Daily Papers

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

In risk-averse reinforcement learning (RL), the goal is to optimize some risk measure of the returns. A risk measure often focuses on the worst returns out of the agent's experience. As a result, standard methods for risk-averse RL often ignore high-return strategies. We prove that under certain conditions this inevitably leads to a local-optimum barrier, and propose a soft risk mechanism to bypass it. We also devise a novel Cross Entropy module for risk sampling, which (1) preserves risk aversion despite the soft risk; (2) independently improves sample efficiency. By separating the risk aversion of the sampler and the optimizer, we can sample episodes with poor conditions, yet optimize with respect to successful strategies. We combine these two concepts in CeSoR - Cross-entropy Soft-Risk optimization algorithm - which can be applied on top of any risk-averse policy gradient (PG) method. We demonstrate improved risk aversion in maze navigation, autonomous driving, and resource allocation benchmarks, including in scenarios where standard risk-averse PG completely fails.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

Recent advances in aligning Large Language Models with human preferences have benefited from larger reward models and better preference data. However, most of these methodologies rely on the accuracy of the reward model. The reward models used in Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) are typically learned from small datasets using stochastic optimization algorithms, making them prone to high variability. We illustrate the inconsistencies between reward models empirically on numerous open-source datasets. We theoretically show that the fluctuation of the reward models can be detrimental to the alignment problem because the derived policies are more overfitted to the reward model and, hence, are riskier if the reward model itself is uncertain. We use concentration of measure to motivate an uncertainty-aware, conservative algorithm for policy optimization. We show that such policies are more risk-averse in the sense that they are more cautious of uncertain rewards. We theoretically prove that our proposed methodology has less risk than the vanilla method. We corroborate our theoretical results with experiments based on designing an ensemble of reward models. We use this ensemble of reward models to align a language model using our methodology and observe that our empirical findings match our theoretical predictions.

When fine-tuning pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) to align with human values and intentions, maximizing the estimated reward can lead to superior performance, but it also introduces potential risks due to deviations from the reference model's intended behavior. Most existing methods typically introduce KL divergence to constrain deviations between the trained model and the reference model; however, this may not be sufficient in certain applications that require tight risk control. In this paper, we introduce Risk-aware Direct Preference Optimization (Ra-DPO), a novel approach that incorporates risk-awareness by employing a class of nested risk measures. This approach formulates a constrained risk-aware advantage function maximization problem and then converts the Bradley-Terry model into a token-level representation. The objective function maximizes the likelihood of the policy while suppressing the deviation between a trained model and the reference model using a sequential risk ratio, thereby enhancing the model's risk-awareness. Experimental results across three open-source datasets: IMDb Dataset, Anthropic HH Dataset, and AlpacaEval, demonstrate the proposed method's superior performance in balancing alignment performance and model drift. Our code is opensourced at https://github.com/zlj123-max/Ra-DPO.

Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL) has become a popular tool to control the risk of uncertain outcomes and ensure reliable performance in various sequential decision-making problems. While policy gradient methods have been developed for risk-sensitive RL, it remains unclear if these methods enjoy the same global convergence guarantees as in the risk-neutral case. In this paper, we consider a class of dynamic time-consistent risk measures, called Expected Conditional Risk Measures (ECRMs), and derive policy gradient updates for ECRM-based objective functions. Under both constrained direct parameterization and unconstrained softmax parameterization, we provide global convergence and iteration complexities of the corresponding risk-averse policy gradient algorithms. We further test risk-averse variants of REINFORCE and actor-critic algorithms to demonstrate the efficacy of our method and the importance of risk control.

Task robust adaptation is a long-standing pursuit in sequential decision-making. Some risk-averse strategies, e.g., the conditional value-at-risk principle, are incorporated in domain randomization or meta reinforcement learning to prioritize difficult tasks in optimization, which demand costly intensive evaluations. The efficiency issue prompts the development of robust active task sampling to train adaptive policies, where risk-predictive models are used to surrogate policy evaluation. This work characterizes the optimization pipeline of robust active task sampling as a Markov decision process, posits theoretical and practical insights, and constitutes robustness concepts in risk-averse scenarios. Importantly, we propose an easy-to-implement method, referred to as Posterior and Diversity Synergized Task Sampling (PDTS), to accommodate fast and robust sequential decision-making. Extensive experiments show that PDTS unlocks the potential of robust active task sampling, significantly improves the zero-shot and few-shot adaptation robustness in challenging tasks, and even accelerates the learning process under certain scenarios. Our project website is at https://thu-rllab.github.io/PDTS_project_page.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable reward has recently emerged as a central paradigm for post-training large language models (LLMs); however, prevailing mean-based methods, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), suffer from entropy collapse and limited reasoning gains. We argue that these issues stem from overemphasizing high-probability output sequences while neglecting rare but informative reasoning paths. To address these challenges, we propose Risk-based Policy Optimization (RiskPO), which substitutes classical mean-based objectives with principled risk measures. Specifically, we introduce a Mixed Value-at-Risk objective that integrates weighted attention over multiple regions of the reward distribution, thereby amplifying gradient signals on challenging instances and preventing overconfident convergence. We further design a bundling scheme that aggregates multiple questions into bundles, thus enriching the feedback signal and yielding more stable and informative training dynamics. Theoretically, we prove that the risk-averse update alleviates entropy collapse and promotes exploration. Numerically, RiskPO achieves consistent and significant improvements in mathematical reasoning, multi-modal reasoning, and code generation benchmarks, surpassing GRPO and its variants on both Pass@1 and Pass@k metrics. Our results demonstrate that risk-based optimization provides a rigorous and effective paradigm for enhancing LLM reasoning capabilities.

Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL) aims to optimize policies that balance the expected reward and risk. In this paper, we present a novel risk-sensitive RL framework that employs an Iterated Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) objective under both linear and general function approximations, enriched by human feedback. These new formulations provide a principled way to guarantee safety in each decision making step throughout the control process. Moreover, integrating human feedback into risk-sensitive RL framework bridges the gap between algorithmic decision-making and human participation, allowing us to also guarantee safety for human-in-the-loop systems. We propose provably sample-efficient algorithms for this Iterated CVaR RL and provide rigorous theoretical analysis. Furthermore, we establish a matching lower bound to corroborate the optimality of our algorithms in a linear context.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Growth in the penetration of renewable energy sources makes supply more uncertain and leads to an increase in the system imbalance. This trend, together with the single imbalance pricing, opens an opportunity for balance responsible parties (BRPs) to perform energy arbitrage in the imbalance settlement mechanism. To this end, we propose a battery control framework based on distributional reinforcement learning (DRL). Our proposed control framework takes a risk-sensitive perspective, allowing BRPs to adjust their risk preferences: we aim to optimize a weighted sum of the arbitrage profit and a risk measure while constraining the daily number of cycles for the battery. We assess the performance of our proposed control framework using the Belgian imbalance prices of 2022 and compare two state-of-the-art RL methods, deep Q learning and soft actor-critic. Results reveal that the distributional soft actor-critic method can outperform other methods. Moreover, we note that our fully risk-averse agent appropriately learns to hedge against the risk related to the unknown imbalance price by (dis)charging the battery only when the agent is more certain about the price.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

This paper studies distributional model risk in marginal problems, where each marginal measure is assumed to lie in a Wasserstein ball centered at a fixed reference measure with a given radius. Theoretically, we establish several fundamental results including strong duality, finiteness of the proposed Wasserstein distributional model risk, and the existence of an optimizer at each radius. In addition, we show continuity of the Wasserstein distributional model risk as a function of the radius. Using strong duality, we extend the well-known Makarov bounds for the distribution function of the sum of two random variables with given marginals to Wasserstein distributionally robust Markarov bounds. Practically, we illustrate our results on four distinct applications when the sample information comes from multiple data sources and only some marginal reference measures are identified. They are: partial identification of treatment effects; externally valid treatment choice via robust welfare functions; Wasserstein distributionally robust estimation under data combination; and evaluation of the worst aggregate risk measures.

