Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

The applicants’ personal details as well as the facts in relation to each case are set out in the Annex to this judgment.

The applicants complained of the excessive length of different civil and administrative proceedings under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

In case of the first and fourth applicant the Constitutional Court rejected their the constitutional appeals, whereas in case of the second and third applicant the Constitutional Court found a violation of a right to a trial within reasonable time, but awarded no damages.


No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation);No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression-{general} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Kyiv.

At the time of the events she belonged to an artistic group called the St Luke Brotherhood, which was known for its provocative public performances.

On 16 December 2010 the applicant, together with three other members of the above-mentioned union, made what she described as an “act of performance”, which, according to both parties’ accounts, consisted of the following. They went to the Eternal Glory Memorial to those who perished in the Second World War, which contained the tombs of thirty-two soldiers, including that of an Unknown Soldier. The applicant took a frying pan prepared in advance, broke some eggs into it and fried them over the Eternal Flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Two of her friends joined her and fried sausages on skewers over the flame. Another member of the group filmed the event. Two police officers approached them and made a remark that their behaviour was inappropriate, without further interference. On the same day the applicant posted the video on the Internet on behalf of the St Luke Brotherhood. It was accompanied by the following statement:

“Precious natural gas has been being burned, pointlessly, at the Glory Memorial in Kyiv for fifty-three years now. This pleasure costs taxpayers about 300,000 hryvnias [UAH] per month. And this is only one ‘eternal flame’ pagan temple, whereas there are hundreds or even thousands of them throughout Ukraine. On 16 December the St Luke Brotherhood reacted to this by an act of protest in the Glory Park in the capital. It showed that people should use the ‘eternal flame’.

We suggest to the outraged representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine to follow the example of ancient Roman vestal virgins and to carry out around-the-clock duty at the ‘eternal flames’, keeping the fire lit manually by wood. There is no doubt that communists will have no problems with fulfilling this task, because they already have experience of taking care of the Lenin monument in Kyiv and their financing is much better than that which the vestal virgins had.”

While the parties did not provide a copy of the video in question to the Court, it was possible to view it on several publicly available websites. In addition to the factual account from the parties summarised above, the Court notes that the soundtrack to the video was a famous 1974 Soviet song “The battle is going on again” (devoted to the victory of the 1917 revolution and optimism about the future of the communist regime). The video started with the following opening titles: “The St Luke Brotherhood presents”, “Recipe of the day”, “Eternal fried eggs on the eternal flame”. The participants in the performance did not make any public address and their conversation was not audible. They had no posters or other visual aids, apart from the food and cooking utensils. It could be seen on the video that once the applicant had broken the eggs in the frying pan and was about to approach the fire, while her friends held skewers with sausages, the two police officers appeared and the applicant explained something to them and they left. In order to reach the flame the applicant had to step over a sculpture of a wreath of oak leaves and step on the words “Glory to the Unknown Soldier”.

There were several complaints to the police that the action on the video had amounted to desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and called for criminal prosecution.

On 21 December 2010 the police questioned D., one of the women who had participated in the performance. She submitted that she had not known the other members of the group and that she had met them by chance. As they had allegedly explained to her, they had been hungry and had intended to cook food in order to eat it.

On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against D. and three unidentified persons on suspicion of hooliganism.

On 23 December 2010 D. wrote a confession that she had participated in a protest against inappropriate use of natural gas and that she regretted it. She knew only the first names of the other participants.

On 24 December 2010 another criminal case was opened against her and three unidentified persons in respect of the same event, this time on suspicion of desecration of a tomb. It was joined to that opened earlier. Subsequently the charge of hooliganism was dropped.

The police retrieved photos of several persons who might have been involved in the incident from the passport office’s database and showed them to D. She recognised the applicant.

On 5 February 2011 the investigator questioned the applicant’s grandmother and mother, who lived at the address of the applicant’s registered residence. They submitted that they knew nothing about her involvement in the event in question. They also stated that the applicant did not in fact live there and denied knowing her whereabouts or having her contact details. They only knew that she had left for western Ukraine, without further details. The grandmother stated that the applicant had visited her about two weeks earlier. The applicant’s mother had seen her about a week earlier and had received a telephone call from her two days earlier.

On 18 February 2011 the investigator severed the criminal case in respect of the applicant and two unidentified persons on suspicion of desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by a group following a prior conspiracy.

On the same day the applicant was declared wanted by the police.

On 17 March 2011 the investigator applied to the Pecherskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the Pecherskyy Court”) for the applicant’s detention as a preventive measure pending trial. His arguments were as follows: the offence of which the applicant was suspected was punishable by a prison term of more than three years; the applicant had absconded, as a result of which she had been declared wanted by the police; and she could reoffend or hinder the establishment of the truth if at liberty.

On 25 March 2011 a judge of the Pecherskyy Court allowed that application in part: he ordered the applicant’s arrest with a view to bringing her before the court for examination.

On 29 March 2011 at 9 p.m. the applicant was arrested at the flat of a certain Z. in Kyiv. As the latter subsequently stated during her questioning, the applicant had been living there from 25 March 2011 at the request of an acquaintance.

On 31 March 2011 the applicant was questioned as an accused in the presence of her lawyer. While insisting that her only intention had been to protest against the inappropriate use of natural gas, she confessed to the offence and expressed remorse.

On the same day the investigator once again applied to the Pecherskyy Court for the applicant’s detention as a preventive measure. His reasoning was the same as before.

On 31 March and 1 April 2011 two deputies of the Kyiv Regional Council applied to the Pecherskyy Court for the applicant’s release in exchange of their personal guarantee of her adequate procedural behaviour.

On 1 April 2011 the Pecherskyy Court remanded the applicant in custody as a preventive measure pending trial. It noted that she was accused of a serious offence punishable by imprisonment of from three to five years. Furthermore, the judge referred to the fact that the applicant had absconded and had therefore been put on the wanted list. It was also considered that she might hinder establishing the truth if at liberty. In so far as the applicant’s lawyer relied on her positive character references from various sources, the court noted that those could not guarantee her compliance with all the procedural requirements. While having noted that the applicant also relied on the letters of personal guarantee from the people’s deputies, the judge did not further comment on them. It was specified in the ruling that the term of the applicant’s detention was to be calculated from 29 March 2011. Under the applicable legislation, the duration of pre-trial detention was limited to two months, with the possibility of further extensions.

The applicant’s lawyer appealed. He submitted that his client was willing to cooperate with the investigation and that there were no reasons for her detention. It was further pointed out in the appeal that the applicant had been declared wanted by the police on the very same day the criminal case against her had been opened. The lawyer noted that there had not been a single summons sent by the investigation to the applicant’s address prior to her arrest. According to her, she had found out about the charge against her only on the day of her arrest on 29 March 2011. Lastly, the lawyer submitted that the first-instance court had not considered any less intrusive preventive measures as an alternative to detention and that it had left without consideration the people deputies’ letters of guarantee.

On 11 April 2011 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal rejected the above appeal. It noted that the Pecherskyy Court had already duly examined all the arguments raised in it.

On 25 May 2011 the applicant was indicted. On the same day the case was sent to the Pecherskyy Court for trial.

On 10 June 2011 the applicant applied to the court for release under an undertaking not to abscond. She submitted that she enjoyed positive character references, had no criminal record and had cooperated with the investigation. Furthermore, the applicant observed that by that time the investigation had already been completed and could not therefore be hampered. She emphasised that her actions had been nothing else than a protest driven by good motives. Several members of parliament and other prominent figures joined her in that application and expressed their wish to act as her personal guarantors.

On 17 June 2011 the Pecherskyy Court held a preparatory hearing, during which it rejected the applicant’s application for release with reference to the seriousness of the charge against her, “the nature and the circumstances of the offence of which she [was] accused”, as well as the fact that she had been declared wanted by the police. The judge also stated, in general terms, that there were no grounds for the applicant’s release under a personal guarantee.

