Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-2 - Information on reasons for arrest);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

Egidijus Kūris;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in 1974. According to the latest information available to the Court, he lives in Istanbul.

The applicant arrived in Turkey in 2006. The parties are in dispute as to whether he entered the country legally at the time.

On 4 or 6 November 2009 the applicant was apprehended in Edirne while trying to flee to Greece illegally. Following brief periods of detention at İpsala Gendarmerie Command and Tunca Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre (“Tunca Accommodation Centre”), he was transferred to Gaziosmanpaşa Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre (“Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre”) in Kırklareli, with a view to being deported. The exact date of his transfer is unknown to the Court; while the applicant claimed that he had been transferred on 9 November 2009, the Government maintained that the transfer had taken place on 11 November 2009 without, however, presenting any documents in support of their submission.

It appears that throughout his stay at Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre, the applicant made numerous attempts to seek asylum, all of which were allegedly ignored by the national authorities, until he was able to get in touch with a lawyer. On 27 July 2010 he lodged a new asylum request through his lawyer, which was admitted by the domestic authorities for processing.

On 1 September 2010 the lawyer requested the applicant’s immediate release from Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre in two separate letters sent to the Kırklareli Governor’s Office and the Ministry of the Interior, claiming thqsat his detention in prison-like conditions had no basis in domestic law and also contravened Article 5 of the Convention.

On 24 September 2010 the applicant was granted asylum seeker status by the Ministry of the Interior, along with a temporary residence permit in Kırklareli, valid until the completion of the asylum procedure.

On 27 September 2010 he was released from Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre.

Following his release, on 30 September 2010 the applicant went to Istanbul instead of staying in Kırklareli as ordered. On 1 October 2010 he was arrested on suspicion of attempted burglary and placed in police custody at Şehit Tevfik Fikret Erciyes district police station in Fatih, Istanbul (“Fatih police station”). On the same day, he was interrogated by the Fatih public prosecutor and the Fatih Magistrates’ Court, which ordered his release. The relevant decision was not made available to the Court.

Despite the court order for his release, the applicant was taken back to Fatih police station, where he was placed in a holding cell in the basement.

On 4 October 2010 the applicant’s lawyer visited him at the station and requested his release. He was, however, informed that this would not be possible as there was an order for his deportation.

On 7 October 2010 his lawyer went to Fatih police station once again, to visit the applicant and to inspect the conditions of his detention. According to the lawyer’s notes, there were two cells with iron bars in the basement of the station where the applicant was being held, both of which measured approximately 2 x 4 m. On the day of his visit, the applicant was sharing a cell with approximately ten other foreigners, all of whom were sitting on the floor with their backs against the wall and sharing three blankets between them. There were similarly ten to twelve people in the other cell. There was a small vent in the wall measuring approximately 30 x 50 cm, which let in very little light. There was also a pile of rubbish outside it. During their meeting, the applicant also gave a detailed account of his detention conditions, which the lawyer noted as follows. The number of detainees in the cell varied between seven and fifteen. There were no beds, and there was no room for more than three people to lie down at the same time. They were only provided with three blankets and four small pillows to share, and there was no heating. The cell, which also lacked natural light and sufficient ventilation, was always cold and there was no provision for outdoor exercise. The food provided was also insufficient; they had to pay to receive more. It appears that the lawyer brought the applicant and some of the other detainees sandwiches after the meeting, as they had complained of being hungry.

On 9 October 2010 the applicant was transferred to Kumkapı Removal Centre pending his deportation, apparently because the basement of Fatih police station was flooded.

On 12 October 2010 Fatih police station was inspected by the Fatih public prosecutor, who found the detention facility to be in compliance with the standards set out in the relevant regulations without, however, going into any details about the specific conditions in his brief report.

On 19 October 2010 the applicant was conditionally released from Kumkapı Removal Centre and instructed to go to Kırklareli, after it became apparent that he had already been granted a temporary permit to reside there in September 2010.

It appears that following his release from Kumkapı Removal Centre, the applicant went to Edirne instead of going to Kırklareli as instructed. On 12 November 2010 he was apprehended in Edirne close to the Greek border while attempting to flee to Greece once again. He was placed back in Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre.

During a headcount conducted on 1 December 2010, officers at Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre noticed that the applicant was intoxicated and behaving rowdily. He was therefore separated from the other detainees and escorted to the management office. According to the Government, as one of the officers was unlocking the door to the management office, the applicant collapsed unexpectedly in the corridor and hit his face on a radiator. The impact caused heavy bleeding in his left eye, and he started throwing up, in a semi-conscious state. According to the applicant, however, he did not fall but was forcefully pushed by one of the officers against the radiator and was severely beaten up once he landed on the floor.

The applicant was then taken to the Kırklareli State Hospital, where it appears he was diagnosed with alcohol poisoning. Following some initial medical treatment, on 3 December 2010 he was admitted to the ophthalmology department of the Trakya University Hospital, where he underwent an operation on his left eye, as well as various related treatments. He was discharged on 23 December 2010. The medical report drawn up on the day of his discharge indicated that he had been admitted to the ophthalmology department with symptoms of pain, reduced vision and exophthalmos in the left eye, which he had stated had been caused by a blow to his eye. He was diagnosed with widespread corneal erosion and a retrobulbar haemorrhage. He was also found to have an orbital floor fracture caused by the blunt trauma to his eye, for which he underwent an operation.

In the meantime, the Kırklareli public prosecutor had initiated an investigation into the incident of 1 December 2010 of his own motion. According to the documents in the case file, on 2 December 2010 he took a statement from a caretaker working at Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre, who had witnessed the applicant suddenly collapse while the two officers escorting him had been unlocking the door.

Moreover, on an unspecified date, the police took a statement from the applicant in hospital, who at the time alleged that he had lost his balance because he had been pushed by an officer.

Following his discharge from hospital, the applicant was taken to Şehit Hayrettin Yeşin police station in Kırklareli on 23 December 2010 to give a statement, in the presence of his lawyer, regarding the injury he had sustained on 1 December 2010. The applicant stated that he had no complaints of ill-treatment and that he had lost his balance and fallen over because he had been intoxicated at the time. He was subsequently told he was free to leave, but was ordered to stay in Kırklareli in accordance with his residence permit.

On 21 January 2011 the Kırklareli public prosecutor decided not to bring any charges in relation to the applicant’s injury in the light of his statement of 23 December 2010.

In the meantime, the applicant went to Istanbul after being released from detention on 23 December 2010, despite being specifically ordered to remain in Kırklareli. On 28 December 2010 he lodged a criminal complaint with the Fatih public prosecutor against the police officers who had allegedly illtreated him at Gaziosmanpaşa Accommodation Centre. He argued, in particular, that following the headcount on the evening of 1 December 2010 he had been taken to the management office, where one of the officers had grabbed him by the collar and tossed him against the wall, as a result of which he had hit his eye on the radiator and passed out. He claimed that he had not told the truth at Şehit Hayrettin Yeşin police station, as he had been warned by an officer that his detention would be prolonged if he pressed charges.

When the public prosecutor subsequently summoned him to make a statement, the applicant stated that he had previously misrepresented the facts as he had been scared, without giving any more details as to why. He added that he had also been severely beaten up by the officers after he had collapsed onto the floor, and admitted that he had been drinking kolonya (citrus cologne), mixed with a soft drink, prior to the incident.

On 31 January 2011 the Fatih public prosecutor issued a decision to the effect that he had no jurisdiction (görevsizlik kararı) in respect of the applicant’s complaints, and referred the matter to the Kırklareli public prosecutor.

On 8 April 2011 the Kırklareli public prosecutor took statements from two of the suspected police officers and three witnesses, also police officers. The two suspects denied the applicant’s allegation that they had attacked him. All of the witnesses corroborated that the applicant had been very drunk on the relevant day, and one of them, who had been at the scene of the incident, stated that the applicant had fallen over without anyone having pushed him.

On 9 September 2011 the Kırklareli public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute because of insufficient evidence. Referring to the inconsistency between the applicant’s statements, the public prosecutor stressed that although the applicant had stated that he had been scared to tell the truth at Şehit Hayrettin Yeşin police station on 23 December 2010, there had been no reason for him to be scared, particularly because he had made his statement in the presence of his lawyer.

The applicant did not object to the decision of the Kırklareli public prosecutor, despite being entitled to do so before the Edirne Assize Court.

On 18 May 2011 the applicant’s request for asylum was rejected by the Ministry of the Interior, as he had failed to comply with the requirements to be granted asylum seeker status as set out in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Geneva Convention”) and the Turkish Asylum Regulation.


No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading punishment;Inhuman punishment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading punishment;Inhuman punishment)

Alvina Gyulumyan;Ján Šikuta;Johannes Silvis;Josep Casadevall;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in 1970. He is serving a life sentence in the Leopoldov prison.

On 7 September 2005, at about 10 p.m., the applicant was taken to a police station. In the course of the night he was questioned about the violent death of his stepfather. He was tested for alcohol in his blood and biological samples were taken from him. A police investigator accused the applicant of murder. The applicant was suspected of having stabbed his stepfather fourteen times on 7 September 2005, as a result of which the latter had died. At the request of the public prosecutor the applicant was formally arrested at 12.30 a.m. on 8 September 2005.