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) framework under a broad class of risk objectives, characterized by convex scoring functions. This class covers many common risk measures, such as variance, Expected Shortfall, entropic Value-at-Risk, and mean-risk utility. To resolve the time-inconsistency issue, we consider an augmented state space and an auxiliary variable and recast the problem as a two-state optimization problem. We propose a customized Actor-Critic algorithm and establish some theoretical approximation guarantees. A key theoretical contribution is that our results do not require the Markov decision process to be continuous. Additionally, we propose an auxiliary variable sampling method inspired by the alternating minimization algorithm, which is convergent under certain conditions. We validate our approach in simulation experiments with a financial application in statistical arbitrage trading, demonstrating the effectiveness of the algorithm.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

The optimized certainty equivalent (OCE) is a family of risk measures that cover important examples such as entropic risk, conditional value-at-risk and mean-variance models. In this paper, we propose a new episodic risk-sensitive reinforcement learning formulation based on tabular Markov decision processes with recursive OCEs. We design an efficient learning algorithm for this problem based on value iteration and upper confidence bound. We derive an upper bound on the regret of the proposed algorithm, and also establish a minimax lower bound. Our bounds show that the regret rate achieved by our proposed algorithm has optimal dependence on the number of episodes and the number of actions.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Climate-economic modeling under uncertainty presents significant computational challenges that may limit policymakers' ability to address climate change effectively. This paper explores neural network-based approaches for solving high-dimensional optimal control problems arising from models that incorporate ambiguity aversion in climate mitigation decisions. We develop a continuous-time endogenous-growth economic model that accounts for multiple mitigation pathways, including emission-free capital and carbon intensity reductions. Given the inherent complexity and high dimensionality of these models, traditional numerical methods become computationally intractable. We benchmark several neural network architectures against finite-difference generated solutions, evaluating their ability to capture the dynamic interactions between uncertainty, technology transitions, and optimal climate policy. Our findings demonstrate that appropriate neural architecture selection significantly impacts both solution accuracy and computational efficiency when modeling climate-economic systems under uncertainty. These methodological advances enable more sophisticated modeling of climate policy decisions, allowing for better representation of technology transitions and uncertainty-critical elements for developing effective mitigation strategies in the face of climate change.

Most learning algorithms with formal regret guarantees assume that no mistake is irreparable and essentially rely on trying all possible behaviors. This approach is problematic when some mistakes are catastrophic, i.e., irreparable. We propose an online learning problem where the goal is to minimize the chance of catastrophe. Specifically, we assume that the payoff in each round represents the chance of avoiding catastrophe that round and aim to maximize the product of payoffs (the overall chance of avoiding catastrophe) while allowing a limited number of queries to a mentor. We first show that in general, any algorithm either constantly queries the mentor or is nearly guaranteed to cause catastrophe. However, in settings where the mentor policy class is learnable in the standard online learning model, we provide an algorithm whose regret and rate of querying the mentor both approach 0 as the time horizon grows. Conceptually, if a policy class is learnable in the absence of catastrophic risk, it is learnable in the presence of catastrophic risk if the agent can ask for help.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

Robust planning in interactive scenarios requires predicting the uncertain future to make risk-aware decisions. Unfortunately, due to long-tail safety-critical events, the risk is often under-estimated by finite-sampling approximations of probabilistic motion forecasts. This can lead to overconfident and unsafe robot behavior, even with robust planners. Instead of assuming full prediction coverage that robust planners require, we propose to make prediction itself risk-aware. We introduce a new prediction objective to learn a risk-biased distribution over trajectories, so that risk evaluation simplifies to an expected cost estimation under this biased distribution. This reduces the sample complexity of the risk estimation during online planning, which is needed for safe real-time performance. Evaluation results in a didactic simulation environment and on a real-world dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. The code and a demo are available.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

The robustness of legged locomotion is crucial for quadrupedal robots in challenging terrains. Recently, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has shown promising results in legged locomotion and various methods try to integrate privileged distillation, scene modeling, and external sensors to improve the generalization and robustness of locomotion policies. However, these methods are hard to handle uncertain scenarios such as abrupt terrain changes or unexpected external forces. In this paper, we consider a novel risk-sensitive perspective to enhance the robustness of legged locomotion. Specifically, we employ a distributional value function learned by quantile regression to model the aleatoric uncertainty of environments, and perform risk-averse policy learning by optimizing the worst-case scenarios via a risk distortion measure. Extensive experiments in both simulation environments and a real Aliengo robot demonstrate that our method is efficient in handling various external disturbances, and the resulting policy exhibits improved robustness in harsh and uncertain situations in legged locomotion. Videos are available at https://risk-averse-locomotion.github.io/.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

Systemic financial risk refers to the simultaneous failure or destabilization of multiple financial institutions, often triggered by contagion mechanisms or common exposures to shocks. In this paper, we present a dynamical model of bank leverage (the ratio of asset holdings to equity) a quantity that both reflects and drives risk dynamics. We model how banks, constrained by Value-at-Risk (VaR) regulations, adjust their leverage in response to changes in the price of a single asset, assumed to be held in fixed proportion across banks. This leverage-targeting behavior introduces a procyclical feedback loop between asset prices and leverage. In the dynamics, this can manifest as logistic-like behavior with a rich bifurcation structure across model parameters. By analyzing these coupled dynamics in both isolated and interconnected bank models, we outline a framework for understanding how systemic risk can emerge from seemingly rational micro-level behavior.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Ecological management and decision-making typically focus on uncertainty about the future, but surprisingly little is known about how to account for uncertainty of the present: that is, the realities of having only partial or imperfect measurements. Our primary paradigms for handling decisions under uncertainty -- the precautionary principle and optimal control -- have so far given contradictory results. This paradox is best illustrated in the example of fisheries management, where many ideas that guide thinking about ecological decision making were first developed. We find that simplistic optimal control approaches have repeatedly concluded that a manager should increase catch quotas when faced with greater uncertainty about the fish biomass. Current best practices take a more precautionary approach, decreasing catch quotas by a fixed amount to account for uncertainty. Using comparisons to both simulated and historical catch data, we find that neither approach is sufficient to avoid stock collapses under moderate observational uncertainty. Using partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) methods, we demonstrate how this paradox arises from flaws in the standard theory, which contributes to over-exploitation of fisheries and increased probability of economic and ecological collapse. In contrast, we find POMDP-based management avoids such over-exploitation while also generating higher economic value. These results have significant implications for how we handle uncertainty in both fisheries and ecological management more generally.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

