addresses found in his address book himself;

Had one of the documents (a phone tap report) in his home as well as in his office at work;

He knew the name of another target.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 29 September 2004, criminal complaint lodged on behalf of the AIVD by its acting head, to the effect that it has emerged that one of the targets (O.) turns out to be aware that he is an object of investigations. In particular, O. turns out to possess a copy of a document to that effect. The document has been circulated to “tens of persons” within the AIVD. The applicant is mentioned by name.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 5 October 2004, statement by the AIVD’s acting head to the effect that a secret AIVD document (copy of a telephone interception report) has been found during a search of the applicant’s home. The name of the person who printed it out would normally have been stated on the document but appears to have been removed.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 5 October 2004, statement by an AIVD official to the effect that a document shown him by police officers is secret and that one of the persons to whom it had been given was the applicant.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 28 October 2004, statement by an AIVD official relating to investigations undertaken by the AIVD itself on a copy of the hard disk of the applicant’s home computer. This is stated to have revealed information compromising the applicant. In particular, the applicant is reported to have informed a target about AIVD investigations.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 4 November 2004, statement by an AIVD official to the effect that a fax seized from a target was a transcript of an intercepted phone call prepared by the applicant. The content of the document reveals specific methods used by the AIVD in terrorism-related investigations. The document is identical to a document found in the applicant’s office desk, which bears the applicant’s ID.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 31 January 2005, statement by an AIVD official to the effect that the leaked information is State secret, sensitive, and relates to ongoing AIVD operations for gathering information on terrorist groups.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 30 September 2004, from which it appears that the applicant was arrested that day and was found in the possession of an address book.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 4 October 2004, mentioning that objects (envelopes, diaries, a phone tap report, written notes, floppy discs, compact discs and computers) were seized in the applicant’s home. No further details given.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 4 October 2004, list of goods seized in the home of a target.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 6 October 2004, relating the search of the applicant’s office and describing State secret documents found in his desk. One of these is identical to a document found in the possession of a target; another is identical to a document found in the applicant’s home (albeit that the applicant’s ID has been whited out). These documents are identified by the acting head of the AIVD as State secret.

A transcript of a page out of the applicant’s address book, bearing names in Arabic script identified by an AIVD expert as the names of targets.

A copy of a post-it note found in the applicant’s address book.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8 October 2004 to the effect that two (unnamed) AIVD members have classified the list of goods seized in the applicant’s home (paragraph 9 above) as State secret.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8 October 2004 identifying persons mentioned in the transcript of the phone tap.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 12 October 2004 identifying the transcript of the intercepted telephone conversation as identical to a document found in the applicant’s office desk.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 27 October 2004 to the effect that a document found in a search of the home of a target (C.) was identical to a classified document found in the applicant’s office desk.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 29 December 2004 relating the arrest of another target (O.), who was found to be in possession of classified AIVD documents. O. stated that these had been sent to a friend of his anonymously by post. A search of the applicant’s hard disk revealed an e-mail inquiring of a friend (S.B.) whether “the information sent to him by post had been of any use.”

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 3 February 2005. A search of the dwelling shared by Mohammed B., who was later convicted of the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, had led to the finding, among the personal effects of Mohammed B.’s flat-mate, of a transcript of a conversation that was part of an AIVD investigation.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 3 February 2005. The post-it note found in the applicant’s address book bore an address to which it appears that “the aforementioned document” was found to have been sent.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 18 March 2005. Description of documents found in the possession of the target C., whose house had been searched, and copies of some of which were found in the possession of the target O. All are classified documents already mentioned in other National Police Internal Investigations Department reports.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 21 January 2005. Interview of an AIVD official responsible for the security of the IT system. No name is given, the official identified only by a number (05/20040094). It emerges that the applicant had access to all the systems needed for his work as an audio analyst and had his own user ID and password.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 21 February 2005. Interview of witness 05/20040094 to the effect that the applicant, and he alone, prepared a transcript of a conversation later found in the possession of the target H.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 30 September 2004. Interview of the applicant from which it appears that the applicant has been employed by the AIVD since 2003, receives weekly reports about investigations in progress (which are classified), has signed a promise of secrecy and knows the targets O. and C. who are friends of his brother-in-law. He is aware that O. and C. are investigation targets.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 2 October 2004. Interview of the applicant, who recognises the transcript of the intercepted telephone conversation, which he admits is classified and should not have left AIVD premises, but which he must have taken home by mistake. The applicant also recognises a note bearing a name.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 6 October 2004. Interview of the applicant, who recognises the post-it note with the names of three targets (O., K. and H.) and admits that he knows he should not take names of targets home. The applicant also admits that there is no other possible explanation for finding the transcript of the intercepted telephone conversation in his office desk than that he himself put it there.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 7 October 2004. The applicant identifies two observation reports which are classified. One of them is stated to have been found in his office at work.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 26 October 2004. The applicant identifies the name of the target H. on the post-it note.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8 November 2004. The applicant identifies private e-mail addresses used by him (in his private capacity of agent for a travel agency based in Morocco) and by his wife respectively.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8 November 2004. The applicant admits that the transcript of the intercepted telephone conversation bears his user ID. The name H. on the post-it note corresponds to the person H. who is a target of an AIVD investigation; the applicant himself identified him as a target.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 27 October 2004. A DNA sample is taken from the applicant.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 9 November 2004. The DNA sample corresponds to DNA found on an envelope.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 8 November 2004. A further DNA match is found on an envelope.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 25 March 2005. It is more than one billion times more likely that the DNA match can be explained by the presence of the DNA of the applicant than by the presence of the DNA of strangers.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 1 October 2004. The target C. states that he received two envelopes containing documents from which it appeared that he and other Moroccan men were being watched.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 2 October 2004. The target C. relates how he received the two envelopes. The first had been sent to him at his home address. The second had been addressed to him, but sent to the home address of a second person, B1, and handed to him by a third, B2.