By a decision of 12 September 2005 a judge of the Košice I District Court remanded the applicant in custody with effect from 8 September 2005. On 28 September 2005 the Košice Regional Court dismissed a complaint by the applicant against that decision.

In the context of the investigation the applicant, repeatedly and in the presence of his lawyer, admitted having stabbed his stepfather and described the circumstances. He later requested that his action be qualified as causing bodily harm as he had not intended to kill the victim.

On 5 December 2005 the public prosecutor indicted the applicant before the Košice Regional Court.

On 13 July 2007 the Košice Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder. With reference to Article 219 § 2, Article 29 §§ 1 and 3, Article 30 § 1(c), Article 43 § 1 and Article 35 § 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, the first-instance court sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release on parole.

On the basis of statements by twenty-two witnesses, the opinions of five medical experts and a forensic institute, and the documentary evidence available, the court established that the applicant had deliberately stabbed his stepfather fourteen times with a knife with the intention of killing him. That action had been prompted by the applicant’s aggressive behaviour while in a state of intoxication and his abnormally antisocial personality.

The Regional Court noted that at the pre-trial stage the applicant had admitted, several times and in the presence of his lawyer, the offence imputed to him and had described the relevant facts in detail. However, at the main hearing he denied having killed the victim. The court held, for the reasons which were set out in detail in its judgment, that the evidence available clearly indicated that he had committed the offence. He had done so in a particularly contemptible manner as he had attacked the victim unexpectedly and had taken advantage of the latter’s incapacity to defend himself as a result of heavy intoxication.

According to the expert opinion on which the court relied, the applicant was pathologically aggressive. He lacked any self-control and there were practically no prospects of his re-socialisation at that time. The probability that he would re-offend in the future was extremely high.

The applicant had been convicted of different offences five times previously. Those convictions included a rape and a murder. He had committed the second murder only several months after his conditional release from prison, where he had been serving a sentence imposed for a similar offence. The Regional Court concluded that the statutory conditions for imposing a life sentence without the right to be released on parole were therefore met.

At the same time, the Regional Court quashed the six-month prison sentence which the Michalovce District Court had imposed on the applicant on 24 October 2005, as well as all consecutive decisions concerning that punishment.

The applicant appealed. He submitted that he had made the initial statements admitting the offence while in a state of a shock and fatigue resulting from his intoxication, and that the police had exposed him to psychological pressure prior to the interrogation. There existed no direct evidence proving that he had committed the offence. The applicant further argued that the first-instance court had not established all the relevant facts and had committed errors of law. The evidence obtained did not suffice for his conviction. No reconstruction of the crime had been carried out, the reference in the expert opinion as to an injury to the victim’s hand and the applicant’s social and psychological profile were confusing. The applicant further argued that the Regional Court had failed to hear the children who had found the blood-stained knife.

On 27 February 2008 the Supreme Court quashed the first-instance judgment to the extent that it concerned the sentence imposed. It then imposed a term of life imprisonment on the applicant and held, with reference to Article 30 § 1(d) of the Criminal Code, that the possibility of his release on parole was to be excluded. It did so because the Regional Court had incorrectly referred, in the operative part of its judgment, to the subparagraph of Article 30 § 1 of the Criminal Code which allowed for such a penalty.

In all other respects the Supreme Court endorsed the conclusions reached at first instance. It considered the applicant’s arguments irrelevant. In particular, in September and October 2005 the applicant had admitted three times, in the presence of his lawyer, to have committed the offence. In that context he had indicated manifold details which could only have been known to the perpetrator, for example that he had taken the knife from the flat where he and his mother lived, and where he had hidden it after the incident. The applicant had also described the T-shirt he had worn and such a T-shirt had been found hidden in the applicant’s flat stained with the victim’s blood. That blood could not have stemmed from an injury on the victim’s hand, as claimed by the applicant, as the experts had excluded such an injury. The applicant had also indicated a motive for his actions.

The Supreme Court held that the Regional Court had gathered all relevant evidence with a view to establishing the facts of the case and had correctly applied the law when convicting the applicant. The statutory prerequisites for imposing a life sentence without the possibility of release on parole were met.

The appeal court also quashed the six-month prison sentence which the Michalovce District Court had imposed on the applicant on 24 October 2005, as well as all relevant consecutive decisions relating to that punishment.

The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. As in the appeal proceedings, he challenged the establishment of the facts and the conclusions reached in the first-instance and appeal proceedings.

On 2 March 2009 the Supreme Court (cassation chamber) dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The decision stated that in proceedings in an appeal on points of law courts could only examine errors of law allegedly committed at lower levels of jurisdiction. However, no such arguments had been put forward by the applicant. The interrogations at the pre-trial stage in the course of which the applicant had admitted the offence had been carried out in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the presence of his lawyer. The Regional Court had therefore been entitled to read out those statements at the main hearing before it.

As to the sentence imposed, the applicant had not raised any specific arguments in his appeal on points of law. In any event, the lower courts had correctly concluded that, given his earlier convictions, the three-strike rule set out in Article 43 § 1 of the Criminal Code was applicable to his case. Similarly, the lower courts had correctly exercised their discretionary power under Article 30 § 1(d) of the Criminal Code when excluding the possibility of his release on parole.

On 7 May 2009 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Constitutional Court. He indicated that it was directed against the abovementioned ordinary courts at three levels which had dealt with his case, and at the prosecuting authorities involved. In the summary of his complaint the applicant indicated that it concerned his conviction and the sentence imposed. He alleged a breach of his rights under the Constitution and the Convention. He complained, inter alia, that he had been detained unlawfully and that the criminal proceedings against him had been flawed. He explicitly alleged a breach of Article 3, Article 5 § 1(a) and (c) and § 3, Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3(d), and Articles 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention, as well as Article 2 § 1 of Protocol No. 7.

The applicant joined to his appeal the three ordinary courts’ decisions in his case and requested that the Constitutional Court quash them. He indicated that he was indigent and asked the Constitutional Court to appoint a lawyer to represent him in the constitutional proceedings.

In a letter dated 21 September 2009 a Constitutional Court judge informed the applicant that in his complaint he had not specified an outcome he sought to obtain from the Constitutional Court which would be enforceable given the powers of that court. As the Constitutional Court could not deal with such a submission, it had to be set aside pursuant to section 23(a) of the Constitutional Court Act 1993.

On 21 December 2005 the Košice I District Court ordered that the applicant be released from pre-trial detention and start serving a six-month prison term which had been imposed by a penal order issued by the Michalovce District Court on 24 October 2005 in a different set of proceedings.

In a decision of 14 July 2006 the Košice Regional Court ordered that the applicant be released from pre-trial detention and start serving a thirty-seven month prison term which had been imposed in a different set of proceedings by the Banská Bystrica District Court.

A decision issued by a higher judicial officer of the Košice Regional Court on 31 March 2008 stated that the period of the applicant’s detention from 8 September 2005 to 14 July 2006 was to be incorporated into the term of life imprisonment imposed on him. The applicant was further ordered to reimburse to the State the costs of his detention during the above period, pursuant to Article 555 § 1 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 2005. On 12 May 2008 the presiding judge of the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against that decision. On that basis the Košice prison administration ordered the applicant, on 4 June 2008, to pay the equivalent of approximately 800 euros (EUR) in respect of the 310 days he had spent in pre-trial detention.

In the course of the criminal proceedings, newspapers published several articles about the case in which they implied that the applicant was a brutal offender. The applicant considered that those articles were based on information which the media had obtained from the prosecuting authorities dealing with his case.

On 14 November 2013 the applicant filed a fresh appeal on points of law in respect of the proceedings leading to his conviction. The proceedings are pending.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained that they had been denied an opportunity to appear in person before the court in the civil proceedings to which they were parties.


No violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom to impart information;Freedom to receive information)

Aleš Pejchal;András Sajó;Dean Spielmann;Egidijus Kūris;Elisabeth Steiner;Ganna Yudkivska;Guido Raimondi;Helen Keller;Josep Casadevall;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Kristina Pardalos;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Luis López Guerra;Mark Villiger;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Nebojša Vučinić;Päivi Hirvelä;Paul Lemmens;Paul Mahoney;Robert Spano;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant is a journalist by profession. On 15 October 2003 he published an article in the weekly magazine L’Illustré entitled “Tragedy on the Lausanne Bridge – the reckless driver’s version – Questioning of the mad driver” (“Drame du Grand-Pont à Lausanne – la version du chauffard – l’interrogatoire du conducteur fou”). The article in question concerned a set of criminal proceedings against M.B., a motorist who had been remanded in custody after an incident on 8 July 2003 in which he had rammed his car into pedestrians, before throwing himself off the Lausanne Bridge (Grand-Pont). The incident, in which three people had died and eight others had been injured, had caused much emotion and controversy in Switzerland. The article began as follows:

“Surname: B. First name: M. Born on 1 January 1966 in Tamanrasset (Algeria), son of B.B. and F.I., resident in Lausanne, holder of a category C licence, spouse of M.B. Profession: nursing assistant ... It is 8.15 p.m. on Tuesday 8 July 2003, in the austere premises of the Lausanne criminal investigation department. Six hours after his tragic headlong race along the Lausanne Bridge, resulting in three deaths and eight casualties, this reckless driver is alone for the first time, facing three investigators. Will he own up? In fact he doesn’t actually seem to realise what is happening, as if oblivious to the events and all the hubbub around him. The man who upset the whole of Lausanne this fine summer day is not very talkative. This Algerian citizen is withdrawn, introverted, inscrutable, indeed completely impenetrable. And yet the questions are flying from all sides. What were the reasons for this ‘accident’, one of the policemen rather clumsily writes, as if he had already formed his opinion. Four words in reply: ‘I do not know’.”

