Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-3-a - Ratione materiae);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Fair hearing)

Aleš Pejchal;Armen Harutyunyan;Kristina Pardalos;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos

The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Afidnes Attikis.

On 2 November 2001 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against C.T. for breach of duty and extortion concerning acts he had allegedly committed as mayor of Kifissia Municipality. The applicant gave a statement under oath on the same day, repeating the allegations in his criminal complaint. He made a further statement under oath related to his criminal complaint on 21 December 2001.

At the time the complaint was lodged C.T. was a member of the Greek Parliament. In accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution, the public prosecutor asked Parliament to lift C.T.’s immunity from prosecution for breach of duty, extortion and bribery. That request was rejected on 20 March 2002.

On 5 August 2003 the applicant, relying on the Court’s judgments in Cordova v. Italy (no. 1) (no. 40877/98, ECHR 2003I) and Cordova v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 45649/99, ECHR 2003I (extracts)) resubmitted his criminal complaint, arguing that Parliament’s rejection of the request to lift C.T.’s immunity had violated his right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. On 21 October 2003 the criminal complaint was submitted to Parliament. On 2 February 2004 the President of Parliament rejected the request to lift C.T.’s immunity, relying on Article 83 § 8 of Parliament’s Regulation, according to which a request to lift a member’s immunity for a criminal complaint based on the same facts as a previous request was inadmissible.

On 18 March 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that Parliament’s refusal to lift C.T.’s immunity had violated his right of access to a court. On 16 November 2006 the Court delivered a judgment concluding that the refusal by the President of Parliament to lift C.T.’s immunity for acts that had allegedly been committed prior to his election had violated the applicant’s right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (Tsalkitzis v. Greece, no. 11801/04, 16 November 2006). To date, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has not yet concluded the supervision of the execution of the judgment under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention.

In the meantime, on 4 April 2004 the applicant appeared on a television show on the nationwide ALTER Channel and reiterated the allegations made in his criminal complaint.

On 2 July 2004 C.T. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant for false accusation, perjury and slander. Following a preliminary examination, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant. On 15 November 2007 the applicant was convicted in absentia by a threemember panel of the Athens Court of First Instance. He was sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment and deprivation of his political rights (decision no. 63131/07). C.T. joined the proceedings as a civil party. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision.

Before the three-member panel of the Athens Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”), the applicant submitted that his trial for slander should have been suspended pursuant to Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code or, in any event, that it should have been adjourned in respect of all the charges, pursuant to Article 59 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At a hearing on 25 May 2009 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s application to suspend or adjourn the trial and proceeded to examine C.T.’s criminal complaint. In particular, it held the following:

“... Following this, the party who had filed the criminal complaint, Vasileios Tsalkitzis, lodged application no. 11801/04 with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, complaining that Greece had not lifted C.T.’s parliamentary immunity and that criminal proceedings had not been initiated against him. That Court ... held that the refusal of the President of the Greek Parliament had violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ... Therefore, the following issues have been identified concerning: a) the relation of international conventions to current constitutional provisions; b) the act in question of the President of the Greek Parliament and whether it breaches constitutional provisions and the above-mentioned international convention; and c) the question of whether or not it is possible to suspend the current criminal case being tried following the criminal complaint dated 2.11.2001 by the defendant Vasileios Tsalkitzis against ... C.T ... The matter of the supremacy of the Constitution does not appear to be contradicted by the above-mentioned European Court of Human Rights judgment, which identifies the issue as the act of the President of Parliament of not putting the request to the Plenary of the Greek Parliament, which resulted, according to the judgment, in impeding the applicant’s and the case’s access to the competent criminal court ... It is noted that the President of Parliament’s act was based on Article 82 of Parliament’s Regulations...

According to the foregoing, it is clear that the Greek Parliament has irrevocably dismissed the request of the public prosecutor of the Athens Court of First Instance, thus refusing to lift the immunity of the member of Parliament against whom the criminal complaint was lodged ... on the basis of a legitimate procedure foreseen by the above-mentioned constitutional provisions. Therefore, according to the legislation, there is absolutely no possibility of reconsidering the issue and, eventually, of instituting a criminal prosecution. During the ... Plenary meetings of the Greek Parliament, the issue of the well-foundedness of the accusation was examined as a whole, as were all aspects of the case, securing the work of the deputy and at the same time protecting him from malicious acts. In addition, and this is important, the whole case file which had been created following the preliminary examination was taken into account, as was the opinion of the competent public prosecutor who, following a review of the case, considered that there was no reason to initiate criminal proceedings against C.T. for the offences of which he had been accused ...”

Subsequently, the Court of Appeal proceeded to examine witnesses. The trial record shows that the applicant left the building following a short break after the examination of the first three witnesses for the prosecution. His lawyer then contacted him to find out his whereabouts and informed the court that he was not feeling well and had thus left the building. The hearing continued in the presence of his lawyer. In total, five prosecution witnesses were heard, including C.T., who joined the proceedings as a civil party, and one defence witness. It does not transpire from the information provided that the applicant or his representative requested the examination of any other defence witness and that such a request was refused. In view of the applicant’s absence, the Court of Appeal asked his representative to express the applicant’s views on the accusations. The applicant’s representative stated that his client denied all the charges and insisted on the truthfulness of his allegations against C.T.

The Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance verdict, including the sentence of twenty months’ imprisonment and the deprivation of political rights (decision no. 4512/2009).

On 9 November 2009 the applicant appealed on points of law. He stated, inter alia, that the proceedings should have been suspended or adjourned pursuant to Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 59 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 5 May 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law (decision no. 912/2010). In particular, it held the following:

“... It is clear from this new provision (Article 59 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) ... that in order to adjourn a trial owing to an interlocutory criminal issue (ποινικό προδικαστικό ζήτημα) concerning Articles 224, 229, 362, 363 of the Criminal Code, a criminal prosecution must have been instituted for an act attested to on oath or for which a legal complaint has been submitted or one which a defendant has alleged or disseminated information about. As regards Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code ... the suspension of criminal proceedings is obligatory, but also requires a prior criminal prosecution for the act that a defendant has alleged or disseminated information about ... In the present case ... the court dismissed the above requests, providing full and correct reasoning, in particular because the immunity of the person against whom the criminal complaint had been lodged, who is now a civil party and member of Parliament, had not been lifted. Hence, a criminal prosecution had not been instituted, which is a prerequisite for the suspension and adjournment of criminal proceedings against a defendant who requests them. It can be concluded from the above-mentioned considerations that the court correctly interpreted and implemented the above-mentioned provisions, and did not violate them, when it proceeded to examine the allegations of false accusation, perjury and slander against the defendant-appellant on points of law and dismissed the defendant’s request on the grounds that a criminal prosecution had not been instituted against the current civil party, former mayor and now member of Parliament, without suspending and adjourning the proceedings until the end of the previously instituted proceedings against him ...”

The decision was finalised on 4 June 2010 (καθαρογραφή) and the applicant was able to receive a copy on 7 June 2010. The applicant was imprisoned from 13 May 2010 to 21 May 2010 as he was not able to pay the fine to which his sentence had been commuted. On 21 May 2010 his sentence was commuted to community service and he was released. Finally, on 31 May 2010 the applicant paid 5,799.94 euros in lieu of serving his sentence.


Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly);Violation of Article 6+6-3 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3 - Rights of defence;Article 6-3-b - Adequate facilities;Adequate time;Article 6-3-c - Legal assistance of own choosing);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)

The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Baku. At the material time she was deputy chairperson of one of the main opposition parties in the country, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan.

On 17 April 2011 and 26 January 2013 the applicant participated in demonstrations organised by the opposition in Baku.

On 11 April 2011, the organisers had given the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”), notice of the demonstration of 17 April 2011. It appears that no prior notice was given to the BCEA by the organisers of the demonstration of 26 January 2013. Information about that assembly was disseminated through Facebook or the press.

The BCEA refused to authorise the demonstration of 17 April 2011 at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku – the yard of a driving school situated in the 20th residential area of the Sabail District. The BCEA noted that the place proposed by the organisers was in an area with heavy traffic.

Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku.

According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants of the demonstration of 17 April 2011 were demanding free and fair elections and democratic reforms in the country, and protesting about impediments to freedom of assembly. The participants of the demonstration of 26 January 2013 were condemning the use of force by the police against participants of previous demonstrations.

