Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-e - Persons of unsound mind);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Jon Fridrik Kjølbro;Ledi Bianku;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano

The applicant was born in 1957. He is detained in the Paifve social-protection institution (“the Paifve EDS”).

In 1997 the applicant was convicted of theft and of sexual assault, by the Liège Court of Appeal and the Eupen Criminal Court respectively. The prison sentences were due to end on 20 February 2004.

While imprisoned, the applicant committed offences in respect of which fresh proceedings were brought. On 16 June 2003 the Committals Division (chambre du conseil) of the Liège Court of First Instance decided, pursuant to section 7 of the Law of 9 April 1930 on Social Protection in respect of Mental Defectives, Habitual Offenders and Persons Convicted of certain Sexual Offences (the “Social Protection Act”), and on the basis, inter alia, of a neuropsychiatric report by Dr L., dated 15 December 2001, and a report by psychologist H., dated 20 August 2002, to order the applicant’s preventive detention.

On 1 August 2003 the Indictment Division of the Liège Court of Appeal upheld that decision. The applicant did not appeal on points of law.

On 15 January 2004, based among other elements on a psychiatric report by Dr V. dated 23 September 2003, the Minister of Justice also decided that the applicant was to be detained in a psychiatric institution, pursuant to section 21 of the Social Protection Act, as a continuation of the sentences imposed in 1997.

On 21 January 2004 the applicant entered the Paifve EDS, located in the French-speaking region, further to a decision of 16 October 2003 by the Social Protection Board for the Lantin Prison psychiatric wing (the “CDS”).

On an unspecified date the applicant made an initial application for release on a trial basis.

On 27 January 2006 the CDS postponed its examination of the request for release on a trial basis until March 2006, and recommended finding an institution that could admit the applicant and provide him with therapy in German, the only language he could understand and speak.

The application was examined by the CDS on 9 June 2006. At the hearing, the head of the Paifve EDS acknowledged that the institution was unable to provide the therapeutic care recommended by the experts who had already been consulted, given that no German-speaking doctor, therapist, psychologist, social worker or warden was employed in the institution.

In consequence, the CDS held:

“It is undisputed that the detainee speaks only German, and that the medical, welfare and prison staff in the institution in which he is detained are unable to provide him with any therapeutic or welfare assistance; he has been abandoned to his fate without any treatment since his arrival in Paifve (on 21 January 2004), even if some individuals have, on a voluntary basis, made considerable efforts to explain to him his situation, which he experiences as an injustice;

In the present case, the two-fold legal aim of the preventive detention, namely protection of society and of the patient’s health, can only be achieved if the deprivation of liberty is accompanied by the treatment necessitated by the detainee’s mental health; since this double condition is not fulfilled, [Mr] Rooman’s detention is unlawful; ...”

The CDS postponed its examination of the application for release on a trial basis until a hearing in September 2006, pending the appointment of German-speaking employees to the Paifve EDS.

In accordance with an order by the chairperson of the CDS of 24 September 2006, the applicant was transferred to Verviers Prison so that its German-language psychosocial team could assess his mental health and ascertain whether he posed a danger to the public. On 30 October 2006 the CDS confirmed this order and postponed the case to a later date.

On 26 January 2007 the CDS dismissed the application for release on parole. It had been indicated in a report of 24 January 2007, drawn up by the German-language psychosocial team in Verviers Prison, that the applicant had a psychotic personality and paranoid character traits (high self-opinion, feeling of omnipotence, lack of self-criticism and threatening remarks) and that he was refusing any treatment. Furthermore, the CDS noted that there was no institution in Belgium which could meet the security and language requirements in the applicant’s specific case; the only German-language hospital which could be considered was an open hospital, and it had thus to be ruled out in view of the applicant’s mental health.

On 14 April 2008 the applicant applied for day release. On 5 June 2008 the CDS noted that it had proved impossible to provide any treatment and that the search for a German-language institution had proved unsuccessful. Accordingly, it ordered the Eupen remand prison to prepare a plan for release on a trial basis, and ordered a new expert report in order to assess the level of danger posed by the applicant. It adjourned examination of the request sine die.

Having received a new application from the applicant for release on a trial basis, the CDS held, in a decision of 5 May 2009:

“There has been no progress in Mr Rooman’s situation; progress cannot occur until he is in a setting where he can be understood in his own language, like any citizen of this country. A single member of the prison staff, a nurse [A.W.], is temporarily providing him with social contact, whereas a psychiatrist and/or a psychologist should be available to him.

The prison authorities have not put forward any kind of solution to this problem, of which its various services are fully aware. Worse, as those authorities are unable to provide him with the necessary treatment, they seem to have resigned themselves to a role that extends no further than an unfair repressive detention.

The medical reports and [Dr Ro.’s] expert report indicate that Rooman, who continues to present a danger to society, cannot be released without support and preparation in an institutional setting, something that cannot currently be provided in Belgium, but is available abroad.”

In consequence, the CDS invited the Eupen remand prison to prepare, together with applicant, a plan for release on a trial basis, and encouraged the authorities to take, rapidly, the measures necessary to improve the applicant’s situation. It adjourned the case to a later date. 22. On 13 October 2009 the CDS found:

“In the years since this file was opened (October 2003), the persons involved in this case have been thwarted by the fact that the detainee speaks and understands only one language, and that the authorities have no German-speaking staff available for him, with the exception of one nurse [A.W.] (who is apparently due to retire in the near future);

In September 2005 Doctor [Ri.], expert, wrote that relaxation of the detainee’s regime ‘is possible only in parallel with successful treatment, assessed by predefined steps. The treatment must begin in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution...’ Given that treatment in Germany is impossible, it was to begin in Paifve with German-speaking psychiatrists and therapists;

Since that time the detainee’s situation has not changed: he converses with and leaves the building only in the company of the sole German-speaking member of staff, and a treatment programme has not even been put in place. No satisfactory follow-up has been given to the requests by the [Social Protection] Board for an end to be put to this unlawful situation for Mr Rooman, who is deprived of his freedom in order, on the one hand, to protect society from possible dangerous conduct by him, and on the other, to provide him with the treatment necessary for his reinsertion;...

In the light of the authorities’ failure, the question now before the Board is whether there exists, outside the social-protection facility, a unit or persons who could provide home-based therapy for Mr Rooman; ...”

On those grounds, and pointing out that German was one of the national languages and that the applicant was thus entitled to speak, be understood and receive treatment in that language, the CDS asked the Eupen remand prison to search in and around Verviers and Eupen for either a mental health unit, or a doctor or clinic, which could provide home-based therapy for the applicant in his mother tongue. It reserved its decision on the application for release on parole.

On 12 January 2010 the applicant submitted pleadings in support of his application for release. He criticised the failure to provide him with therapeutic care and the effect on his health of any prospect of seeing his situation improve. As his main submission, he requested his immediate release on the grounds of the illegality of his detention. Alternatively, he asked that the CDS impose an obligation on the relevant authorities to take all necessary measures so that he would receive the treatment required by his mental-health condition in his mother tongue.

By an interlocutory decision of 13 January 2010, the CDS noted that the applicant’s situation had not changed and that the reply from the Eupen judicial assistance unit left no hope of ensuring that the applicant would receive appropriate treatment, in a secure establishment or elsewhere. The CDS considered that it was necessary to attempt one last plea to the Minister of Justice, whose intervention had previously led to some changes, even if they were insufficient to resolve the problem. The CDS accordingly ordered that an “official denunciation” of the applicant’s situation be sent to the Minister of Justice.

On 29 April 2010 the CDS noted that the Minister of Justice had not replied to its submission and that the applicant’s situation had worsened, in that he could no longer count on help from the German-speaking nurse A.W., who had left the Paifve EDS. The CDS continued:

“It follows from the report [from the psychosocial department] of 30 March 2010 that, except for occasional meetings with a social worker “who speaks German”, the detainee has no social contact in his language and that he has had no opportunity for several months to converse and to gain a fresh perspective in the outside world; the doctor and psychologist who signed this report do not seem particularly convinced by the completion of the ‘ongoing measures (taken) by the department to enable a German-language psychologist to intervene occasionally to provide care for the German-speaking patients in the EDS’;

Mr Rooman’s situation is frozen: an ill individual, he is detained in a prison medical institution where no one is able to provide the treatment to which he is entitled; the Minister and his departments are turning a deaf ear, with no concern for the despair to which this manifestly unjust attitude may give rise;

In spite of the unlawfulness of Mr Rooman’s detention, his health condition means that release cannot be envisaged unless it is accompanied by therapy and practical support;

The [Social Protection] Board has no powers, firstly, to restore the detainee’s basic rights, namely, the rights to liberty, to health care and to respect for his humanity, and secondly, to compel the Minister to put an end to this situation, which his administration has been fully aware of for more than six years.”