The article continued with a summary of the questions put by the police officers and the investigating judge and M.B.’s replies. It also mentioned that M.B. had been “charged with premeditated murder (assassinat) and, in the alternative, with murder (meurtre), grievous bodily harm, endangering life and serious traffic offences”, and that he “appear[ed] to show no remorse”. The article was accompanied by several photographs of letters which M.B. had sent to the investigating judge. It ended with the following paragraph:

“From his prison cell, M.B. now spends his time sending letters to the investigating judge ...: on being taken into custody he asked for his watch to be returned and requested a cup for his coffee, some dried fruit and chocolate. On 11 July, three days after the events, he even asked to be temporarily released for ‘a few days’. ‘I would like to phone my big brother in Algeria’, he subsequently begged. He finally announced on 11 August that he had come to a ‘final decision’: he dismissed his lawyer, Mr M.B., on grounds of ‘lack of trust’. Two days later, another letter: could the judge send him ‘the directory of the Bar Association of the Canton of Vaud’ to help him find a different defence lawyer? However, with all the recurrent lies and omissions, the mixture of naivety and arrogance, amnesia and sheer madness characterising all these statements, surely M.B. is doing everything in his power to make himself impossible to defend?”

The article also included a brief summary entitled “He lost his marbles...” (“Il a perdu la boule...”), and statements from M.B.’s wife and from his doctor.

It appears from the file that the applicant’s article was not the only piece to have been published on the Lausanne Bridge tragedy. The authorities responsible for the criminal investigation had themselves decided to inform the press about certain aspects of the investigation, which had led to the publication of an article in the Tribune de Genève on 14 August 2003.

M.B. did not lodge a complaint against the applicant. However, criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant on the initiative of the public prosecutor for having published secret documents. It emerged from the investigation that one of the parties claiming damages in the proceedings against M.B. had photocopied the case file and lost one of the copies in a shopping centre. An unknown person had then brought the copy to the offices of the magazine which had published the impugned article.

By an order of 23 June 2004 the Lausanne investigating judge sentenced the applicant to one month’s imprisonment, suspended for one year.

Following an application by the applicant to have the decision set aside, the Lausanne Police Court, by a judgment of 22 September 2005, replaced the prison sentence with a fine of 4,000 Swiss francs (CHF) (approximately 2,667 euros (EUR)). At the hearing on 13 May 2015, in reply to a question from the Court, the applicant’s representative stated that the sum of CHF 4,000 had been advanced by his client’s employer and that his client was intending to refund it after the proceedings before the Court. He also confirmed that the amount set by the criminal court had taken account of the applicant’s previous record.

The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. His appeal was dismissed on 30 January 2006 by the Criminal Court of Cassation of the Canton of Vaud.

The applicant lodged a public-law appeal and an appeal on grounds of nullity with the Federal Court, which on 29 April 2008 dismissed the appeals. Its decision was served on the applicant on 9 May 2008. The relevant passages from the decision are as follows:

“7. In short, the appellant submits that his conviction for a breach of Article 293 of the Criminal Code is contrary to federal law. He does not challenge the fact that the information which he published falls within the ambit of Article 293 of the Criminal Code. He does, on the other hand, submit, under an interpretation of Articles 293 and 32 of the Criminal Code in the light of the principles inferred from Article 10 ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights, that having received that information in good faith without obtaining it unlawfully, he had the duty as a professional journalist, under Article 32 of the Criminal Code, to publish it owing to what he sees as the obvious interest of the so-called ‘Lausanne Bridge’ case to the general public in French-speaking Switzerland.

7.1. In accordance with Article 293 of the Criminal Code (Publication of secret official deliberations), anyone who, without being entitled to do so, makes public all or part of the documents, investigations or deliberations of an authority which are secret by law or by virtue of a decision taken by that authority, acting within its powers, will be punished by a fine (paragraph 1). Complicity in such acts is also punishable (see paragraph 2). The court may decide not to impose any penalties if the secret thus made public is of minor importance (see paragraph 3).

According to case-law, this provision proceeds from a formal conception of secrecy. It is sufficient that the documents, deliberations or investigations in question have been declared secret by law or by virtue of a decision taken by the authority, or in other words that there has been an intention to keep them from becoming public, regardless of the type of classification selected (for example, top secret or confidential). On the other hand, strict secrecy presupposes that the holder of the specific information wishes to keep it secret, that there is a legitimate interest at stake, and that the information is known or accessible only to a select group of persons (see ATF [Judgments of the Swiss Federal Court] 126 IV 236, point 2a, p. 242, and 2c/aa, p. 244). This state of affairs was not altered by the entry into force of paragraph 3 of this Article on 1 April 1998 (RO [Recueil officiel – Official Collection of Federal Statutes] 1998 852 856; FF [Feuille fédérale] 1996 IV 533). That rule concerns not secrets in the substantive sense but rather instances of futile, petty or excessive concealment (see ATF 126 IV 236, point 2c/bb, p. 246). In order to exclude the application of paragraph 3, the court must therefore first of all examine the reasons for classifying the information as secret. It must, however, do so with restraint, without interfering with the discretionary power wielded by the authority which declared the information secret. It is sufficient that this declaration should nonetheless appear tenable vis-à-vis the content of the documents, investigations or deliberations in issue. Moreover, the journalists’ viewpoint on the interest in publishing the information is irrelevant (see ATF 126 IV 236, point 2d, p. 246). In its Stoll v. Switzerland judgment of 10 December 2007, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that this formal conception of secrecy was not contrary to Article 10 ECHR inasmuch as it did not prevent the Federal Court from determining whether the interference in issue was compatible with Article 10 ECHR, by assessing, in the context of its examination of Article 293, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code, the justification for classifying a given piece of information as secret, on the one hand, and weighing up the interests at stake, on the other (see Stoll v. Switzerland, cited above, §§ 138 and 139).

7.2. In the present case the offence with which the appellant is charged concerned the publication of records of interviews and correspondence contained in the case file of a live criminal investigation.

In pursuance of Article 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Canton of Vaud (CPP/VD), all investigations must remain secret until their final conclusion (see paragraph 1). The secrecy requirement relates to all the evidence uncovered by the investigation itself as well as all non-public decisions and investigative measures (see paragraph 2). The law also specifies that the following are bound by secrecy vis-à-vis anyone who does not have access to the case file: the judges and judicial staff (save in cases where disclosure would facilitate the investigation or is justified on public-order, administrative or judicial grounds; see Article 185 CPP/VD), and also the parties, their friends and relatives, their lawyers, the latter’s associates, consultants and staff, and any experts and witnesses. However, disclosure to friends or relatives by the parties or their lawyer is not punishable (see Article 185a CPP/VD). Lastly, the law provides for a range of exceptions. As an exception to Article 185, the cantonal investigating judge and, with the latter’s agreement, the judge responsible for the preliminary inquiry or senior police officers specially appointed by the cantonal government [Conseil d’Etat] (see Article 168, paragraph 3) may inform the press, radio or television about a pending investigation if so required by the public interest or considerations of fairness, particularly where public cooperation is required to shed light on an offence, in cases which are particularly serious or are already known to the general public, or where erroneous information must be corrected or the general public reassured (see Article 185b, paragraph 1, CPP/VD).

The present case therefore concerns secrecy imposed by the law rather than by an official decision.

7.3. As a general rule, the reason for the confidentiality of judicial investigations, which applies to most sets of cantonal criminal proceedings, is the need to protect the interests of the criminal proceedings by anticipating risks of collusion and the danger of evidence being tampered with or destroyed. Nevertheless, the interests of the accused must not be disregarded either, particularly vis-à-vis the presumption of innocence and, more broadly, the accused’s personal relations and interests (see Hauser, Schweri and Hartmann, Schweizerisches Strafprozessrecht, 6th ed., 2005, § 52, no. 6, p. 235; Gérard Piquerez, op. cit., § 134, no. 1066, p. 678; Gérard Piquerez, Procédure pénale suisse: manuel, 2nd ed., 2007, no. 849, pp. 559 et seq.), as well as the need to protect the opinion-forming process and the decision-making process within a State authority, as protected, precisely, by Article 293 of the Criminal Code (see ATF 126 IV 236, point 2c/aa, p. 245). The European Court of Human Rights has already had occasion to deem such a purpose legitimate in itself. The aim is to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary in accordance with the wording of Article 10 (2) ECHR, which also mentions the protection of the reputation or rights of others (see Weber v. Switzerland, judgment of 22 May 1990, § 45, and Dupuis and Others v. France, judgment of 7 June 2007, § 32).

