Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Procedure prescribed by law;Article 5-1-c - Bringing before competent legal authority);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Procedure prescribed by law;Article 5-1-c - Bringing before competent legal authority);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Lakha-Varanda, Chechen Republic.

On 11 July 2008 P. caused a traffic accident while driving and damaged the applicant’s car. According to P., the applicant threatened him, asking for cash for his car’s repair.

On 16 July 2008 P. reported the applicant to the regional police department for combatting organised crime. The police decided to run a special operation to arrest the applicant. They gave P. 2,000 United States dollars (USD) and 90,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in marked notes. At around noon several police officers arrived at a car market where P. worked. At about 5 p.m. the applicant entered P.’s office. P. met the applicant and gave him the money he had received from the police. Immediately thereafter, the policemen arrested the applicant. According to the police officers, the applicant resisted the arrest and they had to handcuff him. The applicant was then taken to the regional police department for combatting organised crime. At 5 p.m. the policemen searched the applicant and found heroin on him. Lay witnesses F. and R. were present during the search. The applicant alleged that it was the police officers who had planted the drug on him.

At 8 p.m. on 16 July 2008 police captain A. drew up an administrative arrest record, according to which the applicant had “failed to comply with the policemen’s legitimate request to present his identification document, resisted them and tried to abscond”. No legal assistance was made available to the applicant.

On 17 July 2008 at 12.45 p.m. investigator S. from the town police department opened a criminal investigation against the applicant on suspicion of illegal drug possession. At 6.20 p.m. she drew up a criminal arrest record.

On 18 July 2008 the Odintsovo Town Court authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court noted as follows:

“As is apparent from the evidential material submitted, [the applicant] is suspected of having committed a serious offence and he has a prior criminal record. If released, he might abscond and interfere with [administration of justice]. ”

The applicant appealed, noting that he had been arrested by the police a day before the record of his arrest was prepared and that the Town Court had failed to take his fact into consideration. He also argued that the Town Court had ignored the fact that he had a permanent place of residence in Moscow, that he had been the sole provider for two minor children and his wife, that he was in the fourth year of study by correspondence at a higher educational establishment and that he had employment. Nor had the prosecutor furnished any evidence disclosing the applicant’s intent to abscond or to interfere with the administration of justice. Lastly, he noted that the arrest order did not indicate a time-limit for his detention.

On 5 August 2008 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the arrest order of 18 July 2008 on appeal.

On 15 September 2008 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 17 November 2008. The court reasoned as follows:

“As is apparent from the evidential material submitted, [the applicant] is charged with a serious offence and has a prior criminal record. Accordingly, if released, he might abscond and interfere with [administration of justice].”

On 12 November 2008 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 31 December 2008. The court reasoned as follows:

“Taking into account the fact that [the applicant] is charged with a serious offence which he committed whilst on parole, that he has a prior criminal record and that he might abscond, continue his criminal activities, and interfere with the administration of justice, it is necessary that [the applicant] remain in custody. ”

On 16 December 2008 the Town Court set the trial-date for 23 December 2008. The court also ordered that the applicant remain in custody pending examination of the case and noted as follows:

“... According to the material submitted by the prosecutor, [the applicant] had been previously convicted. He is charged with a[n] ... offence classified as particularly serious ... . ... The court considers that, if released, [the applicant] might abscond. Furthermore, [the applicant’s] release might interfere with the comprehensive and objective examination of the evidence. Accordingly, the measure of restraint previously imposed on [the applicant] cannot be lifted.”

On 18 December 2008 the Town Court opened the trial.

On 22 May 2009 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 8 September 2009 noting as follows:

“Having heard the parties’ arguments, the court concludes that, in view of the fact that [the applicant] is charged with a ... grievous offence ... which he committed whilst on parole, the court considers that, if released, he might abscond or continue criminal activities. Furthermore, the [applicant’s] release might interfere with the comprehensive and objective examination of the case. Accordingly, ... the detention imposed on [the applicant] cannot be lifted.”

On 25 June 2009 the Town Court returned the case file to the prosecutor’s office for rectification of certain omissions and extended the applicant’s detention until 8 September 2009. The court referred to the gravity of the charges against the applicant and noted that the latter was charged with having committed a serious offence whilst released on parole.

On 16 July 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 22 May 2009 on appeal.

On 23 July 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 June 2009 on appeal.

On an unspecified date the prosecutor’s office returned the case file to the Town Court.

On 2 November 2009 the Town Court opened the trial. On the same date the applicant studied the material in the case file at the court-house. He tore several pages out of the case file and burnt them.

During the subsequent hearings the court heard evidence from a certain P., police officers And., Rom., Ak., Z., Shch., and T. − who had taken part in the applicant’s arrest − the head of the police unit Pl., lay witness R. − who had been present when the applicant was searched on 16 July 2008 − and forensic expert P., who had run a laboratory test on the heroin found on the applicant.

On 11 and 12 November and 2, 3, 4 and 8 December 2009 the applicant received repeated reprimands from the presiding judge for making threats and insulting persons present in the courtroom. The judge warned the applicant that he might be removed from the courtroom for continuing with such disruptive behaviour.

On 9 December 2009 the director of the company that provided the interpreters for the trial complained to the court that the applicant had threatened the interpreters who had earlier taken part in the proceedings.

On 16 December 2009 the applicant refused to leave the remand prison to attend a trial hearing. The hearing was adjourned.

On 17 December 2009 the court held the last trial hearing. The presiding judge confirmed the presence of the parties and witnesses. L., a police officer who had been in charge of the operation leading to the applicant’s arrest on 16 July 2008, appeared for questioning. The applicant insulted the witness. The presiding judge reprimanded the applicant and warned him that he would be removed from the courtroom if he persisted with his disruptive behaviour. The applicant started talking in Chechen. The interpreter refused to interpret and asked the court to relieve him of his duties. The presiding judge informed the parties that the interpreters who had earlier taken part in the proceedings had decided to refuse further engagement in view of the insults and threats made by the applicant. The applicant talked back to the judge in Chechen. The interpreter refused to interpret into Russian. The presiding judge again reprimanded the applicant and warned him about his possible removal from the courtroom. The presiding judge presented the report from the remand prison management stating that on 16 December 2009 the applicant had refused to be transported from the remand prison to the court-house for the hearing. The presiding judge asked the prosecution and defence whether it was possible, in the circumstances, to remove the applicant from the courtroom. The prosecutor did not object. The applicant stated that the presiding judge’s conduct clearly demonstrated that he was being pressurised by high-ranking law-enforcement officials to deliver an unlawful judgment in the applicant’s case and that his decision to remove the applicant from the courtroom would be unlawful and in contravention of the Convention. The court ruled as follows:

“... the court decides to remove [the applicant] from the courtroom ... for the following reasons. [The applicant] has repeatedly been disruptive in the courtroom in the course of the trial, including the current hearing. In particular, ... while studying the material in the case file, [the applicant] destroyed five pages thereof. He repeatedly refused to appear in the courtroom referring to his needs to pray, eat, wash and go to the bathroom. On several occasions he refused to appear before the court alleging that he was ill. However, the emergency response doctors summoned did not confirm his allegation. He has insulted witnesses and other participants in the proceedings and shown disrespect for the judges participating in the trial by making negative comments about the judicial system in Russia. He claimed to know the home address of [a witness] and one of the judges. He has made statements and comments unrelated to the trial. During this hearing, [the applicant] insulted a witness ... . After [the applicant] said something in the Chechen language, the interpreter asked the court to [relieve him of his duties] ... . The head of the interpreters’ agency reported that [the applicant] spoke Chechen [in the courtroom] with the sole intention of insulting and threatening the interpreters.”

The trial continued in the applicant’s absence. The court questioned L., who, at the time, had been in charge of the special operation conducted in response to P.’s complaint about the applicant extorting money from him. The applicant’s lawyer was present and put questions to the witness. The court also established that witness F. had failed to appear and decided that the statement he had made earlier to the investigator should be read out. The court also read out statements made by witnesses Shch. and T. earlier during the trial as those witnesses had also failed to appear. Lastly, the court granted a request from the applicant’s lawyer and read out several earlier statements made by the applicant and several witnesses for the defence who had failed to appear. According to the record of the court hearing, the applicant refused to return to the courtroom to participate in the closing arguments. The judgment was read out in the applicant’s absence.

The Town Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. The court based its findings on statements made by witnesses questioned by the investigator and the court, police reports and other material in the case file, and forensic evidence. The court accepted the prosecution’s version of events, namely that the applicant had been arrested by special police forces in the course of an operation targeting him as a racketeer as alleged by P. and that heroin had been found on him during the search conducted immediately after his arrest.

On 13 April 2010 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal.

On 11 December 2013 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court reviewed the applicant’s conviction and reduced the applicant’s sentence to three years and two months’ imprisonment.