The CDS decided, while “remaining open to any proposals”, to leave the applicant’s situation unchanged; in other words, it rejected his application for release.

The applicant appealed against that decision to the Higher Social Protection Board (“the CSDS”).

In parallel, the applicant made an urgent application to the President of the Liège Court of First Instance, in order to have his detention declared unlawful and obtain his immediate release, or, alternatively, to obtain a decision ordering the Belgian State to provide him with the medical care required by his situation.

By an order of 12 May 2010, the president of the court held that he did not have jurisdiction, on the grounds that the CDS was the lawful body with power to release the applicant or decide on his continued detention.

On 27 May 2010 the CSDS upheld the CDS’s decision of 29 April 2010 to maintain the applicant in detention. Unlike the CDS, the CSDS held that the applicant’s detention was perfectly legal, given that he had been lawfully detained and that he did not fulfil the conditions for definitive or conditional release. Under section 18 of the Social Protection Act, release could only be ordered if the detainee’s mental condition had improved sufficiently and if the conditions for his social reinsertion had been satisfied. However, this was not the situation here. The CSDS also considered that the mere fact that the applicant spoke only German did not mean that the authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the treatment required by his condition.

The applicant appealed on points of law, alleging a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention.

On 8 September 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law. In response to the argument alleging a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, it held that legal reasons had been given for the CSDS’s decision and that it had been justified in law. It found:

“As preventive detention is primarily a security measure, the therapeutic action necessitated by such detention is not legally required in order for the detention to be lawful, even if its aim, secondary to that of protecting society, is to provide the detained person with the necessary treatment.

The social protection boards derive from section 14 (2) of the Act the power, rather than the obligation, to order, in a decision giving specific reasons, placement in an institution that is appropriate in terms of the security measures and the treatment to be given. It follows that execution of the preventive detention measure does not become unlawful solely because it is implemented in one of the institutions created by the government for that purpose, rather than in another institution specifically designated for the possible treatment it might provide.”

The argument alleging a violation of Article 3 of the Convention was declared inadmissible, since its examination would require a factual verification of the conditions in which the preventive detention was being conducted and such an examination fell outside the scope of the Court of Cassation’s jurisdiction. For the remainder, the Court of Cassation considered that the CSDS had replied to the applicant’s complaint in finding that the fact that he spoke only German did not mean that the relevant authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the care he required.

On 13 November 2013 the applicant again applied for release.

A report by the psychosocial department of the Paifve EDS, dated 13 January 2014, reiterated that the applicant had a poor command of the French language, and spoke only a few words of French, which did not enable him to conduct a conversation; in consequence, he had very little contact with the other patients and members of staff. The report also referred to a single meeting between the applicant and a German-speaking psychologist in June 2010. The report noted an improvement in the applicant’s behaviour; he was apparently less aggressive and intolerant than before. Further, the applicant had never expressed a wish to meet members of the psychosocial team on a regular basis. The report concluded that he should remain in detention in the Paifve EDS, citing among other reasons his “untreated mental health problems”.

On 24 January 2014 the CDS noted, firstly, the content of the reports by Dr Ri., of 5 September 2005, and Dr Ro., of 21 January 2009, which stressed the need for psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution, before an open facility could be envisaged. The CDS noted that, in the interim, the various attempts to find a solution to the language problem had not succeeded in bringing about a significant improvement in the applicant’s health: the rare outings accompanied by a German-speaking member of the prison staff had been abandoned when this employee, who was not replaced, became unavailable; attempts to find a German-language institution, doctor or therapist had met with failure; no follow-up seemed to have been given to the announcement that a minimum number of German-speaking staff were to be recruited, and the applicant had, of his own accord, declined the assistance of the German-speaking social worker with whom he had occasionally met. The CDS rejected the application for release on parole, finding that the conditions for release (an improvement in the applicant’s mental state and guarantees for his social rehabilitation) were not met. With regard to the alleged absence of treatment in German, the CDS specified:

“The detainee claims that he is not receiving the appropriate treatment for his mental health condition in German, his mother tongue, without however describing or even mentioning the treatment that he has allegedly been denied and that he would agree to accept or in which he would take part. The mere fact that he only speaks German does not mean that the Paifve social-protection facility has not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the care his condition requires.

While, as the applicant points out in his submissions, it is for the relevant authorities to take all the necessary measures for his health, it is not, however, within the [Social Protection] Board’s powers to release a detainee who claims to be the victim of shortcomings on the part of the authorities...

Nor does the Board have jurisdiction to issue orders to the authorities or to third parties, [or] to penalise their actions or shortcomings ...”

On 3 April 2014 the CSDS upheld the decision by the CDS, finding, among other points:

“Contrary to what he alleges in his pleadings, the detainee receives all the treatment required by his condition, from competent and qualified staff in the Paifve EDS, and his specific medical needs are fully taken into account. In spite of the treatment given, the detainee’s mental condition has not yet improved sufficiently, on account of his paranoid and psychopathic character traits, his lack of self-criticism and his constant demand. The detainee is thus clearly wrong in attributing the lack of improvement in his mental condition to the language issue alone.

The continued preventive detention in a EDS that is adapted to his medical condition of an individual who would represent a danger to the public in the event of release, where his mental condition has not sufficiently improved and the conditions for his social rehabilitation are not met, is not unlawful and does not amount to a violation of the provisions of the [Convention].”

On 25 June 2014 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision by the CSDS on the grounds that it had not addressed the applicant’s argument that he was not receiving care appropriate to his situation, in view of the fact that he spoke and understood only German and that no German-speaking staff members were available in the facility where he was being held. The case was sent back to the CSDS with a differently constituted membership.

On 22 July 2014 the CSDS issued an interlocutory finding, requesting the CDS to appoint a group of German-speaking experts to update the psychiatric report of 21 January 2009. It instructed the head of the Paifve EDS institution to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the requisite care was made available, by at least providing the services of a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist. It ordered that the case be reopened and scheduled a hearing for 17 October 2014.

The Court has not been informed of the progress of those proceedings.

In the meantime, on 28 March 2014 the applicant brought proceedings against the Belgian State before the President of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance, as the judge responsible for hearing urgent applications in application of Article 584 of the Judicial Code. He asked for his release or, as a subsidiary measure, the imposition of the measures required by his state of health.

By an interlocutory order of 4 July 2014, the president of the court asked the head of the Paifve EDS and Dr B. from the psychosocial unit in that EDS to submit statements concerning the treatment available in the Paifve EDS and the treatment that had in fact been provided to the applicant.

Statements submitted by the head of the Paifve EDS and by Dr B. on 28 August 2014 indicated that the applicant now had access to consultations with a German-speaking psychologist and that the authorities had made contact with a German-speaking psychiatrist who had agreed to meet the applicant.

In an order of 10 October 2014, the president of the court noted that, until September 2014, the applicant had never had access to a psychiatrist who could communicate with him in German. He had had access to a German-speaking psychologist, outside the EDS, between May and November 2010. He noted that the consultations with the psychologist had come to an end not, as alleged by the State in its pleadings, because the applicant no longer wished to attend them, but because of late payment by the Belgian State of the psychologist’s fees and expenses. The consultations with the psychologist had, however, resumed in July 2014. The president then noted that, until April 2010, the applicant had benefitted from the presence of and care provided by a German-speaking nurse, that that nurse had in the meantime left the Paifve EDS, but that since August 2014 he had been authorised to accompany the applicant on outings. Lastly, the order noted that the applicant had had contacts with a German-speaking social worker, but that he had declined the latter’s services in February 2014.

With regard to the main request, the president held that he did not have jurisdiction to order the applicant’s release, as only the social protection bodies had power to do so. With regard to the subsidiary request, the president noted that the applicant had not had access to the mental health treatment required by his condition, and that there was prima facie a violation of his right of access to health care. His situation amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. In consequence, the president ordered the Belgian State to appoint a German-speaking psychiatrist and medical auxiliary for the applicant, subject to a penalty in the event of non-compliance, and to put in place the care routinely provided to French-speaking detainees suffering from a mental illness similar to that of the applicant.

On the basis of the information produced, no appeal has been lodged against this order. According to the applicant’s representative, the Belgian State appointed a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist, who visited the applicant several times. However, these visits stopped at the end of 2015.

In the meantime, on 2 May 2014 the applicant had filed a negligence claim against the Belgian State, on the basis of Article 1382 of the Civil Code.