Furthermore, in so far as the impugned publication concerned excerpts from records of interviews of the accused and reproduced certain letters sent by the latter to the investigating judge, this evidence can validly be classified secret, by prohibiting public access to it, as provided by the legislation of the Canton of Vaud. This is the inescapable conclusion as regards the records of interviews of the accused, as it would be inadmissible to allow such documents to be analysed in the public sphere, before the conclusion of the investigation, before the trial and out of context, in a manner liable to influence the decisions taken by the investigating judge and the trial court. It is also the only possible conclusion as regards the letters sent by the accused to the investigating judge, which focused on practical problems and criticisms of his lawyer (see Police Court judgment, point 4, p. 7). We might point out here that it appears from the impugned publication – which the cantonal authorities did not reproduce in full in their decisions, although they did refer to it and its content is not disputed – that the aforementioned practical problems concerned requests for temporary release and for access to personal effects (letters of 11 July 2003), for a change of cell (letter of 7 August 2003) and for authorisation to use the telephone (letter of 6 August 2003). Regardless of the guarantee of the presumption of innocence and the inferences concerning the detainee’s character which might be drawn during the criminal proceedings from such correspondence, the detainee, whose liberty is considerably restricted, even in respect of everyday acts relating to his private life, or indeed intimate sphere, can expect the authority restricting his liberty to protect him from public exposure of the practical details of his life as a remand prisoner and as a person facing charges (see Article 13 of the Constitution).

It follows that in the instant case the information published by the appellant, in so far as it concerned the content of the records of his interviews and his correspondence with the investigating judge, cannot be described as a secret of minor importance for the purposes of Article 293, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code. That being so, the impugned publication constituted the factual elements of the offence provided for in Article 293, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code.

7.4. Moreover, the information in question may be described as being secret in substantive terms because it was only accessible to a restricted number of persons (the investigating judge and the parties to the proceedings). Furthermore, the investigating authority was desirous to keep them secret, with not only a legitimate interest in doing so but an obligation under the Cantonal Code of Criminal Procedure, the justification for which was mentioned above (see point 7.3 above).

7.5. Therefore, the only remaining point at issue is the existence of justification.

In short, the appellant submits that he had the professional duty (under former Article 32 of the Criminal Code) as a journalist to publish the information in question because of what he describes as the obvious interest in the ‘Lausanne Bridge’ case for the population of French-speaking Switzerland. He considers that in the light of European case-law, the basic assumption should be that publication is justified in principle unless there is a pressing social need to maintain secrecy. From the standpoint of good faith, he submits that Article 32 should apply to journalists who are not responsible for the indiscretion committed by a third party and who receive information without committing any offence themselves other than the breach of secrecy stemming from the publication. Lastly, he contends that the mode of publication is not a relevant criterion.

8.1. As regards the former point, the cantonal court found that while the accident of 8 July 2003, the circumstances of which were undoubtedly unusual, had triggered a great deal of public emotion, it had nevertheless, in legal terms, been simply a road accident with fatal consequences, and did not in itself entail any obvious public interest. It was not a case of collective trauma on the part of the Lausanne population, which would have justified reassuring the citizens and keeping them informed of the progress of the investigation (see judgment appealed against, point 2, p. 9).

It is true that the ‘Lausanne Bridge case’ attracted extensive media coverage (see Police Court judgment, point 4, p. 8, to which the cantonal judgment refers (judgment appealed against, point B, p. 2)). However, this circumstance alone, alongside the unusual nature of the accident, is insufficient to substantiate a major public interest in publishing the confidential information in question. Unless it can be justified per se, the interest aroused among the public by media coverage of events cannot constitute a public interest in the disclosure of classified information, because that would mean that it would be sufficient to spark the public’s interest in a certain event in order to justify the subsequent publication of confidential information likely to maintain that interest. Furthermore, such a public interest is manifestly lacking as regards the letters that were published. As we have seen above (see point 7.3 above), these letters virtually exclusively concerned criticisms levelled by the accused against his lawyer and such practical problems as requests for temporary release, for access to personal effects, to change cells and to use the telephone. This type of information provides no relevant insights into the accident or the circumstances surrounding it. It relates to the private life, or indeed intimate sphere, of the person in custody, and it is difficult to see any interest which its publication could satisfy other than a certain kind of voyeurism. The same applies to the appellant’s requests to the investigating judge in relation to his choice of defence lawyer. Nor is it clear, as regards the records of his interviews, what political question or matter of public interest would have arisen or been worth debating in the public sphere, and the cantonal authorities explicitly ruled out the existence of any collective trauma which might have justified reassuring or informing the population. This finding of fact, which the appellant has not disputed in his public-law appeal, is binding on this court (see section 277 bis of the Federal Criminal Procedure Act). That being the case, the appellant fails to demonstrate the ‘obvious’ interest to the general public of the information published, and the cantonal court cannot be criticised for having concluded that at the very most, such an interest involved satisfying an unhealthy curiosity.

8.2. The other two factors relied upon by the appellant concern his behaviour (good faith in access to information and mode of publication).

8.2.1. It should first of all be noted that Article 293 of the Criminal Code punishes only the disclosure of information, irrespective of how the perpetrator obtained it. Moreover, even under Article 10 ECHR, the European Court does not attach decisive importance to this fact when considering whether applicants have fulfilled their duties and responsibilities. The determining fact is rather that they could not claim in good faith to be unaware that disclosure of the information was punishable by law (see Stoll v. Switzerland, cited above, § 144, and Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999I). This point is well-established in the present case (see section B above).

8.2.2. On the other hand, the mode of publication can play a more important role in the context of safeguarding freedom of expression. While the European Court of Human Rights reiterates that neither it, nor the domestic courts for that matter, should substitute their own views for those of the press as to what technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists, in weighing up the interests at stake it nevertheless takes account of the content, vocabulary and format of the publication, and of the headings and sub-headings (whether chosen by the journalist or the editors), and the accuracy of the information (see Stoll v. Switzerland, cited above, §§ 146 et seq., especially 146, 147 and 149).

In the instant case the cantonal court ruled that the tone adopted by the appellant in his article showed that his main concern was not, as he claims, to inform the general public about the State’s conduct of the criminal investigation. The headline of the article (‘Questioning of the mad driver’, ‘the reckless driver’s version’) already lacked objectivity. It suggested that the case had already been tried in the author’s view, in the sense that the fatalities on the Lausanne Bridge had been caused not by an ordinary motorist but by a ‘mad driver’, a man ‘oblivious to the events and all the hubbub around him’; The journalist concluded by wondering whether the driver was in fact doing his best to ‘make himself impossible to defend’. The manner in which he quoted the excerpts from the records of interviews and reproduced the letters sent by the defendant to the judge pointed to the motives of the author of the impugned article: he confined himself to sensationalism, his modus operandi being exclusively geared to satisfying the relatively unhealthy curiosity which anyone is liable to feel about this type of case. Readers of this highly biased publication would have formed an opinion and subjectively prejudged the future action to be taken by the courts regarding this case, without the least respect for the principle of presumption of innocence (see judgment appealed against, point 2, pp. 9 et seq.). The cantonal court concluded that this factor did not indicate that the public interest in receiving information prevailed. That court cannot be criticised on that account.

8.3. The appellant also submitted that the records of interviews and the letters would in any case be mentioned in subsequent public hearings. He inferred from this that preserving the confidentiality of this information could therefore not be justified by any ‘pressing social need’.

However, the mere possibility that the secrecy of criminal investigations might be lifted during a subsequent phase of proceedings, particularly during the trial, which is generally subject to the publicity principle, does not undermine the justification for keeping judicial investigations confidential, because the primary aim is to protect the opinion-forming and decision-making processes on the part not only of the trial court but also of the investigating authority, until the completion of this secret phase of proceedings. Moreover, far from being neutral and comprehensive, the publication in issue included comments and assessments which presented the information in issue in a particular light, without providing the opportunities for adversarial argument which are the very essence of proceedings in trial courts.

8.4. Lastly, the appellant did not explicitly criticise the amount of the fine imposed on him. Nor did he challenge the refusal to grant him a probationary period after which the fine would be struck out (former Article 49, point 4, in conjunction with former Article 106, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code) under Swiss law. From the angle of weighing up the interest in the interference, we might simply note that the fine imposed, the amount of which took into account a previous conviction dating back to 1998 (imposition of a CHF 2,000 fine, which could be struck out after a two-year probationary period, for coercion and defamation), does not exceed half the amount of the appellant’s monthly income at the material time (see Police Court judgment, point 1, p. 5), and there is nothing to suggest that his freelance status at the time of the first-instance judgment led to any significant drop in his earnings. It should also be pointed out that at CHF 4,000 the amount of the fine is below the statutory maximum set out in former Article 106, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code (as in force until 31 December 2006), and that this maximum amount, set by the legislature more than thirty years ago, was not revised until the entry into force of the new general section of the Criminal Code, which now sets a figure of CHF 10,000 (see Article 106, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code as in force since 1 January 2007). Furthermore, the sanction for the offence with which the appellant is charged did not prevent him from expressing his views, since it was imposed after the article had been published (see Stoll v. Switzerland, cited above, § 156). That being the case, it is unclear, in view of the nature of the offence charged (the least serious in the classification set out in the Swiss Criminal Code), the amount of the fine and the time of its imposition, how the sanction imposed on the applicant could be regarded as a form of censorship.