On 21 May 2009 the applicant was taken to the Odintsovo police station. According to applicant, at the station he was assaulted by three police officers. They throttled him and pulled his arms behind his back causing him enormous pain.

On 21 and 22 May 2009 the applicant was examined by a paramedic. According to the official report, the applicant complained about chronic stomach pain.

On 22 May 2009 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the police and the prosecutor’s office about the incident of 21 May 2009.

On 25 May 2009 the police completed an internal inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. It was established that five police officers had had to subdue the applicant during a body search. They had pinned him to the ground and handcuffed him.

On 10 July 2009 investigator B. refused to institute criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators. On 31 August 2009 his superior quashed the said decision and remitted the matter for further inquiry.

On 9 September 2009 investigator D. dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unsubstantiated and refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. Relying on the evidential material obtained in the course of the inquiry, he concluded that the police officers had acted in accordance with the law. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the decision of 9 September 2009.

Following communication of the application to the Government, on 4 February 2014 the Acting Head of the Investigative Committee of Odintsovo Town quashed the decision of 9 September 2009 and remitted the matter for further inquiry. The parties did not disclose the outcome of the proceedings.

On 25 September 2009, remand prison director M. ordered the applicant’s placement in a disciplinary cell.

According to the applicant, on their way to the disciplinary cell M. repeatedly hit the applicant against the wall, administering blows to his head and body. The applicant’s nose and lips began to bleed. Then the guards handcuffed the applicant and continued beating him.

According to the Government, the applicant refused to enter the disciplinary cell. Instead, he threw a punch at M.’s face and M. hit his head against the wall. M. tried to subdue the applicant by pulling his right arm behind his back. The applicant resisted and kicked M. Guard N. came to M.’s rescue and pulled the applicant’s arm behind his back. The applicant fell to the floor and his nose bled. The guards handcuffed the applicant and took him to a cell where he calmed down. The guards called an ambulance.

On the same date the prison director and the guards reported the use of force against the applicant. According to the reports, M. pulled the applicant’s right arm behind his back using a combat technique and guard K. handcuffed the applicant to put an end to his resistance.

On an unspecified date the applicant underwent a medical examination. According to the medical report the applicant had sustained the following injuries: bruises on the right forearm and shoulder, left shoulder, left armpit and left calf; a bruised wound on the lower lip.

On 6 October 2009 the applicant complained that he had been beaten up by M. On 15 October 2009 investigator Mar. dismissed the applicant’s allegations as unsubstantiated and refused to institute criminal proceedings against M.

On 12 October 2009 a medical forensic expert examined the applicant and his medical case history. The expert concluded that the applicant’s injuries could have resulted from impact by blunt and solid objects and that the applicant might have sustained the injuries on 25 September 2009 as a result of blows or a fall. The expert concluded that the injuries were not serious and had not caused any harm to the applicant’s health.

On 22 October 2009 the expert issued an additional forensic report, noting that it was impossible to determine the exact date on which the applicant had sustained the injuries. It could have been on 25 September 2009 or some time before or after that date.

On 7 October 2009 the prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation into the incident of 25 September 2009. The applicant was charged with the use of force against a State agent.

On an unspecified date the Town Court received the file and opened the trial. During the trial, the applicant maintained his innocence. He claimed that the remand prison director and the guards had beaten him up on 25 September 2009 and he had then been prosecuted on trumped-up charges to cover up for the beatings.

On 16 December 2010 the Town Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. The court dismissed the applicant’s version of events as unsubstantiated, relying on the prosecution and defence witnesses’ statements and forensic evidence. On 17 March 2011 the Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. The court also re-calculated the applicant’s sentence. It took into account that the applicant had two previous convictions and sentenced him cumulatively to seven years’ imprisonment.

On 11 December 2013 the Presidium of the Regional Court reclassified the charges against the applicant by way of supervisory review, reduced his sentence to five years’ imprisonment and sentenced him cumulatively to five and a half years’ imprisonment.

On 29 October 2010 the applicant was detained in remand prison no. IZ77/4 in Moscow. According to the applicant, the prison guards beat him and nine other inmates. According to the Government, the applicant was inciting other inmates to disobey the guards. He also threatened the guards and insulted them. The guards used rubber truncheons and handcuffs to subdue the applicant.

On 3 November 2010 the applicant took part in a hearing at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation by means of video link. The applicant demonstrated to the judges extensive bruising on his stomach, chest and lower back and claimed that he had been beaten up by guards of the remand prison.

On 9 November 2010 the Supreme Court informed the Moscow City Prosecutor of the applicant’s injuries and forwarded the applicant’s complaint about the beatings in the remand prison.

According to the Government, on 12 January 2014 an investigator completed the inquiry into the incident of 29 October 2010 and refused to institute criminal proceedings against the prison guards. On 27 January 2014 the district prosecutor quashed the decision of 12 January 2014 and remitted the matter for further inquiry. The Government did not disclose the outcome.

According to the applicant, on 24 June 2012 he was beaten up whilst in detention in correctional colony no. IK-19 in the Sverdlovsk Region. According to the Government, the applicant had an altercation with inmate Ur. As a result, the applicant sustained bruises and a bone fracture on the right side of the face and concussion. On an unspecified date the authorities instituted criminal proceedings against Ur. The parties did not disclose their outcome.

On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. IK-2 in Yekaterinburg.

According to the applicant, on 29 September 2012 some time after 10 p.m. a group of young and strongly-built men entered his cell and beat him up. They were led by inmate O.

According to the applicant, on 1 October 2012 a man wearing the uniform of a major and accompanied by several medical orderlies entered the applicant’s cell. The major started beating the applicant, who was lying on the bed. The major then told the orderlies to pull the applicant off the bed and continued the beatings, administering multiple blows to the applicant’s head and other parts of the body.

On 7 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. IK-19 in the Sverdlovsk Region. Upon arrival, he underwent a medical examination. The medical practitioners recorded a wound on the applicant’s head and a bruise near the hip bone. The applicant explained that he had sustained the injuries as a result of the beatings to which he had been subjected in correctional colony no. IK-2. The management of correctional colony no. IK-19 forwarded the relevant report to the regional investigation committee but it was never received by them. According to the Government, the authorities’ inquiry into the loss of the report is still pending.

According to the Government, the inquiries into the incidents of 29 September and 1 October 2012 are still pending.

Between 17 July 2009 and 13 April 2011 the applicant was detained in identical conditions in the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo, in remand prison no. IZ50/1 in Mozhaysk and in remand prison no. IZ-77/4 in Moscow. The cells were overcrowded, dirty, poorly ventilated and insufficiently lit. The toilet offered no privacy. The use of a shower was limited.

From 22 November 2012 to 11 January 2013 the applicant was held in remand prison no. IZ-66/1 in Yekaterinburg.

On numerous occasions between 10 November 2008 and 17 December 2009 the applicant was held in the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo. According to the Government, the centre comprised fifteen cells measuring 184 sq. m in total. The centre had an outdoor area where the inmates were able to exercise. The inmates were able to take a shower at least once a week. They were provided with three meals per day and an individual sleeping place, bed linen, toiletries, a bowl, a mug and a spoon.

According to the applicant, at all times the cells in the temporary detention centre were overcrowded and the personal space available to the inmates fell short of the statutory minimum standard of 4 sq. m. The cells were dirty and there was no ventilation. The lighting was poor and insufficient for reading. The access to shower facilities was limited. The applicant received one meal a day. On the days of the court hearings, the applicant did not have any meals at all.

The applicant did not provide a description of the conditions in which he was detained in remand prisons nos. IZ-50/1 in Mozhaysk and IZ77/4 in Moscow, beyond alleging that they were identical to the conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo.

On 22 November 2012 the applicant was placed in cell no. 423 in remand prison no. IZ-66/1 in Yekaterinburg. The cell measured no more than 15 sq. m and was equipped with four beds. Between seven and nine inmates were held in the cell, together with the applicant.

From 29 November to 28 December 2012 the applicant was held in cell no. 240. The cell was constantly overcrowded and housed between eighteen and thirty inmates.

From 29 December 2012 to 11 January 2013 the applicant was held in cell no. 2. It measured 6.23 sq. m and housed two inmates.

According to the applicant, on the days of the court hearings and on the days when there was a change of the applicant’s place of detention, he was woken up early and placed in an overcrowded holding cell. He was then taken to the place of his destination (a court-house or a detention facility) in a prison van. On each occasion the number of the persons transported with the applicant exceeded the van’s capacity of 24 persons. The vans were dirty and unventilated and had no heating. The trip lasted several hours. The van compartments were stiflingly hot in the summer and very cold in the winter.