A key challenge in the field of reinforcement learning is to develop agents that behave cautiously in novel situations. It is generally impossible to anticipate all situations that an autonomous system may face or what behavior would best avoid bad outcomes. An agent that can learn to be cautious would overcome this challenge by discovering for itself when and how to behave cautiously. In contrast, current approaches typically embed task-specific safety information or explicit cautious behaviors into the system, which is error-prone and imposes extra burdens on practitioners. In this paper, we present both a sequence of tasks where cautious behavior becomes increasingly non-obvious, as well as an algorithm to demonstrate that it is possible for a system to learn to be cautious. The essential features of our algorithm are that it characterizes reward function uncertainty without task-specific safety information and uses this uncertainty to construct a robust policy. Specifically, we construct robust policies with a k-of-N counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) subroutine given learned reward function uncertainty represented by a neural network ensemble. These policies exhibit caution in each of our tasks without any task-specific safety tuning. Our code is available at https://github.com/montaserFath/Learning-to-be-Cautious

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

We consider finite-horizon Markov Decision Processes where parameters, such as transition probabilities, are unknown and estimated from data. The popular distributionally robust approach to addressing the parameter uncertainty can sometimes be overly conservative. In this paper, we propose a new formulation, Bayesian risk Markov Decision Process (BR-MDP), to address parameter uncertainty in MDPs, where a risk functional is applied in nested form to the expected total cost with respect to the Bayesian posterior distribution of the unknown parameters. The proposed formulation provides more flexible risk attitutes towards parameter uncertainty and takes into account the availability of data in future times stages. To solve the proposed formulation with the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) risk functional, we propose an efficient approximation algorithm by deriving an analytical approximation of the value function and utilizing the convexity of CVaR. We demonstrate the empirical performance of the BR-MDP formulation and proposed algorithms on a gambler's betting problem and an inventory control problem.

Off-policy actor-critic methods in reinforcement learning train a critic with temporal-difference updates and use it as a learning signal for the policy (actor). This design typically achieves higher sample efficiency than purely on-policy methods. However, critic networks tend to overestimate value estimates systematically. This is often addressed by introducing a pessimistic bias based on uncertainty estimates. Current methods employ ensembling to quantify the critic's epistemic uncertainty-uncertainty due to limited data and model ambiguity-to scale pessimistic updates. In this work, we propose a new algorithm called Stochastic Actor-Critic (STAC) that incorporates temporal (one-step) aleatoric uncertainty-uncertainty arising from stochastic transitions, rewards, and policy-induced variability in Bellman targets-to scale pessimistic bias in temporal-difference updates, rather than relying on epistemic uncertainty. STAC uses a single distributional critic network to model the temporal return uncertainty, and applies dropout to both the critic and actor networks for regularization. Our results show that pessimism based on a distributional critic alone suffices to mitigate overestimation, and naturally leads to risk-averse behavior in stochastic environments. Introducing dropout further improves training stability and performance by means of regularization. With this design, STAC achieves improved computational efficiency using a single distributional critic network.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where rare but severe failures can result in irreversible harm. However, prevailing evaluation benchmarks often reduce complex social risk to mean-centered scalar scores, thereby obscuring distributional structure, cross-dimensional interactions, and worst-case behavior. This paper introduces Social Harm Analysis via Risk Profiles (SHARP), a framework for multidimensional, distribution-aware evaluation of social harm. SHARP models harm as a multivariate random variable and integrates explicit decomposition into bias, fairness, ethics, and epistemic reliability with a union-of-failures aggregation reparameterized as additive cumulative log-risk. The framework further employs risk-sensitive distributional statistics, with Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR95) as a primary metric, to characterize worst-case model behavior. Application of SHARP to eleven frontier LLMs, evaluated on a fixed corpus of n=901 socially sensitive prompts, reveals that models with similar average risk can exhibit more than twofold differences in tail exposure and volatility. Across models, dimension-wise marginal tail behavior varies systematically across harm dimensions, with bias exhibiting the strongest tail severities, epistemic and fairness risks occupying intermediate regimes, and ethical misalignment consistently lower; together, these patterns reveal heterogeneous, model-dependent failure structures that scalar benchmarks conflate. These findings indicate that responsible evaluation and governance of LLMs require moving beyond scalar averages toward multidimensional, tail-sensitive risk profiling.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) strengthens LLM reasoning, but training often oscillates between {entropy collapse} and {entropy explosion}. We trace both hazards to the mean baseline used in value-free RL (e.g., GRPO and DAPO), which improperly penalizes negative-advantage samples under reward outliers. We propose {Quantile Advantage Estimation} (QAE), replacing the mean with a group-wise K-quantile baseline. QAE induces a response-level, two-regime gate: on hard queries (p <= 1 - K) it reinforces rare successes, while on easy queries (p > 1 - K) it targets remaining failures. Under first-order softmax updates, we prove {two-sided entropy safety}, giving lower and upper bounds on one-step entropy change that curb explosion and prevent collapse. Empirically, this minimal modification stabilizes entropy, sparsifies credit assignment (with tuned K, roughly 80% of responses receive zero advantage), and yields sustained pass@1 gains on Qwen3-8B/14B-Base across AIME 2024/2025 and AMC 2023. These results identify {baseline design} -- rather than token-level heuristics -- as the primary mechanism for scaling RLVR.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

The Growth-at-Risk (GaR) framework has garnered attention in recent econometric literature, yet current approaches implicitly assume a constant Pareto exponent. We introduce novel and robust econometrics to estimate the tails of GaR based on a rigorous theoretical framework and establish validity and effectiveness. Simulations demonstrate consistent outperformance relative to existing alternatives in terms of predictive accuracy. We perform a long-term GaR analysis that provides accurate and insightful predictions, effectively capturing financial anomalies better than current methods.

Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.

Dueling bandits is a prominent framework for decision-making involving preferential feedback, a valuable feature that fits various applications involving human interaction, such as ranking, information retrieval, and recommendation systems. While substantial efforts have been made to minimize the cumulative regret in dueling bandits, a notable gap in the current research is the absence of regret bounds that account for the inherent uncertainty in pairwise comparisons between the dueling arms. Intuitively, greater uncertainty suggests a higher level of difficulty in the problem. To bridge this gap, this paper studies the problem of contextual dueling bandits, where the binary comparison of dueling arms is generated from a generalized linear model (GLM). We propose a new SupLinUCB-type algorithm that enjoys computational efficiency and a variance-aware regret bound tilde Obig(dsum_{t=1^Tsigma_t^2} + dbig), where sigma_t is the variance of the pairwise comparison in round t, d is the dimension of the context vectors, and T is the time horizon. Our regret bound naturally aligns with the intuitive expectation in scenarios where the comparison is deterministic, the algorithm only suffers from an tilde O(d) regret. We perform empirical experiments on synthetic data to confirm the advantage of our method over previous variance-agnostic algorithms.