8.5. It follows from the foregoing that the appellant disclosed a secret within the meaning of Article 293, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code and that he cannot rely on any justifying factor in his favour. The decision appealed against does not violate federal law as interpreted in the light of the Convention provisions relied upon by the appellant.”


No violation of Article 6+6-3-d - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-d - Examination of witnesses)

Aleš Pejchal;Armen Harutyunyan;Kristina Pardalos;Ledi Bianku;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Pauliine Koskelo

The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Prague.

In the period between 30 December 2005 and 8 June 2006 the applicant was found to have addressed emails to C., his former partner, stating, among other things:

“... It is this [C.] that I wish to see; I don’t want to meet the other one again. I gave up the possibility of keeping her at bay by any means (such as pictures of her injecting drugs, pictures of her offering prostitution services or pictures of her masturbating), because I have so much respect for her that I did not want to spend any more hours trying to pull off dirty tricks on her, naively believing that the second time I would be able to open her eyes to the truth. ...

You say that you are scared of me. Well, get rid of that fear finally; otherwise we cannot even be very good friends ...

I suggest we draw a line under the past, particularly the evil period, and turn over a new leaf. In the same spirit, I suggest not talking about the evil things ever again; otherwise you will not be able to get rid of your fear ...

... Are we really only able to talk to each other when I yell at you or tie you up or abduct you in my car, or do I have to think up a similar dirty trick? Do I have to become evil before you can hear me out and are willing to talk to me? You are not going to believe me, but it hurt me that I had to lower myself to that level. ...

It’s a pity that one has to abduct you or tie you up, in other words simply use means of physical restraint in order to make you listen and carefully think about and evaluate what they have told you. I would be happier if you could do so without such actions ...

... promise made in the car ...

Because I have not humiliated you either, although I had a good opportunity to do so. I could have taken pictures of you, forced you to make a porn movie and sent it to all those people in England. I could have forced you to sign whatever I wished for, and I know that you would forced yourself to sign whatever I wished and I know that you would have done it at that moment. Do not wonder about the things I am able to think about; wonder about why I have not done so ...

I will tell her everything about what I have done to you as well as why I have done it; I will give her your contact details, and maybe she can help us become closer ...

I told the psychologist everything about what I have done to you, ... how I was bad to you, including the threats I have recently made in order to make you hear me out. When I told her about how I tied you up, she replied that I must not do that to you ever again and that I should be glad that you have not turned me in ...

On Monday, it will be one month since that last time I threatened you and intimidated you ...

... all my threats are really just my defensive response to various feelings of injustice ...

When you were at my place, I could have done whatever I wanted with you; but I’m not like that, it is hard to hurt you in any way because I love you ...

If you cannot accept it, I will not do anything more than what I have repeated a thousand times when we made that agreement at Christmas ...

I will do or pay someone to do something that will harm you. Ranging from pettiness to heavy force that would be in violation of the law ...

[C.], I’m slowly starting to realise that my feelings for you are heading towards freezing point and hatred is starting to prevail ...”

On 7 June 2006 C. made a statement about the applicant’s threatening telephone calls and emails at the police station in Surrey (the United Kingdom). On the next day, upon police advice, she changed her telephone number and email address.

On 23 June 2006 the Prague 1 District Prosecutor’s Office (obvodní státní zástupce) received an anonymous criminal complaint containing allegations of the sexual abuse of children. The female informer indicated that a certain C. had confessed that she had participated in sexual abuse whilst working as an au pair in the United Kingdom.

In July 2006 several individuals including the applicant were questioned in connection with the criminal investigation into the criminal complaint.

On 13 July 2006 C.’s mother made a statement at the police station in Prague 1 according to which the applicant had tied C. up in his apartment and had shown her a bag in which he intended to carry her away. She stated, in particular, that:

“On 6 June 2006, my daughter called me, asking me whether I had time and that maybe I should sit down. She informed me that she had not been dating [L.], as she had claimed the entire time she dated [the applicant], but that instead she had been dating [the applicant], who had allegedly threatened and was currently still threatening her with physical annihilation if she would not resume her relationship with him; he had also demanded that [C.] continue to have sexual relations with him. She decided to tell me about the entire matter only after he had allegedly sent her an email with the words ... ‘and don’t forget that you have a family – mother, brother – back at home’ ... Given her experience of him, [C.] considers it very likely that this threat could be carried out by [the applicant]. Since that time she had changed her email address and phone number; she also informed me that she had changed her place of residence in England because she did not want to have contact with him any more. In addition, my daughter informed me that she had also reported the entire matter in England, where she had been questioned about the matter after suffering a mental breakdown there. This condition of my daughter was caused by the actions of the [applicant], who had continuously been sending her emails and threatening her. My daughter said that she had these emails at her disposal ...

In addition, I learned from my daughter that [the applicant], during the period when he was communicating and was able to communicate with her, had told her that she could come back to him, that she was in no danger from him because he had started seeing a psychologist ... in order to reduce or eradicate his violent behaviour, which he was aware of and had been using against her – against [C.] ...”

On 19 July 2006 C.’s female friend D.B. stated that, in a letter of 28 January 2006, C. had confided in her about the forcible coercion by the applicant, which had taken place on 29 December 2005. She further stated that, at about the same time, C. had called her from the United Kingdom, telling her that the applicant had been menacing her and her family with threats to their lives. In addition, she said that the applicant had contacted her by SMS, by phone and by email. She submitted the letter to the police.

On 7 August 2006 the police asked the Prague 6 District Prosecutor’s Office to apply for an “urgent or non-repeatable measure” (neodkladný nebo neopakovatelný úkon) pursuant to Article 158a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the CCP”), and the following day an interview with C. was conducted. The request included a very detailed justification explaining that the applicant had forcibly coerced C. in the Czech Republic as well as in the United Kingdom, where she had filed a criminal complaint. At the time of making that request, C. had been living and working in the United Kingdom but arrived back in the Czech Republic for the purpose of her interview on 8 August 2006. Her employment and the distance between the place of her employment and Prague, where she was interviewed, made it impossible for her to travel more often to the Czech Republic, where she did not feel safe anyway, given the prior events.

On the same day, a prosecutor at the District Prosecutor’s Office asked the Prague 6 District Court (obvodní soud) to secure the presence of a judge during C.’s interview, which was to be carried out as an urgent and non-repeatable measure.

On 8 August 2006 the police interviewed C. as a witness in the presence of a judge pursuant to Article 158a of the CCP. At that time, the applicant had not been charged and was therefore not present at the interview. C. stated at the outset that:

“... [S]ince September 2005 I have been working as an au pair in the United Kingdom. ... I arrived in the Czech Republic on the basis of an agreement with the police authorities of [the Czech Republic] and upon the advice of my employer, ..., who is a police officer, after the actions of [the applicant] reached such an intensity that I started to be really scared.”

She further stated that the applicant had not come to terms with the fact that she had broken off their intimate relationship. She described in detail the acts of intimidation conducted by him in the form of phone calls, SMS messages, emails, letters and verbal threats. She also stated that on 29 December 2005, between 12 noon and 4.30 p.m., she had been present in the applicant’s flat, where he had tied her to the bed, partially undressed the lower part of her body, and threatened to drug her with heroin, to carry her out from the flat in a large bag and to hand her over to unspecified persons to be trafficked to Turkey for 100,000 CZK (EUR 3,622) unless she promised to resume their intimate relationship, which she had broken off on 25 December 2005. According to her, the applicant had threatened to take pornographic pictures of her or to record a porn movie with her, which he would then send to her employer in the United Kingdom and the company which had acted as intermediary in finding her a job in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, on 1 January 2006 they had been in a car together and the applicant had threatened to throw C. into a snowdrift and drive off, or to kill both her and himself in a deliberate car accident. C. also stated that the applicant had searched through her mobile phone contacts to find the number of her female friend D.B., whom he had contacted at a later date. C. wrote an explanatory letter to D.B. She had also phoned her mother and had confided in her about the intimidation by the applicant. C. also stated that the applicant was seeing a psychotherapist. As the intimidation continued, C. filed a criminal complaint at a police station in the United Kingdom on 7 June 2006.

She also stated:

“Upon the advice of the police in the United Kingdom, on 8 June 2006 I changed my mail address, after 9 June 2006 I also changed the number of my mobile phone and at the advice of my employer, I have also the confidential employment that [the applicant] or his eventual messengers could not contact me. ...