The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse them. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and taken to a police station.

According to the applicant, during her arrest in the first case several police officers twisted her arms behind her back, held her head down and forced her to move in that position for 20-25 metres in the direction of a police car. As a result, the muscles in her neck, arms, back and other parts of her body hurt. At the police station she was kept handcuffed.

In a photograph, submitted to the Court by the applicant and allegedly taken at the time of her arrest, the applicant is shown with both arms twisted behind her back by two police officers and with her body bent as a result of that restraint.

In both cases on the day of the applicant’s arrest, an “administrative offence report” (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) was issued in respect of her. In the first case the report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order from the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). In the second case the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under Article 298.1 of the CAO (breach of the rules on the organisation and holding of assemblies, by an assembly organiser).

According to the applicant, she was never served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other documents from her case files. In neither case was she given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while in police custody.

In the first case the applicant was brought before the Nasimi District Court on 18 April 2011, the day following her arrest. In the second case she was brought before the Sabail District Court on 26 January 2013, the day of her arrest.

According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. In the second case members of the public were not allowed inside the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public.

According to the applicant, in neither case was she given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of her own choice.

State-funded lawyers were appointed to assist the applicant. The records of the court hearings in both cases show that in their oral submissions the State-funded lawyers briefly stated that the applicant was not guilty and/or asked the respective court to discontinue the case.

In both cases the courts questioned only the police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested the applicant or issued an administrative offence report in respect of her. The police officers testified that the applicant had attempted to stage an unauthorised demonstration, and, in the second case, had also incited others to participate in such an assembly.

In the first case the first-instance court found that the applicant had participated or attempted to participate in an unauthorised demonstration. In the second case the court found that the applicant had incited people to participate in an unlawful assembly and, by doing so, had violated the rules on organising and holding assemblies.

By a decision of 18 April 2011 the first-instance court in the first case convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced her to five days’ “administrative” detention. By a decision of 26 January 2013 the court in the second case convicted the applicant under Article 298.1 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 2,000 manats (AZN).

On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that her convictions were in violation of her rights because the demonstrations in which she had participated had been peaceful. She also complained that her arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair.

In the first case the applicant also requested the Court of Appeal to order a forensic examination of the injuries she had allegedly sustained during her arrest. The court disregarded that request. The court also disregarded the applicant’s requests to examine video recordings of the arrest made by some journalists; to question the police officers appearing in those video recordings; and to demand the medical record issued in respect of the applicant in the detention facility where she had served her administrative detention.

In the first case the applicant was assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of her own choice. In the second case she was not represented by a lawyer.

In both cases, on 22 April 2011 and 6 February 2013 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court.

On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint before the General Prosecutor’s Office asking it to conduct an investigation into illtreatment allegedly committed by the police during her arrest.

By a letter of 25 May 2011 the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant’s lawyer that the complaint had been forwarded to the Baku City prosecutor’s office for examination. The letter also instructed the Baku City prosecutor’s office to inform the lawyer about the results of the examination.

On an unspecified date, the applicant was summoned to the Nasimi District prosecutor’s office and questioned in connection with her complaint of ill-treatment.

According to the applicant, neither she nor her lawyer was informed about any actions taken by the authorities to investigate her complaint. It was only after making enquiries about the outcome of the investigation, in January 2012, that the applicant managed to obtain a copy of an investigator’s decision of 16 June 2011 refusing to open a criminal case.

The applicant did not lodge a complaint with a court against the decision of 16 June 2011.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Strzelce Opolskie Prison.

The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

The applicant was detained in Mysłowice Remand Centre from 20 April 2010 to 12 January 2011 and in Wojkowice Prison from 12 January 2011 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days).

The parties’ statements relating to the conditions of the applicant’s detention from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 are to a large extent contradictory.

The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in Mysłowice Remand Centre and Wojkowice Prison, he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m².

In their observations, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells only on 20 April, 18 and 19 May 2009.

In the course of civil proceedings instituted by the applicant (see paragraphs 14-16 below), the domestic courts established, without giving any further details, that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days).

Regarding the conditions of detention in Mysłowice Remand Centre, the domestic court established that the overall conditions in cells were adequate. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day.

Regarding the conditions of detention in Wojkowice Prison, as established by the domestic courts, the toilets were separated from the cell’s living area, every prisoner had his own bed, a stool and access to cold running water. The prisoners had basic hygiene products at their disposal. The ceiling was infested with humidity. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day.

On 24 February 2012 the applicant brought a civil action for the infringement of his personal rights on account of inadequate living conditions in Wojkowice Prison from November 2005 to July 2006 and from January to March 2007, in Mysłowice Remand Centre from 20 April 2010 to 12 January 2011 and, subsequently, again in Wojkowice Prison from 12 January 2011 to 9 March 2012. The applicant argued that he had been detained in overcrowded cells, where the space per person had been below the statutory minimum of 3 m². He claimed 80,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 20,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation.

On 18 December 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 the applicant had been detained in cells above the minimum statutory standard. As regards the remainder of the period, the claim was time-barred as lodged outside the three-year period of statutory limitation.

On 27 June 2013 the Katowice Court of Appeal overruled the lower court’s judgment and allowed the applicant’s action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 he had been detained in overcrowded cells. The court relied in this respect on the applicant’s submissions, holding that the State Treasury had in fact acknowledged these by its multiple refusals to provide the first and the second instance courts with an official register of cells in which the applicant had been detained. It also granted the applicant PLN 1,000 (EUR 250) in compensation, holding that the breach of the statutory minimum standard had not been significant.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Yerevan.

She is a civil servant working for the Ministry of Environmental Protection (hereinafter “the Ministry”) as a State inspector. She suffers from cardiac problems, including a heart rhythm disorder.

According to the applicant, on 10 January 2012 H.A., her head of division, and A.K., his deputy, used violence against her in H.A.’s office. In particular, they assaulted her, grabbed her hands, insulted her and forcibly took a document concerning her which she had taken in to them in order to write down her objections. As a result of the violence she fainted, sustained bodily injuries, received numerous bruises on her hands and was seriously humiliated.

On 12 January 2012 the applicant filed a written report with the head of staff of the Ministry, giving a detailed account of what had happened. She stated, inter alia, that she had returned her appraisal report for the second half of 2011 to H.A. since she had disagreed with the assessment received. On 10 January 2012 she had been informed by one of her colleagues that H.A. wanted to see her in his office. During their meeting, H.A. had given her the appraisal report and asked her why she had not signed it. She had responded that she wanted to discuss it. H.A. had refused to provide any clarifications, stating that he was the one to make decisions and would submit the report to the relevant division without her signature. H.A. had then ordered her to return the appraisal report, which she had refused to do, stating that she would write down her objections, sign the document and then return it to him. When she had been about to leave, H.A. had immediately closed and locked the door to his office and had started to approach her, shouting that she was a thief and had stolen a document from his office. Using physical violence and personal insults, he had tried to take the papers from her. After she had called for help, A.K. had entered the office and instead of diffusing the situation had also insulted her and ordered her to hand him the documents. The two of them had grabbed her hands, causing her serious pain, and forcibly taken away the papers. As a result of the stress and pain she had fainted for a short period of time, after which she had been told that she could leave as there was nothing else to discuss. She concluded by stating that as a result of the violent behaviour of H.A. and A.K. she had suffered injuries, health problems and serious distress. She requested that the relevant measures be taken in accordance with the law.

After the incident, the applicant felt unwell and underwent a medical examination. She was diagnosed with acute bronchitis and WolffParkinson-White syndrome (a heart rhythm disorder) and was put on sick leave from 13 to 27 January 2012.

On 14 January 2012 the applicant reported the incident to the police, stating that on 10 January 2012 she and H.A., her head of division, had had an argument during which he had been violent and caused her bodily harm. She made a statement giving an account of events similar to that in her report to the head of staff of the Ministry.

The investigator ordered a forensic medical examination the same day to determine whether the applicant had any bodily injuries and, if so, their nature, origin, seriousness and the time and manner of their infliction.

On 15 January 2012 H.A. gave a statement to the police. In particular, he stated that the applicant had refused to return her appraisal report to him, after which he had left his office, closed the door and called A.K., asking him to come to see him with the other employees. During that time the applicant had kept shouting and swearing. She had called their superior to say that he had locked her in. He denied harassing the applicant either physically or verbally and said that she had used foul language.