According to the Government, the applicant was transported in GAZ vans which comprised two compartments measuring 6.2 sq. m and 1.2 sq. m respectively, in strict compliance with the vans’ design capacity. The vans were equipped with ventilation and heating. The trips from the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo to the Odintsovo Town Court lasted no more than 5 to 10 minutes. The trips from the same detention centre to the courts in Moscow lasted no more than three hours.

According to the applicant, at the court-house he was placed in a holding cell measuring 5 sq. m together with two to four other inmates. He was held in such conditions for several hours awaiting the hearing. He was allowed to use the toilet only once. The cell was not ventilated. All the other detainees smoked and the applicant, a non-smoker, was exposed to the others’ tobacco smoke.

On 13 April 2011 the applicant was transported to correctional colony no. IK-19 in the Sverdlovsk Region. The trip lasted from 13 to 27 April 2011.

According to the applicant, he was held with twelve to fourteen other inmates in a train compartment of which the capacity was a maximum of six persons. During the stops, the applicant was housed in remand prisons in Moscow, Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg. All the cells there were overcrowded. The applicant was not provided with an individual sleeping place.

According to the Government, the applicant was transported in a train compartment measuring 159 x 214 x 287 cm. At no time did the number of inmates transported in one compartment together with the applicant exceed ten persons, the compartment’s capacity being twelve persons. It was equipped with eight sitting and four sleeping places. The applicant was provided with dry food rations and drinking water.


No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)

Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Ledi Bianku;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Mahoney

The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Bychawa.

The applicant was married in 1999. In 2001 his wife gave birth to P.

In December 2001 the applicant filed for divorce with the Lublin Regional Court. In his petition he requested that the child should reside with his mother and that she should be given custody. He submitted that he was not P.’s biological father.

At the same time the applicant instituted a separate set of proceedings challenging his paternity in respect of P. In a subsequent decision his claim was dismissed as it had been established by DNA tests that the applicant was in fact the boy’s father.

On 6 May 2002 the applicant requested the court conducting the divorce proceedings to give him custody of the child, to rule that the child’s place of residence should be with him, and that the mother should be divested of her parental rights. The Government submitted that he had further requested that the child be placed in a public care institution. The applicant contested this. He argued that his intentions had been misconstrued.

On 28 October 2003 the court dissolved the applicant’s marriage. It found that both parties had been at fault in the breakdown of the marital relationship. It held that parental authority was to be exercised by both parents, and stipulated that the place of residence of P. was to be with the boy’s mother. The applicant was allowed to visit the child at his mother’s address and in her presence on every third Sunday of the month between 10 a.m. and noon.

In the written grounds of the judgment the court observed that the applicant’s conduct was open to criticism. It referred to the unsuccessful paternity challenge he had brought before the courts and expressed the view that he was not really interested in maintaining meaningful contact with his son.

The applicant appealed. On 18 May 2004 the Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. The divorce judgment became final.

Subsequently difficulties arose as to compliance with the access order, as the mother persistently refused to respect it.

On 25 September 2006 the applicant instituted proceedings seeking to have the access arrangements specified by the divorce judgment enforced. On 29 November 2006 the court questioned him in connection with these proceedings. He did not remember when he had last seen his son.

The mother was questioned on 17 January 2007. She told the court that the applicant had come to see his son for the first time in 2006, just after she had requested an increase in the amount of the monthly maintenance payments. She was of the view that the applicant was not interested in the child.

By a decision of 28 June 2007 the Lublin District Court fixed a onemonth time-limit for the child’s mother to allow the applicant contact with P. on the terms stipulated by the divorce judgment. It held that she was to pay a fine of 600 Polish zlotys (PLN) in the event of continued failure on her part to comply with the access arrangements.

In July 2007 the applicant again requested the court to take measures to oblige the mother to cooperate and allow him contact with his child. On 25 September 2007 the Lublin District Court refused to grant the applicant an exemption from the obligation to pay court fees in respect of this request.

In October 2007 the applicant complained to the Lublin District Prosecutor about the mother’s conduct. He was informed in reply that issues of compliance with decisions of civil courts did not fall within the jurisdiction of the prosecuting authorities.

On 17 December 2007 the Lublin District Court imposed a fine on the mother in the amount of PLN 600 for her failure to allow the applicant contact with P., and set another one-month time-limit for her to comply with that order on pain of a fine in the amount of PLN 700.

On a further complaint by the applicant, by a decision of 9 April 2008 the same court ordered the mother to pay the fine of PLN 700 and set another one-month time-limit for her to comply with the access arrangements on pain of a further fine of PLN 800.

On 1 July 2008 the Lublin District Court appointed a court guardian (kurator) to supervise the execution of the access arrangements determined by the divorce judgment. It held that the guardian should accompany the applicant on each and every visit to his child under the schedule determined by that judgment.

On 26 August 2008 P.’s mother requested the court to restrict the applicant’s parental authority and to change the access arrangements by banning the applicant from contact with his son.

On 17 September 2008 the court ordered the mother to pay a fine of PLN 800 for her continued refusals to allow the child to see his father and set a new one-month time-limit for her on pain of a further fine in the amount of PLN 1,300.

On 22 September 2008 the applicant requested the court to rule that the child should move to his home and for the mother to be granted access rights.

On 25 September 2008 the court refused to examine the applicant’s new request for a fine to be imposed on the mother, having regard to its decision of 17 September 2008 (see paragraph 23 above).

On 21 December 2008 the Lublin District Court dismissed the applicant’s request of 23 September 2008 (see paragraph 25 above), finding that the child had good living conditions at his mother’s home and felt safe with her. The applicant did not appeal against this decision.

On 12 February, 5 March, 16 April and 10 December 2008 the applicant requested the Lublin District Court to take more vigorous enforcement measures. He submitted that he could not see his son and that the measures applied so far had failed.

On 26 January 2009 P.’s mother requested the Lublin District Court to divest the applicant of parental authority. She submitted that the applicant had for many years not been interested in the child and that the child was afraid of him as he had provoked a brawl at the school.

On 1 July 2009 the Lublin District Court authorised the courtappointed guardian to take the child from the mother to ensure compliance with the access arrangements so that his father could see him.

On 16 August 2009 the court-appointed guardian went with the applicant to the mother’s apartment to visit the child. No one answered the door. On 18 August 2009 the guardian complained to the prosecuting authorities about her failure to cooperate.

In September 2009 the applicant again requested the court to take more vigorous measures to ensure that he had effective enjoyment of his access rights. In reply on 16 September 2009 the Lublin District Court informed the applicant that the enforcement order of 1 July 2009 remained valid and that it was operational in respect of every new attempt he made to see his son.

On 20 September and 18 October 2009 the court-appointed guardian attended at the scheduled times to assist the applicant for the purposes of his monthly visits to see his son but the applicant failed to turn up for the visits.

On 28 October 2009 the applicant informed the court that on 16 August 2009 the court guardian had gone with him to the mother’s apartment. She had refused to open the door or let him see the child. The applicant submitted that the guardian had remained passive in the face of the mother’s defiance. Afterwards, the head of the court-appointed guardians had informed the applicant that no new attempts to assist him in seeing his son would be made, as the previous attempt had failed. He had also informed the applicant that he regarded his case as closed and that he had forwarded the case file to the court.

On 8 October 2009 the same court refused to hear a request by the applicant for enforcement of his access rights, referring to the valid decision given on 1 July 2008 (see paragraph 22 above). An identical decision was given by the same court on 12 January 2010 in respect of a fresh request by the applicant for assistance in the execution of the access arrangements. On 21 December the Lublin District Court refused to amend the access arrangements by deciding that the applicant’s son should live with him.

On 17 January 2010 the guardian accompanied the applicant. Again, no one answered the door to the mother’s apartment. The guardian called the police. They attended, but their intervention was to no avail as no one answered the door. The guardian again informed the prosecuting authorities about the mother’s conduct.

On 20 January 2010 the applicant made a new request for assistance.

On 29 March 2010 the court made a new enforcement order, identical to that of 1 July 2008 (see paragraph 22 above). In the written grounds for this order the court emphasised the mother’s uncooperative behaviour in respect of the access arrangements, and stated that the execution of the access arrangements necessitated close cooperation on the part of both parents, who were obliged to act in the child’s best interest.

On 6 April and 21 April 2010 the applicant again requested the court to assist him. On 18 April 2010 he failed to turn up for another visit, scheduled on that date. On 16 May 2010 the mother did not answer the door when the applicant, assisted by the court guardian, came to see the boy. The guardian again informed the prosecution about her obstructive behaviour.

On 20 June 2010 the mother again failed to open the door to the applicant, accompanied by the guardian and ultimately by the police.

On 29 June 2010 the applicant again requested the court to assist him. In reply, the court asked him whether his request was to be understood as a new request for assistance by court-appointed guardians in the execution of the access arrangements. The applicant replied that he had simply sought the court’s advice as to how he could deal with his situation, which remained unchanged as the mother remained uncooperative.