I was asked to make comment on the email notice which was made anonymously at the Prague 1 District Prosecutor’s Office on 23 June 2006 at 10.48 a.m.. ... I do not know any girl who would meet me in a club in the United Kingdom; I do not know any such girl who would know the information about me, which were written in this denouncement. ... The information indicated in this denouncement corresponded to what [the applicant] knows about me, what I foolishly told him in the past.”

At the end of the interview, C. submitted copies of her email exchanges with the applicant and a tape recording of his voice messages, and made available SMS messages on her mobile phone for transcription.

On 25 October 2006 a judge at the Prague 6 District Court ordered the compilation of a list of incoming and outgoing telephone calls from the applicant’s mobile phone between 20 December 2005 and 31 July 2006. On 26 October 2006 he ordered the compilation of a list of communications executed from three mail-boxes between 14 February and 30 June 2006 and between 1 January and 30 June 2006, respectively. On 31 October 2006 the judge ordered the compilation of a list of communications carried out from several of the applicant’s other mail-boxes in the period from 25 December 2005 to 30 June 2006, and also the provision of information on the total number of communications logged in these mailboxes between 25 December 2005 and 18 October 2006. On the same day, the judge ordered the compilation of a list of outgoing telephone calls from the applicant’s land line on 9 June 2006 between 11 a.m and 3 p.m.

On 5 April 2007 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for unlawful restraint (omezování osobní svobody) in concurrence with coercion (vydírání), defamation (pomluva) and false accusation (křivé obvinění).

In April 2007 a search was conducted in both the applicant’s flat and the commercial premises where he ran his business, upon the search orders issued on 16 and 18 April 2007 respectively. The applicant was arrested on 20 April 2007 and was charged with unlawful restrain, coercion, defamation and false accusation, and released afterwards.

The police continued to gather evidence during 2007 and 2008. They obtained an expert psychiatric opinion on the applicant’s health, analysed his computer, carried out a search of his flat and questioned a number of witnesses.

On 27 April 2007 C.’s mother was interviewed. She stated, in particular, that:

“On 6 June 2006 ... my daughter called me at work, started crying on the phone ... She told me that ... she had been dating [the applicant] the entire time. [She] continued crying a lot, which made me realise that this was not all there was to it. It made me feel physically sick. She continued the story, saying that when she was at home for Christmas [the applicant] had abducted her. She had agreed to meet him somewhere in Prague they met normally and agreed to go out for a drink in the evening. But he said that he needed to change clothes so they would first drive to his place and then go out later in the evening. In the apartment, however, he tied her up and menaced her with horrible threats. At that time, she did not tell me any details. ... At the same time, during our phone conversation we came onto the topic of the threatening emails that [the applicant] had been sending her the entire time. She said that she had not paid much attention to them but that lately it had got completely out of hand and ... he had started threatening to kill her and, finally, had sent her an email saying that she should not forget that she had her entire family in Prague, specifically mentioning her mother and brother, and that she should not forget that he knew where we lived.

I personally contacted the psychologist ... She confirmed that my daughter had phoned her as well. She said that she had advised her ... to immediately cut off all contact with [the applicant] ... I told her about what [the applicant] had done to my daughter at Christmas 2005 and she essentially replied that [the applicant] had also told her about it and that she had strictly forbidden him to ever do such a thing again ...

[C.] told me that in December 2005, when she was in his flat, [the applicant] had tied her up, threatened to kill her, to traffic her, to make a movie of her taking drugs or a porn movie; he had also searched through her handbag and taken a piece of paper with her home address or had written it down, had searched through the address book in her mobile phone and had accessed her electronic mail box after forcing her to give him the password ...”

The investigation having been concluded in May 2008, the applicant was indicted for coercion under Article 235 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code on 16 June 2008. This legal classification of his criminal acts was more serious than that indicated in the notice served on him on 20 April 2007, when he had been charged with deprivation of personal liberty under Article 231 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code in conjunction with coercion under Article 235 § 1 of the Criminal Code. According to the applicant, he had not been informed about it, contrary to Article 176 § 2 of the CCP.

According to the Government, on 10 September 2008 C. apologised through her mother for not being able to attend the hearing before the District Court.

The trial started on 14 October 2008. As C. apologised for not attending the main hearing, the statement made by her on 8 August 2006 was therefore read out. The applicant claimed that C.’s residence abroad had not been a sufficient reason for carrying out her interview as an urgent measure and that her statement should not be read out at the trial. He argued that the conditions laid down in Article 211 § 2 of CCP had not been met.

The District Court tried to summons C. again. In its letter of 12 March 2009, the court sent a summons to the main hearing to C. through her mother. On 13 March 2009 the District Prosecutor’s Office sent to the District Court copies of the documents justifying the urgent need to interview C., namely the request of 7 August 2006 to secure the presence of a judge during an urgent and non-repeatable measure and the police letter of 7 August 2006.

In a letter of 24 April 2009, C. informed the presiding judge that, although she had been summonsed, she was unable to attend the main hearing because she had been working abroad for more than four years and intended to stay abroad on a permanent basis. She stated that the circumstances justifying the applicant’s criminal prosecution were very stressful for both her and her mother. It appears that the District Court did not try to summon C. again.

In a judgment of 8 December 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty of coercion and sentenced him to two and a half years’ suspended prison sentence subject to a probationary period of two years. The court explicitly noted that in finding the applicant guilty, it mainly relied on the testimony of C., but also on a statement made by D.K., a schoolfriend of C.’s, who stated that she had received emails concerning C.; the statement by M.V., C.’s psychotherapist, who testified that C. had confided in her about having been taken somewhere by the applicant against her will; the statement by C.’s mother; a testimony by L.B. implying that the applicant and C. had met at Christmas 2005; expert opinions in cybernetics and computer technology and in psychiatry; the emails sent by the applicant to C. between 30 December 2005 and 8 June 2006; and the letter from C. to D.B., in which C. wrote to her female friend about the applicant’s violent behaviour.

The court then stated:

“Based on such secured evidence, the court came to a clear conclusion, finding the defendant guilty as indicated in the verdict of the judgment. The defendant denies any such behaviour and actions on his part directed against [C.] as described in the judgment; however, he has clearly been proved guilty by the evidence taken. The court relied in particular on the testimony of witness [C.], who described the defendant’s actions in great detail. The testimony is consistent with further evidence taken. This includes email correspondence, which corroborates the victim’s statement and the victim’s mother’s statement to the effect that the victim had confided in her about everything on 6 June 2006. A brief description of the defendant’s behaviour was also included in the letter sent by the victim to her female friend [D.B.] which was available to the court ... In his expert opinion, the expert concluded that it was absolutely possible and posed no problem for the defendant to use previously prepared straps to tie the victim to bed and partially undress the bottom half of her body, and that it was absolutely possible and posed no problem for him to tie her up in the manner she had described ...”

On 13 February 2010 the applicant appealed, raising a number of procedural, factual and interpretational complaints. He claimed, inter alia, that C.’s statement remained uncorroborated evidence on which his conviction was based.

In his extensive submissions of 26 March 2010, he requested that C. be questioned in order, inter alia, to clarify the contradictions between the statements given by C., her mother, and her psychologist and the applicant’s testimony. He also suggested that an expert opinion be drawn up by a psychiatric expert to assess the reliability of C. and to complete and assess other evidence, including the hearing of three witnesses who had been rejected without adequate reasoning by the first instance court. He also requested that the Prague Municipal Court (městský soud) postpone the public hearing, without giving any reason in this respect.

The hearing before the Municipal Court was held on 30 March 2010 in the absence of the applicant, who had apologised in writing on 29 March 2010 indicating that he could not attend the hearing due to serious personal and family reasons, but agreeing that the court carry out merely the procedural acts allowed by Article 263 § 5 of the CCP and asking, at the same time, to postpone the hearing afterwards. At the hearing he was represented by counsel who, contrary to the applicant’s written appeal, did not request that any further evidence be taken. The court, having rejected the applicant’s request to postpone the hearing, examined his appeal, upholding the conviction of the first instance court.

The court found that the applicant’s guilt had been securely established in particular by the statement given by C., which was not the only evidence against the applicant, her statements having been corroborated by further indirect evidence, such as the testimony of her mother, in whom C. had confided at the material time. The appellate court also found that, although C. and her mother had not had a close relationship before, C. contacted her out of fear for her and her brother’s life and described the acts of coercion carried out by the applicant. Witness C.’s mother also claimed that the initial anonymous criminal complaint sent by email to the Prague 1 District Prosecutor’s Office had been sent by the applicant, who had thus lodged a false accusation. Her testimony was examined in detail. The indirect evidence also included text messages sent by the applicant on 5 June 2006 and the criminal complaint filed by C. in the United Kingdom on 7 June 2006. The time concurrence was thus a significant factor, too.