Official record by the investigating judge of 28 June 2005. Target C. recognises the documents sent to him.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 27 September 2004. Statement by the target O. O was aware that he was being watched, since his friend C. had received reports by post.

Official record by the investigating judge of 28 June 2005. The target O. admits that when arrested he had two sheets of paper in his pocket which he had received from a friend (A.B., the “third person” mentioned in document no. 36).

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 30 September 2004. B1 states that the target C. had received letters mentioning “our names”. One had been sent to his address (the address of the target C.); the second had been sent to the address of B2. The letters had been AIVD documents from which it appeared that all three were being watched. B1 recognised the documents.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 2 October 2004. B2 recognises the envelope sent to C. from a photocopy.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 2 October 2004. B2 describes how the second letter, addressed to C. and O., was received at the address of B1. He had opened the letter, which mentioned him and O. He had left it with C. O. had received a copy as well.

Official record by the investigating judge of 28 June 2005. B2 recognises the second letter referred to under no. 42. He had taken the letter to C. and given a copy to O.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 18 January 2005. Statement by S.B. (see under no. 18 above) who admits to knowing the applicant and also that he had received the e-mail from the applicant. In April or May 2004 he had received a transcript of an intercepted conversation from the applicant.

Official record by the investigating judge of 21 June 2005. S.B. admits to having received the e-mail from the applicant. He admitted to having received a transcript by mail and recognised it from a photocopy.

National Police Internal Investigations Department report of 10 November 2004. Target H. recognises the telephone transcript, which was sent to him at his home address. He suggests that it was sent to him because the other targets still lived with their parents.

Official report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations [which is the Ministry responsible for the AIVD], 15 March 2005, with a statement of the (by then) Head of the AIVD to the effect that it is now possible to accommodate the applicant’s defence by offering documents with fewer parts blacked out, but noting that the documents in issue come from a place that is out of bounds.

A copy of the Royal Decree designating the AIVD offices out of bounds.

The applicant’s letter of appointment as a member of the AIVD (17 October 2003).

Official report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, 10 February 2010, to the effect that the documents found in the possession of unauthorised third parties in the course of the criminal investigation against the applicant concern current AIVD counterterrorist operations and destroying their secrecy endangers national security.

Letter from the Head of the AIVD to the investigating judge, 17 June 2005, confirming that those documents concern AIVD counterterrorist operations and endanger the interests of the State by offering an insight into the AIVD’s state of intelligence, sources and operational methods.

Official report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations, 28 December 2006, signed by the Head of the AIVD, stating that not blacking out the blacked-out parts of particular documents would harm the State by disclosing the AIVD’s state of intelligence, sources (including one human source) and operational methods, naming the foreign intelligence services with which the AIVD cooperates, and disclosing the nature of information exchanged with those foreign services; identifying targeted organisations and their members (referred to as “Arab nationalist extremists”).

Official record of verification by the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism, 29 December 2006. The prosecutor has personally examined the documents in issue in unredacted form and found the unredacted parts of the redacted documents identical to the corresponding parts of the unredacted documents.

Photocopies of the address book with the post-it note and the redacted AIVD documents were attached to the judgment.

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning included the following:

“In considering whether the positions adopted by the service [i.e. the AIVD] and/or its members as regards the necessary secrecy and in answering the question to what extent restrictions on (among other things) the right to question witnesses can be justified, other issues than that of defining State secrets in a strict sense also play a part. That is apparent from the chapeau paragraph of section 85(1) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, which imposes on AIVD officials a duty of secrecy ‘without prejudice to Articles 98-98c of the Criminal Code’. That obligation extends to ‘all information the confidential character of which he knows or ought reasonably to suspect’. Only a ministerial decision as referred to in section 86(2) of that Act can relieve the official of this duty of secrecy if he wishes to act as a witness. The legislature has thus placed the choice in the ‘conflict ... between the interests of State security, which may imperatively require certain sources or information to be kept secret, and the interest of establishing the material truth in, among other things, ... criminal procedure’ [reference to the statutory drafting history of an earlier Act, repealed by the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, omitted] in the hands of the said Ministers.

The above leads the Court of Appeal to conclude as follows. In addition to State secrets within the meaning of Article 98 of the Criminal Code there are other matters that (in the view of the AIVD) fall under the duty of secrecy of section 85 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. The Court of Appeal deduces, on the basis of what is laid down in section 86 of that Act, that that obligation (in principle) prevails over the duties of a witness in a criminal trial. The Court of Appeal’s examination of the question whether an AIVD staff member has rightly invoked his duty [of secrecy] is necessarily detached/marginal. Things are different where it concerns the question whether the right of the defence to question witnesses is materially impaired, it being relevant, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, whether the statement of that particular witness is used in evidence.”

and

“The interests of State security, which the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and Articles 98 and following of the Criminal Code are intended to protect, stand in the way of granting a complete exemption from the duty of secrecy as desired by the defence.

It is obvious that the said duty of secrecy constitutes, to some extent, a restriction on – normally entirely – unimpeded free and confidential discussion between the suspect and his counsel and that – had it been in force unmitigated – it would prevent a fair trial.

As the Court of Appeal held in its interlocutory judgment of 12 October 2006, the duty of secrecy is subject only to the exceptions set out in the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act.

This means that the situation in which the suspect finds himself in the present criminal case leaves only the avenue left by section 86(1) of the said Act.”

and

“The Advocate General has given the undertaking, at the Court of Appeal’s hearing of 2 September 2006, that [the applicant] shall not be prosecuted if a violation of the duty of secrecy by [the applicant] is justified by reliance on Article 6 of the Convention, with due regard to the demands of proportionality and subsidiarity inherent pertaining to a legal defence (strafuitsluitingsgrond).