On 29 June 2010 the guardian determined that the enforcement proceedings in respect of the order of 29 March 2010 were to be closed, as the three-month period of validity of that period specified in Article 598.12 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure had expired.

In July 2010 the applicant twice complained to the District Prosecutor about his situation.

On 18 July 2010 the applicant again sought unsuccessfully to see his son. The court-appointed guardian was not present, apparently because the applicant had failed to lodge a new request with the court for his assistance and the previous execution order had expired (see paragraph 41 before). The applicant called the police. They attended, but he did not succeed in seeing his son, because the police officers refused to assist him, having regard to the fact that the child was not at home at that time. The applicant requested that criminal proceedings be instituted against them on charges of abuse of official authority. His complaint was subsequently investigated. The internal enquiry was closed on 16 September 2009 as the officers’ conduct had not been aggressive or inappropriate. Subsequently, on 15 November 2010 the Lubartów District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation against the officers, having noted, inter alia, that the applicant’s son had not been at home on the material date.

On 19 and 26 July 2010, respectively, the applicant again requested the court and the court guardian to assist him in the enforcement of the access arrangements. He reiterated his request on 25 August 2010. In reply, on 4 October 2010 the court issued another order authorising the guardian to assist the applicant in the execution of the access arrangements with a view to addressing the mother’s defiance.

On 15 November 2010 the Lublin District Court dismissed the mother’s application for the applicant to be deprived of parental rights. It further amended the access arrangements specified in the divorce judgment. It limited the mother’s parental authority by assigning a guardian to supervise her in the exercise of her parental rights. The court further ordered the mother to attend family therapy in order to improve her communication with the child’s father.

In the written grounds of that decision the court noted that between 2001 and 2006 the applicant had shown no interest in his son and had failed to pay maintenance in the amount of PLN 270 per month. The mother had requested the bailiff to institute enforcement proceedings in respect of the maintenance. This decision became final on 23 December 2010.

On 21 November 2010 the guardian failed to attend to assist the applicant, as she was ill. On 19 December 2010 the applicant went to see his son accompanied by the guardian but no one answered the door. The guardian informed the prosecutor about the mother’s behaviour.

On 27 December 2010 the applicant again requested the court to ensure the mother’s compliance with the access arrangements, and requested the court to assist him.

On 4 January 2011 the guardian discontinued the enforcement proceedings, referring to the provisions of Article 598.12 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

On 14 March 2011 the court again ordered a court guardian to take the child from the mother to ensure compliance with access arrangements.

On 17 April and 15 May 2011 the guardian accompanied the applicant to the visits planned for these dates. No one answered the door and the guardian informed the prosecutor about the mother’s conduct.

On 6 July and 9 November 2011 the Lublin District Court gave new decisions authorising the guardian to take the child from the mother to ensure compliance with the access arrangement on terms specified in those arrangements.

On 17 July 2011 the applicant requested the court to divest the mother of her parental rights, referring to her persistent refusal to respect the access arrangements. The Lublin District Court requested an assessment by the RODK (Regional Family Consultation Centre) of the family’s emotional skills and their communication and parenting situation.

In August, September and October 2011 the applicant again complained to the court about the mother’s failure to respect the access arrangements. On 21 December 2011 the court refused to impose a fine on her, having regard to the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure which had entered into force in August 2011.

On 11 January 2012 the Lublin District Court imposed on the mother an obligation to pay PLN 1,000 to the applicant in punitive damages for each failure to comply with the access arrangements.

On 28 February 2012 the Regional Family Consultation Centre submitted its opinion to the court about the emotional ties between the mother, the father and the child, prepared for the purposes of the proceedings in which the applicant had requested the court to envisage that the mother be divested of her parental rights. The experts were of the view that the child’s father was focused on the enforcement of his rights. He was not taking into account the needs and expectations of his child. The experts pointed out the negative consequences for the child’s development of the father’s actions aiming at depriving the child’s mother of parental authority. They stressed the existence of strong emotional ties between the child and the mother and the lack of such ties between the father and his son. They noted the lack of willingness and readiness of the child to maintain contact with his father. The experts noted that the father had taken various steps to deprive the child’s mother of parental authority without taking the child’s feelings into consideration.

On 16 April, 25 May and 9 July 2012 the applicant requested the Lublin Zachód District Court to order the mother to pay damages to him for her failure to respect the access arrangements. He subsequently withdrew the first request. The second was rejected for his failure to comply with the applicable legal requirements. Subsequently, the applicant supplemented his request of 9 July 2012 by referring to the mother’s failure to let him see his son during his monthly attempts to see his son in July, August, September and October 2012.

During the applicant’s visit in September 2012, P. asked his father to leave the apartment and told him that he was not wanted and not liked there.

The Government submitted that on 8 October 2012, during a hearing before the Lublin District Court, the applicant had stated that he had seen his son at the child’s mother’s residence in June, September and October 2012. The applicant contested this statement, arguing that he had seen his son only for several minutes on each occasion.

On 5 December 2012 the Lublin District Court, in reply to the applicant’s request of 9 July 2012, ordered the mother to pay PLN 2,100 to the applicant, consisting of PLN 300 for each previous failure to comply with the contact arrangements. The court pointed out that she had prevented the father from having contact with his son four times (in April, May, July and August 2012) and obstructed contact three times (in June, September and October 2012). The applicant appealed. Following his appeal, on an unspecified later date the court amended its own decision and imposed on the mother an obligation to pay PLN 7,000 to the applicant in damages for her failure to comply with his access rights (PLN 1,000 for each occasion of noncompliance).

On numerous occasions the applicant and later also the court-appointed guardian, acting on the basis of Article 598.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, repeatedly informed the Lublin District Prosecutor about the child’s mother’s obstructive behaviour and about her non-compliance with the access arrangements.

On 28 June 2006, 9 November 2009 the Lublin police and on 23 March and 30 September 2010, 3 March 2011 and 13 January 2012 the Lublin District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation, finding that the mother had no case to answer, as her failure to answer the door and allow the applicant to see his son did not amount to a criminal offence of unlawful restriction of liberty of a minor (brak znamion czynu zabronionego). The refusals were upheld by the competent court on, inter alia, 7 December 2010 and 26 January 2012.

On 27 May 2011 the Lublin District Prosecutor brought a bill of indictment before the Lublin – Zachód District Court against the mother on charges of unlawful restriction of liberty against a minor. On 23 September 2011 the Lublin District Court discontinued the proceedings, holding that a parent who exercised her or his parental authority could not be regarded as a perpetrator of an offence of unlawful detention of a minor under 15 years of age, even if that parent was acting contrary to the wishes or without the consent of the other parent.


CASE OF TSARTSIDZE AND OTHERS v. GEORGIA

Violation of Article 9 - Freedom of thought conscience and religion (Article 9-1 - Freedom of religion);Violation of Article 14+9-1 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 9 - Freedom of thought conscience and religion;Article 9-1 - Freedom of religion)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Iulia Motoc;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicants, Mr Ramaz Tsartsidze, Mr Samvel Bozoyani, Mr Mamuka Gelashvili (applicants nos. 1-3, case no. 1); Mr Alexander Mikirtumov, Mr Binali Aliev (applicants nos. 4-5, case no. 2); Mr Gia Dzamukov, Mr Vladimer Gabunia (applicants nos. 6-7, case no. 3); Mr Boris Gogoladze, Ms Anastasia Tvaradze, Ms Madona Kapanadze (applicants nos. 8-10, case no. 4); and Mr Jimsher Gogelashvili, Mr George Kurua and Mr Omar Chubinidze (applicants nos. 11-13, case no. 5) are all Jehovah’s Witnesses. Their application to the Court relates to five cases of religiously motivated aggression to which they were allegedly subjected in Georgia at various times. The events described in cases nos. 1 and 4 were the subject of the Court’s examination in the case of Begheluri and Others v. Georgia (no. 28490/02, 7 October 2014).

The following account of the facts is based on the applicants’ submissions.

This part of the application concerns the applicants Mr R. Tsartsidze, Mr S. Bozoyani and Mr M. Gelashvili (applicants nos. 1-3).

On 16 September 2000 nineteen coaches and several cars with Jehovah’s Witnesses headed to Marneuli to attend the convention at Mr Tsartsidze’s premises. The police set up checkpoints along the route and blocked the roads, preventing the Jehovah’s Witnesses from reaching their destination. At the same time, the police authorised a coach containing extremist members of the Orthodox Church, led by Mr V. Mkalavishvili, also known as Father Basil (see Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156/01, § 11, 3 May 2007), to continue their journey to Marneuli in order to attack and damage the site within Mr Tsartsidze’s property where the Jehovah’s Witnesses were to gather. The attackers destroyed objects for religious use and seized items belonging to others. The police officers who were in attendance refused to intervene. Property belonging to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, including 1.5 tonnes of religious literature was confiscated. The religious literature was burnt in the street. Other items (tents, 400 benches, and other items) were distributed to local residents by Father Basil’s supporters (see Begheluri and Others, cited above, §§ 16-21).