On the same day A.K. made a statement and similarly denied using violence against the applicant. Between 16 and 25 January 2012 a number of the applicant’s colleagues who were at work on the day of the incident were questioned and denied that H.A. and A.K. had been violent towards the applicant.

On 18 January 2012 the forensic medical examination was completed. The relevant parts of the expert’s opinion read as follows:

“Complaints: At present [the applicant] complains of a nervous breakdown.

Results of personal examination: An irregularly shaped, non-homogenous, greenishyellow ecchymosis measuring 6 x 2 cm is present on the mid-third of the inner right upper arm. Two similar round-shaped ecchymoses are present on the inner surface of the same area measuring 1 cm in diameter: on the mid-third of the inner left upper arm measuring 1 cm in diameter; on the lower third of the inner left upper arm measuring 2 x 1 cm and 1.5 x 1.2 cm and on the mid-third of the outer left forearm measuring 2.5 x 1.5 cm.

Conclusion: [The applicant’s] bodily injuries in the form of ecchymoses [around] the right and left upper arms and the left forearm have been inflicted with blunt, hard objects possibly in the period mentioned; [the injuries] taken separately as well as all together do not contain elements of [short-term] damage to health.”

On 24 January 2012 the investigator took an additional statement from the applicant. She stated that she had no objections to the opinion of the forensic medical expert and intended to pursue her complaint.

On 25 January 2012 the investigator took another additional statement from the applicant. The relevant parts read as follows:

“Question: In the course of collecting evidence H.A. and A.K. said that they did not hit you and did absolutely not grab your hands. What can you say about this?

Answer: ... I do not know why H.A. and A.K. said that but it is logical that they would deny committing such acts. I will reiterate once again that H.A. and A.K. pulled and pushed me and grabbed my hands thus causing me injuries.”

On 27 January 2012 the investigator took a further additional statement from the applicant. She stated:

“I inform you that since the time I [went] to the police ... [H.A.] and [A.K.] have not even apologised; moreover, they have created such an atmosphere that it is impossible to work, since other employees ignore me and avoid contact with me for fear of losing their jobs. Since H.A. and A.K. are continuing this kind of behaviour, abusing their official capacity, in the circumstances I am unable to reconcile with them. I am complaining and requesting that H.A. and A.K. be prosecuted. I also wish to add that because of their actions I have had health problems and as a result have been on sick leave from 13 to 27 January ...”

On 28 January 2012 H.A. was questioned again and stated, inter alia, that the applicant had made a false statement. He had never harassed her or grabbed her hands and had remained seated in his chair until she had left. As for the injuries discovered on the applicant’s body, H.A. stated that he had never touched her and did not know how they had been inflicted.

It appears that no decision was taken by the investigator for about a month.

On 24 February 2012 the applicant sent a written request to the head of the Marash Division of the Central Police Department for criminal proceedings to be brought against H.A. and A.K. She stated in her request, inter alia, that she had been informed of the provisions of Article 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which criminal proceedings could only be instituted on the basis of a complaint by her. She further stated that she had not reconciled with H.A. and A.K. and was calling for them to be prosecuted. On the same date the investigator took an additional statement from the applicant. A further additional statement was taken from her on 27 February 2012.

On 1 March 2012 the prosecutor instructed the investigator to refuse to bring criminal proceedings against H.A. and A.K. on the grounds that no crime had been committed. It was suggested that the applicant had perceived the events subjectively and that her supervisors had never used violence against her.

On 5 March 2012 the investigator refused to bring criminal proceedings against H.A. and A.K. for lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The decision stated, in particular, that the applicant had made unclear and contradictory statements with regard to the incident. It further stated that the evidence collected had revealed that on 10 January 2012 first H.A. and then A.K., who had gone to the latter’s office, had tried to calm the applicant down, as she had been insulting H.A. During the incident A.K. had caught hold of her hand and taken the document that she had taken from H.A. Intentional infliction of bodily harm was punishable under Article 118 of the Criminal Code, but negligent infliction of bodily harm was not punishable. In the case at hand the applicant’s injuries had been caused by H.A. and A.K.’s negligence; it had not been established that they had intentionally caused her injuries.

On 13 March 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor against the investigator’s decision. She argued, inter alia, that contrary to what was stated in the decision she had described in detail how she had been treated. In particular, she had submitted that first H.A. had grabbed her hands using force, harassed her and locked her in his office so that she could not leave. Thereafter A.K. had come in and also assaulted her. The applicant complained that the conclusion in the investigator’s decision, according to which H.A. and A.K. had caused her injuries by negligence, could not be substantiated and pursued the purpose of exonerating public officials from responsibility. She further complained that, as a result of deliberate violence on the part of H.A. and A.K., she had experienced severe emotional suffering as a woman since her superior had debased her and caused her serious bodily harm without good reason, right in the workplace. In addition, the applicant stated that the incident had taken place in the workplace and naturally all the witnesses questioned by the investigator were the subordinates of H.A. and A.K. If criminal proceedings were instituted, they would be questioned as witnesses and warned about criminal liability for making false statements.

H.A. also lodged a complaint against the investigator’s decision, claiming that it had not been established that he or A.K. had ever hit the applicant.

On 15 March 2012 the prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint and allowed H.A.’s complaint. In particular, the prosecutor upheld the investigator’s refusal to institute criminal proceedings but changed the grounds for it, stating that no crime had been committed involving H.A. and A.K. The decision stated that no evidence had been obtained that would establish that H.A. and A.K. had inflicted injuries on the applicant, except her own unspecified and contradictory statements. As regards the applicant, the decision stated, inter alia, that because the stress she had suffered as a result of the incident in H.A.’s office she had perceived and described what had happened in a subjective manner. In these circumstances, her contradictory statements did not correspond to the evidence gathered but that did not create grounds for prosecuting her for false accusations.

On 4 April 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court (hereinafter “the District Court”), requesting that criminal proceedings be instituted. She reiterated her previous arguments and complained, in particular, that the question of her injuries had not been addressed at all in the prosecutor’s decision, which had ignored the results of the forensic medical examination. In the end, it had never been established who had inflicted her injuries. The applicant further complained that the prosecution had relied on the statements of subordinates of those who had committed the offence in question. Their statements could not be considered objective and reliable in view of the serious fear of those concerned losing their jobs. If criminal proceedings were instituted, they would have the procedural status of witnesses and would be warned about criminal liability for making false statements.

On 18 May 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. In doing so, it found that the disputed decision had been lawful, while the applicant’s arguments stemmed from an individual and subjective interpretation of the events in question and the procedural measures undertaken in relation to them.

The applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court’s decision. She argued, inter alia, that it had failed to examine her arguments. In particular, the issue of the existence of a number of injuries on her body as established by the forensic medical examination had not been addressed at all.

On 12 July 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and fully upheld the District Court’s decision. In doing so, it stated that the applicant had made unclear and contradictory statements about the circumstances of the incident which had not been corroborated by other evidence, namely the statements of H.A., A.K. and others questioned in relation to the incident.

On 2 August 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She argued that the decisions of the District Court and the Criminal Court of Appeal had failed to explain the existence of injuries on her body or the fact that H.A. had locked her in his office. She also reiterated her arguments in relation to the refusal to institute criminal proceedings and the unreliability of the statements made by her colleagues.

On 6 September 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.


Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention)

Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Tbilisi.

At 3.50 p.m. on 19 February 2005 the applicant was arrested as a suspect in a criminal case. On 21 February 2005 he was charged with multiple episodes of fraud.

On 22 February 2005 the First-Instance Panel of the Supreme Court of Georgia, rejecting the prosecutor’s request to place the applicant in pre-trial detention, ordered the applicant’s release under police supervision. The applicant was released at 4.00 p.m. on the same day.

On 25 February 2005 the Appeals Chamber of the Supreme Court of Georgia, reversing the lower-instance decision, placed the applicant in pre-trial detention for three months. It justified its decision solely by noting that the applicant had been charged with a serious crime carrying a possible penalty of more than five years’ imprisonment. This fact in itself, in the Supreme Court’s view, substantiated the risk of the applicant absconding, given that Article 151 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), as in force at the material time, provided that the seriousness of an offence could constitute grounds for the imposition of pre-trial detention.