The conditions attached to the exemption aforementioned, all of which concern the interest of State security in relation to the interests of the defence in the present criminal proceedings, do not appear unreasonable to the Court of Appeal within the framework of the interests of State security and in the Court of Appeal’s opinion have done no relevant harm to the interests of the defence.”

and

“The Court of Appeal can only answer the question whether the information in issue is to be considered ‘State secret’ or as information relating to State security by referring to the texts, as contained in the file, of [the documents concerned], to the extent that these documents have been added to the file in censored form as appendices to the AIVD’s official record of 15 March 2005, [an uncensored e-mail relevant to one of the charges] and the explanations to these documents given by the AIVD, especially as contained in the said official record of the head of the AIVD of 10 February 2005 and the official record of the acting head of the AIVD of 28 December 2006, which latter report has been verified by the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism (Landelijke Officier van Justitie Terrorismebestrijding) as appears from the latter’s official report of 29 December 2006.

The Court of Appeal considers itself sufficiently able to determine the nature and character of this information on the basis of these documents, considered in context. For that purpose it is not necessary, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, to possess or have access to entirely uncensored versions of the information. In this connection, the Court of Appeal has sought, in giving its interlocutory judgment aimed at obtaining a further official report about the type and nature of the State security interest of the information contained in the censored texts portions, to gain optimum understanding of the nature and character of the information. Although the AIVD, in submitting its official record of 28 December 2006 (verified by the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism), has not entirely kept to the letter of the Court of Appeal’s order, the Court of Appeal has, based on the texts before it, considered in context with the AIVD’s explanations in its official records of 10 February 2005 and 28 December 2006, sufficiently gained the understanding referred to.”

The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).

The Supreme Court gave judgment on 7 July 2009 (ECLI:NL:HR:BG7232). It held that the length of the proceedings before it had been excessive and the applicant was entitled to compensation in the form of a reduction of sentence. It therefore quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal for technical reasons in order to revise the sentence which it reduced by two months to three years and ten months. It held, however, that the appeal was unfounded. Its reasoning included the following:

“5.5. There is no statutory provision for an exception to the duty of secrecy laid down in section 85 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act in the event that the official concerned is a suspect. Even then the official is bound by his duty of secrecy and he will not be permitted to divulge information in violation of that duty.

If, however, the trial judge takes the view, whether or not it be in response to a request or a legal argument (verweer) put forward by the defence, that the interest of the defence requires that information falling under the duty of secrecy is disclosed by the suspect, the court will have to weigh the conflicting interests in the case. The guiding principle (richtsnoer) in so doing is whether, if this information cannot be disclosed after all, there can still be a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.

If the trial court reaches the finding that it is necessary, from the point of view of that Convention guarantee, to take cognisance of that secret information and the handicap for the defence [resulting from not being able to disclose it] is not sufficiently compensated by the procedure followed, it will have to determine – for example, by hearing the appropriate AIVD official or officials on this point – whether the duty of secrecy is to be maintained intact in relation to that information. If that is the case, the conclusion will have to be that there cannot be any fair trial and the prosecution will have to be declared inadmissible (zal de officier van justitie niet-ontvankelijk moeten worden verklaard in de vervolging).

5.6. In so far as the Court of Appeal has been inspired by a procedural framework other than outlined above, it has misinterpreted the law (heeft het blijk gegeven van een onjuiste rechtsopvatting). However, that need not lead to the quashing of the judgment [of the Court of Appeal] for the following reasons. ...”

The Supreme Court went on to find that the compensatory measures had been sufficient in the circumstances: the possibility had been offered to hear AIVD officials as witnesses without disclosing their identities, and the Court of Appeal had been sufficiently informed by the information contained in the case file – the uncensored parts of documents, the official explanatory documents submitted by the AIVD, and the checking of the AIVD position by the National Public Prosecutor for Counter-terrorism – to make a proper assessment as to whether the documents in issue were properly classified State secret.


Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Ksenija Turković

The applicant is a Croatian national, who was born in 1981. The President decided that the applicant’s identity should not be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 § 4). The applicant was represented before the Court by Mr I. Farčić, a lawyer practising in Zagreb.

The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant worked as a police inspector in one of the local branches of the Z. Police Department.

During 2012 and 2013 the Split Police Department (Policijska uprava Splitsko-dalmatinska) investigated an organised chain of prostitution in the Split area. The investigation disclosed that the applicant had several contacts with the principal suspect in the investigation, M.H., and that he was one of the clients of the services organised by M.H.

In this connection two police inspectors of the Split Police Department, D.Z. and S.K., were ordered to interview the applicant and to obtain from him the available evidence.

On 26 March 2013 D.Z. and S.K. came to the premises of the Z. Police Department in order to interview the applicant.

In the morning of the same day the Chief of Crime Police of the Z. Police Department invited the applicant to his office. When the applicant arrived at around 9.30 a.m., the secretary of the Chief of Crime Police called M.A., a police inspector at the Z. Police Department, to escort the applicant to a meeting room for an interview with D.Z. and S.K.

According to the applicant, while escorting him to the meeting room the inspector M.A. without any reason started pulling his arm saying that he was a “dirty policeman” and that he knew those of his kind very well. The applicant protested against the use of force which made M.A. to press him even harder. The applicant also alleged that during the interview M.A. and the inspectors of the Split Police Department exerted pressure on him forcing him to confess. In particular, S.K. threatened to beat him if he would not confess.

According to the Government, the applicant was escorted to a meeting room without any use of force by M.A. or any of the other police officers. There was also no use of force or any other form of ill-treatment or coercion against the applicant during the interview.