By a judgment of 9 September 2016, the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance held the fact of having failed to provide the applicant with psychological treatment in his mother tongue between 2010 and 2014 to be negligent. It held, in particular:

“It is undeniable that the psychiatric and psychological treatment which [the applicant] must enjoy must be provided to him in German, the only language in which he is fluent and, moreover, one of the three national languages in Belgium.

However, between 2010 and 2014 [the applicant] received no medico-psychiatric treatment in his own language.

Whatever the quality – which is, indeed, undisputed – of the care provided to detainees in the Paifve [EDS], it is totally inappropriate for [the applicant’s] mental-health condition merely on account of the fact that it is not available in German.

In spite of the official and repeated denunciations of this situation by the Social Protection Board to the Belgian State since 2010, the latter has taken no steps to correct it. In addition, it has produced no evidence of the least action taken by it to that end.

This failure to act amounts to negligence within the meaning of Article 1382 of the Civil Code.

Moreover, and as [the applicant] also submits, Articles 3 and 5 [of the Convention] require the Belgian State to take the necessary measures to provide him with access to the basic care necessitated by his mental health.

In the present case, the applicant’s vulnerability on account of the very nature of his psychological disorder and the absence of any genuine possibility of contact in his language have necessarily exacerbated his feelings of distress and anxiety.

It is immaterial that, in any event, the [applicant’s] state of mental health does not allow for his release. The mere fact of having been detained for an indefinite period without appropriate care amounts in the present case to a violation of Articles 3 and 5 [of the Convention].

Contrary to the submissions of the Belgian State, the fact that [the applicant] is not always receptive to psychological, medical and social therapy does not allow for minimisation of the Belgian State’s negligent attitude towards a person who suffers from a mental disorder, whose discernment is, by assumption, uncertain.

By the same token, at the risk of setting aside the lived experience of the person suffering from a mental disorder, [the applicant’s] stable conduct within the institution does not suffice to establish that he received appropriate care for his condition.”

Finding that this absence of treatment had caused mental suffering to the applicant, the court ordered the State to pay him 75,000 euros (“EUR”), an amount assessed ex aequo et bono, in compensation for the period for the January 2010 to October 2014.

According to information provided on 19 June 2017 by his representative, the applicant was due to lodge an appeal against this judgment. He challenges the period accepted by the court and argues that the lack of treatment pre-dated 2010; he also complains about a lack of treatment in 2016 and the decision to award compensation ex aequo et bono rather than on a daily basis.


No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court)

Elisabeth Steiner;Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre;Julia Laffranque;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Tallinn.

On 29 June 2005 the applicant and O., a Nigerian national, married in Copenhagen, Denmark, where they were living at that time.

Since 1 November 2005 they have lived apart. According to the applicant, in 2006 she initiated proceedings for dissolution of the marriage in Denmark. By a decision of 2 November 2007 the Copenhagen City Court decided to grant the applicant separation from O. – which in Danish law is not identical to a divorce, since the spouses remained legally married. According to the decision O. was thought to be in Nigeria; he had been summoned to court by a public notice but had not appeared. It appears that the marriage between the applicant and O. has not been officially dissolved.

In September 2008 the applicant moved to Estonia. On 4 October 2008 she gave birth to a daughter, A., whose father, according to the applicant, was D. When registering the birth, the applicant was told by the officials of the municipality that since she was married, her husband O. would be registered as the child’s father. According to the applicant this was done despite her objections.

On 28 September 2009 the applicant lodged a claim with the Harju County Court seeking a declaration that the entry in the birth register concerning her daughter’s father was incorrect. She provided the court with a notice from the Copenhagen population register about O.’s registered address but added that in fact O. no longer lived there and she did not know his actual address. She asked the court to serve the summons on the defendant by a public notice.

By a decision of 15 December 2009 the County Court declined to proceed with the examination of the claim. It noted that the applicant had paid 1,000 kroons (EEK) (approximately 64 euros (EUR)) in State fees instead of the applicable fee of EEK 5,000 (EUR 320). The County Court gave the applicant a thirty-day time-limit to pay the remaining part of the fee. It also gave the applicant the same time-limit to find out where O. currently lived. The court noted that in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure (Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik), in filiation cases parties had to appear in court in person and they also had to be summoned personally. Accordingly, the court could not proceed with the claim without having information about the defendant’s address. The court noted that in view of the fact that the defendant was a Nigerian national probably living in Denmark, it was likely that the defendant had to be heard in a court in the place of his residence in line with the provisions of EU Council Regulation no. 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters. However, for that it was necessary to ascertain where O. was residing. The court noted that it was the plaintiff’s obligation to find out where O. actually lived; it considered that the applicant’s efforts in this respect had not been sufficient. It referred to the fact that O. was the applicant’s husband and that divorce proceedings were pending before a Danish court, and concluded that the applicant had better chances of ascertaining O.’s whereabouts, for example through his acquaintances, relatives and colleagues.

On 30 December 2009 the applicant requested the County Court to declare unconstitutional the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure related to the State fee and the requirement that the defendant be summoned and that he appear in court in person. She also informed the court of her intention to request information from the Danish police as to the defendant’s residence and asked for an extension of the time-limit to rectify the deficiencies in her claim indicated by the County Court in its decision of 15 December 2009.

By a decision of 12 February 2010 the County Court dismissed the applicant’s request concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It acceded to the applicant’s request for the extension of the time-limit.

It appears that the applicant did not inform the County Court of whether she had made any inquiries about O.’s whereabouts to the Danish authorities or of the results of any such inquiries.

On 16 April 2010 the County Court declined to entertain the case since the applicant had failed to eliminate the deficiencies indicated in its earlier decisions. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision.

In the meantime, on 18 March 2010, the applicant lodged a new claim with the Harju County Court seeking the establishment of her daughter’s filiation from D., a British national living in the United Kingdom. She asked the court to order that a DNA test be carried out with the assistance of the British authorities. The applicant supplied the court with D.’s and his parents’ addresses.

On 20 April 2010 the County Court refused to examine the claim. Referring to the Supreme Court’s case-law (judgment of 12 September 1996, case no. 3-2-3-20-96), the County Court found that it was not legally possible to establish the child’s filiation from D. without the entry in the birth register, according to which her father was O., having been declared incorrect beforehand. The claims could not be examined simultaneously.

The applicant appealed. On 17 June 2010 the Tallinn Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court, which decided not to examine the appeal on 8 September 2010.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

András Sajó;Egidijus Kūris;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano

The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained in Stargard Szczeciński.

The applicant is a habitual offender. He was arrested on an unspecified date on suspicion of uttering threats. He was subsequently convicted as charged and sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment. He was first detained in Nowogard Prison and subsequently in Goleniów Prison.

On 7 September 2011 the applicant’s cell was searched. During the search the prison officers found a note entitled “Protest letter” signed by 135 prisoners. The prisoners stated their opposition to the forthcoming changes to the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences affecting, in particular, the possibility of shopping during prison visits. The letter was confiscated by the authorities.

On 8 September 2011 the Nowogard Prison Penitentiary Commission imposed on the applicant the so-called “dangerous detainee” regime. The commission held that the applicant was one of the organisers of a planned collective remonstrance in Nowogard Prison, and that it was therefore necessary to isolate him from other prisoners.

The applicant appealed against that decision. He submitted that he was not the organiser of the protest but merely one of 140 prisoners who had signed the letter.

On 29 November 2011 the Szczecin Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court held that the decision had been lawful.

On an unknown date the applicant was transferred to Goleniów Prison.

On 6 December 2011 the Goleniów Prison Penitentiary Commission extended the imposition of the “dangerous detainee” regime, holding that the applicant represented a serious threat to the community and should be kept in a solitary cell. The applicant appealed.

On 31 January 2012 the Szczecin Regional Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to the commission. The court held that only the original decision to impose the regime of 8 September 2011 had been justified. The following one taken on 6 December 2011 had not indicated any new circumstances justifying the continuing application of the regime and its reasoning had been scarce. The court noted that several months had elapsed since the applicant had signed the protest letter and the suppositions regarding the allegedly planned collective remonstrance of the prisoners had been not confirmed.

On 14 February 2012 the Goleniów Prison Penitentiary Commission decided to lift the “dangerous detainee” regime. The regime was imposed on the applicant for a total of five months and seven days.


Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Dmitry Dedov;Elisabeth Steiner;Erik Møse;Khanlar Hajiyev;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque

The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Orel. At the time of the events the applicant, a Ph.D. in Physics and Mathematics, was a tenured professor in the physics department of the Orel State Technical University.