Offline reinforcement learning enables agents to leverage large pre-collected datasets of environment transitions to learn control policies, circumventing the need for potentially expensive or unsafe online data collection. Significant progress has been made recently in offline model-based reinforcement learning, approaches which leverage a learned dynamics model. This typically involves constructing a probabilistic model, and using the model uncertainty to penalize rewards where there is insufficient data, solving for a pessimistic MDP that lower bounds the true MDP. Existing methods, however, exhibit a breakdown between theory and practice, whereby pessimistic return ought to be bounded by the total variation distance of the model from the true dynamics, but is instead implemented through a penalty based on estimated model uncertainty. This has spawned a variety of uncertainty heuristics, with little to no comparison between differing approaches. In this paper, we compare these heuristics, and design novel protocols to investigate their interaction with other hyperparameters, such as the number of models, or imaginary rollout horizon. Using these insights, we show that selecting these key hyperparameters using Bayesian Optimization produces superior configurations that are vastly different to those currently used in existing hand-tuned state-of-the-art methods, and result in drastically stronger performance.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Robust Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and risk-sensitive MDPs are both powerful tools for making decisions in the presence of uncertainties. Previous efforts have aimed to establish their connections, revealing equivalences in specific formulations. This paper introduces a new formulation for risk-sensitive MDPs, which assesses risk in a slightly different manner compared to the classical Markov risk measure (Ruszczy\'nski 2010), and establishes its equivalence with a class of regularized robust MDP (RMDP) problems, including the standard RMDP as a special case. Leveraging this equivalence, we further derive the policy gradient theorem for both problems, proving gradient domination and global convergence of the exact policy gradient method under the tabular setting with direct parameterization. This forms a sharp contrast to the Markov risk measure, known to be potentially non-gradient-dominant (Huang et al. 2021). We also propose a sample-based offline learning algorithm, namely the robust fitted-Z iteration (RFZI), for a specific regularized RMDP problem with a KL-divergence regularization term (or equivalently the risk-sensitive MDP with an entropy risk measure). We showcase its streamlined design and less stringent assumptions due to the equivalence and analyze its sample complexity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Drug shortages pose critical risks to patient care and healthcare systems worldwide, yet the effectiveness of regulatory interventions remains poorly understood due to information asymmetries in pharmaceutical supply chains. We propose ShortageSim, addresses this challenge by providing the first simulation framework that evaluates the impact of regulatory interventions on competition dynamics under information asymmetry. Using Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents, the framework models the strategic decisions of drug manufacturers and institutional buyers, in response to shortage alerts given by the regulatory agency. Unlike traditional game theory models that assume perfect rationality and complete information, ShortageSim simulates heterogeneous interpretations on regulatory announcements and the resulting decisions. Experiments on self-processed dataset of historical shortage events show that ShortageSim reduces the resolution lag for production disruption cases by up to 84\%, achieving closer alignment to real-world trajectories than the zero-shot baseline. Our framework confirms the effect of regulatory alert in addressing shortages and introduces a new method for understanding competition in multi-stage environments under uncertainty. We open-source ShortageSim and a dataset of 2,925 FDA shortage events, providing a novel framework for future research on policy design and testing in supply chains under information asymmetry.

Closed-loop decision-making systems (e.g., lending, screening, or recidivism risk assessment) often operate under fairness and service constraints while inducing feedback effects: decisions change who appears in the future, yielding non-stationary data and potentially amplifying disparities. We study online learning of a one-dimensional threshold policy from bandit feedback under demographic parity (DP) and, optionally, service-rate constraints. The learner observes only a scalar score each round and selects a threshold; reward and constraint residuals are revealed only for the chosen threshold. We propose Optimistic Feasible Search (OFS), a simple grid-based method that maintains confidence bounds for reward and constraint residuals for each candidate threshold. At each round, OFS selects a threshold that appears feasible under confidence bounds and, among those, maximizes optimistic reward; if no threshold appears feasible, OFS selects the threshold minimizing optimistic constraint violation. This design directly targets feasible high-utility thresholds and is particularly effective for low-dimensional, interpretable policy classes where discretization is natural. We evaluate OFS on (i) a synthetic closed-loop benchmark with stable contraction dynamics and (ii) two semi-synthetic closed-loop benchmarks grounded in German Credit and COMPAS, constructed by training a score model and feeding group-dependent acceptance decisions back into population composition. Across all environments, OFS achieves higher reward with smaller cumulative constraint violation than unconstrained and primal-dual bandit baselines, and is near-oracle relative to the best feasible fixed threshold under the same sweep procedure. Experiments are reproducible and organized with double-blind-friendly relative outputs.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

Robust optimization safeguards decisions against uncertainty by optimizing against worst-case scenarios, yet their effectiveness hinges on a prespecified robustness level that is often chosen ad hoc, leading to either insufficient protection or overly conservative and costly solutions. Recent approaches using conformal prediction construct data-driven uncertainty sets with finite-sample coverage guarantees, but they still fix coverage targets a priori and offer little guidance for selecting robustness levels. We propose a new framework that provides distribution-free, finite-sample guarantees on both miscoverage and regret for any family of robust predict-then-optimize policies. Our method constructs valid estimators that trace out the miscoverage-regret Pareto frontier, enabling decision-makers to reliably evaluate and calibrate robustness levels according to their cost-risk preferences. The framework is simple to implement, broadly applicable across classical optimization formulations, and achieves sharper finite-sample performance than existing approaches. These results offer the first principled data-driven methodology for guiding robustness selection and empower practitioners to balance robustness and conservativeness in high-stakes decision-making.

We introduce distributional dynamic programming (DP) methods for optimizing statistical functionals of the return distribution, with standard reinforcement learning as a special case. Previous distributional DP methods could optimize the same class of expected utilities as classic DP. To go beyond expected utilities, we combine distributional DP with stock augmentation, a technique previously introduced for classic DP in the context of risk-sensitive RL, where the MDP state is augmented with a statistic of the rewards obtained so far (since the first time step). We find that a number of recently studied problems can be formulated as stock-augmented return distribution optimization, and we show that we can use distributional DP to solve them. We analyze distributional value and policy iteration, with bounds and a study of what objectives these distributional DP methods can or cannot optimize. We describe a number of applications outlining how to use distributional DP to solve different stock-augmented return distribution optimization problems, for example maximizing conditional value-at-risk, and homeostatic regulation. To highlight the practical potential of stock-augmented return distribution optimization and distributional DP, we combine the core ideas of distributional value iteration with the deep RL agent DQN, and empirically evaluate it for solving instances of the applications discussed.