A note of the applicant’s interview dated 26 March 2013 available to the Court shows that the applicant confessed to having one sexual intercourse with a prostitute in Split. The applicant also gave his mobile phone card to the police officers and duly signed a seizure record indicating that he had no objections.

After the interview the applicant returned to his work where he resumed with his duties until the end of the working day.

On 29 March 2013, at around 7.30 p.m., the applicant saw a doctor in a hospital in Z. concerning the injuries he had allegedly sustained in the premises of the Z. Police Department on 26 March 2013. The relevant part of the medical record reads:

“According to the statement of the injured person ...:

During the performance of his duties a crime inspector at [the Z. Police Department] injured him on his left arm.

Diagnosis:

Contusion on the left side of chest. Contusion and large haematoma on the left upper arm.”

The relevant part of another medical record of the same day reads:

“Time of the injury: 26.03.2013 9.30 a.m.

Reason for [the examination]: During the performance of his duties a crime inspector at [the Z. Police Department] injured him on the left shoulder.

Main diagnosis: S20 – superficial injuries of chest (torso).”

The applicant underwent further medical examinations on 8 and 17 April 2013, which indicated recession of the injuries on his upper arm and chest.

Following the applicant’s medical examination on 29 March 2013 (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above), the hospital forwarded a copy of his medical record to the Z. Police Department.

On 16 April 2013 the applicant was interviewed in the Z. Police Department concerning his alleged ill-treatment of 26 March 2013. The applicant stated that he had been forcefully grabbed by the hand by one of the Z. Police Department inspectors who escorted him to a meeting room. Inside the meeting room the inspector threatened him with ill-treatment saying that he should know very well why he had been summoned to an interview. At one point two inspectors of the Split Police Department had joined them and then he was questioned concerning his alleged contacts with prostitutes. The applicant also explained that following his interview he had said to an on-duty officer at the police station, Z.T., what had happened to him. He also stated that only later he had gone to see his lawyer and then decided that he should lodge an official complaint concerning his alleged ill-treatment.

On 18 April 2013 the inspector M.A. was interviewed and he denied any use of force against the applicant. On 23 and 24 April 2013 the inspectors of the Split Police Department D.Z. and S.K. submitted their reports denying any threats or use of force against the applicant.

On 25 April 2013 the applicant’s colleague Z.T. was interviewed. Z.T. stated that upon the applicant’s return from his meeting at the Z. Police Department on 26 March 2013, he had explained to Z.T. that he had been interviewed by the police inspectors concerning his alleged contacts with prostitutes. The applicant had also said to Z.T. that while escorting him to the meeting room one of the police inspectors took him by the hand. However, Z.T. explained that although the applicant had said that the inspectors were rude he did not say that he was ill-treated or injured nor did he explain in what manner were the inspectors rude. The following day Z.T. went together with the applicant to the internal control department and on their way there the applicant had not mentioned to Z.T. any injuries nor did he complain of any pain.

On 17 May 2013 the Z. Police Department forwarded the material obtained during its inquiry to the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Z.).

On 17 April 2013 the applicant sent an email to the Internal Control Unit of the Ministry of the Interior (Služba za unutarnju kontrolu Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova; hereinafter: the “Internal Control Unit”) complaining about his alleged ill-treatment by a police inspector during his interview in the Z. Police Department on 26 March 2013. He in particular alleged that he had been grabbed by the hand and pulled by a police inspector who escorted him to a meeting room where the same inspector then continued with the threats forcing him to confess to the alleged involvement in prostitution. The applicant also contended that the police inspector had forcefully taken his mobile phone and searched it. There were allegedly some other police officers who laughed at him.

Further, on 15 May 2013 the applicant forwarded a photograph to the Internal Control Unit depicting the alleged injuries he had sustained as a result of his ill-treatment of 26 March 2013.

During its inquiry the Internal Control Unit obtained a report from the Z. Police Department as well as the applicant’s medical records and reports form the inspectors D.Z. and S.K., and it interviewed the applicant, the inspector M.A. and the applicant’s colleague Z.T., as well as the Chief of Crime Police of the Z. Police Department.

On 18 July 2013 the Internal Control Unit informed the applicant that it considered his allegations unfounded and unsubstantiated.

The applicant challenged these findings and the Internal Control Unit informed him on 26 July 2013 that his complaints were forwarded to the Commission for Complaints of the Ministry of the Interior (Povjerentsvo za rad po pritužbama Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova; hereinafter: the “Commission”).

The proceedings before the Commission are still pending.

On 26 June 2013 the applicant sent a letter to the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office complaining about his alleged ill-treatment during his interview in the Z. Police Department on 26 March 2013.

On 2 July 2013 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the Chief of the Z. Police Department, the Chief for Crime Police of the Z. Police Department and his deputy, the inspectors M.A. and S.K. and the Head of the Internal Control Unit, alleging his ill-treatment during the interview of 26 March 2013 and their abuse of powers by lodging criminal complaints against him in connection with his alleged involvement in the prostitution (see paragraph 36 below). In connection with the alleged ill-treatment, the applicant submitted in general terms that the inspector M.A. had unlawfully used force against him and that the inspector S.K. had threatened him, forcing him to confess to his alleged involvement in prostitution.

During the investigation, the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office interviewed the Chief for Crime Police of the Z. Police Department and the inspector M.A., who denied any unlawfulness or the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment.

In the further course of the investigation the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office summoned the applicant’s colleague Z.T. for an interview.

The investigation before the Z. Municipal State Attorney’s Office is still pending.