By Order no. 383 of 14 December 2006, the president (ректор) of the Orel State Technical University convened a university-wide conference for the election of the university’s academic senate (ученый совет), its standing governing body. The date of the conference was fixed for 26 December 2006. According to the Regulation on the Composition of the Academic Senate of the Orel University, candidates to the senate were to be nominated at staff meetings in structural entities by open majority vote (section 3 of the Regulation of 12 December 2006).

Unhappy about the fact that neither he nor his colleagues in the physics department had been consulted or informed about the nomination and discussion of candidates to the academic senate, the applicant took the floor at the above public conference and spoke as follows:

“... the elected academic senate may not be considered a legitimate body and its decisions likewise cannot be considered legitimate. All of them can be challenged in courts. The problem is that the staff or departments did not know anything about the candidates to the academic senate or of their academic achievements; no one nominated those candidates. This is some kind of a private party that is going on, some people have gathered and elected themselves. My rights have been violated: I, as a member of the faculty, have been excluded from the procedure which is of great importance both for me and for the university as a whole – the election of the academic senate. My rights have been breached, and I will complain to courts about the breaches of my rights. The rights of ordinary university employees, ordinary lecturers, have been breached, too: they were removed from the election to the academic senate, this is discrimination. Any discrimination is a form of war; you have declared war to the people, and sooner or later you will get the results of this war in some way or another, in your own families.”

The Orel University sued the applicant in defamation, claiming that his speech had undermined the professional reputation of the university and of its academic senate. The statement of claim was signed by the university president.

The Sovetskiy District Court of Orel reviewed the university statutes and regulations on the procedure for the election of the academic senate and took oral evidence from witnesses. Four witnesses testified that the physics department had not held a meeting for the election of delegates to the conference or nomination of candidates to the senate because the delegates and candidates had been elected and nominated at the meeting between the heads of departments. The staff had been informed about the meeting several days in advance and anyone could attend it.

By judgment of 27 February 2007, the District Court found the applicant liable for defamation of the Orel University and its academic senate. According to the judgment, the applicant “publicly accused [them] of a violation of applicable laws [and] commission of a dishonest act”. It also held as follows:

“The court cannot agree with the respondent party’s argument that the statements [he had] disseminated at the conference were an expression of an opinion. The statements were made in the affirmative form which is apparent from the minutes of the conference of 26 December 2006, the audio recording of the conference, and testimony by witnesses. The witnesses K. and Sh. who had attended the conference on 26 December 2006 explained that they understood the statements as an affirmation which produced a negative impression on them ...

Every legal entity has the right to require that a public appraisal of its activities reflect the real state of affairs. Any negative appraisal of the activities of a legal entity affects its reputation and undermines it. The activity of a legal entity can only be potentially successful if its business reputation in the eyes of other organisations and ordinary citizens is maintained at a certain level, especially in a market economy.”

The District Court awarded the Orel University 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages and RUB 2,000 in court fees and directed that the applicant read the refutation at the following university conference.

The applicant filed an appeal, relying in particular on Article 10 of the Convention. He also pointed out that the award in respect of damages exceeded his monthly salary.

On 11 April 2007 the Orel Regional Court upheld the District Court’s judgment on the merits but partly amended it. Firstly, it considered that the sentences “All of them can be challenged in courts ... Any discrimination is a form of war; you have declared war to the people, and sooner or later you will get the results of this war in some way or another, in your own families.” did not contain any statements about the plaintiff and could not therefore be damaging for its reputation. Secondly, it noted that the sentence “no one nominated those candidates [in the departments]” was actually true because candidates had been nominated at the meetings of department heads. Thirdly, the Regional Court considered it appropriate that the operative part of the District Court’s judgment be read out at the following conference by the president rather than by the applicant. Finally, it offered a more nuanced characterisation of the disputed phrases as a statement of fact:

“Mr Kharlamov’s speech contained a statement of fact: the elected academic senate may not be considered a legitimate body and all of its decisions are likewise illegitimate, in other words, the academic senate was unlawfully elected and its decisions are unlawful. This is a verifiable statement. Accordingly, this information is not a subjective opinion of the defendant but a factual allegation.”


No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

András Sajó;Krzysztof Wojtyczek;Nona Tsotsoria;Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The applicant was born in 1963 and is currently in detention in Wronki.

The applicant has been serving a prison sentence in Wronki Prison since 31 March 2010.

On 19 September 2010 he brought a civil compensation claim before the Szamotuły District Court. He claimed that the conditions of detention in many of his cells in Wronki Prison were so bad as to amount to a breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. He referred to the fact that the cells were not properly heated in the autumn and winter and had no proper ventilation in the summer, meaning that the prisoners suffered from intense levels of heat. The windows were old and the frames leaked. He further submitted that the toilet facilities were only separated from the cells by a low fibreboard partition, which made even a minimum level of privacy impossible for him.

On 21 June 2011 the Szamotuły District Court refused a request by the applicant to gather evidence by producing photographs and carrying out an on-the-spot inspection of the cells concerned. It closed the hearing and gave judgment, dismissing the applicant’s claim in its entirety.

The court established, referring to evidence submitted by the State Treasury, acting as the legal representative for Wronki Prison, that prisoners had access to sports, cultural and educational activities and medical care. They were provided with personal hygiene items and had appropriate food. Those factors, seen as a whole, alleviated the harm which was an inherent part and consequence of serving prison sentences.

The court further found that the toilet facilities in the applicant’s cells were indeed separated off by fibreboard partitions. This did not provide full privacy, but was sufficient to ensure that the prisoners were out of sight of others when they used the toilet. There was a WC and a washbasin in each toilet facility.

As regards the applicant’s allegations of inadequate ventilation and insufficient heating in the cells, the court found that the cells were well lit and properly ventilated; the windows had been repaired and the heaters had been changed and worked properly. As regards the alleged lack of light, the court found that the applicant had been granted special permission to use an additional reading lamp.

The court was of the view that the State Treasury had not acted unlawfully and that there had been no intention to act in bad faith or to cause harm or damage to the applicant. In the absence of unlawfulness no breach of personal rights could be found. In any event, the conditions in Wronki Prison were not so harsh as to amount to a breach of personal rights.

The applicant appealed, arguing that the court had failed to establish the facts of the case correctly, in the main because it had refused to gather evidence in the form of photographs, film or an inspection of the cells. The judgment had therefore been based on insufficient factual findings. Furthermore, in so far as the court had referred to the general conditions in which the applicant served his sentence (quality of the food, medical care, access to cultural and sports activities), those factors had not constituted the basis of his claim. He had complained neither about poor food quality nor about insufficient access to cultural and sports activities. The grounds of his claim had fundamentally related to the sanitary conditions in the cells and, in particular, a lack of privacy when using the toilet. This lack of privacy had been explicitly confirmed by the first-instance court. He reiterated that the lack of a proper divide between the toilets and the cell amounted to a breach of his personal rights and dignity. He further indicated that some of the cells at the prison had toilet facilities that were properly separated from the rest of the cell by normal walls and a door.

By a judgment of 6 December 2011 the Poznań Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, fully accepting the findings of fact made by the firstinstance court and that court’s legal assessment of those facts. In particular, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the nuisance caused by the manner in which cells were fitted with toilet facilities, namely by way of fibreboard partitions, did not exceed the normal difficulties and harm which were inherent in serving a prison sentence.


Alena Poláčková;Branko Lubarda;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra

The applicant, Mr Yasir Cabi Qadir Mucalim, is a Somali national, who was born in 1992 and lives in Almelo. He was represented before the Court initially by Mr P. Bouwman and later by Mr M.P. Ufkes, both of them lawyers practising in Helmond at relevant times.

On 24 August 2009 the applicant arrived at Schiphol (Amsterdam) Airport where he requested asylum.

On 29 August 2009 he was interviewed about his identity, nationality and travel itinerary (eerste gehoor). It emerged that he had lodged a previous asylum request in Malta.

A Dublin Claim interview (gehoor Dublinclaim) was held on 31 August 2009 in which the applicant described the conditions in which he had been detained in Malta. Asylum-seekers lived in tents, the camp was overcrowded and sanitary facilities were filthy. He objected to being sent back to Malta as he did not wish to face the same conditions of detention again.

On 29 September 2009 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) rejected the applicant’s asylum request on the ground, in so far as relevant to the case before the Court, that under Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (“the Dublin Regulation”) the State responsible for examining his application for asylum was Malta and Malta had agreed to take him back.