On 25 March 2005 amendments were introduced to Article 151 §§ 1 and 4 of the CCP; those amendments, inter alia, provided that, subject to assessment by the national courts, pre-trial detention should in principle only be the last resort in cases where

On 18 May 2005 the Investigative Panel of the Tbilisi District Court, having heard the prosecutor’s argument that more time was needed to finalise the investigation, extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention for another two months, until 22 July 2005. The court did not address the question of whether the required investigative actions could be conducted without the applicant’s continued detention. The applicant’s reasons for his objection to any prolongation (his good reputation and family situation; the absence of previous convictions; and formal assurances from several public persons, including a member of parliament) were dismissed by the court. The court also refused an offer made by the Georgian Labour Union to post bail for the applicant in the form of bonds with an approximate value of 680,000 Georgian laris (GEL, approximately 248,300 euros (EUR)), reasoning that, under Article 168 § 3 of the CCP, persons being charged with serious offences were not subject to release on bail.

On 23 May 2005 the Appeals Chamber of the Tbilisi District Court upheld the order of 18 May 2005. Like the lower-instance court, the appellate court did not address the possibility of imposing a more lenient measure of restraint in order to ensure the aims of the investigation.

On 15 June 2005 the applicant requested that his pre-trial detention be replaced by a more lenient measure of restraint. The prosecutor agreed to the applicant’s request.

On 9 July 2005 the Tbilisi District Court released the applicant on bail on payment of a security of GEL 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,800). When ordering his release, the court took into consideration the applicant’s good references and the fact that he had fully compensated the injured party for the damage caused by his allegedly fraudulent activities.

At the time of submission of the present application, while the applicant contended that he was unable to have certain unspecified witnesses examined and to obtain expert opinions pertinent to his case, the criminal proceedings against him were still pending.


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;George Nicolaou;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Johannes Silvis;Luis López Guerra

At the material time all the applicants were detained in Russian penal facilities. Where relevant, the dates of their detention are listed in Annex I.

While in detention, the applicants Mr Yevdokimov, Mr Rezanov, and Mr Morozov lodged defamation claims against private third parties; the applicants Mr Makhov, Mr Resin, Mr Anikanov, Mr Lebetskiy, Mr Gromovoy, Mr Gordeyev and Mr Vinokhodov brought claims seeking compensation for the allegedly inhuman conditions of their detention; and the applicant Mr Martirosyan lodged a civil claim for compensation, alleging that the criminal proceedings had been instituted unlawfully.

None of the applicants were able to attend the hearings at which their claims were examined. The domestic courts refused them the possibility to be present at the hearing, on the ground that there was no domestic legal provision for bringing detainees to courts. In particular, they quoted Article 77.1 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 11 below) and the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the other cases, the issue of the applicants’ presence in court was not addressed.

The applicants appealed, raising the question of their appearance in court in the appeal statement. Some submitted a separate request seeking leave to appear before the appeal court. The appeal courts either dismissed the applicants’ arguments or concluded that their absence from the court was in line with the legislation and did not contravene the principle of fairness.

The applicants’ claims were refused at two levels of jurisdiction. The dates of the final judgments are set out in Annex I.


Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention.


Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;George Nicolaou;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.

The Swedish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms G. Isaksson of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

In February 2008 the applicants, who are all Swedish citizens, were indicted on charges of having committed, inter alia, aggravated drug offences and aggravated violation of the Act on Trade in Medicinal Products (lagen (1996:1152) om handel med läkemedel m.m., hereafter “the 1996 Act”). According to the prosecutor, during the period from 1 January 2003 to 30 January 2007, in Stockholm and the county of Skåne, the applicants and three other defendants had, together and in consultation, created a business on three different websites on the internet through which they had sold medicinal products illegally for a total amount of at least 28.8 million Swedish kronor (SEK), approximately 3 million euros (EUR) of which products for an amount of at least SEK 9.6 million, approximately EUR 1 million, constituted narcotic drugs.

The first and second applicants were accused of having been responsible for the business. The first applicant had operated from Sweden while the second applicant had operated mainly from Thailand. They had allegedly controlled the other defendants’ actions, received orders from customers all over the world and forwarded these to the persons responsible for the distribution of the medicinal products, including the narcotic drugs. According to the prosecutor, they had also been involved in company acquisitions to facilitate the web trade of medicinal products and credit card payments. The first and second applicants had also participated in the creation of the websites where the medicinal products, including the narcotic drugs, had been sold and opened bank accounts for payments received for the products. The third applicant, who had operated from Sweden, was accused of having created, administered and dealt with customer contacts for two of the websites through which the medicinal products and narcotic drugs had been sold. In relation to the charges for aggravated drug offences, he was also accused of having promoted narcotic drug trafficking by illegally holding and forwarding payments for narcotic drugs. The fourth applicant was accused of having created one of the internet sites used for the trading of the medicinal products and the narcotic drugs and of having administered and dealt with customer contacts on all three internet sites.

Legal representatives were appointed to the applicants, who denied the charges. The applicants and their co-defendants argued, among other things, that Swedish courts did not have jurisdiction in the case as no medicinal products had ever been physically present in Sweden and nothing had been sold to persons in Sweden. The medicinal products had been acquired outside of Sweden and sold to people in various countries but never in Sweden. In their view, their business had been lawful and they had not committed any criminal offence under Swedish law.

On 4 April 2008, following a main hearing which lasted 14 days, the Attunda District Court (tingsrätten) convicted the applicants of aggravated drug offences and sentenced them to between two and seven years’ imprisonment. In so far as concerned its jurisdiction, the District Court first noted that the Swedish Narcotics Penal Act (Narkotikastrafflagen (1968:64)) was applicable also to crimes committed outside of Sweden for which reason the alleged drug offences were covered by that Act. It then noted that several of the alleged activities had taken place in Sweden, such as offering the medicinal products, including the narcotic drugs, for sale from Sweden and establishing the contacts between sellers and buyers from Sweden. These activities were, in the court’s view, sufficient to find that the alleged crimes had been completed in Sweden. Therefore, it had jurisdiction to try this charge. The court proceeded to find that the applicants had been involved in the activities as specified by the prosecutor and that they had known that it was illegal and in breach of Swedish law.

However, the District Court acquitted the applicants of the second charge as it found that the 1996 Act was not applicable in the present case as no medicinal products had passed through Sweden and the business had not been aimed at consumers in Sweden. According to the court, the State’s monopoly to trade with medicinal products in Sweden had therefore not been breached.

The applicants as well as the prosecutor appealed against the judgment to the Svea Court of Appeal (hovrätten). The prosecutor argued, inter alia, that the applicants should also be convicted of aggravated violation of the 1996 Act. The applicants submitted inter alia that the appellate court should dismiss the charges against them or, alternatively, that the charges for aggravated drugs offences should be rejected. They maintained that Swedish courts lacked jurisdiction and that they had not committed any criminal offence under Swedish law.

On 2 July 2008, following a main hearing, the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s conviction of aggravated drug offences for the first and second applicants. It aquitted the third applicant of that charge as it did not find that he had been aware that medicinal products classified as narcotic drugs had been sold on the internet sites. Lastly, it altered the fourth applicant’s conviction to complicity to aggravated drug offences. However, the appellate court also convicted the first and second applicants of aggravated violation of the 1996 Act and the third and fourth applicants of complicity to aggravated violation of the 1996 Act. The first and second applicants were sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, the third applicant was given a probationary sentence and a fine of SEK 10,800 and the fourth applicant was sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment.

The appellate court found that since the first applicant, who had had the leading role in the business, had operated from Sweden and the other defendants had taken part in the same business, all their actions should be deemed as having been committed in Sweden. Consequently, the court had jurisdiction to consider the acts and Swedish law was applicable. As regards the charge of aggravated violation of the 1996 Act, the appellate court noted that the business had been large scale, comprising sales of at least SEK 19,200,000. Since the 1996 Act prohibited sales of medicinal products by others that the Swedish State, or a legal entity in which the State had decisive influence, the court found that the applicants had violated the Act as specified by the prosecutor in the indictment. The Court of Appeal further noted that it did not consider that convicting the defendants would be in breach of either the principle of legality when applying the 1996 Act in its wording before it was amended on 1 May 2006, or any EC laws or regulations.

The applicants and two of their co-defendants appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), maintaining their claims.