Meanwhile, on an unspecified date the applicant also lodged a criminal complaint against the Chief for Crime Police of the Z. Police Department and his deputy as well as the inspectors M.A. and S.K. before the State Attorney’s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta; hereinafter: the “State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office”) alleging his ill-treatment during the interview of 26 March 2013 and irregularities in processing the case against him concerning his alleged involvement in prostitution.

On 31 October 2013 the State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office rejected the applicant’s criminal complaint as ill-founded on the grounds that there was no evidence that on 26 March 2013 he had left the premises of the Z. Police Department with any injuries and that the fact that he had sought medical help only three days after the alleged ill-treatment remained fully unexplained. This led to a conclusion that his injuries had not been caused in the course of his police interview. The State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office also indicated that it did not find any irregularities in processing of the applicant’s case by any of the persons involved.

On 27 March 2013 the applicant was provisionally suspended from the police service.

The disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in connection with his alleged involvement in prostitution, and concerning another event of alleged breach of the confidentiality of information, are still pending.

On 5 April 2013 the Split Police Department lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant before the State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office in connection with a suspicion of his involvement in a prostitution scheme.

On an unspecified date the State Attorney’s Organised Crime Office rejected the criminal complaint as ill-founded.

The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette nos. 56/1990, 135/1997, 8/1998, 113/2000, 124/2000, 28/2001, 41/2001, 55/2001, 76/2010 and 85/2010) read as follows:

Article 23

“No one shall be subjected to any form of ill-treatment ...”


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation)

The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Siirt.

On 9 January 2009 the applicant was taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation and disseminating its propaganda.

On 13 January 2009 the applicant was brought before the Siirt Magistrates’ Court, who ordered his detention on remand taking into account the strong suspicion that he had committed the alleged offences.

On 3 August 2009 the applicant’s lawyer filed an objection against the above decision on the applicant’s detention and requested his release.

On 6 August 2009 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating terrorist propaganda, and aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation.

On 10 August 2009, at the end of the preparatory hearing, the Diyarbakır Assize Court decided to prolong the applicant’s detention on the basis of the case-file.

On 8 September 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court ex officio examined the applicant’s detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it.

On 1 October 2009, at the end of the first hearing before the Diyarbakır Assize Court, the applicant was released pending trial.

On 31 December 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the charges against him. No appeal was filed and the judgment became final on 8 January 2010.


Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Ledi Bianku;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently serving a life sentence in Antalya.

On an unspecified date the applicant went to the Mersin Security Directorate headquarters to complete certain procedures regarding the sale of his car and found out that a warrant for his arrest had been issued by the Antalya Security Directorate.

Subsequently, at approximately 1 p.m. on 16 February 2004 the applicant went to the Antalya Security Directorate. It appears that at some point he confessed to his involvement in the shooting of a certain K.G. and as a result, at 4 p.m. the same day he took part in a photo identification procedure. According to a report drawn up by the police and signed by the applicant, the applicant turned himself in and confessed to his involvement in the shooting of K.G., which had taken place in 1992, and identified S.K., M.N.A. and A.Y. as his accomplices. There was no record indicating that the applicant had been advised of his rights, including his right to legal assistance and his right to remain silent, under the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the material time.

At around 5.30 p.m. the same day, the applicant participated in a reconstruction of the events (yer gösterme). According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, the latter described in detail what steps he had taken before the shooting, how he had shot K.G. in 1992 in Antalya, and how he had left the crime scene. There was no record indicating that the applicant had been advised of his rights, including his right to legal assistance and to remain silent, under the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the material time.

The police started questioning the applicant at around 6.30 p.m. the same day. According to the applicant, he was shown an arrest warrant, dated 19 November 1992, in which the offence was indicated as “breaching Law no. 6136 (the Firearms Act)” and the deadline stipulated in the statute of limitations was “2 September 1997”. In this connection, the police officers told him that the offence for which he was being sought was illegal possession of firearms and explosives contrary to Law no. 6136. They said that any statement given by him was merely a “formality”, since the time-limit for prosecution of that offence had already expired in 1997. The applicant therefore agreed to give a statement. His statements were transcribed on a pre-printed form. According to this form, he had been reminded of his rights to remain silent and to be represented by a lawyer. It appears that the applicant had refused legal assistance, since the first page of the record includes a pre-printed phrase stating “No lawyer is requested” with the applicant’s signature underneath. He was thus questioned in the absence of a lawyer.

The applicant was accordingly questioned at the Anti-Terrorism Department of the Antalya Security Directorate about his involvement in the PKK (the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan, an illegal organisation) and the wounding of a certain K.G. in 1992. In his nine-page statement, the applicant admitted to his involvement in the PKK and explained in detail that he had shot K.G. upon the instructions of the illegal organisation.

On 17 February 2004 the applicant was questioned again by the Antalya public prosecutor and the investigating judge. According to the statement drawn up during the questioning by the public prosecutor, the applicant had been advised of his rights again. However, the statement he gave was similar to his police statement.

Before the investigating judge, the applicant was advised of his rights again. He stated that he did not want the assistance of a lawyer and repeated the content of his police statement. The investigating judge first ordered the applicant’s release; however, following an objection by the prosecutor, he ordered that the applicant be placed in detention pending trial.

On 10 March 2004 the public prosecutor at the Izmir State Security Court filed an indictment with that court and accused the applicant of carrying out activities for the purposes of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, an offence under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. In his indictment, the public prosecutor also indicated that the applicant had turned himself in.

During the hearings before the Izmir State Security Court the applicant was represented by a lawyer. At a hearing held on 4 May 2004, the applicant gave evidence in the presence of his lawyer and retracted the statements he had made previously. He maintained, in particular, that he had been tricked by the police into giving incriminating statements by being shown a paper in which the time-limit for prosecution of the offence he was accused of committing had expired. He denied his involvement in the shooting and rejected the accusations against him. The applicant further submitted that he did not know the co-accused, A.Y., S.K. or M.N.A.