On 30 June 2011 the applicant applied once again to be released. On the same day the Pecherskyy Court allowed that application and released her under an undertaking not to leave the town.

On 4 October 2012 the Pecherskyy Court found the applicant guilty of the desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, acting as part of a group of persons following a prior conspiracy. The court noted that the applicant had convinced D. and two other people, whose identities remained unestablished, to carry out a performance at the “Eternal Glory” memorial aimed at protesting against the waste of natural gas caused by the burning of the Eternal Flame. D., who was questioned in court, confirmed that account of events. The court also questioned the memorial keeper, who had witnessed the performance from a distance, and the two police officers who had spoken to the applicant and her friends (see paragraph 7 above). Furthermore, the court examined the video-recording of the performance as material evidence.

The judgment mentioned the statement made by the applicant during the hearing that in her opinion people bringing flowers to the memorial did not really understand what exactly it was dedicated to. She insisted that she had not committed any crime as her performance had not been meant to desecrate the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Furthermore, she maintained that there could not be a tomb beneath the Eternal Flame because of the gas pipe.

The Pecherskyy Court held that the applicant’s arguments had no impact on the legal classification of her actions and that they were refuted by the evidence as a whole. The judgment further stated in that regard:

“... the court considers that by committing deliberate acts in a group which showed disrespect for the burial place of the Unknown Soldier and for the public tradition of honouring the memory of soldiers who perished defending or liberating Kyiv and the lands of Ukraine from the fascist hordes, and by subsequently presenting those actions as a protest, [the applicant] has tried to escape social condemnation of her conduct and criminal liability for the offence.”

Relying on local authority documents, the court dismissed the applicant’s submission that there was no established location for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

The court did not discern any aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the case. At the same time, in deciding on the penalty, it took into account, on the one hand, the fact that the applicant did not have a criminal record, that she was working as a political analyst and got positive character references by her place of residence and work. On the other hand, the court noted that the criminal offence in question was of medium gravity and that the applicant did not show any remorse for what she had done. As a result, she was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years.

On the same date the Pecherskyy Court exempted D. from criminal liability under the surety of her employer.

The applicant appealed. Relying on the definition of the desecration of a burial place under the Burial and Funeral Business Act (see paragraph 47 below), she maintained that in the absence of any intention by her to “defile the family or social memory of a deceased or to show contempt for a burial place, or social and religious principles and traditions”, there were no constituent elements of a crime in her actions. The applicant reiterated her argument that her performance had been nothing more than a protest. Lastly, she submitted that the criminal proceedings against her had violated her right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.

The prosecutor also appealed, considering the sentence to be too lenient.

On 18 December 2012 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. It stated that desecration of a tomb could have different expressions, indicating an insulting attitude, mockery or disrespect towards a tomb or the person buried therein, regardless of the stated motives. As regards the applicant’s argument on her right to freedom of expression, the court noted that that right was not unlimited and that the restriction in the applicant’s case was in accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim. The appellate court also rejected the prosecutor’s appeal.

The applicant further reiterated her arguments in an appeal on points of law lodged by her, which was, however, rejected by the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters on 11 April 2013.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Administrative proceedings;Article 6-1 - Impartial tribunal;Independent tribunal);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)

André Potocki;Angelika Nußberger;Carlo Ranzoni;Erik Møse;Ganna Yudkivska;Mārtiņš Mits;Yonko Grozev

The applicants were domestic court judges. Proceedings were brought against them, resulting in their dismissal from the post of judge. The facts giving rise to their dismissals were established by the High Council of Justice (Вища рада юстиції, hereinafter “the HCJ”). The HCJ’s decisions were submitted to Parliament or to the President of Ukraine (depending on which of those authorities had appointed the applicants to the post of judge) for the final decisions on their dismissals.

The applicants further unsuccessfully challenged their dismissals before the Higher Administrative Court (“the HAC”) or other courts.

On 4 February 2004 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had ignored the instructions given to him by the chairman and deputy chairman of his court. In addition, the applicant had unlawfully instituted criminal proceedings against the chairman of the court. The HCJ further noted that the applicant had disregarded the internal rules of the court, his professional competence had not improved and he had had communication difficulties with colleagues from the court. It rejected the applicant’s contentions that the dismissal proposal had not been based on the real facts and that the chairman of the court had been biased against him and had interfered with the applicant’s professional activity. The HCJ concluded that the applicant had not fairly and duly performed his duties and had to be dismissed.

On 22 May 2008 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision concerning his dismissal before the courts.

On 13 July 2007 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated.

On 26 October 2010 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.

On 2 November 2010 the applicant unsuccessfully applied to the court of appeal for a copy of the decision of 26 October 2010.

On 17 and 19 November 2010 the applicant lodged cassation appeals against that decision with the HAC. He was not informed about the outcome of the proceedings before the HAC.

On 22 April 2009 the applicant challenged the parliamentary resolution of 22 May 2008 before the Kyiv Administrative Court.

On 13 October 2009 the court suspended the proceedings pending the outcome of the proceedings concerning the lawfulness of the HCJ’s decision.

On 16 August 2012 the court decided to leave the applicant’s claim without consideration on the merits.

On 7 June 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to the President of Ukraine to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant, acting as a first-instance judge, had disregarded the rules governing territorial jurisdiction in a case concerning a labour dispute in a State company. It further found that he had violated the rules governing the interim measures in that case. Substantial damage to the State had been caused as a result of the interim measure ordered.

On 6 July 2010 the President of Ukraine issued a decree dismissing the applicant from the post of judge on grounds of “breach of oath”.

The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decision and the Presidential decree concerning his dismissal.

On 28 July 2010 the HAC upheld the factual findings and legal assessments of the HCJ in the applicant’s case and dismissed the claims as unsubstantiated.

On 17 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It adopted two decisions on making submissions to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had systematically made procedural mistakes when administering justice, had adopted decisions in breach of domestic law and had wrongly applied interim measures. The HCJ also considered that the applicant had incurred expenses which were manifestly incommensurate with his official income. The HCJ concluded that the facts of the case suggested that the applicant had dishonoured the judicial profession and cast doubt on his objectivity and impartiality. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated.

On 3 June 2010 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decisions and the parliamentary resolution concerning his dismissal.

On 13 August 2010 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated.

On 11 June 2009 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted several unlawful and unsubstantiated decisions and had failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated.

On 3 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant instituted proceedings against Parliament challenging his dismissal before the HAC. In his claim he also argued that the conclusions of the HCJ were unfounded and unlawful; there had been violations in the proceedings before the HCJ. The HCJ joined the proceedings as a third party.

On 18 August 2010 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. It found that the HCJ’s conclusions were well-founded and that the decisions of the HCJ and Parliament were lawful.

On 26 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It adopted three decisions on making submissions to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted a number of unlawful and unsubstantiated decisions and that she had failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice. The HCJ considered that the applicant’s procedural mistakes had dishonoured the judicial profession, cast doubt on her objectivity and impartiality, and suggested that she had to be dismissed. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated.

On 17 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging one of the HCJ’s decisions of 26 May 2010 and the parliamentary resolution concerning her dismissal.

On 23 September 2010 the HAC considered the case. It found that the HCJ’s decision was lawful and substantiated. As to the other two decisions taken on the same day by the HCJ, the HAC noted that the applicant had not challenged them. The HAC concluded that there were no grounds to examine the lawfulness of the HCJ’s other decisions. The HAC further found that the applicant’s right to participate in the plenary session of Parliament had not been respected and declared the parliamentary resolution in respect of the applicant unlawful.

On 23 December 2010 Parliament once again voted for the dismissal of the applicant (on the basis of the HCJ’s decisions of 26 May 2010) and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the second resolution of Parliament.

On 31 May 2011 the HAC rejected the claim as unsubstantiated. It found that the procedure for the applicant’s dismissal in Parliament and the resolution to that effect were lawful.