As regards the reliability of C. and the assessment of evidence, the court stated:

“... the assessment of the evidence is reasonable and convincing, as is [the District Court’s] conclusion concerning the reliability of witness [C.]. The District Court was not wrong in believing this witness, who proved the defendant’s guilt of the criminal acts. The testimony of the victim was not the only convincing evidence against the applicant on which the District Court based its conclusion about the defendant’s guilt, since the defendant’s criminal acts are also proved by a chain of indirect evidence corroborating the testimony of the victim and confirming the credibility of her statements. This includes, in particular, the testimony of her mother ... in whom the victim confided during a phone call on 6 June 2006 in which she described the defendant’s actions, including the way he had tied her up in his apartment, threatened her and sent her threatening emails. The testimonies given by [C.] and her mother ... regarding the relevant facts correspond to the content of the criminal complaint filed by the victim at the police station in Surrey, United Kingdom ... on 7 June 2006. The defendant’s complaint that the unreliability of the victim is proved by the fact that she did not confide earlier in her mother or a close female friend about his alleged behaviour is ill-founded: the evidence taken clearly shows that the victim and her mother did not previously have a particularly close relationship since she did not confide in her mother about her relationship with the defendant. This is understandable given that she was allegedly abused by the mother’s partner (as the victim confided in the defendant). Furthermore, the victim was already back in the United Kingdom at the relevant time (as of 3 January 2006) and her contact with the defendant was conducted solely via mobile phone calls and email correspondence. In these circumstances, the behaviour of the victim appears rather logical and understandable, i.e. confiding in her mother and brother concerning the threats to their health and her life in an SMS message. ... The reliability of the victim and the veracity of her testimony is also corroborated by the emails included in the ... These emails, which were submitted to the police by the victim, correspond case file to her testimony as to the timeframe and the contents ... It is hardly possible for the Municipal Court to believe that the victim would systematically and for many months beforehand prepare all the evidence ... in order to be able to file a criminal complaint against the defendant. In addition to the above, the defendant’s contacts with the victim (which he himself did not deny) and her reliability are also clearly shown in the defendant’s affidavit of 2 June 2006 ..., in which the defendant declared he did not have any financial claims against the victim. Finally, one should not disregard the statement of an impartial witness ... namely the victim’s psychotherapist, who confirmed that the victim came to her because of relational problems with the defendant, confided in her about having been held by the defendant against her will and driven off somewhere in his car, and about his emails threatening to harm her if she left him. All this indirect evidence is interrelated and consistent with the victim’s testimony. Consequently, the defendant’s complaint concerning the unreliability of the victim is ill-founded ... As a result, the District Court correctly believed the testimony given by the victim in relation to this matter, considering her testimony in general to be credible ...

The defendant’s behaviour and verbal aggression, as documented in the emails and SMS messages sent by him escalated at a later stage, prompting the victim to file a criminal complaint and change her contact details because she was afraid of the defendant’s behaviour after he threatened to harm her mother and brother. ...”

In respect of the applicant’s complaint concerning C.’s interview, which was conducted as an urgent and non-repeatable measure under Article 158a of the CCP, the Municipal Court noted that:

“The victim was duly interviewed in the presence of a judge ..., with the unrepeatability of the measure being determined by the long-term residence of the witness in the United Kingdom. The justification of such a procedure and the unavailability of the witness were confirmed by the efforts of the District Court to secure her attendance at the main hearing, which the witness repeatedly failed to attend, providing a written statement to the effect that she was residing abroad on a long-term basis and would not be able to attend the main hearing in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the Municipal Court deemed legal the procedure applied by the District Court whereby, after exhausting the possibility of examining the victim in the main hearing for unavailability due to her residence abroad, it read out the statement she had made ... in the pre-trial proceedings in accordance with Article 211 § 2(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although this was key evidence, it was not the only evidence proving the defendant’s guilt ...”

The appellate court admitted that the prosecutor had violated Article 176 § 2 of the CCP in reclassifying the charges without notifying the applicant. It found, however, that this omission did not impact on the legality and correctness of the reviewed judgment to the extent that a duty to reverse it resulted.

On 18 July 2010 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law (dovolání) which was rejected as unsubstantiated by the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) on 30 November 2010. The court stated that the appellate court had not proceeded erroneously in having decided the case in the absence of the applicant, who had not sufficiently substantiated his request to have the hearing postponed. It added that the applicant’s counsel had not requested that further evidence be gathered and assessed and that, therefore, there had been no need to postpone the hearing.

On 13 March 2011 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) which was dismissed by the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) in a decision of 1 December 2011 which was served on the applicant on 9 December 2011. Having analysed the testimony given by C., the Constitutional Court found that, although it was direct evidence, it was corroborated by a chain of indirect evidence, especially the testimony of her mother. In respect of the remaining complaints, the Constitutional Court agreed with the findings of the lower courts stating, in particular:

“The applicant’s complaints regarding the search in his flat and non-residential premises and lands are unsubstantiated. The search in the applicant’s domicile was carried out in compliance with Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of the search order issued by the Prague 6 District Court. The applicant had the opportunity, if he was convinced that the search is unlawful, to lodge a constitutional appeal against this order ... In a constitutional appeal against the final judgment of conviction, it is possible, in connection with a search carried out unlawfully, complain in particular the inadmissibility of concrete pieces of evidence which were gathered and on the basis of which [an applicant] was found guilty. However, the applicant did not expressly submit any concrete evidence which would be gathered illegally. ...”

On 30 August 2012 the applicant submitted to the Ministry of Justice a claim for compensation for damages caused by delays in the criminal proceedings under the State Liability Act (no. 82/1998). On 24 September 2012 his claim was rejected as having been introduced outside the six-month statutory time-limit. On 24 May 2013 the applicant filed an action for damages against the Ministry, which appears to be still pending before the Prague 2 District Court.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition)

Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in 1980 and is serving a prison sentence in the Mordoviya Republic.

According to the official version of the events, on 31 May 2007 K., a close friend of the applicant, was arrested by the police when he attempted to sell to P. the amphetamines he had earlier bought from the applicant. K. voluntarily agreed to participate in a fake drug deal organised by the police to help them arrest the applicant in order to stop his drug dealing. He made a written statement to that effect. K. called the applicant in the presence of two attesting witnesses and police officers and asked him to sell him ten ecstasy pills. The applicant met K. at 11 p.m. He gave him the drugs and K. paid him in cash. The police officers then arrested him. K. gave the police the drugs he had received from the applicant. The police took the marked banknotes K. had paid for the drugs from the applicant’s bag. Then they cut the applicant’s nails for forensic analysis. The attesting witnesses were present at the scene and could observe the whole operation.

According to the applicant, K. called him and asked for help because he had been arrested. He also asked for money. The applicant agreed to help him. When he met K., the latter put several banknotes in his bag, which was open. Then several plain-clothed police officers arrested him. They handcuffed him, took the banknotes which K. had planted in his bag, cut a section out of his bag and cut his nails, together with some adjacent skin. When the applicant refused to sign the arrest record, one of the police officers punched him. The applicant then signed the document.

The applicant was taken to a police station. The head of the police station, S., beat the applicant up in order to make him confess to the crime. The police officers also took some of the applicant’s personal effects and the cash he had on him. The applicant spent the night at the police station.

On 1 June 2007 the applicant met with a lawyer, Kh. The latter told him to confess to the crime and to give some cash to the police. They would then let him go and make sure that he received a conditional sentence. The applicant did as he had been told by Kh.

The applicant remained in custody during the criminal proceedings against him.

On 17 January 2008 the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow found the applicant guilty of drug dealing and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. The court based its findings on (1) the testimonies of K., police officers, one of the attesting witnesses and the investigator; (2) materials pertaining to the fake drug deal; and (3) forensic evidence. The court also noted that the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment had not been subjected to examination in the course of the trial.

At the trial the applicant was represented by three lawyers. He pleaded not guilty. He recounted his version of the events, alleging that K. and the police had set him up.

On 23 April 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal.

The Government’s submissions as regards the conditions in which the applicant was transported may be summarised as follows:

The applicant was always transported alone in a single compartment. He was allowed to use a toilet at the courthouse, if necessary. Once at the courthouse, he had access to drinking water.

The Department of the Interior used five types of van for transporting defendants to and from the courthouse. The GAZ-2705 van had an inmate compartment measuring 2.7 by 1.6 by 1.5 m comprising two cells with seating capacity for four persons each and one single cell. The inmate compartment in GAZ-3307 and GAZ-3309 vans measured 3.8 by 2.4 by 1.6 m and had two cells with seating capacity for twelve persons each and one single cell. The inmate compartment of the KAVZ-3976 van measured 3.0 by 2.1 by 1.7 m and had one cell with seating capacity for five persons and six single cells. The inmate compartment in ZIL-4331 vans measured 4.5 by 2.4 by 1.65 m and had two cells with seating capacity for seventeen persons each and two single cells.

The vans were ventilated through an opening in the door and by vents in the compartments. They were equipped with heating and lighting. They were cleaned daily and disinfected on a weekly basis. The vans were in good working order at all times.

According to the technical specifications for prison vans submitted by the Government, a single compartment in a prison van cannot measure less than 0.5 by 0.6 m. The width of one seating place should be 0.45 m.