During the same hearing, the trial court deemed it necessary to hear from people who had been tried for the same incident in a previous case, no. 1996/9, namely M.N.A., S.K. and B.Ç., with a view to verifying the defence submissions of the applicant and his co-accused, A.Y. In this connection, the trial court ordered that the necessary steps be taken to find out in which prisons M.N.A., S.K. and B.Ç. had been held and ordered an enquiry as to their addresses in the event that they had been released from prison. The trial court further ordered that a confrontation take place once the witnesses had been located. It ordered that photographs be taken of the applicant and A.Y., one from the side and the other from the front, and sent with the reports concerning the case, in the event that M.N.A., S.K. and B.Ç. were located outside its jurisdiction. If they resided in the centre of İzmir, they should be heard in person.

The trial court also ordered that the address of the victim, K.G., be ascertained with a view to bringing him before the court, so that evidence could be taken from him in person.

At a hearing held on 29 June 2004, the trial court heard evidence from S.K. as a witness. S.K. said that he neither knew nor had ever seen the applicant and A.Y. He did not have direct knowledge of K.G.’s shooting and had given his previous statement as a result of information he had obtained from M.N.A. and B.Ç. The trial court reiterated its orders concerning M.N.A., B.Ç. and K.G.

At a hearing held on 26 August 2004, A.Y.’s lawyer submitted a medical report issued by the Elazığ Psychiatric Hospital, dated 3 September 2002, which stated that M.N.A. suffered from depression. The lawyer accordingly asked the trial court not to call M.N.A. as a witness. The trial court did not respond to that request.

Under Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to the Izmir Assize Court.

On 19 August 2004 M.N.A. was questioned by the Siirt Assize Court, pursuant to a letter rogatory from the trial court. According to the transcript of the hearing at the Siirt Assize Court, M.N.A. was serving a sentence in the Siirt E-type Prison at that time. He explained that in 1992, together with the applicant and a certain A.Y., he had received instructions from the PKK and S.K. to shoot K.G. Accordingly, while he had secured the area, the applicant and A.Y. had gone to shoot K.G. He had heard gunshots but had not seen K.G. being shot. He further identified the applicant and A.Y. from the photographs. The Siirt Assize Court then asked M.N.A. to clarify the inconsistency between the statements he had given to the police and the public prosecutor in 1995 and those he had just given to the court. M.N.A. insisted that he was now telling them the correct version of the events. The court reminded him that in his statement of 29 November 1995 before the public prosecutor he had said that he had not known the accused, and asked him to clarify that point. M.N.A then explained that it was because he had been questioned as an accused on 29 November 1995. He repeated that he was now telling them the correct version of the events.

On 17 December 2004, at the seventh hearing, M.N.A.’s statement was read out. The applicant objected to the statement, referring to the inconsistency of M.N.A.’s statements since 1995. A.Y.’s lawyer also referred to the medical report in respect of M.N.A. and requested that his statement be considered as unreliable. The trial court did not provide a response to that request. It reiterated its orders concerning B.Ç. and K.G.

On 17 February 2005 the eighth hearing was held, and the trial court again reiterated its orders concerning B.Ç. and K.G.

At the ninth hearing on 28 April 2005 the trial court once again reiterated its orders concerning B.Ç. and K.G.

At the tenth hearing on 12 July 2005 the victim, K.G. appeared before the trial court and gave evidence as a witness. K.G. submitted that he had not seen the applicant or A.Y. at the crime scene and that they had not been involved in his shooting. He gave a detailed description of the people who had shot him.

On 4 October 2005 the Izmir Assize Court found the applicant guilty as charged and convicted him on the basis of the case file as a whole, including the record of the reconstruction of the events and the report of the photo identification.

The court accordingly sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment, under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code, for carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory.

On 14 February 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court in order to determine whether the terms of the new Criminal Code, which had entered into force on 1 June 2005 (no. 5237), were more favourable for the applicant. The case was thus re-examined by the Izmir Assize Court in view of the recent legislative changes.

On 13 June 2006 the applicant’s lawyer requested that the trial court bring M.N.A before the court in order to cross-examine him directly and arrange a physical confrontation between him and the applicant. The Izmir Assize Court rejected the request on the grounds that it had already examined and rejected the same request.

On the same date the Izmir Assize Court, relying on the same pieces of evidence, once again found the applicant guilty as charged under Article 125 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The applicant lodged an appeal on 3 July 2003, in which his lawyer submitted, inter alia, that M.N.A.’s statements should not have been taken into consideration given the medical report on his mental state. He further submitted that the applicant had been deceived by the police and asked the Court of Cassation to declare his statements inadmissible and in contravention of Article 6 of the Convention.

On 19 December 2006 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s appeal.


CASE OF SERGIYENKO AND SACHENKO v. UKRAINE

Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom of movement-{general} (Article 2 para. 1 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom of movement)

André Potocki;Mārtiņš Mits;Síofra O’Leary

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the excessive length of criminal proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law. In application no. 78377/13 the applicant also raised another complaint under the provisions of the Convention.


George Nicolaou;Guido Raimondi;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

The applicant, Mr Pëllumb Qeska, is an Albanian national, who was born in 1945 and lives in Korça. He was represented before the Court by Mr A. Tabaku, a lawyer practising in Korça.

The Albanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their then Agents, Ms S. Mëneri and Ms E. Hajro of the State Advocate’s Office.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicant was one of the co-owners of two plots of land situated in the city of Korça. The first plot of land (“plot A”) measured approximately 182.7 sq. m and the second plot of land (“plot B”) approximately 84 sq. m.