On 7 June 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to the President of Ukraine to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had wrongly applied an interim measure in a case where the Ministry of Justice had been the defendant. It concluded that the violation had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality, and suggested that he had not duly performed his duties and had dishonoured the judicial profession.

On 18 June 2010 the applicant was dismissed by decree of the President of Ukraine.

The applicant challenged his dismissal before the HAC.

On 27 January 2011 the HAC found that the HCJ’s decision was unlawful. It then noted that the applicant had not sought to have the presidential decree concerning his dismissal “declared unlawful” but had sought the “quashing” of that decree. However, such a measure was outside the competence of the HAC. In that regard the HAC referred to Article 11 of the Code of Administrative Justice (“the CAJ”) considering that it was prevented by that provision from examining the case beyond the scope of the claims.

On 18 March 2014 the Acting President of Ukraine reversed the Presidential decree of 18 June 2010 concerning the applicant’s dismissal, having regard to the HAC’s decision of 27 June 2011.

On 19 March 2014 the applicant resumed his office of judge.

On 6 December 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It adopted two decisions on making submissions to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had violated procedural rules when administering justice and that he had interfered with the activities of the law-enforcement authorities when they carried out a search operation. Those violations had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality, and suggested that he had not performed his duties properly. The HCJ rejected the applicant’s contentions challenging the dismissal proposal.

On 23 December 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant challenged the decisions of the HCJ and Parliament concerning his dismissal before the HAC.

On 6 April 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. According to the applicant, on that day the HAC delivered only the introductory and operative parts of the decision.

On 5 May 2011 the HAC dispatched a copy of the full text of the decision to the applicant. Allegedly, the applicant received that letter on 7 May 2011.

On 1 March 2011 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted several unlawful and unfounded decisions, had wrongly applied an interim measure, and had committed procedural errors when administering justice. The HCJ considered that those violations had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity, impartiality and independence; they also suggested that she had ignored requirements of domestic law and had failed to perform her duties properly. The HCJ rejected objections raised by the applicant as unfounded.

The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision before the HAC.

On 2 June 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated.

On 7 July 2011 a draft parliamentary resolution concerning the applicant’s dismissal was not adopted by a majority vote in Parliament.

On 3 November 2011 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect.

On 17 May 2012 the HAC rejected as unfounded the applicant’s claim against the HCJ and Parliament concerning her dismissal, noting in particular that the HCJ decision of 1 March 2011 had been earlier reviewed by the HAC. The HAC further found no violations in the parliamentary procedure for the applicant’s dismissal.

On 26 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had participated, as a presiding judge, in the consideration of a case in which Judge V., a relative of his, had been a third party. The consideration of that case had resulted in a wrong decision, which had been quashed by a higher court. The HCJ further noted that the applicant had concealed the fact that he and Judge V. were related. The HCJ considered that those facts had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality; they suggested that he had dishonoured the judicial profession, neglected the ethical rules of judicial conduct, and failed to carry out his duties properly. The HCJ rejected objections raised by the applicant as unfounded.

On 17 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the resolution of Parliament and arguing that the conclusions of the HCJ were unfounded and unlawful.

On 15 September 2010 the HAC considered the case. It noted that the applicant had not challenged the HCJ’s decision as such; nor had he indicated the HCJ as a party to the proceedings. The HAC concluded that there were no grounds to examine the lawfulness of the HCJ’s decision in respect of the applicant. It further found that the applicant’s right to participate in the parliamentary procedure had not been respected and declared the parliamentary resolution concerning the applicant unlawful.

On 23 December 2010 Parliament once again voted for the dismissal of the applicant (on the basis of the HCJ’s decision of 26 May 2010) and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC, challenging the second resolution of Parliament. He claimed that the conclusions of the HCJ were unfounded and unlawful, and that there had been violations in the proceedings before the HCJ. He requested that the HCJ be admitted to the case as a third party.

On 5 July 2011 the HAC considered the case and rejected the claim as unsubstantiated. It noted that the applicant had not challenged the HCJ’s decision as such and found that there were no grounds to review its findings. The HAC further found that the procedure for the applicant’s dismissal in Parliament and the resolution to that effect were lawful.

On 6 December 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had wrongly applied domestic law in land and administrative cases and had not followed procedural rules when dealing with those cases. It concluded that those violations had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality; they suggested that he had failed to carry out his duties properly and had dishonoured the judicial profession. Objections raised by the applicant were dismissed as unfounded.

On 21 April 2011 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.

On 19 May 2011 the applicant applied to the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decision and the parliamentary resolution concerning his dismissal. He also claimed that he had missed the deadline for challenging the HCJ decision because of the serious illness of his child.

On 21 June 2011 the HAC left the applicant’s claim against the HCJ without consideration, finding that the applicant had missed the deadline for challenging the HCJ decision without a valid reason.

On 21 July 2011 the HAC dismissed the applicant’s claim against the parliamentary resolution as unsubstantiated. It noted in particular that the applicant had been informed of the plenary meeting of Parliament and that his failure to appear did not give grounds for declaring the parliamentary resolution unlawful.

On 26 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ found that the applicant had failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice in a corporate dispute and had adopted an unlawful decision in that case. It considered that those violations suggested that the applicant had dishonoured the judicial profession and had not acted diligently and impartially. Objections raised by the applicant were dismissed as unfounded.

The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decision and the resolution of Parliament.

On 18 August 2010 the HAC found that the decision of the HCJ was lawful. As to the proceedings in Parliament, the HAC found that the applicant’s right to participate in the parliamentary procedure had not been respected and declared the parliamentary resolution in respect of the applicant unlawful.

The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the second resolution of Parliament. At the applicant’s request, the HCJ joined the case as a third party.

On 28 September 2011 the HAC considered the case and rejected the claim as unfounded. It noted that the HCJ’s decision of 26 May 2010 had been earlier reviewed by the HAC. It then found that the procedure for the applicant’s dismissal in Parliament and the resolution to that effect were lawful.

On 14 June 2011 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted several unlawful decisions and had committed procedural errors when administering justice. It considered that his errors had cast doubt on his objectivity, impartiality and independence, and suggested that he had not performed his duties properly.

On 22 September 2011 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.

On 4 October 2011 the HAC dismissed a claim brought by the applicant concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the HCJ decision.

On 21 February 2007 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have her dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had wrongly applied an interim measure in a corporate dispute by which she had groundlessly interfered with the economic activities of a company; she had also failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice in that case. The HCJ found that those violations suggested that the applicant had not acted lawfully, impartially and independently. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated.

On 5 June 2008 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant challenged her dismissal before the Vinnytsya Administrative Court, arguing that the HCJ and Parliament had acted unlawfully.

On 28 November 2008 that court rejected the applicant’s claim as unfounded.

On 16 December 2009 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant.

On 6 March 2012 the HAC dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant.

On 24 January 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had on several occasions taken leave without obtaining the relevant approval from the court administration; he had failed to appear in the office without valid reasons; he had prevented his judicial assistant from performing his functions; he had refused to take cases for consideration; and he had not complied with the requirement to submit income-tax declarations. Having regard to those facts, the HCJ found that the applicant had neglected his professional duties, dishonoured the judicial profession and had to be dismissed.

On 12 April 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.

Between February and August 2012 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decision. By several decisions the HAC refused to open proceedings, noting that the applicant had failed to prepare and submit his claim in accordance with the requirements of the CAJ.

The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the parliamentary resolution on his dismissal.

On 5 June 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated.

On 24 January 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had on several occasions taken leave without obtaining the relevant approval from the court administration; he had failed to appear in the office without valid reason; he had refused to take cases for consideration; he had delayed the examination of criminal cases; he had prevented his judicial assistant from performing his functions; and he had not complied with the requirement to submit income-tax declarations. Having regard to those facts, the HCJ found that the applicant had neglected his professional duties, dishonoured the judicial profession and had to be dismissed.