The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal concerning the question whether what the Court of Appeal had found proven in relation to each of the defendants under the charges of aggravated violation of the 1996 Act meant that the prerequisites to convict them under that Act were fulfilled. The question of leave to appeal for the remainder of the case was adjourned.

On 5 December 2008, the Supreme Court gave judgment, answering the question in the affirmative, namely, that the prerequisites to convict the applicants under the 1996 Act were fulfilled in the present case. In view of its finding, it refused leave to appeal for the remainder of the case. The Supreme Court first noted that the prosecuted activities of the defendants, that is the running of the retail business during the specified time, were to be seen collectively and hence be considered as one crime, even though they comprised several acts carried out at various times where each act was sufficient to be considered a crime of itself. The main question was then whether the activities could be considered to have been performed in Sweden. Agreeing with the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court found that this was the case since some of the acts had been carried out in Sweden and Sweden therefore had jurisdiction to try the charge in its entirety in accordance with the principle of ubiquity and Chapter 2, Articles 1 and 4 of the Penal Code (Brottsbalken (1962:700)). As regards the acts of complicity, such acts should be considered to be committed not only where they were performed, but also where the main act had been committed. The Supreme Court hence concluded that the Swedish courts had jurisdiction to try the charges against the applicants.

The Supreme Court then turned to consider whether the applicants and their co-defendants had violated Swedish law, namely the 1996 Act. Here, the court noted that the 1996 Act was primarily directed at regulating the trade of medicinal products in Sweden and that it had to establish whether it was applicable when neither the products nor the buyers were physically present in Sweden, that is when the trade was based in Sweden but directed against foreign markets. In deciding this, the court had regard to the rapid development of the technical means of trading over national borders and the interest to protect the health and safety of consumers, also outside of Sweden. It further took into account the Act on Electronic Trade and Other Information Society Services (lagen (2002:562) om elektronisk handel och andra informationssamhällets tjänster, hereafter “the Electronic Trade Act”) which was based upon the EU directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (“the Directive on Electronic Commerce”). The directive established the subjective territoriality principle in that Member States should ensure that services emanating from within their territories complied with national provisions applicable in that State. The Supreme Court noted that the subjective territoriality principle was an established principle applicable to various areas. It further concluded that retail trading of medicinal products was not, as such, covered by the scope of the Electronic Trade Act. Even though marketing and ordering of medicinal products via internet did, in fact, fall under the Act, actual deliveries of medicinal products were not covered by the scope of the Act. Having regard to the above as well as to the interest to protect the health and safety of consumers, avoid that Sweden be considered as a suitable base for irresponsible large-scale medicinal trade and that there did not appear to exist any formal or other circumstances directly contradicting that the subjective territoriality principle was applicable, the Supreme Court concluded that the 1996 Act was applicable and that the defendants had breached it as found by the Court of Appeal.

The third applicant requested the Supreme Court to re-open the case on 19 May 2009. He claimed inter alia that section 4 of the 1996 Act in its wording before it was amended on 1 May 2006, referred to a repealed ordinance (the Medicinal Products Ordinance, Läkemedelsförordningen (1962:702)) and that therefore, he could not have foreseen that the acts he was convicted of were illegal. The request was rejected by the Supreme Court on 20 October 2009 since it found that the applicant had not shown any such new circumstance that would justify a re-opening of the case.

The provisions applied in the present case were laid down in the 1996 Act. It may be noted that the 1996 Act was replaced, on 1 July 2009, by a new Act on Trade in Medicinal Products (lagen (2009:36) om handel med läkemedel – hereafter referred to as “the 2009 Act”).

Section 4 of the 1996 Act provided, inter alia, that retail trade of medicinal products should be conducted by the State or by a legal entity, appointed by the Government, in which the State had a decisive influence. Between 1970 and 1 July 2009 the state owned company Apoteket AB had exclusive rights to sell medicinal products in Sweden.

In its wording until 1 May 2006, section 4 of the 1996 Act referred to retail trade in “items that are covered by the now repealed Medicinal Products Ordinance (1962:701)” and one other Act. However, through a legislative amendment this was changed and, as from 1 May 2006, section 4 instead referred to the Medicinal Products Act (Läkemedelslagen (1992:859)) and Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004.

According to section 11 of the 1996 Act, a person who intentionally or negligently violated section 4 should be sentenced to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding one year, unless the act was punishable under the Penal Code. It further provided that minor offences should not be punishable and that an intentional violation that had been conducted as a professional activity, concerned a considerable quantity or value, or otherwise was of a particularly dangerous nature, should be subject to imprisonment not exceeding two years.

With the entry into force of the 2009 Act, on 1 July 2009, the pharmacy market was deregulated to allow actors other than Apoteket AB the right to sell medicinal products to the general public. However, an authorisation and special permit from the Medical Products Agency is required to sell medicinal products to the general public.

Section 1 of the Narcotics Penal Act provides inter alia that any person who unlawfully either transfers narcotics, acquires narcotics for the purpose of transfer, or procures, processes, packages, transports, keeps or in some other similar way handles narcotics that are not for personal use, or offers narcotics for sale, keeps or conveys payment for narcotics, mediates contacts between seller and buyer or takes any other such measure, if the procedure is designed to promote narcotics traffic, shall, if he or she has acted with intent, be sentenced for drug offences to imprisonment for not more than three years.

According to section 3 of the Act, in case of an aggravated offence, the sentence shall be imprisonment of at least two years and at the most ten years.

The Supreme Court has applied the Narcotics Penal Act to criminal acts committed abroad without this having constituted an issue per se (NJA 1971 p. 321 and NJA 1983 p. 425). This approach has also been confirmed in legal doctrine (see for instance, Jareborg, Allmän kriminalrätt [General criminal law], p. 242).

The regulations regarding the jurisdiction of Swedish courts in criminal cases and the applicability of Swedish penal laws are laid down in Chapter 2 of the Penal Code. Chapter 2, Article 1 of the Code provides that crimes committed in Sweden shall be adjudicated in accordance with Swedish law and by a Swedish court. The same applies when it is uncertain where the crime was committed but grounds exist for assuming that it was committed in Sweden.

According to Chapter 2, Article 4 of the Penal Code a crime is deemed to have been committed where the criminal act was perpetrated and also where the crime was completed or, in the case of an attempt, where the intended crime would have been completed. According to the preparatory works to the Penal Code (see NJA II 1948 p. 162) and Swedish case-law (the Supreme Court case NJA 1993 p. 292, as well as the Court of Appeal case RH 2000:84), as soon as a part of a crime has taken place within the realm, the criminal act in its entirety is to be considered to have been perpetrated in Sweden (the principle of ubiquity).

In the case of complicity to a crime, it is considered that the location of the criminal act is determined by both the act of complicity and the main act. An accomplice acting from abroad will be deemed to have committed a crime within the country, if he is aiding a main perpetrator to carry out or complete a crime in Sweden (see, for example, Holmqvist et al., Brottsbalken, En kommentar [Commentary to the Penal Code], p. 2:41).

Application of penal provisions by analogy is prohibited according to Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Penal Code. Penal provisions should be prescribed by law. In a judgment of 12 July 1994 (NJA 1994 p. 480) the Supreme Court stated that there were no impediments to interpret penal provisions in accordance with the recognised principles for interpretation of the law. However, such an interpretation had to be made cautiously.

The penal law principle of legality also embodies a general requirement that a penal provision should be sufficiently clear and precise. It should be possible to foresee the application of a penal provision to a reasonable extent and it should be compatible with the grounds and purpose of the penal provision.


No violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 - Right not to be tried or punished twice)

George Nicolaou;Ineta Ziemele;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Päivi Hirvelä;Zdravka Kalaydjieva

The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Jyväskylä.

The applicant owned shares in a limited liability company. In 2001 and 2002 a tax inspection was conducted in the company for the tax years 1996 to 2001. The tax inspectors found that the company was not owned by four different English companies but in reality the applicant and three other Finnish persons owned it, with equal shares.

On 26 February 2003 additional taxes and tax surcharges (veronkorotus, skatteförhöjning) were imposed on the company for the tax years 1997 to 1999 and 2001.

The company sought rectification from the local Tax Rectification Committee (verotuksen oikaisulautakunta, prövningsnämnden i beskattningsärenden).