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

We develop an econometric framework integrating heavy-tailed Student's t distributions with behavioral probability weighting while preserving infinite divisibility. Using 432{,}752 observations across 86 assets (2004--2024), we demonstrate Student's t specifications outperform Gaussian models in 88.4\% of cases. Bounded probability-weighting transformations preserve mathematical properties required for dynamic pricing. Gaussian models underestimate 99\% Value-at-Risk by 19.7\% versus 3.2\% for our specification. Joint estimation procedures identify tail and behavioral parameters with established asymptotic properties. Results provide robust inference for asset-pricing applications where heavy tails and behavioral distortions coexist.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

When applying offline reinforcement learning (RL) in healthcare scenarios, the out-of-distribution (OOD) issues pose significant risks, as inappropriate generalization beyond clinical expertise can result in potentially harmful recommendations. While existing methods like conservative Q-learning (CQL) attempt to address the OOD issue, their effectiveness is limited by only constraining action selection by suppressing uncertain actions. This action-only regularization imitates clinician actions that prioritize short-term rewards, but it fails to regulate downstream state trajectories, thereby limiting the discovery of improved long-term treatment strategies. To safely improve policy beyond clinician recommendations while ensuring that state-action trajectories remain in-distribution, we propose Offline Guarded Safe Reinforcement Learning (OGSRL), a theoretically grounded model-based offline RL framework. OGSRL introduces a novel dual constraint mechanism for improving policy with reliability and safety. First, the OOD guardian is established to specify clinically validated regions for safe policy exploration. By constraining optimization within these regions, it enables the reliable exploration of treatment strategies that outperform clinician behavior by leveraging the full patient state history, without drifting into unsupported state-action trajectories. Second, we introduce a safety cost constraint that encodes medical knowledge about physiological safety boundaries, providing domain-specific safeguards even in areas where training data might contain potentially unsafe interventions. Notably, we provide theoretical guarantees on safety and near-optimality: policies that satisfy these constraints remain in safe and reliable regions and achieve performance close to the best possible policy supported by the data.

In the post-pandemic world, manufacturing enterprises face increasing uncertainties, especially with vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Although supply chain management has been extensively studied, the critical influence of decision-makers (DMs) in these systems remains underexplored. This study studies the inventory management problem under risk using the newsvendor model by incorporating DMs risk preferences. By employing the Quantum Monte Carlo (QMC) combined with Quantum Amplitude Estimation (QAE) algorithm, the estimation of probabilities or expectation values can be done more efficiently. This offers near-quadratic speedup compared to classical Monte Carlo methods. Our findings illuminate the intricate relationship between risk-aware decision-making and inventory management, providing essential insights for enhancing supply chain resilience and adaptability in uncertain conditions

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has shown significant promise for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, prevailing algorithms like GRPO broadcast a uniform advantage signal across all tokens in a sequence. This coarse-grained approach overlooks the pivotal role of uncertain, high-stakes decisions during reasoning, leading to inefficient exploration and the well-documented problem of entropy collapse. To address this, we introduce UnCertainty-aware Advantage Shaping (UCAS), a model-free method that refines credit assignment by leveraging the model's internal uncertainty signals. UCAS operates in two stages: it first modulates the response-level advantage using the model's overall self-confidence, and then applies a token-level penalty based on raw logit certainty. This dual mechanism encourages exploration of high-uncertainty paths that yield correct answers while penalizing overconfident yet erroneous reasoning, effectively balancing the exploration-exploitation trade-off. Extensive experiments on five mathematical reasoning benchmarks show that UCAS significantly outperforms strong RLVR baselines across multiple model scales, including 1.5B and 7B. Our analysis confirms that UCAS not only achieves higher rewards but also promotes greater reasoning diversity and successfully mitigates entropy collapse.

In this paper, we study risk-sensitive Reinforcement Learning (RL), focusing on the objective of Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) with risk tolerance tau. Starting with multi-arm bandits (MABs), we show the minimax CVaR regret rate is Omega(tau^{-1AK}), where A is the number of actions and K is the number of episodes, and that it is achieved by an Upper Confidence Bound algorithm with a novel Bernstein bonus. For online RL in tabular Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), we show a minimax regret lower bound of Omega(tau^{-1SAK}) (with normalized cumulative rewards), where S is the number of states, and we propose a novel bonus-driven Value Iteration procedure. We show that our algorithm achieves the optimal regret of widetilde O(tau^{-1SAK}) under a continuity assumption and in general attains a near-optimal regret of widetilde O(tau^{-1}SAK), which is minimax-optimal for constant tau. This improves on the best available bounds. By discretizing rewards appropriately, our algorithms are computationally efficient.

In many real-world sequential decision-making problems, an action does not immediately reflect on the feedback and spreads its effects over a long time frame. For instance, in online advertising, investing in a platform produces an instantaneous increase of awareness, but the actual reward, i.e., a conversion, might occur far in the future. Furthermore, whether a conversion takes place depends on: how fast the awareness grows, its vanishing effects, and the synergy or interference with other advertising platforms. Previous work has investigated the Multi-Armed Bandit framework with the possibility of delayed and aggregated feedback, without a particular structure on how an action propagates in the future, disregarding possible dynamical effects. In this paper, we introduce a novel setting, the Dynamical Linear Bandits (DLB), an extension of the linear bandits characterized by a hidden state. When an action is performed, the learner observes a noisy reward whose mean is a linear function of the hidden state and of the action. Then, the hidden state evolves according to linear dynamics, affected by the performed action too. We start by introducing the setting, discussing the notion of optimal policy, and deriving an expected regret lower bound. Then, we provide an optimistic regret minimization algorithm, Dynamical Linear Upper Confidence Bound (DynLin-UCB), that suffers an expected regret of order mathcal{O} Big( d sqrt{T}{(1-rho)^{3/2}} Big), where rho is a measure of the stability of the system, and d is the dimension of the action vector. Finally, we conduct a numerical validation on a synthetic environment and on real-world data to show the effectiveness of DynLin-UCB in comparison with several baselines.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner; for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them being human-aware loss functions (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO), and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B. Crucially, KTO does not need preferences -- only a binary signal of whether an output is desirable or undesirable for a given input. This makes it far easier to use in the real world, where preference data is scarce and expensive.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

Ensuring safety in Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically framed as a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP), is crucial for real-world exploration applications. Current approaches in handling CMDP struggle to balance optimality and feasibility, as direct optimization methods cannot ensure state-wise in-training safety, and projection-based methods correct actions inefficiently through lengthy iterations. To address these challenges, we propose Adaptive Chance-constrained Safeguards (ACS), an adaptive, model-free safe RL algorithm using the safety recovery rate as a surrogate chance constraint to iteratively ensure safety during exploration and after achieving convergence. Theoretical analysis indicates that the relaxed probabilistic constraint sufficiently guarantees forward invariance to the safe set. And extensive experiments conducted on both simulated and real-world safety-critical tasks demonstrate its effectiveness in enforcing safety (nearly zero-violation) while preserving optimality (+23.8%), robustness, and fast response in stochastic real-world settings.