Between February and August 2012 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings in the HAC, challenging the HCJ’s decision. By several decisions the HAC refused to open proceedings, noting that the applicant had failed to prepare and submit his claim in accordance with the requirements of the CAJ.

On 27 June 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated.

On 24 January 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had on several occasions taken leave without obtaining the relevant approval from the court administration; he had failed to appear in the office without valid reason; he had refused to take cases for consideration; he had shown disrespect to the officers of the court registry; and he had not complied with the requirement to submit income-tax declarations. Having regard to those facts, the HCJ found that the applicant had neglected his professional duties, dishonoured the judicial profession and had to be dismissed.

Between February and October 2012 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings in the HAC, challenging the HCJ’s decision. By several decisions the HAC refused to open proceedings, noting that the applicant had failed to prepare and submit his claim in accordance with the requirements of the CAJ.

On 20 September 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated.

On 29 May 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ found that the applicant had committed numerous procedural errors when reviewing, under newly discovered circumstances, a case involving local authorities. The HCJ considered that the errors had been committed intentionally; they cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality and called for his dismissal. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated.

The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC, challenging the HCJ’s decision.

On 21 June 2012 a draft parliamentary resolution concerning the applicant’s dismissal was not adopted by a majority vote.

On 4 July 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim against the HCJ as unsubstantiated. According to the applicant, he received the full text of the decision between 24 and 26 July 2012.

On 5 July 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.

The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the resolution of Parliament.

On 4 September 2012 the HAC considered the case and rejected the claim as unfounded. It noted that the HCJ’s decision of 29 May 2012 had been earlier reviewed by the HAC. It further found that the parliamentary procedure for the applicant’s dismissal and the resolution to that effect were lawful.

On 16 October 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have her dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant, as a member of a panel of judges, had participated in the consideration of a criminal case and the adoption of the judgment in that case. Subsequently, that judgment had been partly quashed by a higher court on the grounds that it was unsubstantiated and the sentence was too lenient. The HCJ considered that the first-instance court’s judgment had had negative consequences: it had caused discontent in society, since the criminal case had been widely discussed in the media. The HCJ concluded that the applicant had disregarded the requirements of procedural law, had not acted diligently and impartially when considering the criminal case and had to be dismissed. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unfounded.

The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the HCJ’s decision.

On 28 February 2013 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. It noted, among other things, that the HCJ had repeatedly postponed the hearings due to the applicant’s failure to appear and had properly informed the applicant of the hearings.

On 23 May 2013 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings and of the lack of any effective remedy in domestic law.


Violation of Article 6+6-3-d - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-d - Examination of witnesses)

Egidijus Kūris;Ganna Yudkivska;Iulia Motoc;Marko Bošnjak;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kharkiv.

At the time of the events she worked as a passport registration officer (паспортист) in one of the municipal housing and public utilities’ offices (КПЖРЕП) in Kharkiv.

On 6 February 2004 a certain M. went to the passport registration office where the applicant worked to apply for a passport for her son, who had reached the age of sixteen. As M. subsequently mentioned to the police (see paragraphs 13 and 17 below), she had already applied to the applicant in the past. According to M., when she was waiting in the queue, she heard people saying that the applicant was known for taking bribes and that her “usual rate” was 100 United States dollars (USD). Given the considerable number of visitors, M. could not get an appointment that day. She waited for the applicant in the corridor after work and explained the situation to her. The applicant allegedly told M. that it might be time-consuming to settle the matter, in particular because of the fact that M.’s son had been born in Russia and his original birth certificate was not available. However, according to M., the applicant agreed to help her to speed up the procedure with the higher authority, where she would need to pay USD 100 to the official in charge.

According to the applicant’s version of events, she did indeed have a late visitor in the corridor that day, whom she advised to come back during working hours, with no further exchange taking place.

On 7 February 2004 M. made a written statement to the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Police that the applicant had asked for a bribe of USD 100 to speed up the passport issuance procedure. M. confirmed that she was aware of the criminal liability for knowingly making a false report about a crime. According to the police records, the above statement was made at 5 p.m. However, as subsequently established (see paragraph 59 below), that was an error and the actual time of the statement was about 10 a.m.

M. provided the police with a banknote of USD 100, two banknotes of USD 20 and one of USD 10. A detective officer put a special luminescent fluid on the banknotes and returned them to M. That act took place in the presence of two attesting witnesses and was documented in a report. It is not known why it was decided to mark the additional banknotes, not only the USD 100 note.

At about 1 p.m. on the same day M. entered the applicant’s office and emerged a few minutes later, indicating to the investigator and the attesting witnesses that she had given the USD 100 banknote to the applicant. As it was the end of the working day, the applicant locked her office and began to leave. However, the investigator stopped her and suggested she return to her office, which they did together in the presence of the two attesting witnesses. The investigator asked the applicant whether she had received any money from M. She stated that she had and took the banknote from her purse. The police officer then checked the applicant’s hands with a special device and found traces of the luminescent liquid. They were wiped off with cotton pads, which were then packed and sealed as material evidence. Such traces were also found on the banknote of USD 100 in the applicant’s purse and on the purse itself. Lastly, several passports and other papers with various banknotes inserted, varying from two Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (equivalent to about 0.28 euros (EUR) at the time) to UAH 50 (equal to about EUR 7), were found in the applicant’s bag and were seized. The investigator drew up an inspection and seizure report. The serial number of the USD 100 banknote seized from the applicant, as indicated in the report, differed by one letter (out of eleven characters) from the one noted in the report on marking the bill with the luminescent fluid drawn up earlier that day (see paragraph 10 above).

The applicant wrote an explanation, stating that she had indeed taken USD 100 from M., which she had intended to pay to an unspecified official at the local passport registration authority with a view to speeding up the issuance of the passport for M.’s son. The applicant also stated that she had voluntarily complied with the police’s request to give them the banknote in question. She noted that she had studied the inspection and seizure report and that she agreed with its contents. Lastly, she stated that she had no complaints against the police and that she regretted her actions.

Also on 7 February 2004, following the police operation, the investigator collected “explanations” from M. and the attesting witnesses. M. supplemented her initial statement to the police with further factual details (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). Both attesting witnesses described the police operation which they had observed, as summarised in paragraphs 10 and 11 above.

On 10 February 2004, during her questioning by the investigator, the applicant changed her account of the events as follows. On 7 February 2004, when she had been about to leave work at 1 p.m., M. had entered the office. She had brought some documents in order to get a passport for her son. The applicant had informed her that certain documents were missing. The applicant had also clarified that she would be working in a different office from Monday, 9 February 2004. While collecting her papers and belongings before leaving, the applicant had noticed that M. had thrown something on the table and had run out of the office. The applicant had seen that it was a USD 100 banknote. She had taken it and had tried to get an explanation from M. However, she had already left. When the applicant had looked out into the corridor, she had only seen a man waiting there. It was T., one of the attesting witnesses. Given that different people would be working in the office on the following working day and because she knew her manager was away, the applicant had decided to keep the banknote in order to return it to M. later.

Furthermore, the applicant explained that her initial statement (see paragraph 12 above) had been made in a state of shock and had not been truthful. Allegedly, the investigator had dictated the statement to her.

On 11 February 2004 a criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of incitement to bribery.

On the same date M. gave written explanations to the Kyiv District Prosecutor’s Office with her account of the events, which was the same as before (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above).

On 16 February 2004 the applicant expressed a wish to be represented by the lawyer Zh. and the latter was admitted to the proceedings. When questioned in her lawyer’s presence on the same day, the applicant admitted that on 7 February 2004 she had hinted to M. that the examination of her application was likely to take time and that the applicant would be prepared to speed up the procedure before the higher authority, which she had not intended to do in reality. However, she had seen M. putting a USD 100 banknote on the table and had decided to take advantage of the situation given her own financial difficulties. She explained the difference between her latest account and her earlier submissions by shock and stress, and expressed remorse for what had happened.