On an unspecified date the applicant initiated civil proceedings with the Korça District Court (“District Court”) seeking the partition of both plots of land in order to determine the shares of each of the co-owners. The co-owners agreed to the request.

On 27 July 2001 the District Court ruled in favour of the partition of both plots of land. It found that the applicant’s share consisted of thirty-three thirty-sixths of plot A and eleven twenty-fourths of plot B. That decision became final on an unspecified date in August 2001, no appeal having been lodged against it.

On an unspecified date in 2002 the applicant instituted a second set of proceedings for the partition of both plots of land, requesting allocation of both plots of land to him in view of the fact that he was the owner of the majority of shares. The co-owners contested the applicant’s request to have both plots of land allocated to him.

On 15 July 2002, having regard to the fact that the applicant was the owner of the largest portion of both combined plots of land upon which a multi-storey building could be erected in accordance with the urban study plans, the District Court allocated him both plots of land. The District Court rejected the other co-owners’ request to have plot B awarded to them. Moreover, the court ordered that the applicant pay compensation to all co-owners, in respect of their property shares, in accordance with an expert’s report.

On an unspecified date, V.Q., one of the fifteen co-owners of plot B, lodged an appeal with the Korça Court of Appeal (“Court of Appeal”) challenging the amount of the compensation paid to him as well as the part of the decision which awarded the applicant plot B. He alleged that since the other co-defendants owned thirteen twenty-fourths of plot B, they should have been awarded plot B. No appeal was lodged by the three co-owners of plot A.

On an unspecified date the Court of Appeal gave notice of the proceedings to the other fourteen co-owners of plot B who were involved as parties to the proceedings before the District Court.

On 9 October 2012 the court adjourned the hearing, none of the parties having shown up. Only the representative of three co-owners, who also had shares in plot A, was present.

On 22 October 2002 the court adjourned the hearing, V.Q. being absent on the strength of a (medical) report. According to the record, three co-owners as well as the representative of three co-owners, who also had shares in plot A, were present at the hearing.

On 1 November 2002 the court decided to continue the proceedings. Five co-owners as well as the representative of three co-owners, who also had shares in plot A, were present. The court decided to hear the expert and the parties’ lawyers at the next hearing.

On 6 November 2002 almost all parties, save one co-owner, were present. The court fined the expert for non-appearance at the hearing.

On 10 December 2002 five co-owners as well as the representative of three co-owners, who also had shares in plot A, were present at the hearing. The expert, who was questioned by the parties, stated that the two plots of land were not connected to each other.

On the same day the Court of Appeal, having heard the co-owners, dismissed the grounds of appeal of V.Q. in respect of plot B and upheld the District Court’s decision as regards both plots. According to the Court of Appeal V.Q.’s share was so small (2.60 sq. m.) that the award of that property to him would be against its purpose. It pointed to the fact that he had lodged an appeal alone, without being joined by the other co-owners who were parties to the proceedings before the District Court. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:

“All parties consented, on the whole, to the [District Court’s] decision, with the exception of V.Q., who appealed against it only in so far as the first part of the decision is concerned [that is plot B], to which he is a party and has a [legitimate] interest (me këtë vendim të gjykatës, përgjithësisht kanë qenë dakort të gjithë palët përjashto të paditurin V.Q., i cili ka ankimuar vendimin vetëm për pjesën e parë të tij, ku është pale dhe ka interes).

The remaining defendants did not join their forces to claim the plot of land jointly, not least that the remaining defendants, 14 of them, lodged no appeal (të paditurit nuk i bashkuan pjesët dhe ta kërkonin këtë sipërfaqe të përbashkët, për më tepër të paditurit e tjerë që në numër janë 14 persona, nuk kanë bërë ankim).

Out of all defendants, only V.Q. who owns 2.60 sq. m, lodged an appeal (prej tyre është ankuar vetëm i padituri V.Q. që si person ka ... dy metra dhe gjashtëdhjetë centimetra katrorë).”

In compliance with the Court of Appeal’s decision, on 26 March 2003 the applicant paid all fifteen co-owners compensation corresponding to their respective shares in plots A and B. He entered his property titles over both plots in the Land Registry on 31 July 2003.

On 7 January 2003 V.Q., joined by thirteen co-owners of plot B, appealed to the Supreme Court. One co-owner did not sign the appeal. The appellants argued that, even though they had attended the hearings before the Court of Appeal, this had not been reflected in that court’s judgment. That the appeal was signed only by V.Q. was to be attributed to the lawyer who had lodged the appeal. No appeal was lodged by the three co-owners, in respect of plot A, with the Supreme Court.

On 18 March 2004 the Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of five judges, by majority, quashed the Court of Appeal decision in respect of plot B and found, inter alia, as follows:

“It follows, as also accepted by the courts, that the defendants have sought to retain this plot of land. Their appeal to the Court of Appeal states that they have the same interest and they jointly claim the plot of land. The appellants own the majority of the plot (thirteen twenty-fourths). Under these circumstances, contrary to the Court of Appeal’s finding, the appellants own the majority of the plot and share the same interest. As they do not seek the partition of that plot, on the basis of the foregoing provision [referring to Article 207 of the Civil Code], the plot should be awarded to the [fifteen] appellants (siç ka rezultuar dhe siç pranojnë dhe vetë gjykatat, të paditurit e kanë kërkuar ta mbajnë këtë sipërfaqe. Edhe në kërkesën ankimore, Gjykatës së Apelit i është parashtruar se ata i kanë interest e njëjta dhe e duan pjesën bashkarisht. Gjithashtu, të gjithë të paditurit zotërojnë në këtë sipërfaqe pjesën më të madhe (13/24 pjesë). Në këto rrethana, kur ndryshe nga sa pranon gjykata e Apelit, të paditurit kanë pjesën më të madhe dhe interest e njëjta si dhe nuk kërkojnë t’u pjesëtohet trualli ... pjesa u duhet lënë këtyrë të fundit).”