When a robot autonomously performs a complex task, it frequently must balance competing objectives while maintaining safety. This becomes more difficult in uncertain environments with stochastic outcomes. Enhancing transparency in the robot's behavior and aligning with user preferences are also crucial. This paper introduces a novel framework for multi-objective reinforcement learning that ensures safe task execution, optimizes trade-offs between objectives, and adheres to user preferences. The framework has two main layers: a multi-objective task planner and a high-level selector. The planning layer generates a set of optimal trade-off plans that guarantee satisfaction of a temporal logic task. The selector uses active inference to decide which generated plan best complies with user preferences and aids learning. Operating iteratively, the framework updates a parameterized learning model based on collected data. Case studies and benchmarks on both manipulation and mobile robots show that our framework outperforms other methods and (i) learns multiple optimal trade-offs, (ii) adheres to a user preference, and (iii) allows the user to adjust the balance between (i) and (ii).

Primal-dual safe RL methods commonly perform iterations between the primal update of the policy and the dual update of the Lagrange Multiplier. Such a training paradigm is highly susceptible to the error in cumulative cost estimation since this estimation serves as the key bond connecting the primal and dual update processes. We show that this problem causes significant underestimation of cost when using off-policy methods, leading to the failure to satisfy the safety constraint. To address this issue, we propose conservative policy optimization, which learns a policy in a constraint-satisfying area by considering the uncertainty in cost estimation. This improves constraint satisfaction but also potentially hinders reward maximization. We then introduce local policy convexification to help eliminate such suboptimality by gradually reducing the estimation uncertainty. We provide theoretical interpretations of the joint coupling effect of these two ingredients and further verify them by extensive experiments. Results on benchmark tasks show that our method not only achieves an asymptotic performance comparable to state-of-the-art on-policy methods while using much fewer samples, but also significantly reduces constraint violation during training. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZifanWu/CAL.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Modern preference alignment techniques, such as Best-of-N (BoN) sampling, rely on reward models trained with pairwise comparison data. While effective at learning relative preferences, this paradigm fails to capture a signal of response acceptability, leaving systems vulnerable to selecting the least bad of many unacceptable options. This is particularly problematic for hard prompts, where the risk of such false acceptances increases with the number of samples. In this paper, we address this critical reliability gap by introducing a new data collection and modeling framework. By augmenting preference data with an outside option, inspired by discrete choice models, we train a reward model that can distinguish not just what is better, but what is good enough. We leverage this capability to create an adaptive inference strategy, best of mini-N in-loop, which partitions the generation budget into sequential loops with a calibrated, early-exit condition. Our experiments show that when tuned as an alignment guardrail, it reduces reliability failures by 70\%, and when tuned as an inference accelerator, it improves average inference speed by over 22\% in IMDB-sentiment setting. We thus provide a principled and flexible framework for practitioners to explicitly manage the trade-off between reliability and computational efficiency.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

In many applications of Reinforcement Learning (RL), it is critically important that the algorithm performs safely, such that instantaneous hard constraints are satisfied at each step, and unsafe states and actions are avoided. However, existing algorithms for ''safe'' RL are often designed under constraints that either require expected cumulative costs to be bounded or assume all states are safe. Thus, such algorithms could violate instantaneous hard constraints and traverse unsafe states (and actions) in practice. Therefore, in this paper, we develop the first near-optimal safe RL algorithm for episodic Markov Decision Processes with unsafe states and actions under instantaneous hard constraints and the linear mixture model. It not only achieves a regret O(d H^3 sqrt{dK}{Delta_c}) that tightly matches the state-of-the-art regret in the setting with only unsafe actions and nearly matches that in the unconstrained setting, but is also safe at each step, where d is the feature-mapping dimension, K is the number of episodes, H is the number of steps in each episode, and Delta_c is a safety-related parameter. We also provide a lower bound Omega(max{dH K, H{Delta_c^2}}), which indicates that the dependency on Delta_c is necessary. Further, both our algorithm design and regret analysis involve several novel ideas, which may be of independent interest.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more prevalent, concerns about their safety, ethics, and potential biases have risen. Systematically evaluating LLMs' risk decision-making tendencies and attitudes, particularly in the ethical domain, has become crucial. This study innovatively applies the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale from cognitive science to LLMs and proposes a novel Ethical Decision-Making Risk Attitude Scale (EDRAS) to assess LLMs' ethical risk attitudes in depth. We further propose a novel approach integrating risk scales and role-playing to quantitatively evaluate systematic biases in LLMs. Through systematic evaluation and analysis of multiple mainstream LLMs, we assessed the "risk personalities" of LLMs across multiple domains, with a particular focus on the ethical domain, and revealed and quantified LLMs' systematic biases towards different groups. This research helps understand LLMs' risk decision-making and ensure their safe and reliable application. Our approach provides a tool for identifying and mitigating biases, contributing to fairer and more trustworthy AI systems. The code and data are available.

This research presents a framework for quantitative risk management in volatile markets, specifically focusing on expectile-based methodologies applied to the FTSE 100 index. Traditional risk measures such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) have demonstrated significant limitations during periods of market stress, as evidenced during the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent volatile periods. This study develops an advanced expectile-based framework that addresses the shortcomings of conventional quantile-based approaches by providing greater sensitivity to tail losses and improved stability in extreme market conditions. The research employs a dataset spanning two decades of FTSE 100 returns, incorporating periods of high volatility, market crashes, and recovery phases. Our methodology introduces novel mathematical formulations for expectile regression models, enhanced threshold determination techniques using time series analysis, and robust backtesting procedures. The empirical results demonstrate that expectile-based Value-at-Risk (EVaR) consistently outperforms traditional VaR measures across various confidence levels and market conditions. The framework exhibits superior performance during volatile periods, with reduced model risk and enhanced predictive accuracy. Furthermore, the study establishes practical implementation guidelines for financial institutions and provides evidence-based recommendations for regulatory compliance and portfolio management. The findings contribute significantly to the literature on financial risk management and offer practical tools for practitioners dealing with volatile market environments.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

Portfolio Selection is an important real-world financial task and has attracted extensive attention in artificial intelligence communities. This task, however, has two main difficulties: (i) the non-stationary price series and complex asset correlations make the learning of feature representation very hard; (ii) the practicality principle in financial markets requires controlling both transaction and risk costs. Most existing methods adopt handcraft features and/or consider no constraints for the costs, which may make them perform unsatisfactorily and fail to control both costs in practice. In this paper, we propose a cost-sensitive portfolio selection method with deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, a novel two-stream portfolio policy network is devised to extract both price series patterns and asset correlations, while a new cost-sensitive reward function is developed to maximize the accumulated return and constrain both costs via reinforcement learning. We theoretically analyze the near-optimality of the proposed reward, which shows that the growth rate of the policy regarding this reward function can approach the theoretical optimum. We also empirically evaluate the proposed method on real-world datasets. Promising results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method in terms of profitability, cost-sensitivity and representation abilities.