On the same date, 16 February 2004, M. was also questioned. As indicated in the report of the questioning, she was registered as living in Kharkiv.

On 26 February 2004 an expert report established that the traces of luminescent liquid on the USD 100 banknote and on the applicant’s hands were the same.

On 28 February 2004 fraud was added to the charges against the applicant, given that she had promised to M. to act as an intermediary in bribing a higher-level official, whereas in reality she had meant to keep the money for herself.

On 28 February 2004 formal charges were brought against the applicant and her status changed from being a suspect to an accused.

On the same day the applicant changed her lawyer. When questioned that day in the presence of her new lawyer (K.), she returned to the account of events she had given on 10 February 2004 (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). She submitted that she had stated differently in the presence of her previous lawyer (see paragraph 18 above) because she had “considered it useless to prove [her] case and feared that nobody would believe [her]”.

On the same day the investigator returned the USD 100 banknote to M., who wrote a receipt in confirmation. She also undertook to keep the banknote until the end of the proceedings.

On 29 February 2004 the Kyivskyy District Prosecutor’s Office approved the bill of indictment against the applicant. It contained the following list of persons to be summoned to court: the applicant, the victim (M.) and the two attesting witnesses (G. and T.).

On 10 November 2004 the Kyivskyy Court dropped the charge of incitement to bribery. It also ruled to relieve the applicant of criminal liability in respect of the fraud charge and terminated proceedings on that point on the grounds that she was not a danger to society (see paragraph 60 below).

The applicant appealed, seeking the termination of the criminal proceedings against her owing to the absence of the constituent elements of a crime in her actions. She denied asking for or receiving any money from M. and maintained that the latter had simply thrown the banknote on her table. Overall, the applicant considered “everything that had happened to [her] as a provocation on the part of the law-enforcement authorities”. She also complained that she had not been able to cross-examine M.

On 14 April 2005 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the above decision. It held that the first-instance court had not been entitled to terminate the proceedings in the way it had done without the applicant’s consent. The appellate court also noted that the applicant’s argument about her inability to cross-examine M. had not been examined. The case was remitted to the same first-instance court for fresh examination by a different panel.

The Kyivskyy Court adjourned hearings in the case several times owing to the absence of M. and the two attesting witnesses. On 18 July 2005 it decided that it was impossible to complete its judicial investigation in their absence and ordered the police to ensure their attendance.

The police found out that M. had sold her house in Kharkiv on an unspecified date in 2004 and had moved to Russia, with her new address being unknown. G. had moved to a different city in Ukraine, but eventually attended one of the hearings. The other attesting witness, T., was always away from home when visited by the police and his neighbours had not seen him for some time. Eventually, the police located him and on 14 October 2005 he made a written statement that he would appear at a hearing scheduled for 17 October 2005 (with no further details available).

As stated in a note issued by a clerk of the Kyivskyy Court on 17 October 2005, the hearing scheduled for that day was postponed to 6 December 2005 given the judges’ involvement in a different case. It is not known whether there was a hearing on 6 December 2005. It is an established fact, however, that T. did not attend any of the hearings.

In January 2006 the applicant enquired with the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Military Enlistment Office as to whether M.’s son was registered there. On 24 January 2006 she received a reply that he had appeared before that office in April and May 2005, and that the army conscription commission had found him unfit for military service in peacetime by a decision of 6 May 2005. The son had not changed the place of his military registration. The applicant brought the above information to the knowledge of the trial court dealing with her case.

On 26 January 2006 the Kyivskyy Court once again ordered the police to ensure the presence of M. and the two attesting witnesses at the trial.

On 8 February 2006 it decided to continue the examination of the case in the absence of M. as it appeared impossible to establish her whereabouts. In reaching that conclusion, the court referred to the fact that she was no longer registered as being resident in the Kharkiv region and that the police had information that she had emigrated to Russia. By the same ruling, the Kyivskyy Court ordered the prosecution authorities to ensure the mandatory presence of T.

On 16 February 2006 the Kyivskyy Court found the applicant guilty of fraud and incitement to bribery and sentenced her to a fine of UAH 5,000 (then equivalent to EUR 830). Although the applicant pleaded innocent, the court considered her guilt to be proved by the totality of the evidence. It relied on the statements of M., the aggrieved party, made during the pretrial investigation, and those of the attesting witnesses, made by G. before the court and by T. during the pre-trial investigation. The court stated that it had “no grounds for questioning the credibility of the aggrieved party and the witnesses whose statements [were] corroborated by other objective [...] evidence”. The trial court also relied on the inspection and seizure report of 7 February 2004 (see paragraph 11 above) and the forensic expert examination report of 26 February 2004 (see paragraph 20 above). The verdict noted that the applicant had initially confessed to the offences, but had later retracted her confession for no apparent reason other than an attempt to escape liability. Her initial statement was considered, however, more plausible.

On 3 March 2006 the applicant appealed and on 25 April 2006 she submitted further “written explanations to [her] appeal”. She complained, in particular, that her conviction had been based mainly on the statements of M., who had never appeared before the court and whom the applicant had never been able to cross-examine. She argued that the first-instance court had not shown due diligence in finding and summoning M. The applicant also complained that the Kyivskyy Court had wrongly relied on her initial confession, which had been dictated to her by the police before the institution of criminal proceedings against her.

The applicant did not refer in her appeal or in its supplement to her inability to examine T. or to have him examined. At the same time, on 7 April 2006, she lodged a written application to the appellate court to summon T. given that he “was an attesting witness” and that he “had made statements against [the applicant]”.

On 25 April 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 16 February 2006. It considered that the applicant had initially made a confession of her own free will and that she had failed to give any convincing explanation about her subsequent change in position. Furthermore, the appellate court noted that the whereabouts of M. and T. could not be established. There were no reasons to question the veracity of the statements they had made during the pre-trial investigation. Nor were there any reasons to suspect any intention by them to falsely accuse the applicant. In sum, the appellate court did not discern any procedural flaws which warranted quashing the verdict.

The applicant appealed on points of law. She argued that the covert operation of 7 February 2004 had been unlawful because it had not been duly authorised and had taken place in the absence of any criminal proceedings against her, even prior to the formal registration of M.’s statement. The applicant also complained that her rights under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention had been breached on account of her inability to cross-examine M. and T.

On 18 October 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the lower courts’ decisions. Its general conclusion was that no violations of the law of criminal procedure had been established.

On 27 March 2009 the Kyivskyy Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case against the applicant for a failure to comply with the judgment of 16 February 2006 (see paragraph 35 above and paragraph 61 below).

On 10 November 2009 the applicant was placed under an undertaking not to leave her town of residence as a preventive measure pending trial.

In the absence of any formal charges against her, the preventive measure ceased to apply ten days later, on 20 November 2009 (see paragraph 62 below), a fact of which the applicant was not aware. It is not known if there was any formal decision lifting the measure in question.

On 7 December 2009 the criminal proceedings were terminated for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in the applicant’s actions. On 11 December 2009 that decision was quashed and the case was returned for additional investigation. The case file does not contain any documents regarding the preventive measure then applicable to the applicant, if any.

On 12, 15 and 18 June 2012 the applicant, who considered herself still bound by the undertaking not to leave her town of residence of 10 November 2009, requested leave to travel outside the Kharkiv region from the investigator. On 22 June 2012 the investigator sent her a letter stating that her request could not be granted because she had not provided any address or other details about the planned trip.

On 5 July 2012 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued again. However, two days later the investigation was resumed.

On 12 October 2012 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in her actions. It was concluded that she had not evaded paying the fine, but that it had been impossible for her to do so given her low income. By the same ruling, the preventive measure in respect of the applicant was lifted, without further details.