The applicant appealed to the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague on 2 October 2009. As relevant to the case before the Court, he alleged that sending him back to Malta would expose him to conditions of detention violating Article 3 of the Convention. He submitted documents in support of this allegation. At the same time he requested a provisional measure in the form of a stay of deportation.

On 15 January 2010 the Regional Court of The Hague (sitting in Zwolle) dismissed both the request for a provisional measure and the appeal, finding that the applicant had failed to make out his case that Malta would fail to meet her Conventional obligations towards him.

The applicant lodged a further appeal (hoger beroep) with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State) on 22 January 2010, at the same time requesting the President of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division to order a provisional measure in the form of a stay of deportation.

On 27 January 2010 the President of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division dismissed the request for a provisional measure on the ground that the applicant’s deportation did not appear imminent.

On 29 January 2010 the applicant lodged a new request for a provisional measure, stating that his deportation to Malta had been scheduled for 1 February 2010.

On the same day the President of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division gave a decision dismissing the request on the ground that the applicant’s further appeal was unlikely to succeed.

On 18 March 2010 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division dismissed the applicant’s further appeal on summary reasoning.

The relevant European, Maltese and Netherlands law, instruments, principles and practice in respect of asylum proceedings, reception of asylum-seekers and transfers of asylum-seekers under the Dublin Regulation are set out in Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, §§ 28-48, ECHR 2014 (extracts); Hussein Diirshi v. the Netherlands and Italy and 3 other applications ((dec.), nos. 2314/10, 18324/10, 47851/10 and 51377/10, §§ 98‑117, 10 September 2013); Mohammed Hussein v. the Netherlands and Italy ((dec.), no. 27725/10, §§ 25-28 and 33-50, 2 April 2013); Suso Musa v. Malta, no. 42337/12, §§ 23-32, 23 July 2013; and Aden Ahmed v. Malta, no. 55352/12, §§ 31-39, 23 July 2013.

By letter of 7 March 2012, the Agent of the Maltese Government submitted replies to questions of the Judge Rapporteur (Rule 44 § 3 (a) of the Rules of Court). As relevant to the case now before the Court, these included the following:

“Upon return to Malta in terms of the Dublin Regulation if an applicant is still considered to be an asylum seeker, and if he so wishes, the applicant will be housed in an open centre where he will be provided with shelter and medical care pending the determination of his request for protection in Malta.”

and

“When aliens are returned to Malta, they are not taken into police custody unless it results that an offence (not including their irregular entry into, or exit from, Malta) was committed by them in Malta.

Moreover, aliens who are rejected asylum seekers and who are returned to Malta will not be deprived of their liberty but efforts will be made for them to be returned to their country of origin.”

By letter of 28 June 2012, the Agent of the Maltese Government supplemented this information. His letter included the following:

“The applicant applied for refugee status and a Preliminary Questionnaire was filled [in] by the applicant on the 22nd July 2008 and the interview with the Refugee Commissioner was held on the 5th January 2009;

On the 27th January 2009, the applicant was granted Subsidiary Protection and he was released from detention on the 29th January 2009 and was transferred to the open centre. Thus, the applicant was put in detention for six months (from the 12th July 2008 till the 29th January 2009); ...”

The applicant did not submit any comments on either letter relevant to the case now before the Court.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Tajikistan);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)

Alena Poláčková;Dmitry Dedov;Georgios A. Serghides;Helen Keller;Helena Jäderblom;Luis López Guerra

The applicant was born in 1980. He arrived in Russia in 2003. He travelled to Tajikistan on a number of occasions to visit his parents for short periods of time.

On 3 May 2011 the applicant was charged in absentia in Tajikistan with participating in an extremist religious movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and an international search and arrest warrant was issued in his name. On 6 May 2011 the Tajik authorities ordered his pre-trial detention.

On 3 November 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and detained. On 4 November 2013 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) ordered his detention pending extradition.

On 4 December 2013 the Tajik prosecution authorities requested the applicant’s extradition on the basis of the above charges. The request included assurances regarding his proper treatment, which were formulated in standard terms.

On 12 December 2013 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 May 2014.

An appeal by the applicant of 16 December 2013 was dismissed by the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) on 3 February 2014.

On 29 April 2014 the District Court again extended the applicant’s detention until 3 August 2014.

An appeal by the applicant of 5 May 2014 was dismissed by the City Court on 23 July 2014.

On 9 October 2014 the applicant’s extradition was refused by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, owing to the absence of culpable actions under Russian criminal law.

On 13 October 2014 the applicant was released from detention.

On 13 October 2014, immediately after his release, the applicant was rearrested for violating migration regulations.

On 14 October 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violating migration regulations, fined him and ordered his administrative removal. Allegations by the applicant regarding a real risk of ill-treatment were dismissed, and he was detained pending expulsion. The District Court assessing the risks stated that “[t]he claims of the representative ... are of a speculative nature and not confirmed by the case materials”

The above judgment was upheld on appeal by the City Court on 24 October 2014. Claims by the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention were dismissed with reference to the District Court’s assessment of the case, which took into consideration “...the nature of the administrative offence, the character of the accused [who was criminally convicted in Russia]...

According to the latest submissions of his representative in 2015, the applicant was still in detention.

On 18 December 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Tajikistan and a real risk of ill-treatment.

On 15 September 2014 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged that decision in the courts, referring, inter alia, to the risk of illtreatment.

On 12 November 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the City Court.


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention. Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention.


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)

The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sofia.

The applicant’s father co-owned a plot of land and a house in Sofia.

By a decision of the mayor of 15 July 1981 the property was expropriated with a view to constructing residential buildings. The decision, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (Закон за териториалното и селищно устройство), provided that the applicant’s father and the applicant were to receive a three-room flat in compensation.

By a supplementary decision of 25 March 1987, based on section 100 of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act, the mayor determined the exact location, size and other details in respect of the future flat offered in compensation. It was to have a surface of 109 square metres and was identified as flat no. 17 on the fifth floor of a residential building which was to be constructed by a State-owned enterprise. Lastly, it was decided that the flat would be given directly to the applicant.

In 1989 the applicant paid to the authorities the part of the value of the future flat which had not been covered by the value of the expropriated property. In 1990 the Sofia municipality settled him temporarily in a flat which was property of the State-owned enterprise B.

On an unspecified date the construction of the building where the flat was to be located was commenced. In 1996 the Sofia municipality concluded a contract with the company B., successor of the State-owned enterprise, delegating to it the construction works. The company was under an obligation to build, at its own expense, and deliver to the municipality, within twenty-four months, the flats earmarked for compensation of the expropriated owners; in exchange of that it was to become the owner of the remainder of the building.

However, the construction was not completed within the deadline set. In 2005, in the context of the winding-up of the company B., the building, still unfinished, was sold to another company. The latter apparently resold the property to a third company, which in 2006 obtained a notary deed declaring it the owner of the building and the flats in it, including one half of flat no. 17 on the fifth floor; however, unlike what was indicated in the decision of 25 March 1987 (see paragraph 7 above), that flat was described as having a surface of 91, and not 109, square metres. The applicant submitted a certificate of occupancy of the building at issue, dated 5 October 2007, but claimed that it only concerned “certain construction activities” and that the building was not in use.

In the meantime, the applicant filed several requests with the municipal authorities in Sofia asking them to complete the compensation procedure and deliver the flat due to him. In a letter of 25 July 2000 the municipality informed him that the company B. had reassured the authorities that it was making effort to fulfill its obligations. In another letter of 13 August 2004 the municipality informed the applicant that it was the company that was responsible to deliver the flat to him. Lastly, in a letter of 8 November 2011 the Sofia municipality informed the applicant that he should have raised his claims in the winding-up procedure of the company B., or should contact the current owner of the building to claim the flat due to him.

In 2007 the applicant was evicted from the flat where he had been temporarily settled, after it had been sold to a private party in the context of the winding-up of the company B. In the ensuing judicial proceedings whereby he challenged unsuccessfully the eviction it was established that at that time the applicant was not living in the flat, and that it was uninhabitable and in a very poor state of repair.


Dmitry Dedov;Erik Møse;Julia Laffranque;Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos;Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska;Ksenija Turković

The applicant, Ms Olga Borisovna Kudeshkina, is a Russian national who was born in 1951 and lives in Moscow. She was represented before the Court by Ms K. Moskalenko, Ms A. Panicheva and Ms M. Voskobitova, lawyers practising in Strasbourg and Moscow.

The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

From 6 November 2000 onwards the applicant held judicial office at the Moscow City Court.

In December 2003 the applicant, in series of media interviews, accused high-ranking judicial officials of putting pressure on her in connection with a high-profile criminal case.