On 16 March 2005 the Tax Rectification Committee partly accepted, partly rejected the company’s applications.

The applicant, in the name of the company, appealed to the Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen), claiming that he owned the whole company through four English companies.

On 28 February 2007 the Helsinki Administrative Court rejected the company’s appeal and upheld the taxation decisions. It found that there was no proof that the English companies had in fact been sold to the applicant but, on the contrary, the case documents showed that in reality all four Finnish persons behind the English companies had equally exercised their powers in the company.

On 10 August 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) refused the company leave to appeal.

In connection with the company taxation, additional taxes and tax surcharges were also imposed on the applicant as he had received disguised dividends from the company. He was to pay 8,500 Finnish marks (FIM) in tax surcharges for the tax year 1997 (1,429.60 euros, EUR), FIM 5,000 for the tax year 1998 (EUR 1,021.43), FIM 6,000 for the tax year 1999 (EUR 1,211.64) and FIM 10,000 for the tax year 2001 (EUR 1,904.50).

The applicant sought rectification from two local Tax Rectification Committees.

On 25 April 2005 the Sisä-Suomi Tax Rectification Committee rejected the applicant’s applications in respect of the tax years 1998, 1999 and 2001.

On 31 May 2005 the Kaakkois-Suomi Tax Rectification Committee rejected the applicant’s application in respect of the tax year 1997.

The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court, claiming that there was no reason to impose additional taxes and tax surcharges as he was the only shareholder in the company.

On 16 April 2007 the Hämeenlinna Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the decisions concerning the tax years 1998, 1999 and 2001. It found that in reality the company was owned by four Finnish persons with equal shares and therefore the taxation decisions were not incorrect.

On 30 December 2008 the Kouvola Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the decision concerning the tax year 1997. It found, like the other courts, that the applicant could not be regarded as the sole owner of the company.

On 10 August 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant leave to appeal against any of the above-mentioned tax decisions.

On 7 March 2002, on the basis of the tax inspection, the tax authorities requested the police to investigate the matter. The applicant was arrested on 4 June 2002 and his office was searched the same day. He was questioned by the police for the first time on 5 June 2002 and was released thereafter. The pre-trial investigation was concluded on 29 December 2006.

On 11 July 2008 the public prosecutor pressed charges against the applicant. The applicant was accused, on the company’s count, of an accounting offence (kirjanpitorikos, bokföringsbrott) for having introduced incorrect and misleading information in the company bookkeeping between 1997 and 2001, and of aggravated tax fraud (törkeä veropetos, grovt skattebedrägeri) for having given incorrect information to the tax authorities between 1998 and 2002. As a result, the company had evaded EUR 59,335.69 in taxes.

On 30 September 2009 the Kotka District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to a one year suspended sentence. As to the length of the proceedings, the court noted that the proceedings had lasted by then 7 years and 4 months. The proceedings had been unusually long and the length was not attributable to the applicant. The proper sentence for the applicant would have been imprisonment for one year but due to the excessive length it was turned into a suspended sentence.

The applicant appealed to the Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten), requesting that the charges be dropped as he had already been convicted in the matter: tax surcharges had been imposed on him and a final decision delivered.

On 2 July 2010 the Kouvola Appeal Court upheld the District Court’s judgment. As to ne bis in idem, the court found that the decisions containing tax surcharges had become final on 10 August 2009. As the charges had been pressed before that, on 11 July 2008, there was no impediment to the examination of the case as the charges had been brought before the administrative proceedings became final. As to the merits, the court found that the applicant’s true position in the company had been concealed in order to avoid his responsibilities and that in reality he had been as much involved as the other shareholders. He could thus be held responsible for the company’s bookkeeping as well as the incorrect information given to the tax authorities.

By letter dated 30 August 2010 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Appeal Court and claiming in particular that he had been convicted twice in the same matter. He also pointed out that the proceedings had already lasted for more than 8 years.

On 14 December 2010 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.


Alvina Gyulumyan;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Kristina Pardalos;Nona Tsotsoria

The applicant, Mr Mohamed Majdi Kattan, is a Syrian national, born in 1973 and living in Ţăndărei. He was represented before the Court by Mr I. Dan, a lawyer practising in Bucharest.

The Romanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumar, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On an unspecified date a third party brought criminal proceedings and joined civil claims against the applicant for attempted fraud and forgery.

On 11 October 2007 the Ialomiţa Prosecutor’s Office indicted the applicant for attempted fraud and forgery and sent his case for trial.

By a judgment of 9 June 2008 the Ialomiţa County Court acquitted the applicant in respect of both charges on the basis of statements he had given to the prosecutor’s office and the court, and testimonial and documentary evidence. The prosecutor’s office and the third party appealed against the judgment.

By a judgment of 7 October 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed their appeals as unfounded on the merits. The prosecutor’s office and the third party lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against the judgment before the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the Court of Cassation”).

On 5 February 2010 the Court of Cassation summoned the applicant to its first hearing of the case, listed for 23 February 2010. On the same date, a bailiff posted the summons on the applicant’s front door and on the Ţăndărei local council noticeboard because no one could be found at the address in the town chosen by the applicant for correspondence with the domestic courts.

By an interlocutory judgment of 23 February 2010 the Court of Cassation noted that although he had been lawfully summoned, the applicant had failed to attend the hearing. In addition, it allowed a request by the applicant’s chosen legal representative seeking an adjournment of the hearing in order to familiarise himself with the case and the reasons for the prosecutor’s office’s and third party’s appeals on points of law. It also ordered that the applicant be summoned to the next hearing, listed for 20 April 2010.

On 17 March 2010 the bailiff posted the summons for a second time on the applicant’s front door and on Ţăndărei local council noticeboard because again no one could be found at the address in the town chosen by the applicant for correspondence with the domestic courts.

By an interlocutory judgment of 20 April 2010 the Court of Cassation noted that although he had been lawfully summoned, the applicant had failed to attend the hearing. It also noted that the applicant’s chosen legal representative had submitted before it that the applicant had not left the country, and that he would contact his client and ask him to appear before the court. In addition, it ordered that the applicant be summoned to the next hearing, listed for 1 June 2010, with a specific direction on the summons which stated “mandatory attendance before the court in order to be heard” (prezența obligatorie la instanță pentru a fi audiat).

By an interlocutory judgment of 1 June 2010 the Court of Cassation noted that the applicant had not been lawfully summoned to the hearing and adjourned the proceedings until 14 September 2010. It ordered that the applicant be summoned in accordance with its directions of 20 April 2010.

On 22 June 2010 the bailiff posted the summons for a third time on the applicant’s front door and Ţăndărei local council noticeboard because again no one could be found at the address in the town chosen by the applicant for correspondence with the domestic courts. The summons included the specific direction given by the Court of Cassation on 20 April 2010.

By an interlocutory judgment of 14 September 2010 the Court of Cassation noted that although he had been lawfully summoned, the applicant had failed to attend the hearing. In addition, it allowed the applicant’s chosen legal representative and the other parties to submit observations on the merits of the case, and afterwards adjourned the proceedings pending deliberation.

By a final judgment of 3 November 2010 the Court of Cassation allowed the Ialomiţa Prosecutor’s Office’s and third party’s appeals on points of law on the basis of the evidence available to it, quashed the judgments of the lower courts, convicted the applicant of attempted fraud and forgery and sentenced him to three years and four months’ imprisonment.

The applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal (contestaţie în anulare) against the final judgment of 3 November 2010. He argued, inter alia, that the final-instance court had breached the applicable rules of criminal procedure and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights because it had convicted him without hearing evidence from him after he had been acquitted by the lower courts.