On 20 November 2012 a new Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) entered into force. Instead of opening a criminal case, it provided for the initiation of an investigation by way of making an entry in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations.

On 22 March 2013 a criminal investigation into the applicant’s failure to comply with the judgment of 16 February 2006 was launched again and was registered in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations. On an unspecified date the proceedings were discontinued. On 8 April 2013 they were, however, resumed.

On 5 June 2013 those proceedings were discontinued once again on the grounds that there were no constituent elements of a crime in the applicant’s actions. The case file contains no information about any further developments.

On 26 February 2013 the applicant lodged a claim against the State Treasury, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of her allegedly unlawful criminal prosecution from 27 March 2009 to 12 October 2012. She enclosed copies of the two rulings of those dates, by which the investigator had opened and had discontinued the criminal proceedings against her. The applicant also mentioned, in general terms, that she had been unlawfully placed under an undertaking not to leave her town, without further details.

The prosecutor submitted objections. He stated that on 20 November 2009 the investigator dealing with the applicant’s case had revoked the impugned preventive measure, given that no charges had been brought against her within ten days of 10 November 2009 (see paragraphs 43 above and 62 below). The prosecutor also noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been reopened on 8 April 2013 (see paragraph 49 above) and remained pending.

On 17 May 2013 the Kyivskyy Court rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. As regards her undertaking not to leave the town, the court concluded that it had only been applicable from 10 to 20 November 2009.

The applicant appealed. She submitted, in particular, that “the [firstinstance] court had not given any legal assessment to the fact that the criminal proceedings against [her] had been instituted on 27 March 2009 and discontinued on 12 October 2012, and that all that time [she] had been under an undertaking not to abscond, which had been lifted by the ruling on the termination of the criminal proceedings of 12 October 2012, that being confirmed by [the investigator’s] letter of 22 June 2012” (see paragraph 45 above). The applicant indicated in brackets the page number of the letter concerned in the case file. She further argued, in general terms, that the court had incorrectly interpreted Article 1176 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 63 below) and that it had not calculated, as prescribed under the Compensation Act (see paragraph 64 below), an amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage to which she was entitled. The applicant did not enclose any documents with her appeal.

On 18 June 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Kyivskyy Court. It noted that the sole fact that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been discontinued did not imply that she had suffered non-pecuniary damage and she had failed to prove otherwise. The appellate court further observed that the applicant “[had] not proved when exactly she had been placed under the undertaking not to leave the town as a preventive measure. Therefore, her submission that she had been restrained in her liberty of movement for more than three years [could] not be taken into consideration”.

The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, in which she indicated, in particular, that the applicability of the undertaking not to leave the town from 10 November 2009 to 12 October 2012 had been established by documents. She reiterated her earlier argument that no assessment had been given to the investigator’s refusals of her requests for leave to travel outside the Kharkiv region in June 2012. This time the applicant enclosed a copy of the letter referred to.

On 22 July 2013 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law.

On 17 April 2006 the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers involved in the undercover operation of 7 February 2004. Her main argument was that M.’s complaint had been registered only at about 5 p.m. that day, which had been after the completion of the police operation and thus had undermined its lawfulness.

The prosecution authorities refused to open a criminal case against the police on several occasions. It was established that M.’s complaint had indeed been registered, by mistake, at 5 p.m. instead of 10 a.m. on 7 February 2004, for which the respective officer had been reprimanded. However, there was no indication of a criminal offence.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention. Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention.


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Sofia.

The applicant’s father owned a house with a yard and a garage in Sofia.

Pursuant to a decision of the mayor issued on 27 July 1978, the property was expropriated for the purposes of constructing a residential building. The order, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act (Закон за териториалното и селищно устройство – “the TUPA”), provided that the applicant’s father was to be compensated with a two-room flat and a garage in a building which the municipality planned to construct.

In a supplementary decision of 19 February 1979, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor specified the exact location, size and other details in respect of the flat to be provided by way of compensation. As no mention was made of a garage, the applicant’s father applied for judicial review of that decision. In a final judgment of 21 June 1979 the Sofia City Court found in his favour and referred the case back to the administrative authorities with instructions to specify the exact garage to be provided as compensation.

In 1982 the flat in question was constructed and handed over to the applicant’s father.

After 1992 the applicant’s father filed numerous requests with the municipal authorities asking them to specify the exact garage to be given to him. By a letter of 12 January 2008 the chief architect of Sofia informed him that no buildings with garages earmarked for the purpose of compensation were being constructed at the moment.

In 2008 the applicant’s father brought an action for damages under the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (Закон за отговорността на държавата и общините за вреди) for unlawful failure on the part of the Sofia municipality to fulfill its obligations to build and provide him with a garage. The action was dismissed in a final judgment of 21 June 2011 of the Supreme Administrative Court, on the grounds that no unlawful failure to act on the part of the authorities had been established.

In the meantime, on 7 April 2008 the applicant’s father passed away. The applicant is his only heir.


Violation of Article 14+P1-1 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property);Reopening of case (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Georges Ravarani;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Samobor.

The applicant owned a flat in Zagreb situated on the third floor of a residential building, where he lived with his wife and two children.

In 2003, three years after he had bought the flat, the applicant’s wife gave birth to their third child. The child was born with multiple physical and mental disabilities.

After the birth the child underwent a number of medical treatments and his condition was under the constant supervision of the competent social care services. In April 2008 an expert commission diagnosed him with incurable cerebral palsy, grave mental retardation and epilepsy. In September 2008 the social services declared the child 100% disabled.

In the meantime, in September 2006, the applicant bought a house in Samobor, and in October 2008 he sold his flat. According to the applicant, the reason for buying a house was the fact that the building in which his flat was situated had no lift and for that reason did not meet the needs of his disabled child and his family. In particular, it was very difficult to take his son out of the flat to see a doctor, or to take him for physiotherapy and to kindergarten or school, and to meet his other social needs.

On 19 October 2006, after he had bought the house in Samobor, the applicant submitted a tax exemption request to the tax authorities. He relied on section 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act, which provided for the possibility of tax exemption for a person who was buying a flat or a house in order to solve his or her housing needs, if he or she, or his or her family members, did not have another flat or house meeting their housing needs (see paragraph 24 below). In his request the applicant argued that the flat which he owned did not meet the housing needs of his family since it was very difficult, and in fact becoming impossible, to take his disabled child out of the flat from the third floor without a lift, given that he was in a wheelchair. The applicant therefore submitted that he had bought the house in order to cater for his son’s needs.

On 6 May 2009 the Samobor Tax Office (Ministarstvo Financija – Porezna uprava, Područni ured Zagreb, Ispostava Samobor) dismissed the applicant’s request, giving the following reasons:

“Section 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act ... provides for tax exemption for citizens who are buying their first real property in order to meet their housing needs, under conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied, including the requirement that the taxpayer in question, or his or her family members, do not have another flat or a house meeting their housing needs. During the proceedings it was established that the taxpayer Joško Guberina had owned a flat measuring 114,49 square metres, in Zagreb ..., which he had sold on 25 November 2008 to ... Given that the surface of that real property, and in view of the number of the taxpayer’s immediate family members (five), satisfied the housing needs of the taxpayer and his immediate family, within the meaning of section 11(9.3) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act, and given that it satisfied all housing needs in terms of hygiene and technical requirements as well as the basic infrastructure (electricity, water and [access to] other public utilities), under section 11(9.5) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act, the taxpayer does not meet the cumulative conditions provided under section 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act. It was therefore decided as noted in the operative part [of the decision].”

The Samobor Tax Office ordered the applicant to pay 83,594.25 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately EUR 11,250) in tax.