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning that, since Pëllumb [the applicant] owns the majority of the plot of land measuring 182.7 sq. m, the other plot of land measuring 84 sq. m should be awarded to him for the purpose of constructing a multi-storey building, is erroneous. These plots of land, irrespective of their neighbouring position and of the fact that they have the same owners, should be treated as two separate objects which have been subject to the partition proceedings for the sake of judicial economy (Arsyetimi i gjykatës se paditësi Pëllumb ka në pronësi pjesën më të madhe të truallit me sipërfaqe 182.7 m2 prandaj dhe trualli me siperfaqe 84 m2I duhet lënë atij për t’u përdorur me qëllim ndërtimin e pallateve shumëkatëshe është i gabuar. Këto troje, pavarësisht nga pozicioni kufi me njëri-tjetrin dhe nga fakti se kanë pjesërisht të njëjtët bashkëpronarë, duhen trajtuar si dy sende te veçanta që janë pjesëtuar në të njëjtin gjykim vetëm për ekonomik gjyqësore.)”

As regards plot A, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal decision and found that,

“In respect of the other plot [referring to plot A], the court’s decision is just and should be upheld. The applicant obviously owns the majority of the plot, thirty-three thirty-sixths. Even if matters stood differently, any appeal by the other three co-owners [to the Supreme Court] would be time-barred (rënë në dekadencë) as they had not lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal. In light of the above, plot [A] should be allocated to the applicant.”

The Supreme Court held that the appellants in whose favour plot B was allocated were to compensate the applicant in cash for his share. There was no dissenting opinion.

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. He complained that he had been deprived of his right to a fair trial, referring to the incoherent reasoning in the Supreme Court’s decision. While the Supreme Court had ruled that any possible action by the three co-owners in respect of plot A would be considered time-barred as they had failed to avail themselves of the appeal to the Court of Appeal, it had not adopted the same approach with respect to the fourteen co-owners as regards plot B, who had not lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal, but whose appeal before the Supreme Court had been declared admissible and decided in their favour.

On 21 December 2004 the Constitutional Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible. It found that:

“the [applicant’s] claims do not concern violations that would render the process unfair. They relate to aspects of proof and the determination of the merits of the case, which fall within the jurisdiction of the lower courts.”

On 24 June 2005, the Supreme Court refused a request by the applicant for a review of the same court’s decision of 18 March 2004.

Article 161 states that a civil action may be jointly brought by co-claimants against co-defendants provided that they have joint rights and obligations, which have the same basis on points of fact or law.

Article 162 reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“Each party acts on his/her own against the opposing party provided that his/her procedural actions or omissions result in neither damage nor profit to the other parties.

If, owing to the nature of the legal relationship in dispute or because of a legal provision, the effect of the decision to be adopted is to be extended onto all parties, the procedural actions which were carried out by one party shall have effect also on other parties who did not appear before the court or did not undertake such actions within the prescribed time-period.”

Articles 369-374 of the Code of Civil Procedure regulate the partition of common or inherited property by virtue of a court decision. The first phase of the partition proceedings consists of a court interim decision which determines the identity of the joint owners, the object to be partitioned and the corresponding parts belonging to each owner. In the second phase of the partition proceedings, the court determines the value of the various objects to be partitioned, after having received a prior opinion of experts. Any inequality in the value of the objects included in the shares is to be compensated in money. The court decides on the financial relationship of the parties arising from their joint ownership.

The relevant provision of the Civil Code reads as follows:

Article 207

“The partition of the co-owned object shall be effected by the agreement of all of the co-owners... When the object is real property, the partition shall be effected by a notarial deed. The partition of the co-owned object corresponds to its division in kind, proportionate to the shares of each co-owner, provided that the partition is possible and does not damage the relevant purpose of the object...

...When some of the co-owners make a request [that the object be allotted exclusively to them], the court may so order, obliging those co-owners to reimburse other co-owners in relation with the partitioned property the cash amount equivalent to the value of their shares.

In unifying decision no. 628 of 15 May 2000 the Supreme Court Joint Benches clarified the nature of the interim decision given at the conclusion of the first phase of the partition proceedings. It ruled that, given its sui generis nature, the interim decision concerning the first phase of the partition proceedings was final and could not be revisited by the court deciding on the second phase of the partition proceedings.

In decision no. 18 of 18 July 2009 (18/09), relying on Article 162 of the CCP, the Constitutional Court ruled that a civil action contesting the amount of compensation in an expropriation case, lodged by only one co-owner, had effect on all co-owners who did not initially join the co-owner in the first-instance court proceedings or did not carry out procedural acts within prescribed time-limits. In that case, the Court of Appeal accepted a co-owner’s civil action, but rejected the appellants’ action on the ground that it had been lodged out of time. The Constitutional Court, relying on Article 162 of the CCP, found a breach of the appellants’ right to a fair hearing and reasoned, inter alia, that the co-owner’s action should have been regarded as carried out by the appellants, who were the remaining co-owners.


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Budakalász.

The applicant was employed with a State-owned gambling service provider for more than 20 years.

On 29 June 2010 the applicant’s employment was terminated by mutual agreement with effect from 30 June 2010. Under this agreement, the employer paid the applicant a gross amount of 21,573,086 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 18,000 euros (EUR)), subject to payroll burdens.

Under new legislation (see paragraph 10 below) the severance payment was subsequently taxed at a 98% rate in its part exceeding HUF 3.5 million; the income tax and social security contributions already paid (see paragraph 7 above) were deducted from the tax payable. Thus, the applicant paid an additional HUF 10,756,341 (approximately EUR 34,000) in special tax on 3 May 2011.