We consider the distributionally robust optimization (DRO) problem with spectral risk-based uncertainty set and f-divergence penalty. This formulation includes common risk-sensitive learning objectives such as regularized condition value-at-risk (CVaR) and average top-k loss. We present Prospect, a stochastic gradient-based algorithm that only requires tuning a single learning rate hyperparameter, and prove that it enjoys linear convergence for smooth regularized losses. This contrasts with previous algorithms that either require tuning multiple hyperparameters or potentially fail to converge due to biased gradient estimates or inadequate regularization. Empirically, we show that Prospect can converge 2-3times faster than baselines such as stochastic gradient and stochastic saddle-point methods on distribution shift and fairness benchmarks spanning tabular, vision, and language domains.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model can do - its capabilities - without assessing what it would do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that propensity - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present PropensityBench, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

We consider a sequential decision making problem where the agent faces the environment characterized by the stochastic discrete events and seeks an optimal intervention policy such that its long-term reward is maximized. This problem exists ubiquitously in social media, finance and health informatics but is rarely investigated by the conventional research in reinforcement learning. To this end, we present a novel framework of the model-based reinforcement learning where the agent's actions and observations are asynchronous stochastic discrete events occurring in continuous-time. We model the dynamics of the environment by Hawkes process with external intervention control term and develop an algorithm to embed such process in the Bellman equation which guides the direction of the value gradient. We demonstrate the superiority of our method in both synthetic simulator and real-world problem.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

Optimization (PPO) has been positioned by recent literature as the canonical method for the RL part of RLHF. PPO performs well empirically but has a heuristic motivation and handles the KL-divergence constraint used in LM-RLHF in an ad-hoc manner and suffers form reward oscillations, entropy collapse, value function drift, and sudden policy divergence that require frequent restarts and extensive hyperparameter tuning. In this paper, we develop a new pure on policy actor-critic RL method for the LM-RLHF setting. We present SAFE (Stable Alignment Finetuning with Entropy-aware control),a novel RLHF algorithm that combines a Double Soft-Min Critic for pessimistic value estimation with a new multi-layer stabilization framework combining entropy-gated KL regulation, and PID-controlled adaptive thresholds. Unlike standard PPO's symmetric KL penalties, SAFE distinguishes high-entropy exploration from low-entropy mode collapse and adjusts penalties dynamically based on reward velocity. Experiments on a 3B parameter model show SAFE achieves +5.15\% training-average reward than PPO (0.725 vs 0.689), negligible reward crashes, and superior KL control than ppo . Our method adds minimal computational overhead and provides an interpretable, crash-resistant RLHF framework that maintains aggressive learning speed while ensuring stable long-horizon optimization suitable for production deployment. Code is available at https://github.com/ryyzn9/SAFE

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Existing approaches to language model alignment often treat safety as a tradeoff against helpfulness, which can lead to unacceptable responses in sensitive domains. To ensure reliable performance in such settings, we propose High-Confidence Safe Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (HC-RLHF), a method that provides high-confidence safety guarantees while maximizing helpfulness. Similar to previous methods, HC-RLHF explicitly decouples human preferences into helpfulness and harmlessness (safety), which are learned by training a reward model and a cost model, respectively. It then employs a two-step process to find safe solutions. In the first step, it optimizes the reward function under an intentionally pessimistic version of the cost constraint. In the second step, the trained model undergoes a safety test to verify whether its performance stays within an upper-confidence bound of the actual cost constraint. We provide a theoretical analysis of HC-RLHF, including proof that it will not return an unsafe solution with a probability greater than a user-specified threshold. For our empirical analysis, we apply HC-RLHF to align three different language models (Qwen2-1.5B, Qwen2.5-3B, and LLaMa3.2-3B) with human preferences. Our results demonstrate that HC-RLHF produces safe models with high probability and can improve harmlessness and helpfulness compared to previous methods.

The explosion in the use of software in important sociotechnical systems has renewed focus on the study of the way technical constructs reflect policies, norms, and human values. This effort requires the engagement of scholars and practitioners from many disciplines. And yet, these disciplines often conceptualize the operative values very differently while referring to them using the same vocabulary. The resulting conflation of ideas confuses discussions about values in technology at disciplinary boundaries. In the service of improving this situation, this paper examines the value of shared vocabularies, analytics, and other tools that facilitate conversations about values in light of these disciplinary specific conceptualizations, the role such tools play in furthering research and practice, outlines different conceptions of "fairness" deployed in discussions about computer systems, and provides an analytic tool for interdisciplinary discussions and collaborations around the concept of fairness. We use a case study of risk assessments in criminal justice applications to both motivate our effort--describing how conflation of different concepts under the banner of "fairness" led to unproductive confusion--and illustrate the value of the fairness analytic by demonstrating how the rigorous analysis it enables can assist in identifying key areas of theoretical, political, and practical misunderstanding or disagreement, and where desired support alignment or collaboration in the absence of consensus.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

We study distributionally robust expected values under optimal transport distance with a quadratic cost function. In general the duality method, for this computation for the payoff function f, requires the computation of the λc-transform f^{λc}. We show that under the quadratic cost function there exists an intuitive and easily implementable representation of f^{λc}, if f is convex and piecewise linear. We apply this to the robust expected shortfall under the risk-neutral measure of an unhedged call option, from the point of view of the writer, as well as that of a portfolio mixing underlying shares with a call and a put option.

The exploration-exploitation (EE) trade-off is a central challenge in reinforcement learning (RL) for large language models (LLMs). With Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), training tends to be exploitation driven: entropy decreases monotonically, samples convergence, and exploration fades. Most existing fixes are sample-centric: they seek or bonus rare samples, assuming exploration comes from novel trajectories and tokens. These heuristics depend on the "luck" of informative samples, lack principled control of the policy, and often yield limited or inconsistent gains. In this work, we are the first to introduce a distribution-centric perspective for RL, in which exploration is always guided by a "better" target distribution, and reveal that a policy's ability to resist entropy collapse is governed by the distribution itself rather than individual samples. Building on this insight, we propose Distribution-Centric Policy Optimization (DCPO), which reformulates entropy regulation as distribution-level regularization. DCPO achieves controllable entropy fully on-policy without sampling from external distributions, enabling efficient exploration while maintaining training stability. Across multiple models and seven benchmarks, DCPO improves over GRPO by about 20\% on average. Overall, DCPO replaces sample-level heuristics with distribution-level principles, offering a theoretically grounded and flexible framework for controllable exploration and a stronger EE trade-off. The code is available in https://github.com/597358816/DCPO.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

In dynamic programming (DP) and reinforcement learning (RL), an agent learns to act optimally in terms of expected long-term return by sequentially interacting with its environment modeled by a Markov decision process (MDP). More generally in distributional reinforcement learning (DRL), the focus is on the whole distribution of the return, not just its expectation. Although DRL-based methods produced state-of-the-art performance in RL with function approximation, they involve additional quantities (compared to the non-distributional setting) that are still not well understood. As a first contribution, we introduce a new class of distributional operators, together with a practical DP algorithm for policy evaluation, that come with a robust MDP interpretation. Indeed, our approach reformulates through an augmented state space where each state is split into a worst-case substate and a best-case substate, whose values are maximized by safe and risky policies respectively. Finally, we derive distributional operators and DP algorithms solving a new control task: How to distinguish safe from risky optimal actions in order to break ties in the space of optimal policies?