The applicant appealed against the above decision to the Finance Ministry (Ministarstvo Financija, Samostalna služba za drugostupanjski upravni postupak; hereafter, “the Ministry”), and on 6 July 2009 the Ministry dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Samobor Tax Office. The relevant part of the decision reads:

“Section 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act (Official Gazette, nos. 69/07-153/02) provides for tax exemption for citizens who are buying their first real property in order to meet their housing needs. It further lays down conditions which the citizen must meet in order to demonstrate that he or she is buying his or her first real property in order to meet his or her housing needs. In this connection, one of the conditions laid down under indent 9.5 is that the citizen and the members of his or her immediate family must not have another real property (flat or house) meeting their housing needs; and indent 9.6 also provides that the citizen and the members of his or her immediate family must not own a flat, a holiday house, or property of a significant value (other property of a significant value can include a piece of land where construction is allowed) or a business premises where the citizen or his or her immediate family members do not exercise a registered [business] activity, whereby the value of the real property is similar to that of the real property (flat or house) which the citizen is purchasing.

Given the rationale of the cited provisions and the facts of the case as established beyond doubt during the proceedings, [the Ministry] considers that the first-instance authority was justified in rejecting the appellant’s request for tax exemption ... The right to tax exemption exists if the citizen, or his or her immediate family members, at the time of purchase [of the real property], do not own, or did not own, another real property meeting their housing needs or a flat, a holiday house or other real property of a significant value. As this is not the situation in the present case, given that the appellant, at the time of purchase [of the house], owned a flat in Zagreb ... larger than the real property he was buying and in respect of which he sought tax exemption, it cannot be said that by buying the house the appellant was purchasing his first real property in order to meet his housing needs.”

On 7 September 2009 the applicant lodged an administrative action with the High Administrative Court (Visoki upravni sud Republike Hrvatske), arguing that in their decisions the lower bodies had ignored his specific family situation and, in particular, his child’s disability and therefore the housing needs of his family. In the applicant’s view, it was necessary to recognise that in his particular case the availability of a lift in the building was an infrastructural requirement on the same level as access to water and electricity in general. He also emphasised that the house was the first real property in respect of which he had sought a real property transfer tax exemption.

On 21 March 2012 the High Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s administrative action as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower administrative bodies. The relevant part of the judgment reads:

“Given that the surface area of the flat [which the applicant owned] satisfied the needs of five members of the plaintiff’s family (provision 9.3) and that the flat at issue was equipped with the basic infrastructure and hygiene and technical requirements, the defendant correctly concluded that the plaintiff, in the given case, did not meet the conditions for a tax exemption set out in section 11(9) of the Real Property Transfer Tax Act.

The arguments regarding the administrative action are ineffective in changing the decision in this administrative matter, and therefore the court considers that the impugned decision did not breach the law to the plaintiff’s detriment.”

On 25 May 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) relying on Article 14 of the Constitution, contending, inter alia, that, given the specific accommodation needs of his family due to his child’s disability, he had been discriminated against by unfair application of the relevant tax legislation. He argued, in particular, that the competent administrative authorities had failed to correct the factual inequality inherent in his particular situation with regard to the ordinary meaning of the term basic infrastructural requirements meeting the housing needs of his family.

On 26 September 2012 the Constitutional Court, endorsing the reasoning of the lower bodies, dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as ill-founded on the grounds that there was no violation of his constitutional rights. In particular, having examined his complaints from the angle of the right to a fair trial, the Constitutional Court held that no issue arose with regard to the other complaints relied upon by the applicant.

The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 11 October 2012.

The Government provided a report by the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth (Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih) of 6 November 2013, according to which the applicant’s child had been in receipt of monthly monetary allowances of HRK 1,000 (approximately EUR 130) in the period between 19 January 2006 and 10 September 2012, and allowances of HRK 625 (approximately EUR 80) from 11 September 2012 onwards. In addition, he had been involved in various therapeutic and social assistance activities, and for the period between 29 June 2010 and 2 October 2011 the applicant’s wife had been granted special status related to her child’s disability and had received inter alia, monthly payments of HRK 2,500 (approximately EUR 300).

According to the applicant, the annual expenses relating to his son’s special needs amounted to some HRK 80,000 (approximately EUR 10,400). This included HRK 28,800 for physiotherapy, HRK 4,500 for speech therapy, HRK 900 for a child neurologist, HRK 7,200 for drugs, HRK 21,175 for a wheelchair (with additional State support of HRK 8,900); HRK 7,200 for swimming therapy; and HRK 9,150 for daily transport to the day-care centre for ten months.


Remainder inadmissible;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Ksenija Turković

The applicant was born in 1961 and lived in Nakhchivan at the time of the events.

The applicant was an independent journalist and worked as a reporter of the Yeni Musavat newspaper in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (“the NAR”).

The applicant was the author of two critical articles about the economic and political situation in the NAR published in the Yeni Musavat newspaper in August and September 2007. The articles, entitled “Food has become considerably more expensive in Nakhchivan (owing to Vasif Talibov’s “care”)” (“Naxçıvanda ərzaq xeyli bahalaşıb (Vasif Talıbovun “qayğısı” sayəsində)”) and “Vasif Talibov rebuilds his native village” (“Vasif Talıbov doğulduğu kəndi söküb yenidən tikdirir”), related in particular to the activities of the Speaker of the Parliament of the NAR, Vasif Talibov, who is also “the supreme official of the NAR” (“Naxçıvan Muxtar Respublikasının ali vəzifəli şəxsi”) under its Constitution of 29 December 1998.

On 17 September 2007 the applicant also met a reporter from Radio Liberty and helped him to prepare a report about the economic and political situation in Nakhchivan.

At around 2 p.m. on 22 September 2007, when the applicant was in a café in the village of Jalilkand in the Sharur District, the head (M.M.) of the district department of the MNS approached him. M.M. accused the applicant of publishing defamatory articles about the NAR, and ordered four men in uniform to arrest him.

The applicant was taken to the premises of the MNS in Sharur by car. His mobile phone was taken away while he was being transported there. When they arrived at the MNS building M.M. told him to stop spreading misinformation about the NAR. He further ordered agents of the MNS to explain to the applicant “the meaning of his activity as a reporter” and left the room.

Five men then began to torture the applicant. They hit him repeatedly with truncheons, kicked him and punched him in the head. Approximately an hour later, M.M. returned and asked the applicant whether he had “grown wise”. M.M. further ordered five men to make the applicant “understand his mistakes”. The applicant was then subjected to further ill-treatment.

The applicant was subsequently taken to the office of M.M. who demanded that he become a member of the ruling political party (YAP - Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyası) and to write defamatory articles about opposition leaders. The applicant refused to do so.

The applicant was released at 2 a.m. on 23 September 2007; his mobile phone was returned to him. Before his release, M.M. told him that if he did not “grow wise”, he would be brought back to the MNS.

Following his release, the applicant immediately informed the Yeni Musavat newspaper of his arrest. According to the applicant, his relatives also took photographs of the injuries on his body. However, he was unable to see a doctor immediately, because it was night.

The Government submitted that on 22 September 2007 the applicant was not arrested, detained or ill-treated, by agents of the MNS.

In the morning of 23 September 2007, while the applicant was about to go and see a doctor, he was arrested by the police and taken to the Sharur District Police Office.

The head of the Sharur District Police Office, M.H., shouted at the applicant, demanding to know why he had informed the press of his arrest.

On the same day the applicant was taken to the Sharur District Court, which sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative detention for obstructing the police. The applicant was not represented by a lawyer at the hearing. Two police officers testified against him. The applicant was not provided with a copy of the court decision.

At the request of the applicant, after the court hearing he was taken to the Sharur Central Hospital, where he was examined by a doctor who observed numerous bruises on his body. However, he was not provided with any medical record.

At around 2.30 p.m. on 23 September 2007 the applicant was approached by the police in the centre of the Jalilkand village, because he was using loud and abusive language in public. As the applicant did not comply with the police request to stop his unlawful action, an administrative offence report was drawn up and he was taken to the police station. It appears from the report that the applicant refused to sign it. The relevant part of the report of 23 September 2007 provides as follows:

“On 23 September 2007 H. Mehdiyev did not comply with the lawful request of the police, and continued to shout and use insulting language in the centre of the Jalilkand village.”