On 19 May 2004 the Judicial Qualifications Board of Moscow decided that the applicant’s statements had been insulting to the judiciary and had been defamatory as regards the individuals mentioned therein. It found that the applicant had thus committed a disciplinary offence and terminated her office as a judge.

On 8 October 2004 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of the Judicial Qualifications Board of Moscow. It found that the applicant’s statements in the media had been false, unsubstantiated and damaging to the reputation of the judiciary and to the authority of all courts of law. It also established that the applicant had publicly expressed an opinion prejudicial to the outcome of a pending criminal case.

On 19 January 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, ruling at final instance, upheld the judgment of 8 October 2004, having confirmed the earlier findings of the lower courts.

On 26 February 2009 the Court adopted a judgment in the case of Kudeshkina v. Russia, no. 29492/05, in which it found that the applicant’s dismissal from the judiciary had violated her right to the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.

In its judgment, the Court examined the proceedings before the Judicial Qualifications Board of Moscow and the ensuing judicial review. It considered that nothing in the impugned interviews would have justified the authorities’ claims of disclosure of confidential information about the pending criminal case. Having noted that the applicant had publicly criticised the conduct of various officials, and had alleged that pressure on judges was common, the Court found that she had undoubtedly raised a very important matter of public interest which had to be open to free debate in a democratic society. It further found that her allegations had not been convincingly refuted in the domestic proceedings. Even if the applicant had allowed herself a certain degree of exaggeration and generalisation, the Court found that her statements had to be regarded as fair comment on a matter of great public importance (ibid., § 95).

The Court also found that the disciplinary procedure which imposed a sanction on the applicant had not complied with important procedural guarantees, in particular as regards the impartiality of the Moscow City Court, which had considered her appeal despite the fact that that court’s President was implicated in the statements (ibid., §§ 96-97). The Court finally observed that the manner in which the penalty had been imposed was capable of having a “chilling effect” on judges wishing to participate in public debate concerning the effectiveness of judicial institutions and held that it had been disproportionately severe.

The Court concluded that the domestic authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between the need to protect the authority of the judiciary and the protection of the reputation or rights of others, on the one hand, and the need to protect the applicant’s right to freedom of expression on the other.

The applicant was awarded 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of nonpecuniary damage. No award was made in respect of pecuniary damage because no claims had been made under this head, nor was an award made in respect of costs and expenses because they had not been substantiated.

On 14 September 2009, the Government’s request for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber having been rejected, the judgment became final.

On 11 December 2009 the applicant lodged an application with the Moscow City Court, asking it to quash the decision of 8 October 2004. Relying on the Court’s judgment of 26 February 2009, she sought to have the proceedings concerning her dismissal reopened on the grounds of new or newly discovered circumstances and to have the case transferred to the Supreme Court for fresh examination. She argued that the Code of Civil Procedure, read in the light of the Code of Commercial Procedure, required a case to be reopened if the Strasbourg Court had found a violation of the Convention on account of domestic judicial decisions taken in a case. She claimed that the finding of a violation of Article 10 as a result of her dismissal from the judiciary constituted a newly discovered circumstance within the meaning of Russian procedural law and that it bound the authorities to reconsider the merits of her case.

On 18 December 2009 the Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant’s application. In so far as relevant, it found as follows:

“... in accordance with [Russian] procedural law, not [all] judgments [of the Court] finding a violation of the Convention provide grounds for the review of a judicial decision, but only a judgment finding a violation of the Convention in the course of the adjudication of a particular case.

The Presidium of the Supreme Court ... has clarified that a judgment of the [Court] finding a violation of the [Convention] that affects the legal standing of a citizen is considered as an independent basis for the review of the national court’s judgment on the matter in relation to which the violation of the Convention was found on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances.

In Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of the Committee of Ministers ... it is also pointed out that the Contracting Parties are encouraged to examine their national legal systems with a view to ensuring that there exist adequate possibilities of re-examination of the case, including reopening of proceedings, in instances where the Court has found a violation of the Convention.

It follows that ... the function of the court deciding on whether to reopen a case on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances is not limited to automatic quashing of the judgment with reference to the [Court’s] judgment, but involves the precise identification of the matter examined by the [Court] and its relation to the circumstances taking place in the course of the [domestic] adjudication of the case.

The reason for this is that, in accordance with the general principles set out in the Convention, the exercise of supranational control by the [Court] over [domestic] courts is not absolute, but is limited by the internationally recognised principle of respect for the autonomy of the national courts’ judicial decisions.

Accordingly, the [Court’s] finding of a violation of the Convention in relation to a particular applicant does not by itself constitute a basis for the review of a judgment taken by the national courts ...

If the [Court] finds a violation of [those] provisions of the Convention that guarantee the general principles of lawfulness in the course of adjudication by national courts, this may provide grounds for the review of domestic judicial decisions in accordance with the procedure provided by law, unless an obstacle of an objective nature prevents it.

If, on the other hand, the [Court] finds a violation of the Convention unrelated to the fundamental guarantees of fair trial ... it may not give grounds for review ... under any rules of procedure because the [Court’s finding of a violation] has been [sufficiently] compensated by the mere fact of [its] acknowledgment or by the payment by the State of the just satisfaction award ...

The right to a fair hearing is guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.

However, there is no ... indication that the [Court] declared the [applicant’s] complaint admissible under Article 6 of the Convention.

It is clear from the [Court’s] judgment of 26 February 2009 that the question of [whether] the judicial decisions taken in [her] civil case complied with Article 6 was not originally the subject of the Court’s examination.

... [S]he complained ... under Article 10 ... and it was a violation of Article 10, not Article 6, which the [Court] found.

The violation [found by the Court] ... was unconnected with the fundamental guarantees of fair hearing in civil proceedings.

... [T]he conclusions made by the [Court] in paragraph 97 of the judgment ... are general statements concerning [the applicant’s] freedom of expression and not her right to a fair hearing.

It follows that the [Court’s decision] in the above judgment cannot constitute by itself a ground for the reopening of civil proceedings ...

In [her] application, [the applicant] also claims that under Article 46 of the Convention the High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by final judgments of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

However, such reference to Article 46 of the Convention is incorrect because the review of national courts’ decisions on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances does not fall [within the mandatory conditions of enforceability] of the [Court’s] judgments.

The operative part of the judgment of 26 February 2009 ... contains no express or implicit indication that the [domestic decision] is subject to review.

However, it is the operative part [of the Court’s judgments] that binds the High Contracting Parties under Article 46 of the Convention.

Accordingly [the applicant] is not a priori entitled to seek the review of the above judicial decision on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances within the framework of the execution of the judgment of 26 February 2009.

... [The just satisfaction award of] 10,000 euros constitutes, under the [Court’s] case-law, exhaustive and sufficient just satisfaction ... for the violation found under Article 10 of the Convention because the applicant is not currently suffering, and cannot suffer, any negative effects resulting from the domestic judicial decision on her freedom of expression as defined in Article 10 of the Convention, and her right of freedom of expression is ... not limited at the moment.

The judgment of 26 February 2009 does not disclose the existence of any facts of legal significance which [the applicant] had not been aware of during the proceedings in this civil case.

The [Court’s] statements in the judgment as to whether the disciplinary penalty imposed on [the applicant] was an appropriate measure are generalisations of a hypothetical and subjective, discretionary nature; personal opinion; and a debating point. They therefore cannot, in view of the requirement of legal certainty, constitute by themselves grounds for the review of a judicial decision.

The [applicant’s] motion to have the case transferred to the Supreme Court for examination ... must be refused because ... the first-instance court declining its jurisdiction in favour of another court is not permitted by civil procedural law in respect of a case where a [final] judgment remains in force.

The reopening of the proceedings [in order] to review the judgment of the Moscow City Court of 8 October 2004 on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances and the transfer of the civil case to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation for examination must be refused.

This decision is subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, to be filed within 10 days.”

The applicant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court, which it dismissed on 10 March 2010, upholding the Moscow City Court’s decision. The decision in so far as relevant read as follows:

“On 26 February 2009 the [Court] delivered the judgment in the case Kudeshkina v. Russia in which a violation of Article 10 of the Convention was found.

In [the applicant’s] view, the said judgment of the [Court] constitutes grounds for the review of the judicial decision taken in the case.

On 18 December 2009 the Moscow City Court rejected [the applicant’s] application for a review of [the same court’s] judgment of 8 October 2004 owing to newly discovered circumstances.

In accordance with Article 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation decisions and judgments that have entered into force may be reviewed owing to newly discovered circumstances.