According to the applicant, he was placed in a prison van compartment measuring 0.7 by 0.7 by 1.6 m. It was lined with metal sheeting and completely isolated from the rest of the van interior. The height of the compartments in the van was insufficient for a man of average stature to enter or stand up without hunching. Inmates were to remain seated at all times while inside the van. On average, each trip lasted three and a half hours. After the court hearings, the applicant and other detainees were first taken to remand prison no. 77/1, where they were sorted depending on destination. Throughout the time the vans were parked at the remand prison, their engines were off and the lighting, heating and ventilation did not function. The compartments inside the vans were very cold in the winter, when the outside temperature was minus 25oC. The inmates were not allowed to use the toilet. All the inmates smoked and the applicant, a nonsmoker, was exposed to second-hand tobacco smoke.

On 21 May 2008 the applicant was transported to a correctional colony to serve his prison sentence.

According to the Government, the applicant was taken from the remand prison to the railway station in a prison van. The trip lasted four hours (from 3.40 to 7.40 a.m.). It took forty minutes to place the prisoners in railway carriages (from 7.40 to 8.20 a.m.). The train journey lasted fifteen hours and ten minutes (from 8.20 a.m. to 11.30 p.m.). On arrival at the destination station, the inmates were again placed in vans and taken to the respective detention facilities. The trip lasted thirty-five minutes (from 11.30 p.m. to 12.05 a.m.).

The train compartment in which the applicant was placed measured 2.05 by 1.51 m. The number of inmates placed in the compartment did not exceed twelve. There were five berths and eight seats in the compartment. The berth was 2.05 m long. The passage between the berths and seats in the compartment was 0.47 m wide. All the inmates had luggage which they were allowed to place under the lower berths. The railway carriage was equipped with heating and ventilation in good working order.

As regards the smoking issue, the Government submitted as follows:

“Inmates transported by [train] ... are not allowed to smoke. They are warned accordingly by the chief guard. However, the inmates who smoked, during a long trip, became stressed if deprived of smoking. They took advantage of the fact that they were allowed to have cigarettes on them and those could not be confiscated. They tried to smoke, hiding it with skill. Their attempts to smoke, if noticed by the guard, were stopped ... ”

Inmates were not allowed to use the toilet within the boundaries of Moscow, that is at the station and during the first forty minutes of the journey. Thereafter, they were allowed to use the toilet every two hours.

According to the Government, the applicant submitted three complaints to the prosecutor’s office about the conditions of his transport. In response, the latter asked the authorities in charge of detainees’ transport to conduct an inquiry. No violations were disclosed.

The trip lasted eighteen hours. The applicant was placed in a train compartment measuring 2.9 square metres together with twelve other inmates. They were not allowed to use the toilet throughout the journey and had to use plastic bottles in the compartment instead. Almost all of the inmates smoked, and the applicant was exposed to second-hand tobacco smoke.

According to a statement signed by the acting head of remand prison SIZO-6 in Moscow and submitted by the Government, during the applicant’s detention in the remand prison from 4 June 2007 to 21 May 2008, he underwent regular medical examinations and received any necessary treatment.

Upon arrival at the remand prison, the applicant underwent obligatory blood tests, an X-ray examination and a physical check-up. The blood tests confirmed the presence of HIV (stage 2 – asymptomatic HIV infection). He was prescribed a special diet and placed under regular medical supervision.

During the period from May 2008 to date, the applicant has been serving a prison sentence in a number of correctional colonies. The parties did not indicate the exact colony numbers.

Following his arrival at correctional colony no. IK-18 in Mordoviya Republic, the applicant underwent a complete physical check-up. The general practitioner recommended consultation with an infectious diseases specialist and a psychiatrist, and prescribed a general blood test and a general sputum smear test.

On 29 May and 22 October 2008 the applicant had X-ray examinations. No abnormalities in the lungs were detected.

According to the applicant’s medical file, he did not receive any HIV-related treatment or examinations in 2008.

On 22 January 2009 the applicant was transferred to a medical correctional colony in order to undergo a comprehensive medical examination. He was examined by an infectious diseases specialist and had a CD4 cell count on 29 January 2009. His CD4 cell count was 759. The diagnosis (stage 2 – asymptomatic HIV infection) was confirmed. He had a biochemical blood test and urine samples were taken. On 30 January 2009 he was discharged from hospital in a satisfactory condition and transferred back to correctional colony no. IK-18.

On 26 January, 25 April and 23 October 2009 the applicant had Xray examinations. No abnormalities in the lungs were detected.

On 5 February, 23 July and 17 December 2009 the applicant consulted the infectious diseases specialist. On 24 December 2009, following contact with a tuberculosis-infected inmate, the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist who recommended preventive antituberculosis treatment.

On 9 December 2009 the applicant had a viral load test.

On 16 February 2010 the applicant had another CD4 cell count. On 11 March 2010 he consulted the infectious diseases specialist. Because the applicant had a low CD4 cell count of 182, the doctor re-classified the applicant’s diagnosis as stage 4A and recommended antiretroviral therapy. The applicant consented.

On the same day the applicant was examined by the tuberculosis specialist. Subsequently, he underwent preventive medical treatment until 30 March 2010.

It appears that the applicant started antiretroviral therapy on 22 March 2010, but developed an allergic reaction to the medication. On 27 March 2010 he consulted the infectious diseases specialist by telephone. The latter recommended discontinuing the treatment. The applicant followed the doctor’s recommendation.

On 15 April 2010 the applicant resumed antiretroviral therapy, which was discontinued in view of the allergic reaction.

From 11 to 28 May 2010 the applicant underwent a medical examination in hospital. On 18 May (or 7 June) 2010 his CD4 cell count was 583. In view of the test results and referring to the side effects of the antiretroviral therapy, the applicant refused to undergo the therapy.

On 15 May 2010 the applicant had an ultrasound scan of his liver, which disclosed diffuse liver changes.

On 5 August 2010 the applicant’s CD4 cell count was 572.

On 3 October 2010 the applicant had a chest X-ray examination. No abnormalities were detected.

From 18 (February) to 4 March and from 18 to 28 April 2011 the applicant underwent an HIV-related examination in hospital. He had an ultrasound scan in connection with polyposis of the gallbladder and diffuse liver changes, and was examined by an infectious diseases specialist.

On 18 February 2011 the applicant had a chest X-ray. No abnormalities in the lungs were detected. On 15 March 2011 the applicant consulted a tuberculosis specialist.

The applicant was admitted to hospital and received treatment for acute gastritis from 4 to 19 July 2011.

On 19 July 2011 the applicant had another chest X-ray, which showed infiltrative shadows on the left lung. On 1 August 2011 the applicant was examined by the tuberculosis specialist, who prescribed a further tomographic examination and sputum smear test.

On 20 July 2011 the applicant agreed to undergo antiretroviral treatment. It appears that it was not carried out at the time.

From 19 July to 16 August 2011 the applicant underwent another HIV-related examination in hospital.

The sputum smear test of 2 August 2011 proved negative. The tomography of 8 August 2011 showed infiltration in the left lung. On 10 August 2011 the tuberculosis specialist ruled out the possibility of tuberculosis infection.

The applicant was admitted to hospital and received treatment for acute laryngitis from 17 to 29 August 2011.

On 8 September 2011 the applicant consulted the infectious diseases specialist.

On 11 September 2011 the applicant’s CD4 cell count was 452.

On 23 September 2011 the applicant had a chest X-ray and was diagnosed with tuberculosis (infiltration stage). On the same day he was admitted to hospital, where he underwent treatment for tuberculosis until 2 December 2011.

From 31 January to 10 February and from 13 to 24 February 2012 the applicant was admitted to hospital for examinations. It was established that his HIV condition was progressing and it was diagnosed as stage 4.

From 18 May to 5 October 2012 the applicant underwent treatment for HIV and tuberculosis in hospital. His CD4 cell count of 13 August 2012 was 303. According to the applicant, he started antiretroviral treatment in September 2012.

The applicant received HIV examinations and treatment in hospital from 17 May to 14 June 2013. Upon discharge, his condition was considered satisfactory.

According to the applicant, the antiretroviral treatment was interrupted from 12 to 22 June 2013 owing to a lack of necessary medication. The applicant’s medical file contains an entry confirming the lack of necessary medication in stock. On 22 June 2013 the applicant received the medication to resume the antiretroviral treatment. Subsequently, there were no interruptions in the prescribed treatment.

On an unspecified date the applicant asked for a transfer to a correctional facility with a less strict regime.

On 14 August 2012 the Tengushevskiy District Court of the Mordoviya Republic dismissed the applicant’s request, noting that he should complete the medical treatment prescribed prior to such a transfer, if any. The applicant did not appeal.

According to the applicant, the administration of correctional colony no. LPU-5 in the Mordoviya Republic where he was serving his prison sentence refused to dispatch his letters of 15 December 2011, and 24 February, 21 June and 15 July 2012 addressed to the Court, in which he complained of inadequate medical care. He further alleged that the letters of 4 April and 1 August 2012, which he had received from the Court, had been opened and read by the administration of the correctional colony; that his letter addressed to the Court of 14 June 2012 had been opened and dispatched with twenty-five days’ delay; and that his letter addressed to his lawyer, Sh., of 22 June 2012 had not been dispatched.