On the same day the Sharur District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 310.1 (obstructing the police) of the Code of Administrative Offences, and sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative detention. It was specified in the decision that it could be appealed against within ten days of its receipt. The relevant part of the decision of 23 September 2007 provides as follows:

“Assessing the evidence at its disposal, the court concludes that the fact that Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu [the applicant] committed the above-mentioned administrative offence is proved by his confession and the statements of witnesses heard in connection with the case.

The court qualifies the administrative offence committed by Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. Therefore, he must be found guilty under this article and must be punished.”

The Government produced a receipt confirming that the applicant had received a copy of the court decision at 5.30 p.m. on 23 September 2007. The receipt was dated 23 September 2007 and signed by the applicant.

At around 7 p.m. on 23 September 2007 the applicant was taken to detention facility no. 8 to serve his sentence.

During his detention the applicant was deprived of food and water. He was not provided with any bedding and was forced to spend nights outside on a concrete walkway. The applicants’ hands were handcuffed at all times and due to the detention facility’s proximity to the River Aras, he suffered badly from mosquito bites.

At midnight on 25 September 2007, the Minister of National Security of the NAR arrived at the detention facility with two other men. They appeared to be drunk. The Minister insulted the applicant and then all of them beat him.

The Government submitted that there was no detention facility no. 8 in the NAR and the applicant was detained in the temporary detention facility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the NAR.

The applicant was detained alone in a cell which was 2.8 metres high, 5.2 m long, and 2.2 m wide. The cell was adequately lit and ventilated. The applicant was provided with a separate bed and bedding, as well as with other necessities. In support of their account of the conditions, the Government produced photographs of the detention facility in question and the cell in which the applicant was held.

The Government also produced a medical record dated 16 December 2013 from the doctor on duty at the detention facility at the time. According to the medical record, at 7.45 p.m. on 23 September 2007 the applicant was examined by the doctor and “no pathology was revealed” (heç bir patalogiya aşkar edilmədi). The medical record of 16 December 2013 provides as follows:

“Examination by the doctor on duty:

At 7.45 p.m. on 23 September 2007 Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu accompanied by two police officers came to the admission department for examination. During the examination of the citizen, no pathology was revealed. The blood pressure was 120/85 mm Hg. Practically healthy (praktiki sağlam). The doctor on duty: I.M.”

Following the applicant’s administrative detention, various Azerbaijani and international human rights organisations asked the Azerbaijani authorities for the applicant’s release. In particular, on 26 September 2007 Reporters Without Borders submitted a request to the Azerbaijani authorities to stop the applicant’s harassment because of his journalistic activities and to order his release. In respect of the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by agents of the MNS on 22 September 2007, the request reads:

“The day before his arrest, Mehdiyev was forced into a car by national security ministry agents and held all day in a ministry building where, according to Reporters Without Borders’ sources, he was beaten because of his reports about gas and electricity problems in the region.”

On 27 September 2007 the Committee to Protect Journalists also called upon the Azerbaijani authorities to stop the applicant’s harassment because of his journalistic activities and to carry out a thorough investigation in this respect. The applicant’s alleged illtreatment by agents of the MNS on 22 September 2007 and his administrative detention were also covered by the Azerbaijani media.

On 27 September 2007 the applicant was released from administrative detention. No official reason was given for his early release from detention.

According to the applicant, after his release from detention, he was treated in the Nakhchivan Republic Hospital, however all the medical institutions refused to give him an official medical certificate. The doctor who examined the applicant told him that his seventh rib was broken. In support of his claim, the applicant relied on a medical record dated 1 October 2007 in which the doctor indicated that an X-ray examination of the applicant’s seventh rib had been carried out, without providing further information. Although the name of the doctor appeared on the medical record, it was not signed or stamped and there was no information about the medical establishment in which the examination was carried out. The medical record of 1 October 2007 provides as follows:

“Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu; born in 1961 in Jalilkand;

X-ray examination of the ribcage and the seventh left side rib in the back armpit (sol yeddinci qabırğasının arxa qoltuqaltı).”

Relying on Articles 3, 5 and 10 of the Convention, on 3 October 2007 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office asking for the institution of a criminal investigation. He submitted the same factual information as what he submitted to the Court (see paragraphs 9-14 above) i.e. that at around 2 p.m. on 22 September 2007 he had been arrested, at the request of the head (M.M.) of the district department of the MNS, in a café in the village of Jalilkand in the Sharur District by agents of the MNS, and had been taken to the premises of the MNS in Sharur. Once there M.M. demanded that he stop spreading misinformation about the NAR. He further ordered the agents of the MNS to explain to the applicant “the meaning of his activity as a reporter” and left the room. Five men then began to torture him. They hit him repeatedly with truncheons, kicked him and punched him in the head. Approximately an hour later, M.M. returned and asked him whether he had “grown wise”. M.M. further ordered the five men to make him “understand his mistakes”. He was then subjected to further ill-treatment and was only released at around 2 a.m. on 23 September 2007. Before his release, M.M. told him that, if he did not “grow wise”, he would be brought back to the MNS.

The applicant sent his complaint by recorded delivery and it appears from the postal document submitted to the Court that the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office received it on 4 October 2007.

The applicant did not receive any reply to his complaint.

On 19 October 2007 the applicant lodged the same complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ombudsman. The applicant produced postal documents confirming that the letters had been sent to the above-mentioned authorities.

By a letter of 25 October 2007 the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicant that it had forwarded his complaint to the Prosecutor of the NAR for examination.

On 7 November 2007 the applicant re-submitted the same complaint to the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office by recorded delivery. The applicant produced a postal document confirming the receipt of his letter by the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office.

By a letter of 23 November 2007, the Ministry of Internal Affairs informed the applicant that it had forwarded his complaint to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the NAR for examination.

No action was taken in respect of the applicant’s above-mentioned complaints.

On 9 February 2008 the applicant lodged an action with the Sharur District Court in accordance with the procedure established by Articles 449451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning appeals against actions and decisions taken by the prosecuting authorities. Relying on Articles 3, 5 and 10 of the Convention, he reiterated his previous complaints and asked the court to declare unlawful the prosecuting authorities’ failure to examine his complaint.

The applicant did not receive any reply from the Sharur District Court.

On 17 March 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court of the NAR, reiterating his previous complaints. He further complained that the Sharur District Court had failed to examine his complaint concerning the prosecuting authorities’ inaction.

In the meantime, the applicant sent the same complaint to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan, complaining that the Sharur District Court had failed to examine his complaint. By a letter of 1 April 2008 the Supreme Court forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Sharur District Court for examination.

By a letter of 29 April 2008, the Supreme Court of the NAR informed the applicant that his complaint could not be examined by it because, as an appellate court, it examined appeals only against firstinstance courts’ decisions.

On 28 July 2008 the applicant made representations to the Judicial Legal Council, stating that the Sharur District Court had failed to examine his complaint.

By a letter of 5 August 2008, the Judicial Legal Council forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Sharur District Court, asking the court to examine the complaint and to take necessary measures. The Judicial Legal Council further asked the Sharur District Court to inform the applicant about the result of the examination.

On 8 January 2009 the applicant applied again to the Judicial Legal Council, arguing that, despite its letter of 5 August 2008 sent to the Sharur District Court, he had not been informed of any decision taken by the Sharur District Court.

By a letter of 14 January 2009, the Judicial Legal Council forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Sharur District Court. The Judicial Legal Council’s letter of 14 January 2009 was identical in wording to its letter of 5 August 2008.

On 18 June 2009 and on 6 January 2010 the applicant sent further letters to the Sharur District Court, reiterating his previous complaints.

The applicant did not receive any response from the Sharur District Court.