According to estimates made on 25 January 2001 and 28 February 2002, the stolen and destroyed equipment and material was worth about 9,000 euros (EUR) and the 1.5 tonnes of stolen and burnt religious literature was worth about EUR 700.

On 16 October 2000 applicants nos. 1-3, other Jehovah’s Witnesses, the representation of the Pennsylvania Watchtower in Georgia and the Union of Jehovah’s Witnesses, lodged an administrative complaint with the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court in Tbilisi against the Ministry of the Interior, the governor of Marneuli, the Marneuli chief of police and his deputy and twelve other police officers involved in the case. The applicants sought compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the State’s agents.

On 8 May 2001 the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court decided to consider the Ministry of the Interior as a third-party intervener and referred the case to the Marneuli District Court for examination.

On 13 May 2002 the Marneuli District Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint as ill-founded. The court considered it to have been shown that individuals acting under the orders of Father Basil had attacked Mr Tsartsidze’s property and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. As to the Marneuli police, the court held that they had not been informed that a convention was due to be held on 16 September 2000 at Mr Tsartsidze’s home and had been taking part on that date in an anti-drugs operation in the area bordering Azerbaijan. The court found that the defendants who were police officers had gone to the scene only after the attack in question and had only been able to observe the damage that had already been done. They could not therefore have contributed by being passive or taking part in the acts of religious aggression against the applicants.

On 18 June 2002 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Tbilisi Regional Court complaining that the court of first instance had ignored the fact that the police had turned back the Jehovah’s Witnesses but had allowed Father Basil and his supporters to go through the same checkpoints. The applicants argued that their witness statements had been disregarded by the first-instance court in favour of unsubstantiated statements by the police officers. The applicants also challenged the status of third-party intervener granted to the Ministry of the Interior in spite of the fact that it had been cited as a defendant.

On 30 December 2003 the regional court dismissed the applicants’ appeal on the same grounds as the first-instance court.

On 29 September 2004 an appeal on points of law by the applicants was dismissed by the Supreme Court, which considered that the applicants had not demonstrated an “intentional” or “negligent” breach of professional obligations by the police officers.

This part of the application concerns Mr Alexander Mikirtumov and Mr Binali Aliev, applicants nos. 4 and 5.

On 26 October 2000, when about thirty members of the Azerbaijani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses were preparing to hold a meeting in Marneuli at Mr Aliev’s home, five plainclothes police officers entered the property. They included S.Kh. and G.N., who, a few days earlier, had allegedly taken part in the attack on the Jehovah’s Witnesses at Mr Tsartsidze’s property (see case no. 1), and N.N. The police officers stated that the meeting could not go ahead. Using insulting language towards the participants, they ordered them to leave the premises. They confiscated religious books and Bibles belonging to the Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Mr Aliev and Mr Mikirtumov, a pastor, were taken to the police station. There, they were insulted by Officer G.N., who ordered Mr Mikirtumov to leave Marneuli and never to return, otherwise he would face serious problems. S.Kh. ordered Mr Aliev not to hold any more religious gatherings at his home if he wished to avoid problems with the police. Mr Mikirtumov was then forced into a car and driven away from Marneuli.

On 27 November 2000 the two applicants, together with the representation of the Pennsylvania Watchtower in Georgia and the Union of Jehovah’s Witnesses, lodged an administrative complaint with the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court against the Ministry of the Interior and the police officers involved. As well as identifying the three police officers, the applicants also gave the number plates of the two vehicles in which the police officers had arrived. They asked that the Ministry of the Interior make a public apology, in accordance with the Police Act, and bring disciplinary proceedings against its staff. The applicants also asked that they be paid compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage and that a directive be sent to all police stations in the country, saying that the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be respected.

On 6 June 2001 the case was sent to the Marneuli District Court, which sent it in turn to the Bolnisi District Court on 14 May 2002.

Questioned by that court, the applicants and other people who had attended the meeting confirmed the above-mentioned facts. Officers S.Kh. and G.N. denied the accusations. While G.N. claimed that he had never entered Mr Aliev’s property on the date in question and was seeing the applicants for the first time, S.Kh. stated that he had that day seen G.N. and other police officers, who were his subordinates, in front of Mr Aliev’s house. He had gone to see what was happening. G.N. had explained that a group of people had informed the police that a meeting of Jehovah’s Witnesses was due to be held and had asked the police to intervene before they did so themselves. The police officers had therefore been obliged to go to the premises. According to S.Kh., G.N. had entered Mr Aliev’s property in order to ask him not to hold the meeting, so as to avoid a clash with the group of individuals in question. S.Kh. stated that he had then continued his journey and denied having taken the two applicants to the police station. He acknowledged, however, that G.N., Mr Aliev and Mr Mikirtumov had been taken together “somewhere”. According to S.Kh., if the applicants had been taken to the police station on the day concerned they would have been questioned, and their visit to the police station duly registered. He criticised the applicants for failing to lodge a complaint with the police chief if they had indeed been taken unlawfully to the police station.

The two applicants, on the contrary, submitted that they had been taken to S.Kh.’s office and that he had ordered that they be required to give written undertakings, respectively, to leave Marneuli and for Mr Aliev not to allow religious meetings at his home. S.Kh. denied those allegations also.

On 17 June 2003 the proceedings brought by the applicants were dismissed as ill-founded. In the court’s opinion, it had not been established that the police officers in question had prevented the religious meeting from being held at Mr Aliev’s home, confiscated the religious books and taken the two applicants to the police station in order to forbid them from performing religious rites in accordance with their faith. With regard to the statements made by four eyewitnesses, the court held that they were not reliable because they had been made by people taking part in the meeting, who had an interest in supporting the applicants’ complaint. Moreover, the statements made by the complainants had been completely rejected by the police officers. Consequently, the court found that there was nothing to prove that the police officers had failed in their professional obligations, within the meaning of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code.

On 21 October 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court upheld the judgment of 17 June 2003, on the same grounds as those used by the lower court.

On 23 February 2005 the Supreme Court, ruling in written proceedings, dismissed an appeal by the applicants on points of law. It concluded that the applicants had failed to prove either an intentional or a negligent breach of duties by the respondent police officers.

This part of the application concerns Mr Gia Dzamukov and Vladimer Gabunia (applicants nos. 6 and 7 respectively).

On 2 September 2000, while in possession of religious tracts, Mr Dzamukov was stopped in the street in Kutaisi by two uniformed police officers, E.K. and E.Ch. His bag with religious literature was confiscated and he was taken to the police station. The applicant was struck by several police officers, including E.Ch., before being released. Before leaving the police station, the applicant asked that his belongings be returned to him. In reply, E.Ch. came up to him and attempted to strangle him with his tie, ordering the applicant to get out of his sight. Outside the station, police officers blocked his path and threatened to beat him with their truncheons. Seeing that the applicant refused to leave and insisted that the confiscated religious literature be returned, a police officer came up and threw his Bible in his face.

On returning home, the applicant and his wife noticed that his chest was red. He also found it painful. His wife immediately went to the police station, protesting about the way her husband had been treated, and asking for the return of the confiscated belongings. She was, in turn, insulted and chased out of the premises.

On the following day, Mr Gabunia, applicant no. 7, was walking in the street in Kutaisi with religious tracts. He gave one to E.K., who was accompanied by another police officer. In response, E.K. reprimanded him, stating that his conduct was not worthy of a Christian. B.M., the second police officer, punched him in the stomach and, after he had fallen to the ground, pulled his bag away from him. The police officers emptied the bag and tore up the religious literature inside. They kept two Bibles for themselves. When the applicant insisted that they return his Bible, B.M. threatened to put him in his car and dump him in the Rioni River.

On 2 October 2000 the applicants lodged an administrative complaint with the Kutaisi Court against the Ministry of the Interior, the chief and deputy chief of Kutaisi police and police officers B.M. and E.K. Claiming that their rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution and Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention had been breached, they asked that the Ministry of the Interior issue a public apology and bring disciplinary proceedings against two of its staff who, in their opinion, had failed to comply with their professional duties, as provided for in the Police Act. The applicants also asked to be compensated in respect of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damage, in application of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code.

Questioned by the court, the applicants confirmed the abovementioned events. Mr Gabunia described in detail the place where he had met the two police officers, and stated that they had been in uniform and wore badges. He also provided information about the make, colour and registration number of their car. Mr Dzamukov provided the registration number of the car in which he had been taken to the police station. His wife gave the registration number of the vehicle in which E.Ch. had followed her., while Ms L.K., a witness to the incident at the police station, confirmed that she had seen Mr Dzamukov there. E.Ch. denied the allegations, stating that he had been on leave on the day in question and had not been in Kutaisi. B.M. and E.K. also denied the allegations, claiming that they were seeing the applicants for the first time.