Conventional wisdom suggests that neural network predictions tend to be unpredictable and overconfident when faced with out-of-distribution (OOD) inputs. Our work reassesses this assumption for neural networks with high-dimensional inputs. Rather than extrapolating in arbitrary ways, we observe that neural network predictions often tend towards a constant value as input data becomes increasingly OOD. Moreover, we find that this value often closely approximates the optimal constant solution (OCS), i.e., the prediction that minimizes the average loss over the training data without observing the input. We present results showing this phenomenon across 8 datasets with different distributional shifts (including CIFAR10-C and ImageNet-R, S), different loss functions (cross entropy, MSE, and Gaussian NLL), and different architectures (CNNs and transformers). Furthermore, we present an explanation for this behavior, which we first validate empirically and then study theoretically in a simplified setting involving deep homogeneous networks with ReLU activations. Finally, we show how one can leverage our insights in practice to enable risk-sensitive decision-making in the presence of OOD inputs.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

Risk parity, also known as equal risk contribution, has recently gained increasing attention as a portfolio allocation method. However, solving portfolio weights must resort to numerical methods as the analytic solution is not available. This study improves two existing iterative methods: the cyclical coordinate descent (CCD) and Newton methods. We enhance the CCD method by simplifying the formulation using a correlation matrix and imposing an additional rescaling step. We also suggest an improved initial guess inspired by the CCD method for the Newton method. Numerical experiments show that the improved CCD method performs the best and is approximately three times faster than the original CCD method, saving more than 40% of the iterations.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has demonstrated great promise in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preference. Depending on the availability of preference data, both online and offline RLHF are active areas of investigation. A key bottleneck is understanding how to incorporate uncertainty estimation in the reward function learned from the preference data for RLHF, regardless of how the preference data is collected. While the principles of optimism or pessimism under uncertainty are well-established in standard reinforcement learning (RL), a practically-implementable and theoretically-grounded form amenable to large language models is not yet available, as standard techniques for constructing confidence intervals become intractable under arbitrary policy parameterizations. In this paper, we introduce a unified approach to online and offline RLHF -- value-incentivized preference optimization (VPO) -- which regularizes the maximum-likelihood estimate of the reward function with the corresponding value function, modulated by a sign to indicate whether the optimism or pessimism is chosen. VPO also directly optimizes the policy with implicit reward modeling, and therefore shares a simpler RLHF pipeline similar to direct preference optimization. Theoretical guarantees of VPO are provided for both online and offline settings, matching the rates of their standard RL counterparts. Moreover, experiments on text summarization and dialog verify the practicality and effectiveness of VPO.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Reinforcement learning has become a cornerstone technique for developing reasoning models in complex tasks, ranging from mathematical problem-solving to imaginary reasoning. The optimization of these models typically relies on policy gradient methods, whose efficacy hinges on the accurate estimation of an advantage function. However, prevailing methods typically employ static advantage estimation, a practice that leads to inefficient credit assignment by neglecting the dynamic utility of training samples over time. This limitation results in suboptimal policy updates, which in turn manifest as slower convergence rates and increased learning instability, as models fail to adapt to evolving sample utilities effectively. To address this problem, we introduce ADORA (Advantage Dynamics via Online Rollout Adaptation), a novel framework for policy optimization. ADORA dynamically adjusts the advantage function's weighting by adaptively categorizing training data into temporarily advantageous and disadvantageous samples, based on their evolving utility during online model rollouts. This tailored data differentiation strategy allows ADORA to be seamlessly integrated into existing policy optimization algorithms without significant architectural modifications, enabling the policy to prioritize learning from more informative experiences and thereby achieve more efficient policy updates. Extensive evaluations across diverse model families and varying data scales demonstrate that ADORA is a robust and efficient framework. It significantly enhances long reasoning in both geometric and mathematical tasks, consistently achieving notable performance gains without requiring sensitive hyperparameter tuning.

This paper claims that machine learning (ML) largely overlooks an important facet of general intelligence: robustness to a qualitatively unknown future in an open world. Such robustness relates to Knightian uncertainty (KU) in economics, i.e. uncertainty that cannot be quantified, which is excluded from consideration in ML's key formalisms. This paper aims to identify this blind spot, argue its importance, and catalyze research into addressing it, which we believe is necessary to create truly robust open-world AI. To help illuminate the blind spot, we contrast one area of ML, reinforcement learning (RL), with the process of biological evolution. Despite staggering ongoing progress, RL still struggles in open-world situations, often failing under unforeseen situations. For example, the idea of zero-shot transferring a self-driving car policy trained only in the US to the UK currently seems exceedingly ambitious. In dramatic contrast, biological evolution routinely produces agents that thrive within an open world, sometimes even to situations that are remarkably out-of-distribution (e.g. invasive species; or humans, who do undertake such zero-shot international driving). Interestingly, evolution achieves such robustness without explicit theory, formalisms, or mathematical gradients. We explore the assumptions underlying RL's typical formalisms, showing how they limit RL's engagement with the unknown unknowns characteristic of an ever-changing complex world. Further, we identify mechanisms through which evolutionary processes foster robustness to novel and unpredictable challenges, and discuss potential pathways to algorithmically embody them. The conclusion is that the intriguing remaining fragility of ML may result from blind spots in its formalisms, and that significant gains may result from direct confrontation with the challenge of KU.

Excellent tail performance is crucial for modern machine learning tasks, such as algorithmic fairness, class imbalance, and risk-sensitive decision making, as it ensures the effective handling of challenging samples within a dataset. Tail performance is also a vital determinant of success for personalized recommender systems to reduce the risk of losing users with low satisfaction. This study introduces a "safe" collaborative filtering method that prioritizes recommendation quality for less-satisfied users rather than focusing on the average performance. Our approach minimizes the conditional value at risk (CVaR), which represents the average risk over the tails of users' loss. To overcome computational challenges for web-scale recommender systems, we develop a robust yet practical algorithm that extends the most scalable method, implicit alternating least squares (iALS). Empirical evaluation on real-world datasets demonstrates the excellent tail performance of our approach while maintaining competitive computational efficiency.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

Detecting AI risks becomes more challenging as stronger models emerge and find novel methods such as Alignment Faking to circumvent these detection attempts. Inspired by how risky behaviors in humans (i.e., illegal activities that may hurt others) are sometimes guided by strongly-held values, we believe that identifying values within AI models can be an early warning system for AI's risky behaviors. We create LitmusValues, an evaluation pipeline to reveal AI models' priorities on a range of AI value classes. Then, we collect AIRiskDilemmas, a diverse collection of dilemmas that pit values against one another in scenarios relevant to AI safety risks such as Power Seeking. By measuring an AI model's value prioritization using its aggregate choices, we obtain a self-consistent set of predicted value priorities that uncover potential risks. We show that values in LitmusValues (including seemingly innocuous ones like Care) can predict for both seen risky behaviors in AIRiskDilemmas and unseen risky behaviors in HarmBench.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.