The Moscow City Court accepted and examined the substance of [the applicant’s] application for review of [its] judgment of 8 October 2004 on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances.

By operation of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention, everyone has a right to express one’s opinion freely. This right includes the freedom to hold one’s opinion and the freedom to impart or receive information without interference by public authorities.

At the same time, the exercise of these freedoms, which carry responsibilities and obligations, may be subject to restrictions or sanctions which are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

Such restrictions are set out for judges in Article 3 of the Law on the Status of Judges in the Russian Federation and Section 2 of the Judicial Code of Conduct ...

As is evident from the file, the reasons for the disciplinary penalty being imposed on [the applicant] were her media statements ...

Acting in breach of the Judicial Code of Conduct she made public statements and comments about a criminal case, the judgment in which had not entered into force.

It should not be overlooked that [the applicant’s] statements about her position, about her attitude to judges and the justice system took place not during her examination of the criminal case but a long time after.

She [made these statements] during the election campaign ...

The first-instance court that decided to reject [her] application for review of [its] judgment of 8 October 2004 owing to newly discovered circumstances took these circumstances into account.

... and finds that the Moscow City Court’s decision must remain unchanged.”

The Code of Civil Procedure (in force at the material time) contains the following provisions regulating the reopening of civil proceedings after a final judgment on the grounds of newly discovered circumstances:

“1. [Judgments] which have come into force may be reconsidered on the basis of newly discovered circumstances.

The grounds for reconsideration ... shall be:

(1) significant circumstances that were unknown and could not have been known to the applicant;

(4) the annulment of ... a decision of the State authority ... that was the basis for the judgment or decision of the court ...”

“... [An application for the reconsideration of a [judgment] owing to the discovery of new circumstances] may be lodged by the parties, the prosecutor, or by other persons who participated in the proceedings within three months of the discovery of the new circumstances.”

“1. Following the examination of an application for the reconsideration of a [judgment] owing to the discovery of new circumstances, the court may either grant the application and quash the [judgment], or dismiss the application.

A court decision by which an application for the reconsideration of a [judgment] owing to the discovery of new circumstances is granted shall not be subject to appeal.

Provided that a [judgment] is quashed, the case shall be examined in accordance with the rules of this Code.”

By a ruling of 26 February 2010 the Constitutional Court of Russia indicated that Article 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be interpreted as, in principle, allowing the launching of proceedings to have a final judgment re-examined on account of newly discovered circumstances, such as the finding of a violation of the European Convention in a given case by the European Court of Human Rights. The Code of Civil Procedure was amended accordingly on 9 December 2010.

The Code of Commercial Procedure provides for the reopening of commercial proceedings on the basis of newly discovered circumstances. One of the grounds allowing such reopening is a finding by the European Court of Human Rights that there has been violation of the Convention in the examination of a particular case by a commercial court (Article 311 § 7).

Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of the Committee of Ministers on the re-examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, adopted on 19 January 2000, encouraged the Contracting Parties “to examine their national legal systems with a view to ensuring that there exist adequate possibilities of reexamination of the case, including reopening of proceedings, in instances where the Court has found a violation of the Convention, especially where: (i) the injured party continues to suffer very serious negative consequences because of the outcome of the domestic decision at issue, which are not adequately remedied by the just satisfaction and cannot be rectified except by re-examination or reopening, and (ii) the judgment of the Court leads to the conclusion that (a) the impugned domestic decision is on the merits contrary to the Convention, or (b) the violation found is based on procedural errors or shortcomings of such gravity that a serious doubt is cast on the outcome of the domestic proceedings complained of.”


Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)

Branko Lubarda;Georgios A. Serghides;Pere Pastor Vilanova

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the Appendix.

The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention. Some applicants also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention.


Violation of Article 14+8 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life;Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)

Julia Laffranque;Nebojša Vučinić;Paul Lemmens;Robert Spano;Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström

The applicant was born in 1960. He currently lives in Belgium, but at the material time lived in Podgorica, Montenegro.

The applicant is a Roma and a Muslim. On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant and his family moved into an apartment in a building constructed for socially disadvantaged families. According to the applicant, because of constant attacks in which his car and the apartment were damaged, the perpetrators of which were never found, he installed a camera outside his apartment.

On 26 May 2009 the applicant’s next-door neighbour, Y, was watching a kickboxing match between a Montenegrin and a Bosnian contestant on television. The applicant overheard the next-door conversation as the doors of both his and Y’s (adjacent) terraces were open. When the Bosnian kickboxer appeared with his coaches, all of whom were Muslim, Y allegedly said that he would slaughter one of them, and X, another neighbour, made a disparaging reference to the Bosnian kickboxer’s Turkish descent. According to the applicant, X left Y’s apartment at a certain point and went to his car, from which he took a gun. Y said “turn it to the left”, which was the direction of the applicant’s terrace. This was followed by nine to ten gunshots, and Y’s calling out insulting references to the applicant’s “Turkish mother”. X, Y and Y’s family picked up the spent cartridges from the ground afterwards.

On 9 September 2009 three neighbours, V (Y’s wife), S and B, were talking on the next-door terrace. As he was on his terrace, the applicant overheard the conversation. V said that she was fighting “cockroaches, frogs, nits and lice, and all sorts of other things”, which had been brought by “those dirty gipsies” (“od ovija gabeljčina”). V continued by saying that B and S “[could] use a hammer and a pruning knife (kosijer), and [she] would use an axe”. S replied that “her [people] carried swords”. V said that the axe could serve just as well. S answered “no, no, he is a Muslim, I have a sword”. B said “all is fine, whatever is more readily available” (“valja što god prije stigne”). V said loudly “An axe, an axe, a sledgehammer, like the one used on pigs”.

On 15 September 2009 Y was having an argument with M, another neighbour, when X joined and said, among other things, that if he “saw red”, he would “kill both you and your brother here like a dog” (“e ću te ubit ka psa i tebe i brata ođe”), apparently pointing at the applicant’s apartment, adding “dirty gypsy” (“cigane glibavi”) and “trash” (“ovo smeće”). This was witnessed by M’s brother, D. It is unclear from the casefile if the applicant was present during the argument or if he learned about it in some other manner.

On 22 September 2009, the day of Ramadan Bayram, a religious holiday celebrated by the applicant and his family, a large cross was drawn on the applicant’s apartment door, and a large message was written on the wall next to it saying “move out or you’ll bitterly regret it” (“seli se, usko će ti bit”). The applicant called the police, who came and took photographs of the cross and the message. The same day the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the police against the families of X, Y, S and B, and one more family living in the building.

Between 19 and 22 October 2009 the police interviewed X, Y, V, B, M, D, and three other neighbours.

X, Y, V, and B denied the applicant’s allegations. X and Y also denied that they had watched the match together, and Y submitted that everything he had said had been addressed to the Bosnian kickboxer. Both X and Y confirmed that they had heard the shots but said they did not know who had fired them. Y and his children had indeed picked up the spent cartridges from the ground, not in order to hide anything, but because the children found the spent cartridges interesting to play with. Neither X nor Y knew who was responsible for the incident of 22 September 2009, but they suspected the applicant himself.

V submitted that the discussion of 9 September 2009 had referred to another person sought by the police at the time in relation to various attacks, and they had been discussing how they would defend themselves in the event of an attack. B denied that she had been in V’s apartment on that occasion.

M confirmed that during the argument with Y, X had come and said that if he “saw red” he would “kill them, as well as this gypsy” (“napraviću dženaze i vama, a i ovom ciganinu”), pointing in the direction of the applicant’s flat. M had assumed that he had meant the applicant. D confirmed M’s statement.

The other two neighbours were not aware of any conflicts amongst the neighbours, or that anybody ill-treated or insulted the applicant on the basis of his national origin. They had no idea who could be responsible for the incident of 22 September 2009. The third neighbour, N.L., confirmed the applicant’s submissions in relation to another incident (see paragraph 30 (b) below).

On 26 October 2009 the case file was transmitted to the State prosecutor’s office (Osnovno državno tužilaštvo) in order to assess whether there were any elements of the criminal offence of jeopardising someone’s security (ugrožavanje sigurnosti).

On 18 November 2009 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the higher State prosecutor’s office (Više državno tužilaštvo) in Podgorica in relation to the above events. He filed the complaint against X, Y, V, S and B for incitement to ethnic, racial and religious hatred, discontent and intolerance (izazivanje nacionalne, rasne i vjerske mržnje, razdora i netrpeljivosti, hereinafter “hate crime”) in connection with discrimination, racial and otherwise (see paragraphs 38-39 below). He also enclosed relevant video material.