On 7 June 2002 the applicants’ complaint was dismissed as illfounded. The court pointed to the rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution and noted that, historically, no religion had ever been persecuted in Georgia. It further noted the following:

“It is also well known that many of Jehovah’s Witnesses blatantly violate the requirements of Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution and frequently impose their opinion and belief on others, thus violating their rights.”

Then the court set aside the three witness statements in favour of the applicants on the ground that those people had not been eyewitnesses. In addition, it noted the following:

“The first two witnesses are Jehovah’s Witnesses and the applicants’ friends, and they have an interest in having the case decided in the applicants’ favour.”

As the applicants had not submitted any other valid evidence (medical reports, torn-up religious literature, or other items), their allegations were held to be ill-founded. Lastly, the court noted that Mr Dzamukov had waited one year before adding E.Ch.’s name to his complaint.

The applicants lodged an appeal, stating that submitting the destroyed religious literature to the court would have had no valid evidential value, since it would not have sufficed to prove that the police officers concerned had torn up the literature on the date in question. The applicants also explained that it had not been necessary to obtain a medical report, given that they had not received serious wounds or injuries. That did not, however, alter the fact that they had been struck by the police officers. Furthermore, in their opinion, the insults directed against them on account of their faith had been sufficient to establish that the police officers had been negligent in carrying out their professional duties.

On 18 December 2002 the Kutaisi District Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal on the same grounds as the first-instance court. In particular, it took account of the fact that the police officers had denied the allegations and that the applicants had suffered no physical injuries. It concluded that, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, there had been no damage to the applicants’ dignity or any infringement of their right to freedom of religion, which ruled out the application of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code and the granting of compensation.

According to the applicants, the appeal court took into consideration an oral statement by E.K., who had claimed that he did not recognise a white car with the registration number DAQ 492, which Mr Dzamukov had nonetheless identified as being that in which the two police officers had been patrolling at the time of the incident in question. After the hearing, however, E.K. had left in that same vehicle, which had been parked in front of the regional court. The applicants took a photograph, and attached it to their appeal on points of law. They complained, in particular, that E.K.’s denial had been accepted by the first-instance court and on appeal without any supporting evidence.

After postponing the hearing several times on account of the absence of the defending parties, the Supreme Court examined the applicants’ appeal on points of law in written proceedings, and dismissed it on 17 October 2003. It criticised the applicants for failing to bring criminal proceedings against the police officers. The Supreme Court stated that acknowledging that the police officers had failed in their professional obligations in the impugned manner (attacking and assaulting the applicants) would be equivalent to recognising, in the context of administrative proceedings, their criminal guilt, which would be contrary to the law. At the same time, if the accusation against the police officers had indeed been confirmed in criminal proceedings, the applicants would have been entitled to compensation, and also to a public apology.

The Supreme Court’s judgment was served on the applicants on 27 November 2003.

This part of the application concerns Mr Boris Gogoladze, Mrs Anastasia Tvaradze and Mrs Madona Kapanadze (applicants nos. 8-10 respectively).

On 1 April 2001 a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses was returning from a religious meeting in the village of Dviri, Borjomi region. At a bus stop they met Mr S.Kh., the deputy governor of the town of Borjomi, Mr J.B., the governor of Dviri, and about fifteen local residents. One of the latter, assaulted Mr Gogoladze, wounding him on the cheek, and tore a bag containing religious literature and other personal effects from his hands. Then he struck the two applicants on the head with a shoulder strap ripped from Mr Gogoladze’s bag. The two governors, who watched the attack, directed insults at the victims. In the end they asked the assailant to desist and left with him (see Begheluri and Others, cited above, § 56).

On 30 April 2001 the applicants filed an administrative complaint with the Borjomi Court against the Borjomi regional administration, the local police chief and the two governors concerned. The applicants asked that the officials apologise publicly and that the regional administration take disciplinary proceedings against them. They also claimed compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage (Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code).

On 17 September 2001 the court dismissed the applicants’ complaint on the grounds that the governors had not been under a legal obligation to ensure the maintenance of public order. It concluded that it had not been shown that they themselves had organised the attack in question or had personally attacked or assaulted the applicants. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Tbilisi Regional Court on 25 July 2003. The regional court held that ensuring the maintenance of public order did not amount to a “pressing obligation” on the governors.

On 13 February 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicants, using the same grounds as the regional court.

This part of the application concerns Mr Jimcher Gogelashvili, George Kurua and Omar Chubinidze (applicants nos. 11-13).

On 27 March 2001 a group of Orthodox religious extremists led by Mr P. Bluashvili, a leader of the Jvari movement, burst into Mr Gogelashvili’s flat, where a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses was holding a meeting. The assailants ordered the Jehovah’s Witnesses, whom they described as Christ-insulters and Satanists, to hand over their religious literature and to leave the premises. The Jehovah’s Witnesses protested, referring to provisions of the Constitution, but were nonetheless obliged to comply. Mr Kurua was insulted by Mr Bluashvili, who then pulled on his tie to strangle him.

After confiscating religious literature from the people present in the flat, the attackers opened the cupboards and took out similar literature, first throwing it on the floor, and then out of the window. The benches used by the Jehovah’s Witnesses during the meeting were also thrown out of the window.

The attack was recorded on video. Moreover, an individual wearing civilian clothes, who, according to the applicants, was a police officer named L. Gogolauri, appears on the screen. He stands in the courtyard, observes the Jehovah’s Witnesses being chased from the flat and allows a child to leave, carrying a bench that has been thrown from a window.

The applicants assessed the pecuniary damage caused by the attack in question at about EUR 760 (audio-visual equipment, religious literature, benches, and other items). They submitted an audit report, dated 23 May 2001, in support of their claim.

On the day after the above incident the same group of attackers publicly burned the religious literature taken from Mr Gogelashvili’s home at the main market in Rustavi. That scene was also captured in the abovementioned recording. According to the applicants, the police officers patrolling the market did not react.

On 30 April 2001 the Jehovah’s Witnesses who had been victims of the attack, including the three applicants named above, as well as the representation of the Pennsylvania Watch Tower in Georgia and the Union of Jehovah’s Witnesses, filed an administrative complaint with the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi Court against the Ministry of the Interior, Mr Th.A., the chief of Rustavi police, Mr L.G., the head of the police station involved in the case, and Mr K.Z., a police officer. They alleged that the officials had failed in their professional obligations and had breached Articles 8-11, 13 and 14 of the Convention.

In particular, the applicants asked that the Ministry of the Interior issue a public apology, in accordance with section 8(37) of the Police Act, and bring disciplinary proceedings against the above-named police officers. The applicants also claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, in application of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code, and asked that a directive be sent to all police stations in the country, stating that the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be respected. Drawing the court’s attention to the spread of violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses throughout the country, they asked that it rule on their case in accordance with the law, as, in their opinion, a proper judicial decision could help to halt such violence.

The court heard the three applicants and other Jehovah’s Witnesses who had been victims of the attack. They all complained about the passivity of the police officers present at the scene. Mr Gogelashvili stated that when the attack had begun, he had gone to a police station located about a hundred metres from his building. After some delay, two police officers had accompanied him back to the scene. He had seen that books and furniture were being thrown out of the window. The police officers had taken no action. He had then run up the stairs to his flat to retrieve some money that he kept in a cupboard. He had found that the cupboard door had been broken and that EUR 130 had been stolen. Mr Gogelashvili complained that the police officers had not intervened to prevent the violation of his private property or to protect the victims.

Mr Kurua stated that immediately after leaving the flat on the attackers’ orders, he had gone to the police station, where he had learned that the alarm had already been raised. He had asked that police officers return with him, in order to “intimidate” the attackers. The officers had refused to accompany him.

Mr Chubinidze stated that during the attack he had telephoned the police from the flat, but that the person on the other end of the telephone had hung up immediately. He had then been obliged to comply with the orders to leave the flat. He had managed to grab his bag back from an attacker who had taken it.

On 10 May 2002 the court decided to strike the case out of its list of cases, on the basis of a letter, allegedly signed by the applicants, withdrawing their complaint. On 5 June 2002 they lodged an appeal, stating that the signatures on the letter in question had been forged and that they had never withdrawn their complaint. On 16 December 2002 the appeal court overturned the decision of 10 May 2002 and proceedings resumed.