By a final judgment of 4 April 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s extraordinary appeal. It held that after the applicant had been acquitted by the lower courts, the Court of Cassation sitting as court of final appeal had had a duty to hear evidence from him in accordance with the applicable rules of criminal procedure. However, although the applicant had been summoned at the correspondence address he had chosen himself, he had failed to attend the hearings. Also, he had not indicated, either through his chosen legal representative or by way of written submissions, his wish for the court to hear evidence from him directly or the objective reasons preventing him from attending the hearings. The final-instance court had summoned the applicant in exactly the same way the lower courts had done. Furthermore, during the proceedings before the first-instance court the summoning of the applicant through the procedure he was contesting had not prevented him from appearing before the court, from being heard by it or from submitting arguments in his defence, either directly or through the same chosen legal representative who had represented him during the entire course of the proceedings. At no stage of the proceedings had the applicant or his legal representative asked the court to summon him at a different address. Consequently, it could not be held that the final-instance court had lacked diligence in determining if the applicant was living at the address indicated by him. The court had assumed that as long as the applicant had been lawfully summoned, he had been familiar with the proceedings and had opted not to appear before the court. In fact, his conduct had been similar to the conduct he had displayed before the second-instance court, in that he had failed to attend the hearings despite having been lawfully summoned to do so, and had chosen to be defended exclusively through his chosen legal representative. It further dismissed the applicant’s argument that he had not been familiar with the proceedings because he had not been in contact with his chosen legal representative, on the grounds that they had signed separate legal representation contracts for each stage of the proceedings, and that on 20 April 2010 the applicant’s legal representative had informed the court about his whereabouts and had pledged to ensure his client’s attendance before it.

Articles 38514 § 2 and 38516 provide that it is mandatory for the finalinstance court to hear direct evidence from an accused when the lower courts have acquitted him or her. Where an appellate court quashes a judgment delivered by a lower court, it has to decide on the evidence to be adduced and set a date on which to take statements from the accused directly if the latter has not been heard or if he or she has been acquitted by the lower court.

Articles 183 § 1 and 184 §§ 1 and 4 provide that if a summoned person fails to appear before the court, and her attendance or direct evidence is required, he or she can be taken before the court on the basis of an order to appear (mandat de aducere). The order to appear is enforceable by the national police, the gendarmes or the local police. If the person responsible for enforcing the order to appear is unable to find the intended recipient of the order at the address indicated, he or she must open an investigation. If the investigation remains fruitless, he or she must draft a report outlining the investigative steps that have been carried out.

Article 38515 § 2 (d) provides that the court examining the appeal on points of law can allow the appeal on points of law and re-examine the case.


The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained about inadequate conditions of detention.


No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);No violation of Article 14+8-1 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Fontanelas.

He is one of the most well-known television hosts in Portugal and is currently the host of a morning talk show. He has worked in the media for almost forty years.

He publicly declared his homosexuality in 2008.

Between midnight and 1 a.m. on 28 December 2009, a live talk show, Five Minutes to Midnight (5 Para a Meia-Noite) was broadcast on one of the channels of the national television service, RTP2. The programme was presented by F.C. and featured two famous people from the media as guests.

In the course of the talk show, during a quiz, the guests were asked to answer the following question, which was identified as the most important by F.C.: “Who is the best Portuguese female TV host?” The possible answers to the question included the name of three female television hosts and the applicant’s; the latter being the “correct” one. The transcript of the quiz reads:

“F.C.: Who is the best female Portuguese TV host? Option A, F.C.; option B, C.V; option C, C.P. or option D, Manuel Luís Goucha.

J.M.: This is a tough one.


CASE OF SILVA AND MONDIM CORREIA v. PORTUGAL

No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life)

Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

The first applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Oliveira de Azeméis. The second applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Vila Real.

The first applicant was born out of wedlock. His mother always considered T.S. to be his father and from an early age he has been in touch with T.S.’s family, who have always treated him as a relative.

On 26 March 2012 the first applicant instituted an action for recognition of paternity before the Vale de Cambra Court. T.S. objected and argued that the applicant’s claim was time-barred under Article 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code. Mr Silva responded that this provision was unconstitutional because it violated Articles 18 §§ 2 and 3 and 26 § 1 of the Constitution.

On 26 June 2012 the judge gave directions (despacho saneador) setting out those matters that had already been established and those that remained outstanding. In addition, the judge dismissed T.S.’s objection that the applicant’s claim was time-barred, holding that the time-limit set by Article 1817 § 1 was unconstitutional insofar as the limitation thus imposed on the possibility of investigating an individual’s paternity at all times constituted an unjustified and disproportionate restriction of the right of a son to know who his father was. It also found that the exercise of a person’s right to know his parentage could not be subject to temporal barriers and could only be restricted in cases where such exercise of the right would constitute an abuse. The fact that the plaintiff had only instituted the proceedings more than fifty years later could not, in itself, be considered to constitute an abuse.

On an unknown date T.S. challenged the judge’s decision of 26 June 2012 ‒ in the part in which it considered Article 1817 § 1 to be incompatible with constitutional provisions ‒ before the Porto Court of Appeal. On an unknown date the applicant submitted his observations in reply (contraalegações), arguing that the decision should be upheld and the proceedings should not be deemed time-barred.

Meanwhile, on an unknown date, at the request of the first applicant, the Vale de Cambra Court ordered DNA tests which established that T.S. was the applicant’s father. In the light of that result the Vale de Cambra Court asked the parties about the usefulness of continuing the proceedings. T.S. did not acknowledge paternity and requested the Vale de Cambra Court to continue the proceedings.

On 9 April 2013 the Porto Court of Appeal dismissed T.S.’s challenge. It held that Article 1817 § 1 was unconstitutional and that the right to seek judicial recognition of paternity should not be subject to a time-limit.

T.S. appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice.

On 14 January 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed T.S.’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Porto Court of Appeal in its entirety.

On an unknown date T.S. appealed to the Constitutional Court, to which he submitted the question of the constitutionality of Article 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code, pursuant to Article 70 § 1 (a) of the Law of the Constitutional Court.

On 10 March 2014 the Constitutional Court held, with reference to its previous ruling no. 401/2011, that Article 1817 § 1 complied with the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

The first applicant appealed to the Conference of the Constitutional Court (Conferência do Tribunal Constitucional), claiming that Article 1817 § 1 was unconstitutional. On 7 May 2014 the Conference of the Constitutional Court upheld the previous decision of the Constitutional Court and dismissed the applicant’s claim.

As a result of the Constitutional Court’s decisions, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s action on 9 July 2014.

The second applicant was born out of wedlock. His mother always considered A.M. to be his father.

On 31 March 2014 he brought paternity proceedings before the Vila Real Court and contended that he had always known that A.M. was his father. A.M. objected, arguing that the claim was time-barred.

On 15 June 2013 the Vila Real Court dismissed the second applicant’s action, holding that it was time-barred for being lodged outside the ten-year time-limit established under Article 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code. In addition, it noted that the second applicant had not argued that there were any factors justifying the addition of a further three years pursuant to Article 1817 §§ 2 and 3 of the Civil Code.

On 5 September 2013 the second applicant appealed to the Porto Court of Appeal, challenging the judgment of the Vila Real Court. He argued that the time-limit established under Article 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code for the institution of paternity proceedings was not compatible with the Constitution and that the right to one’s identity should prevail over the rights of the alleged parent.

On 10 December 2013 the Porto Court of Appeal upheld the firstinstance judgment, finding that Article 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code was not incompatible with constitutional provisions, pursuant to Ruling no. 401/2011 of the Constitutional Court. One of the judges dissented, expressing the view that the protection afforded by the Constitution to the fundamental right to personal identity required that the possibility of investigating one’s biological identity should not be subject to a timelimit.

On 28 January 2014 the second applicant challenged the decision of the Porto Court of Appeal before the Supreme Court of Justice and asked it to rule that the referred time-limit was unconstitutional.

By a judgment of 27 May 2014 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment of the Porto Court of Appeal and held that the tenyear time-limit established under Article 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code was unconstitutional.

On an unknown date A.M. lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court, which by a summary decision of 25 September 2014 ruled that, with reference to its previous ruling no. 401/2011, the provision was constitutional and ordered that the judgment of the Supreme Court be modified accordingly.

The second applicant appealed to the Conference of the Constitutional Court. On 28 October 2014 the Conference upheld the previous decision.

Following the Constitutional Court decisions, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the second applicant’s action on 13 January 2015.


Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström

The applicant, Ms Eşe Fatma Aktaş, is a Turkish national who was born in 1966 and lives in Adana. She was represented before the Court by Mr N. Karakaya, a lawyer practising in Istanbul.

The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

On 4 September 2011, at approximately 11.15 a.m., the motorcycle driven by the applicant’s son-in-law collided with a pickup truck on a highway. It appears that both the applicant’s son-in-law and her daughter, who was riding at the back of the motorcycle as a passenger, died on the spot. S.D., the driver of the pickup truck, was taken into detention for interrogation upon the orders of the Eskipazar Public Prosecutor.