On 24 November 2009 the higher State prosecutor’s office rejected the complaint on the grounds that there were no elements of any hate crime or other criminal offence within its competence. The applicant was notified that he could take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor and that the case file had already been forwarded to the State prosecution service on 26 October 2009 (see paragraph 17 above).

On 25 November 2009 the State prosecution service issued an official report (službena zabilješka) finding that the impugned words of 26 May, as well as those of 9 September 2009, which referred to the use of swords and axes, had not been addressed to either the applicant or anybody close to him, and that the incident of 15 September 2009 could not be considered a threat. It was concluded that none of those three events had involved an element of jeopardising someone’s security, or any other criminal offence subject to public prosecution. The incident of 22 September 2009, however, could be considered as jeopardising security. On 27 November 2009 the State prosecution service asked the police to undertake measures in order to find the perpetrator. At the same time the police were informed that the applicant’s criminal complaint in this regard would be kept until the perpetrator was found, or until 22 September 2012, when the prosecution of that criminal offence would become time-barred. On 31 December 2009 the State prosecutor informed the applicant of this, as well as of the fact that he could file a criminal complaint against a specific person with appropriate evidence (uz valjane dokaze).

On 14 December 2009 the applicant filed an application for an investigation (zahtjev za sprovođenje istrage) with the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica. He enclosed the relevant videos, and proposed that the court hear a number of neighbours, including those he suspected.

On 17 March 2010 the High Court dismissed that application for lack of evidence. In particular, the submitted video material was considered to be inadmissible, having been obtained without a prior court order, and the court observed that the suspected neighbours had denied that what they had said related to the applicant. It was further held that the applicant had not submitted any evidence in relation to the incident of 22 September 2009, nor had he called the police at the time to come to the scene and “collect the necessary material for further analysis” in order to verify his suspicions.

On 26 March 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision. He submitted, in particular, that on 22 September 2009 he had actually called the police, who had only taken photographs of the scene. The fact that they had failed to do what they should have done was in no way his fault, as it was not up to him to tell the police what to do, but only to lodge a criminal complaint, which he had done.

On 31 May 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal for lack of evidence, in substance endorsing the reasoning of the High Court. In doing so, the court held that the applicant’s objections as to the gathering of evidence by the police “could not be the subject of [that] court’s assessment”.

On 19 July 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He maintained, inter alia, that because of the failure of the domestic authorities to protect him and his family, they had had to move out of the apartment (see paragraph 35 below). He relied on the right to private life, the right to an effective domestic remedy, and the prohibition of discrimination.

On 25 March 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal. It considered that it should be examined under Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention and corresponding Articles of the Montenegrin Constitution, and found there had been no violation of any of them.

On 7 April 2016, as regards the incident of 22 September 2009, the police informed the State prosecutor’s office that “[they] had acted on [the applicant’s] criminal complaint and undertaken measures in accordance with their authority, having dedicated a significant amount of time [to the complaint]. While carrying out those official actions [they] had not found material evidence which would undoubtedly indicate the perpetrator of this criminal offence”.

The Government submitted information from the applicant’s criminal record reflecting convictions for minor offences in 1981, 1990 and 2002. For each of these offences he had received a suspended sentence.

On 20 December 2007 the applicant was celebrating Bayram. X and Y claimed before the domestic bodies that the applicant had celebrated inappropriately by playing loud music from very early in the morning, shooting in the air and calling Turks and Wahhabi (vehabije) to jihad. He had apparently also tried to hit X with a flagpole (koplje od zastave). The applicant submitted that X and W (the husband of X’s niece) had been insulting him and his family, while X had also spat on him, shouted obscenities and thrown stones at him, causing him minor physical injuries. On 30 September 2008 the applicant was found guilty in misdemeanour proceedings of disturbing public order and peace (narušavanje javnog reda i mira) by shooting several shots in the air from his starting pistol on 20 December 2007. He was sentenced to a ten-day period of imprisonment and the pistol was confiscated. The decision was upheld by a secondinstance body on 23 December 2008. In relation to the same incident, on 29 July 2008 X and W were charged with violent behaviour against the applicant. In the course of the proceedings, a medical expert witness submitted that the applicant had a contusion (nagnječenje) on the left part of the back of his head, which would have been classified as a minor physical injury at the time it had been inflicted. The medical expert submitted that the injury had been caused by a blunt object, possibly a “larger stone”, and that it could not have been caused by sand or “stones the size of beans”. On 24 May 2011, after the case had been remitted, the Court of First Instance acquitted X and W, considering that it had not been proved that they had committed the offence.

The applicant reported the following events to the police, but to no avail: (a) on 6 October 2008 an unknown person had thrown a brick and broken one of the windows of his apartment; (b) on 11 September 2009 S and her husband, Z, had tried to hit the applicant’s parked car with their own car; this was confirmed by another neighbour, N.L., who witnessed this event and was interviewed by the police in October 2009 (see paragraph 16 above); (c) on 16 October 2009 S had asked Y aloud if he was going to “slaughter” somebody, and he had answered that he was, both of them looking at the applicant; S had said that he would “make [his] car dirty with that man”; (d) on 19 December 2009 an unknown person had fired several shots in front of the applicant’s apartment, below the children’s bedroom; the applicant gave the police eight bullet shells that he had found on the ground; (e) on 1 January 2010, shortly after midnight, X had thrown firecrackers at the applicant’s car and broken its windscreen; he had also thrown a glass bottle at the applicant and a metal bar at his son, swearing profusely and threatening to slaughter them all; this had been followed by gunshots.

On 21 October, 23 October and 30 October 2009 X, V and M.Ć. respectively lodged criminal complaints against the applicant for insulting and provoking them, and for playing loud music and calling Turks and Wahhabi to jihad. On 25 December 2009 those complaints were rejected by the State prosecutor.

On 24 April 2010 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica found the applicant guilty of recording Y without authorisation and eavesdropping (prisluškivanje) on him, and sentenced him to 40 days’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of one year. That judgment was upheld by the High Court on 15 October 2010. On 26 December 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant in this regard.

On 7 May 2010 the applicant was fined 800 euros (EUR) in minor offence proceedings (prekršajni postupak) for threatening (izazivanje osjećaja ugroženosti) V, a decision which was upheld on 7 July 2010.

On 26 May 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against X with the State prosecution service, alleging that in August and September 2009 he had threatened to “cut [the applicant’s] gypsy head off and impale it on a pike” (nabiti na kolac). On 27 July 2010 the deputy State prosecutor rejected the criminal complaint. On 12 August 2010 the applicant filed a private criminal action (optužni predlog) against X, who was acquitted by the Court of First Instance on 7 June 2011. The court found that X had indeed said the impugned words in front of a witness, and that the words could have made the applicant feel frightened and insecure, but the court could not accept “that [the applicant] had taken those words seriously, especially since the witness, who was the only one who had heard the words, had not taken them seriously, which was why he had informed the applicant about them only two months later”. That decision was upheld by the High Court on 7 March 2012.

On 6 July 2010 X threatened the applicant’s daughter by saying that he would kill and slaughter them all, with his hands stretched towards her neck. The girl apparently fainted and was admitted to hospital unconscious. The same day the applicant and his family moved out of their apartment. They were allegedly on a hunger strike for the next twenty-four days, seeking help from various State institutions.


Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Deprivation of property;General principles of international law)

Marko Bošnjak;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Georges Ravarani

The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Balatonrendes.

The applicant served as a civil servant from 21 December 1998 until 28 February 2013. Upon the termination of his service, a certain part of his severance payment was taxed at a 98% rate in the amount of 1,861,703 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 6,200 euros (EUR)).


Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression -{General} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)

The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Budapest.

On 18 May 2009 the applicant, a left-wing politician, participated in a peaceful demonstration wearing a five-pointed red star on his jacket. A police patrol which was present called on the applicant to remove the star, which was then confiscated. The applicant’s complaint to the Head of National Police was to no avail.

Subsequently, he challenged the measure in court.

On 29 June 2010 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed his action. The court held that the display of the red star contravened section 269/B of the Criminal Code and consequently its confiscation was justified under sections 115(1) and 151(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In review proceedings, the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court’s decision on 8 June 2011, holding that the police measure had been lawful, despite the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Vajnai v. Hungary (no. 33629/06, ECHR 2008), whose application in the circumstances had been no task of the police officers present on the premises.

The applicant incurred altogether 1,115 euros in legal costs.


Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)

Egidijus Kūris;Vincent A. De Gaetano;Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.

The applicants complained of the excessive length of civil proceedings. In some of the applications, the applicants also raised complaints under other provisions of the Convention.