Questioned by the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court, a representative of the Ministry of the Interior argued that it had not been established that the police had been present at the scene and asked that the applicants’ complaint be dismissed. The police officers themselves did not attend the hearings on two consecutive dates. Obliged to rule in their absence, on 16 July 2003 the court dismissed the complaint as ill-founded. It considered it established that the applicants had been attacked by a group of individuals led by Mr Bluashvili on 27 March 2001. It considered, however, that the applicants had not demonstrated that the police had been present at the scene or that they had watched passively as acts had been committed against property and the applicants’ rights to freedom of religion. Accordingly, it had not been established that the police officers had failed to perform their professional duties within the meaning of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, in the same decision, the court acknowledged that, after having been informed of the attack, the police officers had gone to the scene, which had resulted in a decision to place the attackers under investigation. According to the court, in the context of the latter criminal proceedings, it would be lawful for the applicants to submit a claim for compensation against the individuals who had infringed their rights. The decision made no reference to the burning of literature at Rustavi market.

On 25 June 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment, repeating the grounds used in it. Neither the representative of the Ministry of the Interior nor the police officers appeared.

On 2 March 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicants. The court concluded that the fact of a breach of duty by the police, either intentionally or by negligence, had not been proven.


CASE OF FERNANDES DE OLIVEIRA v. PORTUGAL

Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Marko Bošnjak;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Ceira.

The applicant’s son, A.J., was born in 1964. He had a history of mental disorders and of alcohol and drug addiction, and since 1984 had spent several periods in the Sobral Cid Psychiatric Hospital (“the HSC”) in Coimbra: from 5 to 8 August 1984; from 15 March to 3 April 1985; from 15 to 28 November 1985; from 10 to 18 January 1993; from 1 to 3 September 1999; from 12 December 1999 to 14 January 2000; and from 2 to 27 April 2000.

According to A.J.’s clinical records, in September 1999 doctors told the applicant that she should seek an order for her son’s compulsory confinement. During his hospitalisation in December 1999 the doctor treating A.J. instructed that he must not be permitted to leave the unit in which he was hospitalised.

During at least two of the periods he spent in hospital, A.J. was authorised to spend weekends at home with his family – three weekends during the period from 12 December 1999 to 14 January 2000, and two weekends during the period from 2 to 27 April 2000. During those two periods, A.J. also escaped from the HSC premises several times and sometimes went to the applicant’s house.

On 1 April 2000 A.J. was voluntarily admitted to the HSC, upon medical advice, because he had attempted to commit suicide.

On 25 April 2000 A.J. went home for the weekend to spend Easter with the applicant and other members of his family, despite the reluctance of the doctor.

At around 10.30 p.m. the applicant took A.J. to the emergency ward of the Coimbra University Hospital because he had drunk a large amount of alcohol. According to the observation record completed by the emergency services, A.J. had behaved recklessly during the weekend because he had got drunk. They added that although A.J. had a history of mental weakness, depressive episodes and recurrent suicide attempts, those characteristics had not been observed that weekend. A.J. was subsequently sent back to the same HSC ward in which he was hospitalised.

On 26 April 2000 A.J. was kept under medical observation for the whole day. He was given medication and his state of health improved. He got up to dine and to welcome visiting family members.

On 27 April 2000 the hospital staff noted that between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. A.J.’s behaviour had been calm and he had been walking around the unit in which he had been hospitalised. He had had lunch and an afternoon snack.

At around 4 p.m. the applicant called the hospital. She was told to call back later, during the afternoon snack, as her son was not inside the building at that time. She was assured that some minutes earlier he had been standing at the door and he looked fine.

At around 7 p.m. it was noticed that A.J. had not appeared for dinner, and a nurse informed the head nurse of his absence. The hospital staff then initiated searches in the areas of the HSC premises where patients were allowed to walk around freely, such as the cafeteria and the park.

At around 8 p.m. the coordinating nurse (enfermeiro coordenador) telephoned the applicant and told her that A.J. had not shown up for dinner.

At some time between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. the hospital reported A.J.’s disappearance to the National Republican Guard (Guarda Nacional Republicana) and the applicant.

It is not known at what time A.J. left the hospital premises and followed a footpath towards the applicant’s house. At around 5.37 p.m. he committed suicide by jumping in front of a train near the HSC premises.

On 17 March 2003 the applicant lodged a civil action with the Coimbra Administrative Court (Tribunal Administrativo do Círculo de Coimbra) against the HSC under the State Liability Act (ação de responsabilidade civil extracontratual por ato de gestão pública), seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages of 100,403 euros (EUR).

The applicant claimed that her son had been treated at the HSC for mental disorders on several occasions; the first actual hospitalisation had been in 1993. He had been admitted to the hospital on 1 April 2000 because he had attempted to commit suicide. The fact that her son had been able to leave the hospital premises on 27 April 2000 during his hospitalisation had led the applicant to conclude that the hospital staff had acted negligently in the performance of their duties. Because of his suicide attempts and mental condition, her son should have been under medical supervision and the hospital staff should have prevented him from leaving the hospital premises. She further claimed that the HSC should have erected fencing around the boundaries of its premises in order to prevent patients from leaving. The fact that those duties had not been complied with reflected the poor organisation of the HSC services. Lastly, she argued that the HSC lacked a mechanism for checking the presence of patients and an emergency procedure capable of detecting a patient’s absence, which would allow the hospital to take the measures required to ensure that patients returned safely.

On 29 October 2003 the court gave a preliminary decision (despacho saneador), specifying which facts were considered to be established and which remained to be established.

On 5 July 2005 the court ordered that an expert report be drawn up on A.J.’s clinical condition and the supervision measures required by that condition.

On 27 September 2006 a psychiatrist appointed by the Medical Association (Ordem dos Médicos) submitted his report, the relevant parts of which read:

Although alcohol dependence was the predominant diagnosis, several other diagnoses were considered. In particular, dependent personality (personalidade dependente); delirious outbreaks (surto delirante); schizophrenia; manic-depressive psychosis (psicose maníaco-depressiva)...

A.J.’s clinical history enables us to consider him an ill person with recurring relapses in excessive alcohol consumption ... but also another kind of symptomatology...

There is no detailed reference in his clinical records to his psychopathological condition on 26 April 2000...

The [plaintiff’s] son suffered from disorders which caused depressive behaviour with a significant inclination to suicide.

Taking into account the clinical documents, his clinical condition may have led to another attempt to commit suicide, which turned out to be fatal.

In addition, the polymorphism of the patient’s psychiatric condition should be emphasised. A psychopathological condition such as the patient’s has a bad prognosis and suicide is frequently preceded by an attempt (or attempts) to commit suicide. ... Indeed, it must be clarified that ... it should also be considered that the hypothesis of [his] diagnosis could be of a borderline personality disorder [perturbação de personalidade borderline]...

There is reference to a multiplicity of diagnoses, all of them capable of enhancing the risk of the patient’s suicide (and also of suicidal behaviour).

The clinical history and psychopathological framework [quadro psicopatológico], for the reasons already mentioned, would predict future suicidal behaviour; thus the occurrence of suicide is not surprising.

With regard to prevention, containment and surveillance measures must without a doubt be adopted. But with a patient like this one, these measures are difficult to adopt (see for example his requests to be discharged despite the doctor’s opinion, which is substantiated) and never enough because of the high potential for suicide.

The fact that the patient had been on antidepressant treatment for more than two weeks, had wandered around the hospital without ever endangering his life ... does not mean that the probability of that event (suicide) was negligible. However, it was hardly avoidable.”

The first hearing took place on 8 October 2008. The applicant and the psychiatrist who had issued the medical opinion gave evidence at the hearing.

At five hearings the court heard evidence from different witnesses, inter alia, the applicant’s daughter – A.J.’s sister; nurses, doctors and medical auxiliaries who had worked for or were still working for the HSC, some of whom had started their shift at 4 p.m. on 27 April 2000; a social worker employed by the HSC since 1995, who had had contact with A.J.; and the train driver. The court also analysed several documents attached to A.J.’s clinical file from the HSC.

On 9 March 2009 the court conducted an on-site inspection.

On 7 January 2010 the court held a hearing at which it adopted a decision concerning the facts.

On 25 April 2011 the Coimbra Administrative Court delivered a judgment in which it ruled against the applicant. If found that although her son had been suffering from a mental disorder, there was no causal link between his wholly unexpected suicide and an alleged violation of the hospital staff’s duty of care. It noted, in particular, that the applicant’s son had been suffering from a psychiatric disorder which had never been properly diagnosed, either because the symptoms were complex or because he had been addicted to alcohol and drugs. In this regard, it pointed out that over the years the applicant’s son had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and depression. However, only after his death and as a consequence of an expert opinion requested from the Medical Association during the proceedings (see paragraph 23 above) was there an agreement that he had been suffering from a severe personality disorder. The court established that he had last been admitted to hospital after a suicide attempt. However, it considered that despite the possibility that people diagnosed with mental diseases such as that of the applicant’s son might commit suicide, during the last days before his death he had not shown any behaviour or mood which could have led the hospital staff to suspect that 27 April 2000 would be different from the preceding days. The court thus concluded that the hospital staff could not have foreseen the suicide of the applicant’s son and that his behaviour had been absolutely unexpected and unpredictable. With regard to the applicant’s argument that the hospital should have supervised her son more effectively and erected fences or other barriers around the hospital premises, the court pointed out that the current paradigm in the treatment of mentally ill patients was to encourage social interaction. The existence of fencing would lead to the stigmatisation and isolation of mentally disabled patients. In the same way, any supervision of patients had to be carried out discreetly. The HSC had a surveillance procedure in place which consisted of verifying the patients’ presence at meal and medication times; this was in compliance with the most recent psychiatric science and respected the patients’ right to privacy. With regard to the applicant’s argument that the emergency procedure was non-existent, the court noted that it consisted in alerting the police and the patient’s family. Therefore, the court found that there had been no omission in the duty of care on the part of the hospital.