Soon after the incident the Eskipazar Public Prosecutor arrived at the scene of the accident in order to carry out a preliminary examination. It appears from the public prosecutor’s initial incident report that the accident took place on a dual carriageway, where the traffic was flowing in single lanes on one carriageway due to roadworks on the other carriageway at the material time. According to the information that the public prosecutor received from the traffic police, the collision had occurred in the pickup truck’s lane.

During his interrogation by the gendarmerie, S.D. stated that he had been driving at a normal speed in his own lane when he noticed a motorcycle coming towards him at great speed in the same lane. Although he had tried to swerve to the right, the motorcycle had hit his vehicle on the left side. He denied any responsibility for the accident.

A detailed accident report was prepared by the traffic police on the same day, in which it was stated that no alcohol had been found in S.D.’s blood. The report also stated that the motorcycle driver, who had strayed into the opposite lane, had been entirely responsible for the accident. The traffic police also prepared a sketch map of the scene.

According to the crime scene report prepared by the gendarmerie the next day, the post-impact skid marks of the pickup truck were found to be 25.40 metres long, and the scratch marks left by the motorcycle on the road suggested that the collision had occurred in the pickup truck’s lane. According to the same report, the accident had not been caused by adverse weather conditions or any physical defects of the road. The report was accompanied by a sketch map of the accident scene.

On 5 September 2011 S.D. was brought before the Eskipazar Public Prosecutor and the Eskipazar Magistrates’ Court, respectively, for questioning. He repeated the statements he had previously made to the gendarmerie. On the same day, the Eskipazar public prosecutor’s office requested S.D.’s arrest on suspicion of causing death through negligence. However, the Eskipazar Magistrates’ Court rejected that request and ordered S.D.’s release from detention.

On 14 November 2011 the applicant requested the collection of certain evidence by the Eskipazar public prosecutor’s office, including any CCTV footage from the accident scene, the suspect’s traffic record, a technical examination of the pickup truck (the brake mechanism in particular), and a medical report on the suspect’s eyesight. The applicant also requested the calculation, by an expert, of the approximate speed of the pickup truck at the time of the accident on the basis of the skid marks it had left on the road.

On 25 November 2011 the Eskipazar public prosecutor’s office ordered the examination of the suspect’s traffic records and any available CCTV footage in accordance with the applicant’s request. It appears that no action was taken as regards the remaining requests.

On 1 December 2011 the Eskipazar Provincial Gendarmerie Command informed the public prosecutor’s office that there were no CCTV cameras in the vicinity of the accident scene, and that S.D. had not been involved in any traffic accidents previously.

On 12 December 2011 the applicant was invited to the Gültepe police station in Istanbul to make a statement. She complained that the Eskipazar public prosecutor’s office was not conducting the investigation in an effective manner. Once again, she requested the collection of all the evidence referred to in paragraph 10 above, as well as an examination of the suspect’s phone records to determine whether he had been talking on the phone around the time of the accident. She also asked to be provided with any expert reports submitted to the investigation file.

On 30 December 2011 the Eskipazar public prosecutor conducted an on-site examination of the accident scene with the participation of a traffic expert (a traffic police officer).

In his report dated 10 January 2012 (“the first expert report”) the traffic expert stated that the absence of any pre-impact skid marks suggested that neither of the drivers had had the opportunity to react in a timely manner (such as by applying the brakes or swerving to the side) to prevent the accident, which had increased the impact of the collision. He found that the motorcycle, which had strayed into the lane occupied by oncoming traffic, had been entirely responsible for the accident. The traffic expert’s report was not provided to the applicant.

The Eskipazar public prosecutor’s office subsequently ordered another expert report from the Forensic Medicine Institute, which conducted an examination on the basis of the material in the investigation file. In its report dated 13 February 2002 (“the second expert report”), the Forensic Medicine Institute repeated the findings of the traffic expert. It appears that that report was not sent to the applicant either.

Based on all the information and evidence collected, on 28 February 2012 the Eskipazar public prosecutor’s office delivered a decision not to prosecute S.D., who had not been found to be at fault in the incident.

The applicant objected to that decision, claiming in particular that she had not been sent the expert reports submitted to the investigation file, which had prevented her from challenging them, and that the public prosecutor had not collected all the evidence relevant to the incident. She also challenged the competence of the police officer who had prepared the first expert report, and claimed that the subsequent report by the Forensic Medicine Institute had merely repeated the findings of that first inadequate report.

On 21 June 2012 the Bartın Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s objection. That decision was served on the applicant on 31 July 2012.


No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Luis López Guerra;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sevojno.

On 30 May 2001 the Užice department of the Central Employment Office (Republicki zavod za tržiste rada – Nacionalna služba za zapošljavanje – Organizaciona jedinica Užice, hereinafter “the Employment Office”) granted unemployment benefits to the applicant until he found a new job or became eligible for retirement (novčana naknada do zaposlenja ili ispunjavanja uslova za starosnu penziju).

On 1 June 2001 the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law on Employment and Rights of Unemployed Persons (“the 2001 Law”) came into force. The law provided for different coefficients and a different methodology for calculating such benefits. It also provided, in Article 20, that any administrative proceedings which had not been concluded by the date on which the new law came into force were to be finalised in accordance with the new law (Article 17 of the 2001 Law provided that Article 20 was applicable as of 1 September 2001).

The applicant was receiving the full amount of the benefits he was entitled to until October 2001. From that date the benefits were decreased to 70-80% of the amount he had initially been awarded, although the decision of 30 May 2001 had not been amended or superseded by a new decision.

Consequently, on 12 November 2007 the applicant brought a civil claim against the Employment Office in the Užice Municipal Court (Opštinski sud u Užicu), seeking payment of the difference between the benefits he had received and those he had been granted by the Employment Office and which had been due from 1 November 2004 (a claim for any earlier sum was statute-barred), plus statutory interest and legal costs.

On 26 December 2007 the Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s claim. It found that his benefits had been correctly calculated, in accordance with the 2001 Law, as the Employment Office’s decision in his case had not yet been final on the date on which the relevant law had come into force.

On 18 March 2008 the Užice District Court (Okružni sud u Užicu) upheld that judgment following an appeal by the applicant.

The applicant’s lawyer brought separate claims on behalf of numerous individuals (hereinafter “the plaintiffs”), seeking outstanding benefits.

On 22 November 2007 the same Municipal Court ruled in favour of M.Ð., one of the plaintiffs, whose claim was factually and legally identical to that of the applicant (M.Ð.’s administrative decision had also been delivered on 30 May 2001). That judgment became final on 19 December 2007.

The Municipal Court ruled in favour of several of the plaintiffs in nine judgments delivered between 24 August 2007 and 17 April 2008, although it appears that the dates on which the respective administrative decisions had come into force differed.

On 26 February 2008 and 19 May 2008 the Arilje Municipal Court delivered two judgments in which it ruled against plaintiffs whose claims were identical to the applicant’s. The Užice District Court upheld those two judgments on 20 March 2008 and 15 September 2008 respectively.

A number of plaintiffs who were in an identical situation to that of the applicant lodged constitutional appeals with the Constitutional Court of Serbia. Between 4 November 2010 and 1 March 2012 the Constitutional Court adopted a number of decisions in those cases, finding a violation of the right to a fair trial. It quashed the civil judgments and ordered the reopening of the civil proceedings.

Acting upon the decisions of the Constitutional Court, the Kragujevac Court of Appeal (which became the competent court of second instance for the applicant’s case after a reorganisation of courts in Serbia in 2010, instead of the Užice District Court) and the Belgrade Court of Appeal reopened proceedings in cases in which the Constitutional Court had made such an order and ruled in favour of the plaintiffs.

On 1 April 2014 the Supreme Court of Cassation adopted a detailed action plan aimed at ensuring the general harmonisation of case-law throughout the Serbian judicial system. The plan contained a series of measures to be taken at various levels of jurisdiction, and, inter alia, included the following: (i) the adoption of guiding legal opinions based on the principles developed in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights; (ii) the dissemination of such opinions; (iii) regular information sharing between the courts; (iv) an increased number of thematic discussions and training programmes; (v) the adoption of specific action plans by the courts at various levels; and (vi) the development of various IT tools and related intranet databases.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court);Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic decisions and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law.