On 12 May 2011 the applicant appealed to the Administrative Supreme Court, claiming that the first-instance court had wrongly assessed the evidence, that its findings of fact had been incorrect, and that it had wrongly interpreted the law.

On 26 September 2012 the Attorney General’s Office attached to the Administrative Supreme Court, called upon to issue an opinion on the appeal, held that the first-instance judgment should be reversed. In their opinion, given that A.J.’s medical record stated that he had attempted to commit suicide on different occasions and considering that he had last been admitted to hospital because of a suicide attempt, a new attempt to commit suicide was likely and should have been foreseen. They noted that the hospital had failed to implement a supervision regime capable of preventing the applicant’s son from leaving the hospital premises. They also argued that the increased monitoring of the patient was part of the hospital’s duty of care and did not detract from the “open door” regime. They concluded that the monitoring measures put in place by the HSC were not adequate for an establishment categorised as a psychiatric hospital or for a patient with A.J.’s characteristics.

On 29 May 2014 the Administrative Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal by two votes to one, upholding the legal and factual findings of the Coimbra Administrative Court. The Administrative Supreme Court held that the HSC had not breached any duty of care, as there had been no indication which could have led the hospital staff to suspect that the applicant’s son would try to commit suicide, namely by leaving the hospital premises. The Supreme Court took into account that during previous periods of hospitalisation the applicant’s son had also left the hospital premises, and that no link had been established between those “escapes” and a particular risk of suicide in so far as they had only been able to establish the existence of a single suicide attempt, on 1 April 2000. The Supreme Court considered that the counting of patients at meal and medication times was sufficient and had allowed the hospital staff to verify A.J.’s attendance during lunch and the afternoon snack on 27 April 2000. It concluded that there had been no anomaly in the functioning of the HSC, nor could any anomaly be attributed to either the lack of security fences or walls, or the method of counting patients.

In a dissenting opinion, one of the judges argued that the hospital should have secured the premises in some way in order to fulfil its duties of care and supervision. By not doing so, it had allowed patients to leave easily without being discharged, thus breaching those duties. As such, that omission had been the cause of the “escape” and suicide of the applicant’s son.

The HSC is located outside Coimbra on seventeen hectares of land, distant from any urban or industrial areas. It is part of the Coimbra Hospital and University Centre.

According to an on-site inspection made by the Coimbra Administrative Court on 9 March 2009 in the course of the proceedings against the hospital, the HSC has eighteen buildings dedicated to each hospital department. The grounds of the HSC do not have security fences or walls of any other kind. The buildings are surrounded by green areas with trees and other vegetation, and the different buildings are accessed by means of roadways (arruamentos) and paths (passeios), which are also surrounded by trees and other vegetation. The main entrance to the HSC has a barrier (cancela) and a security guard. One of the possible exits from the hospital premises leads to a shortcut towards a railway station platform (apeadeiro ferroviário). This shortcut is accessed by taking the road behind building no. 9. The station platform is around a fifteen to twenty minutes’ walk from that part of the HSC’s premises.

Pursuant to the guidelines prepared by the HSC, meals are taken in the hospital cafeteria and patients must remain there until the end of the meal. Patients are not allowed to leave the department without informing the relevant nurse in advance. An afternoon snack is usually provided at around 4.45 p.m.

According to articles which have been published in the media in recent years, several patients have managed to escape from the HSC’s premises since at least 2007. Some of them were found and taken back to the hospital and others were found dead. For example, different local and national media have reported as follows:

(i) on 9 March 2008 the body of a patient who had escaped two weeks earlier was found close to the hospital premises (in Diário de Coimbra);

(ii) on 29 October 2008 a man escaped from the HSC and was hit by a car after jumping in front of it (in Diário das Beiras);

(iii) on 31 July 2008 the body of a patient who had escaped from the hospital the previous month was found in a river (in Diário de Coimbra);

(iv) on 14 August 2008 a patient who had been involuntarily hospitalised in the HSC escaped (in Diário de Coimbra);

(v) in early March 2010 three different patients escaped from the hospital; one of them was located by the police after stealing a car and another was found dead in a nearby river (in bombeirospontopt);

(vi) on 16 October 2011 a patient escaped from the HSC’s premises and attacked two police officers with a hoe (in Correio da Manhã);

(vii) on 1 March 2015 two patients escaped from the HSC and stole a car by ousting the driver (in Tvi24).


Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicants, Ms Raisa Utsmiyeva, Ms Luiza Utsmiyeva and Ms Khabira Guniyeva, are Russian nationals who were born in 1938, 1971 and 1935 respectively and live in Grozny. They were represented before the Court by lawyers of the NGO Materi Chechni. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

The applicants are close relatives of Mr Isa (also spelt Issa) Utsmiyev, who was born in 1960, Ms Larisa Ansarova, who was born in 1959 and Ms Anzhela (also known as Aset) Ansarova, who was born in 1981. Mr Isa Utsmiyev and Ms Larisa Ansarova are married, and Ms Anzhela Ansarova is their daughter. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Isa Utsmiyev and the second applicant is his sister. The third applicant is the mother of Ms Larisa Ansarova.

At the material time, Mr Isa Utsmiyev lived with his wife and daughter in a block of flats in Kosiora Street in Grozny. He used to work at a local police station, but became unemployed shortly before the events.

According to the applicants, at around midnight on 10 June 1996 an APC accompanied by a convoy of military vehicles arrived in Kosiora Street, Grozny. A large number of masked servicemen in camouflage uniforms armed with machine guns got out of the vehicles, cordoned off the area and broke into the family’s flat. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian. They took Mr Isa Utsmiyev and his wife and daughter outside, put them in the APC and drove away.

The applicants have not seen their three relatives since 10 June 1996.

The applicants did not witness the abduction; their account is based on their relatives’ and neighbours’ recollection of the events.

The Government did not contest the facts as presented by the applicants, but at the same time pointed out that there was no unequivocal evidence confirming the alleged involvement of State servicemen in the incident.

On an unspecified date in June or July 1996 the applicants complained of their relatives’ abduction to the Leninskiy district department of the interior (ROVD) in Grozny. On 18 July 1996 it opened a search file (no. 94/96) in respect of Mr Isa Utsmiyev. It is unclear whether files were also opened in respect of Ms Larisa Ansarova and Ms Anzhela Ansarova.

It is also unclear whether any criminal investigation into the abduction was initiated between 1996 and 2001. According to the applicants, owing to the overall instability in the region at the material time, an investigation was opened at some point in 1999, but then the criminal case file was lost in unknown circumstances.

Following a complaint by the first applicant, on 11 February 2001 the Grozny town prosecutor’s office opened a criminal case (no. 11041) to investigate the abduction.

On 26 February 2001 the first applicant was questioned and granted victim status in the criminal case. She stated that on an unspecified date she had learnt from Mr Isa Utsmiyev’s neighbours that on 10 July 1996 four armed men had taken away her son, his wife and their daughter. His wife Ms Larisa Ansarova had been in a dispute with a criminal gang leader, “Malysh”, whose gang had carried out criminal activities in the area and who had promised to take revenge on her. Three days after that conflict the family had been abducted. According to the applicants, at some point later “Malysh” had been killed as a result of a blood feud.

On 11 April 2001 the investigation was suspended.

On 5 July 2002 the investigation was resumed and on 22 July 2002 the first applicant was questioned again. She reiterated her previous statement.

On 5 September 2002 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were informed thereof.

Between September 2002 and May 2010 the applicants did not contact the authorities.

On 24 May 2010 the third applicant complained to the Chechnya Parliament of her relatives’ abduction. On 27 May 2010 her complaint was forwarded to the Chechnya Investigations Committee.

On 22 October 2010 the first applicant complained to the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny, requesting that the investigation be resumed and carried out effectively.

On 28 October 2010 the investigation was resumed and several witnesses were questioned; no new information was obtained.

On 28 November 2010 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were informed thereof.

On 22 December 2010 the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny rejected the applicants’ complaint of 22 October 2010, stating that the investigation had been resumed on 28 October 2010.

The investigation is still pending.